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by  the  Commission  of  the  European  Economic  Community 
I.  In October 1963 the Commission asked a group 
of  independent  experts  to  study,  from  the  point  of 
view  of economic theory,  certain problems regarding 
tariff  systems  for  transport  services  and  charging 
policy  for  the  use  of  infrastructures.  The  Com-
mission's  work  in  these  two  fields,  and  discussions 
at both  national  and  Community level,  had  revealed 
the  need  for  thorough  examination  of  various 
questions.  In  the  matter  of  transport  services,  the 
criteria  for  fixing  tariffs  had to  be  investigated,  and 
in  the  matter of  infrastructures,  the  knotty  problem 
of apportioning their costs. 
//.  The Committee of experts was  as  follows: 
Professor Maurice  Allais,  National School of Mines, 
Paris  (Chairman); 
Professor  Mario  Del  Viscovo,  University  of  Bari; 
Professor  Louis  Duquesne  de  la  Vinelle,  Catholic 
University of Louvain, Adviser to  the EEC Commis-
sion; 
Professor Coenraad J an Oort, University of Utrecht; 
Professor  Hellmuth  Stefan  Seidenfus,  University  of 
Munster. 
Ill.  The  work  of  the  group  took  nearly  a  year. 
The report  it  rendered  to  the  Commission  is  essen-
tially  an exhaustive economic analysis of some of the 
chief  problems  of  transport  policy.  The  report 
contains  no  final  conclusions  but  is  particularly 
concerned  with  demonstrating  the  elements  of  the 
problems  and  with  critically  examining  the  various 
possible  solutions. 
IV.  It  must  be  emphasized  that  the  Committee 
could  not  study  all  the  problems  of  tariff  policy 
which  may  arise.  It had  to  limit  its  analysis  to  a 
situation  governed  by  the  two  hypotheses  of  full 
employment  and  relatively  steady  economic  growth, 
considering  that  problems  likely  to  arise  during 
9 
recessions  or depressions,  and  the specific  measures 
of  transport  policy  which  might  be  necessary  to 
solve them, should be the subject of another, separate 
study.  Hence  the  Committee  has  not  been  able 
to  do  more  than  mention  questions  concerning 
passenger  transport,  although  it  has  indicated  that 
the  various  options  for  goods  transport  are  mainly 
applicable to passenger transport as  well. 
V.  It  goes  without  saying  that  the  opm10ns 
expressed in  the report are  those of its  authors only, 
and  that  its  distribution  does  not  mean  that  the 
Commission  is  responsible  for  the  arguments  devel-
oped in  it.  Nevertheless,  the Commission  considers 
that this  work is  a  very  valuable  contribution to  the 
study  of  the  fundamental  problems  of  transport 
economy,  and one to which reference may profitably 
be  made  for  solutions  to  problems  arising  in 
implementing  the  common  transport  policy. 
However,  as  the  authors of the report have explicitly 
stated,  the  final  choices are necessarily political ones 
which  cannot be based solely on economic consider-
ations. '  In  the  making  of  these  choices,  aims  may 
play  a  part which  do  not come within  the  province 
of  economics  - notably  political  and  social  aims. 
Moreover, the choices will  depend on the possibilities 
of  implementing  them,  and  on  the  practical  conse-
quences  of  the  various  options. 
VI.  The Commission  wishes  to  express  its  warm 
thanks to  the authors of the report for the important 
contribution they have made to the study of transport 
policy (1),  and  it is  pleased  to  be able to  inaugurate 
its  new  series  of  studies  on  transport  with  their 
work. 
(')  The  members  of the  Committee have  kindly  undertaken 
to check the translations, in  their respective mother tongues, 
of  the  report,  of  which  only  the  French  version  was  offi-
cially  adopted  by  the  Committee. GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 
THE  GENERAL CONCEPTION OF  THE REPORT 
1 
The  primary  object  is  to  study  the  possible  bases 
for a common transport policy, with special reference 
to  the formation of prices for using infrastructure and 
for  transport  services. 
2 
The  task  of  the  Committee  of  independent  experts 
was  defined  as  follows  under  the  title  "Terms  of 
reference for  the study of options in  a rational tariff 
policy for transport": 
3 
"The Committee's  task is  to  inform  the Commission 
of  the  European Economic  Community  as  fully  as 
possible  on  the  problems  of  orientating  and  imple-
menting  a  tariff  policy,  in the  widest  sense,  in  the 
context  of  the  Community's  common  transport 
policy.  Both  the  general  principles  of  a  rational 
policy  of  transport  rates  and  a  rational  policy  of 
charges  for  the  use  of  infrastructures  are  to  be 
defined. 
4 
"The  Committee  is  to list  and describe  the  various 
choices open to ensure a rational policy on transport 
rates  and  the  charges  to  be  imposed  on  the  users 
of infrastructure, taking into account both the actual 
situation  of transport from  the  structural  and  insti-
tutional angles  and the teachings of pure and applied 
economic  theory. 
5 
"Very special  attention  will  have  to  be paid  to  the 
implications  of  the  various  options  and  to  the 
possibilities  of applying  them  in  practice.  Further-
more,  for  each  tariff  system  chosen  the  nature  and 
timing  of the measures to  ensure the transition from 
the present to the final  situation should be indicated. 
In conclusion, it will  be necessary to show how each 
system  should  fit  into  the  overall  transport  policy, 
in particular from the poind of view of co-ordination 
of investment  in  infrastructure. 
6 
"The  Committee  is  entirely  free  to  take  up  any 
question not directly concerned with  policy on tariffs 
or charges if it considers this will  help it in  carrying 
out  its  task. 
7 
'Finally,  the  Committee  will  be  well  advised  to 
consult the  documents  on  common  transport  policy 
drawn up by  the  Commission, on the understanding 
11 
that  the  opmwns  expressed  in  such  documents  do 
not in any way restrict its  freedom  to  deal  with  the 
problems concerned in the  manner it considers most 
suitable." 
8 
In  verbal  comments  on  their  terms  of  reference  it 
was  made clear to  the Committee members that they 
were  being  consulted  essentially  as  economists,  and 
that,  with  regard  to  the  various  points  specified, 
their chief task was  to explain the content and scope 
of  economic  theory  on  the  transport  industry  in 
general,  and in particular to study whether economic 
theory  affords  a  valid  solution  for  fixing  the  upper 
and  lower  limits  of tariffs,  and  which  of the  many 
concepts  of  costs  discussed  should  be  taken  into 
consideration.  Finally,  they  were  asked  how  a 
coherent  and  rational  policy  on  charges  for  the 
utilization  of infrastructures  could  be  defined.  All 
these  questions  were  to  be  considered  primarily  as 
regards  the transport of goods. 
9 
Lastly, it was clearly specified that the final decision 
would  necessarily  take  account,  in  addition  to  the 
strictly  economic  aspects,  of  quite  a  number  of 
non-economic  objectives,  but  that  it  would  not'  be 
part  of  the  experts'  task  to  choose  among  these. 
They  were  at  confine  themselves  to  examining  the 
implications of economic theory.  The present report 
was  planned  in  the  light  of  the  terms  of  reference 
thus  interpreted. 
10 
The authors  hope to  make  a  useful  contribution to 
working  out a  common  transport  policy  by  submi~­
ting  its  main  features  to  a  thorough  economic 
analysis.  But,  as  will  be  explained  later,  su.ch  an 
analysis  cannot  claim  to  be  the  last  word  m  the 
great  debate  on  this  common  policy. 
11 
The authors  are conscious  of their debt to  the very 
many  studies  which  have  preceded  theirs,  not only 
at Community level but also on the national plane (1). 
12 
They are convinced that they are continuing the line 
of  development  traced  out  in  all  these  studies.  I~ 
particular,  the  conclusions  emerging  from  theu 
(')  More  particularly  the  European  P~rliament's  reports 
and  discussions  on  transport,  the  basic  .d~cuments  and 
proposals  submitted  by  the  EEC  Commissw~,  and  the 
various  studies  carried  out  in  each  of  the  SIX  member 
countries. analysis are in the spirit of the policy proposals made 
previously. 
13 
The  report make  no  formal  recommendations  laying 
down  a  policy.  Although  the  economic  analysis 
leads  to  a  number of suggestions,  these  are not final 
conclusions but general lines of approach, the definite 
choice between which remains open.  This restriction 
is  necessary  for  two  reasons. 
14 
The  first  is  that  the  data  available  on  some  points 
seem  inadequate.  This  applies  especially  to  the 
real  conditions  and  effects  of  competition  in  the 
market for transport services, particularly with regard 
to  the  dangers  of  abuse  of  dominant  positions  and 
of  uneconomic  competition.  It  is  because  of  such 
inadequate  information  that  the  approach  suggested 
throughout this  report is  essentially a pragmatic one. 
15 
The  second  reason  concerns  the  objectives  of  the 
transport  policy.  By  definition,  economic  analysis 
recognizes  only  strictly  economic  criteria,  i.e.  those 
which  define  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources  as 
a  function  of  preferences  considered  as  given.  But 
other  objectives,  may  be,  and  in  practice  often  are, 
imposed  on  transport  policy.  In  fact  this  policy 
is  traditionally  the  point  where  numerous  int'erests, 
differing  opinions,  and  social  as  well  as  political 
objectives  meet.  The  authors,  who  were  consulted 
mainly  as  economists,  are  inclined  to  consider  the 
economic  aspects,  in  the sense  of optimum resource 
allocation, as particularly important; but other consid-
erations  can,  in  fact  must,  influence  the  final 
decisions  on  transport  policy.  In the  last  analysis, 
therefore, the final  choice will  be a political one and 
inevitably based on a certain weighting of the various 
possible  objectives  of  transport  policy. 
CRITERIA  FOR  AN OPTIMUM ALLOCATION 
OF  RESOURCES 
16 
The  concept  of  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources, 
which  will  be  used  throughout  as  the  principal 
criterion and is  therefore of basic importance for the 
whole  analysis,  can  give  rise  to  erroneous  interpre-
tations.  Although the first part of the report recapi-
tulates  all  the  main  findings  of  economic  theory  as 
applied  to  transport,  a  few  brief  comments  in  this 
introduction  may  well  be  useful,  in  order  to  avoid 
any  confusion  regarding  what  we  mean  here  by 
optimum  resource  allocation. 
17 
First  of  all,  the  criterion  "optimum  resource  alloca-
tion" does  not in  itself imply one particular situation 
12 
for the economy as  a whole.  It implies only a num-
ber  of  conditions  which  must  be  fulfilled  if  the 
economy  is  to  function  efficiently,  i.e.  if  it  is  to 
avoid  a  situation in  which the community concerned 
has  a  lower  level  of  welfare  than  it  cou Id  have 
obtained  if  these  conditions  had  been  fulfilled, 
irrespective  of  how  this  level  of  welfare  is  defined. 
In  other words,  the  conditions  corresponding  to  an 
optimum  allocation  of  resources  define  the  border 
between  all  the  levels  of  welfare  which  can  be 
attained with the existing resources of the community 
and  those  which  cannot  be  thus  obtained.  Any 
position  within  of this  border is  inefficient  and  any 
position beyond is  impossible, but all positions on the 
border  consonant  with  the  general  objective  of  an 
optimum  allocation  of  resources.  Consequently, 
there  is  no  contradiction per se  between the  general 
criterion  of  optimum  resource  allocation  and  the 
objective  of  maximum  social  welfare  in  the  fullest 
meaning of this term, whatever its  precise definition. 
In fact  the  latter  is  one of the objectives  which  can 
be  achieved  by  optimum  allocation  of  resources. 
18 
It is  often  claimed  that  the  general  criterion  of an 
optimum  allocadon  of  resources  merely  implies 
certain  rules  of  market  organization  (in  particular 
with  respect  to  the  price  system),  considered  as  an 
end  in  themselves  and  not  as  a  means.  It is  added 
that these rules could be in conflict with such general 
objectives  of  social  and  economic  policy  as  full 
employment,  steady  economic  growth,  stability  of 
the  general  price  level,  development  of  backward 
regions  and  an  equitable  distribution  of income. 
19 
The  relations  between  these  various  objectives  will 
be examined briefly in Chapter 21, but we  may state 
already,  at  this  point,  that  in  general  no  conflict  of 
the  sort  exists.  The  general  criterion  of  optimum 
allocation  of  resources  simply  requires  a  maximum 
performance  of  the  economy,  irrespective  of  the 
objectives  pursued.  Consequently,  it  implies  full 
employment  and  steady economic  growth.  And,  in 
so  far  as  price  stability  and  the  development  of 
backward  regions  help  the  long-term  development 
of the economy  as  a  whole,  they too are implied by 
an  optimum  allocation of resources. 
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However,  the  theory  of  optimum  allocation  of 
resources  as  usually  presented  suggests  criteria  and 
methods  which  are  strictly  valid  only  under  well-
defined  hypothese  and  may  perhaps  not  be relevant 
when  certain  objectives,  for  instance  a  particular 
distribution  of  income,  are  pursued.  But  this  does 
not mean that there is  necessarily a conflict between 
the  different  objectives  which  may  be  pursued  and 
the criteria and methods which can be deduced from the  now  classic  theory  of  optimum  resource  alloca-
tion.  Often  these  objectives  can  be  attained  by 
means  which  are  not  incompatible  with  maximum 
economic efficiency,  and often also  they can be fully 
achieved  only  if  there  is  optimum  allocation  of 
resources. 
21 
Whatever  limitations  the  theory  may  have  in  its 
present  form,  it  constitutes  an  indispensable  analyt-
ical  instrument  for  defining  a  rational  transport 
policy.  With  its  aid  we  can  distinguish  between 
those  proposals  which  really  imply  optimum  alloca-
tion  of resources  and those  which  are only  arbitrary 
conventions  subject  to  discussion  and  modification. 
FIELD  OF  APPLICATION OF  THE  REPORT 
22 
This  report mainly studies the problems of optimum 
allocation  of  resources  in  the  specific  field  of trans-
port.  Hence,  examination of the general  aspects  of 
such  allocation,  e.g.  full  employment,  steady 
economic  growth  and  price  stability  - general 
objectives of overall policy which concern all  sectors 
of the  economy -· are  clearly  outside its  scope. 
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However,  there  are  certain  links  between  these 
general  economic  objectives  and  transport  policy. 
The  various  sectors  of  the  economy,  including 
transport,  are  subject  to  the requirements of macro-
economic  policy  and  can  be  its  instruments.  For 
instance,  measures  taken  by  the  public  authorities 
to  curb  inflation  may  serve  to  restrict  investments 
in  transport.  Measures  of  this  kind  can  obviously 
not  be  profitably  examined  in  the  limited  conte~t 
of transport policy,  since neither their aims  nor their 
methods  are  specific  to  transport. 
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But  there  is  another  aspect  of  the  links  between 
transport  and  the  economy  in  general  which  needs 
to  be  stressed.  The  criteria  of  optimum  resource 
allocation  may  call  for  different  transport  policies 
according  to  whether  the  economy  is  in  a  situation 
of full  employment  and  steady  growth or not.  The 
authors  have  confined  themselves  to  studying  the 
first  alternative.  At  the  present  stage  of  their 
discussions  they  feel  unable  to  say  whether  this 
limitation constitutes a serious defect.  Further study 
would  be  necessary  to  determine  whether,  and if  so 
on  what points, their conclusions should be  amend~d 
or  amplified  to  meet  the  case  of  an  economy  m 
absolute  or relative  decline.  It folows  thas  as  long 
as  no  such  study  has  been  made  these  conclusions 
can  be  valid  only  for  situations  of  full  employment 
and  relatively  steady  growth. 
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This  is  undoubtedly  a  very  serious  limitation.  Its 
existence  does  not,  of course,  mean  that  the authors 
consider  the  problems  of  a  recession  or  depression 
unimportant  or  unlikely  to  arise,  but  simply  that 
they  have  been  obliged  to  restrict  the  field  of  their 
investigations. 
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Important though  it  may  be,  this  limitation  does  not 
affect  the  conclusions  of  the  report  as  regards  a 
transport policy  if  the  two  general  conditions  of full 
employment and  steady growth  are  satisfied,  at  least 
approximately.  Periods  of  recession  or  depression 
bring  special  problems  calling  for  special  measures. 
There  is  no  reason  to  jeopardize  the  effective 
functioning  of  the  economy  by  applying  such 
measures  during  periods  of  full  employment  and 
economic  growth.  Moreover,  a  recession  or  a 
general  depression  would  call primarily for  measures 
of general  macroeconomic policy. 
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Since.  however,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  general 
macroeconomic  policy  will  always  be  able  to  elimi-
nate  serious  recessions  or depressions,  these  consid-
erations  in  no  way  reduce  the  importance  of  the 
limitations  which  the  hypothesis  of  full  employment 
imposes  on  the  conclusions  of  the  report.  Conse-
quently,  the  authors  strongly  recommend  that  a 
special  study  be  made  in  the  near  future  of  the 
implications  of  such  situations  for  transport  policy. 
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The  report  has  a  further  limitation.  It is  limited 
virtually  to  the  examination  of  "inland  transport", 
i.e.  the  railways,  road  haulage  and  inland  shipping, 
the  three  modes  of  transport  which  are  covered  by 
the common transport policy envisaged in  the Treaty 
of  Rome.  Other  modes  have  been  studied  only 
where  they  affect  policy  on  inland  transport. 
Finally,  outside the  area of infrastructure policy,  the 
study  deals  essentially  with  the  transport  of  goods, 
and  touches  only  incidentally  on  problems  of  pas-
senger  traffic. 
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All these limitations were imposed on the  authors by 
their  terms  of  reference,  and  by  the  need  to  submit 
the  report  within  a  specific  period,  which  obviously 
made it impossible to study every  aspect of transport 
policy. 
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The  need  to  observe  a  deadline  also  explains  wh) 
the  form  of  the  report  is  not  all  that  could  be 
desired.  For lack  of time  the  authors  were  obligee 
to  sacrifice form  to  efficiency and clarity. 31 
In  particular  this  requirement  explains  evident 
repetitions in the report, a joint work whose different 
chapters  were  written  at  different  times.  But  some 
repetition  is  inevitable.  Certain  questions  are  so 
complex  that  one  can  hardly grasp  them  completely 
without  examining  them  from  successive  points  of 
view.  To  enable  the  reader  to  find  easily  all  the 
passages  dealing  with  a  particular subject,  an  index 
has  been prepared which  is  as  complete  as  possible. 
Reference  should  be  made  to  this  index  if  it  is 
desired  to  get  a  very  clear  view  not  only  of  the 
fundamental  aspects  of  a  question  but  of  all  its 
implications. 
PLAN OF  THE REPORT 
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The report consists of three parts.  Part I enunciates 
economic  theory  as  it affects  transport.  Right from 
this  initial  stage  of  the  analysis  a  systematic 
distinction  is  made between infrastructure and trans-
port  services.  Infrastructure  is  shown  to  present 
certain distinct features  which  raise special problems 
both on the level  of economic theory and on that of 
practical  policy. 
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Part 11 deals with the criteria and options of transport 
policy.  After  a  brief  examination  of  economic, 
social  and  political  objectives  in  Chapter  21,  the 
criteria  of  optimum  resource  allocation,  as  worked 
out  on  a  theoretical  level  in  Part  I,  are  briefly 
summed  up  in  Chapter  22,  special  attention  being 
given  to  problems of optimum allocation  in  the case 
of infrastructures (Chapter 23).  In the final chapters 
of  Part  11  various  general  policy  options  will  be 
considered,  first'  for  infrastructure  and  then  for 
transport services.  The list  of options  studied  does 
not  claim  to  be  exhaustive;  it  is  limited  to  those 
which  seem  particularly  important  to  the  present 
discussions  on  transport  policy. 
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Part  Ill, "Analysis  of Various  Systems",  also  deals 
separately  with  infrastructure  and  with  transport 
services,  in  Chapters  31  and  32  respectively.  A 
third  chapter  deals  with  some  questions  of  an 
institutional nature, and a final one gives  the general 
line of approach suggested by the report.  This third 
part,  whose  limitations  are  evident,  analyses  only 
a restricted number of possible  systems.  Discussion 
of  these  is  sufficient  to bring  out the  factors  which 
have  to  be  considered  in  judging  any  of  the  large 
number of  systems  that can be obtained by combin-
ing  a  limited  number of  basic  variants. 
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Both  Part  I  and  the  most  important  chapters  of 
Parts  11  and  Ill  give  general  surveys  in  which  a 
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number  of  partial  conclusions  are  deduced  and 
defined.  These  surveys  are  made  purely  to  show 
the general line of reasoning of the report, and must 
not be read  in  isolation.  The  reader who  confines 
his  attention  to  them  alone  is  liable  to  fall  into 
misapprehension. 
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The  various  parts  and  even  individual  chapters  can 
be, to some extent, read independently.  This system 
involves obvious repetitions.  But in themselves such 
repetitions  have  real  advantages,  particularly  from 
the  practical  point of view,  for in  each chapter and 
even in each section discussion revolves round certain 
specific  aspects  of transport policy.  This procedure 
makes  it  possible  to  examine  each  of  these  aspects 
separately, as  well  as  the various links between them. 
OVERALL  PICTURE 
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The  report  does  not  give  definitive  and  detailed 
proposals for  pollicy.  Its essential  aim  is  to  analyse 
the  major  economic  aspects  of  transport  policy  in 
general  under  conditions  of  full  employment  and 
steady growth, and on this basis to examine a number 
of  systems  which  are  of  practical  importance. 
Although certain conclusions emerge, they are in the 
nature  of  a  critical  review  of the  economic  advan-
tages  and disadvantages of the various  solutions  and 
do  not in any way lead to definite choices, which, in 
any  case,  can  only  be made  in  the light  of factors 
largely outside the province of the report. 
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As  regards  infrastructure,  the  report  examines  a 
number of possible systems, which differ primarily in 
the  method  of  financing  the  expenditure  on  invest-
ment and operation.  The main question the authors 
were  instructed  to  study  was  that  of  the  prices  to 
be  charged  to  the  users  of  infrastructure.  Here, 
economic  theory supplies  a clear answer.  The cor-
rect procedure is  to charge prices which are calculat-
ed to lead to  an optimum utilization of existing infra-
structure.  Aparc  from  the  difficulties  of  applying 
this  solution - difficulties which could be overcome 
to  some  extent  by  approximative  procedures  - it 
will  be  shown  that  such  prices  would  in  general 
entail  a  deficit  and  that,  if  this  deficit  is  large,  it 
gives  rise  to  sedous  problems  of  practical  policy. 
Consequently  other  systems  will  be  considered,  all 
of  them  involving  additional  .charges  for  users. 
Since  none  of  these  systems  entirely  satisfies  the 
criteria of optimum resource allocation, their primary 
justification  is  institutional  and  sociological.  Eco-
nomic  factors  allone  are  an  insufficient  basis  for 
making  a  choice  between  the  system  suggested  by 
economic  theo-ry  and  the  group  of  systems  which impose  additional  charges  on  the  users  in  order  to 
meet the problems of the deficit.  This report leaves 
the  choice  open,  although  the  balance  of  economic 
advantages  and  disadvantages  is  obviously  not  the 
same  for  all  the systems  analysed. 
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Among  the  conclusions  on  infrastructure  which  the 
authors  put forward  with  some  confidence,  because 
they  do  not  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  various 
systems  envisaged,  there  is  one  which,  in  their 
opinion,  is  particularly important.  No  matter what 
price  system  is  adopted  for  use  of  infrastructure, 
there  must  be  a  procedure  for  co-ordinating  infra-
structure,  investments  at  the  regional,  national  or 
Community level, both within each mode of transport 
and  between  the  various  competing  modes.  This 
conclusion  follows  from  two  essential  features  of 
infrastructure: 
a)  The  infrastructure  of  each  mode  of  transport: 
forms  an  economic  unit  whose  various  parts  are 
obviously  closely  interdependent;  and 
b)  Infrastructure  is  subject  to  economic  indivi-
sibilities,  which  implies that every investment project 
will  have  repercussions  outside  the  sector  directly 
concerned,  particularly  on  investment  in  the  infra-
structures of competing modes of transport. 
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These  questions  are  elaborated  in  Chapter  31,  at 
the  end  of  which  a  general  view  is  given  of  the 
suggestions concerning infrastructure arising from the 
report. 
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The  economic  structure of the  market for  transport 
services  is  different  from  that  of  infrastructure.  A 
decentralized  system,  with  competition  between 
modes  of  transport  and  within  each  mode,  can 
generally  be  organized  (except  within  the  railways) 
but  is  only  desirable  where  it  is  not  likely  to  have 
harmful  consequences,  i.e.  where  there  is  neither 
abuse of dominant positions nor uneconomic compe-
tition. 
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The  facts  available  are  insufficient  for  a  judgment 
on the real frequency of abuse of dominant positions 
or of  uneconomic  competition,  but  the  authors  feel 
that  these  are  less  common today than they were in 
the  past,  when  the  railways  still  enjoyed  a  strong 
monopolistic  position  and  when  general  depressions 
caused  disturbances  throughout  the  whole  economy. 
However  this  may  be,  the  policy  suggested  by  the 
report  in  no  way  prejudices  the  final  assessment  of 
the  frequency  of  such  situations  and  is  absolutely 
independent  of  this  assessment. 
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In  view  of  the  differences  between  the  present 
transport  policies  of  the  various  Member  States  of 
the  European  Economic  Community,  inauguration 
of a  common  policy  will  require  a  period  of  adap-
tation  and  transition. 
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The common transport: policy suggested is  essentially 
pragmatic,  and  its  starting  point  is  the  existing 
situation.  Wherever  abuse  of  dominant  positions 
or uneconomic competition is  found,  the introduction 
of  appropriate  m1mmum  and  maximum  rates 
("forked  tariffs"  or  bracket  rates)  is  advocated. 
Where  such  situations  do  not  exist  but  approved 
fixed tariffs or bracket rates are nevertheless applied, 
restrictions  should  be  eased  by  replacing  the  fixed 
tariffs  by  bracket rates,  or by  widening the brackets 
where a  bracket rate system is  already in operation. 
Restrictions  would  thus  be progressively  reduced  in 
all  cases.  A  similar policy  is  suggested  for  dealing 
with  quantitative  restrictions. 
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Such  a  procedure  would  make  it possible  to  intro-
duce  the  common  transport  policy  without  further 
delay  and  without  the  need  to  define  a  priori and 
from  the  outset  the  systems  which  will  finally  be 
applied  to  each  category  of  transport  services. 
These  systems  would  result  gradually  from  expe-
rience. 
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The  problems  of  transport  policy  are  extremely 
complex,  and  present  very  many  aspects.  In  this 
report,  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  consider  the 
most  important  of  these  aspects.  If a  conclusion 
emerges it is that any efficient policy must necessarily 
be flexible  and take  account of the different specific 
cases.  In  such  a  field  there  is  no  universally 
applicable formula,  and  although  the policy  applied 
must  be coherent in  relation  to  the final  objectives, 
it  cannot be uniform. 
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It is  often  said  that  any  Community  organization 
of  transport should  always  entail the  application of 
uniform  principles  or even  rules,  whether  the situa-
tions  concerned  are  identical or not.  However,  the 
only  reasonable  solution  is  to  meet  the  various 
situations  by  applying  principles  and  rules  which 
permit  the  most  effective  attainment  of  the  general 
objectives. 
48 
To  conclude,  the  authors  of  this  report  emphasize 
that  they  are  perfectly  aware  of  the  shortcomings 
of their work,  as  regards  not only its  field  of appli-
cation  but  also  the  analyses  it contains. 49 
They  would  have  liked  more  time  to  improve  the 
presentation  and  go  more deeply  into  certain points, 
but one of their major concerns was  to  finish  within 
the  time-limit.  They  consider  this  report simply  as 
a  contribution  to  the  discussion  of  measures  to 
implement the common transport policy. 
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The  preparation  of  the  various  parts  of  the  report 
naturally led to broad exhanges of opinion and some-
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times  to  the  statement  of  opposing  points  of view. 
In  general,  the  discussions  led  to  fundamental 
agreement  between  the  members  of the  Committee 
on  the  essential  points.  Where  divergences  could 
not be reconciled the report expresses them  as  com-
pletely  as  possible. 
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The report is  submitted unanimously by the members 
of  the  Committee. PART  I 
THE THEORY  OF OPTIMUM  RESOURCE  ALLOCATION  AND 
ITS  APPLICATION  TO  TRANSPORT 
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The  aim  of  the  theory  of  optimum  resource  alloca-
tion  is  to  define  the  conditions  under  which  the 
economic  system  can  attain  maximum  efficiency. 
Economic  efficiency  cannot,  of  course,  constitute 
an  end  in  itself;  but  it  will  always  have  to  be  a 
consideration,  whatever  policy  may  be  pursued. 
It  is  therefore  very  important  that  the  conditions 
under which  an  optimum allocation of resources can 
be  achieved  should  be  well  understood. 
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In  Part  I  our  primary  purpose  is  to  present  an 
instrument  of  analysis;  its  application  has  been  left 
until  Parts  1I  and  Ill.  The  present  Part  will  serve 
to summarize those conclusions reached by the theory 
of optimum resource allocation that are of particular 
importance for  transport. 
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The complexity of this theory is  well  known.  How-
ever,  few  of  its  refinements  are  essential  for  the 
further  analysis  of  our  specific  object  of  inquiry: 
the  practical  application  of  the  theory  to 
transport policy.  Discussion of the reasoning under-
lying  the  various  propositions  of  the  theory  is 
obviously  outside  the  scope  of  this  report,  so  we 
shall  confine  ourselves  here  to  restating  those  pro-
positions,  and  the  assumptions  upon which  they  are 
based,  as  clearly  and  simply  as  possible (1).  When 
errors that are relatively important from  the practical 
point  of  view  have  been  or  might  be  made  in 
interpreting  the  theory,  we  shall  give  all  the  detail 
necessary. 
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In  Chapter  I 0  we  shall  define  and  analyse  the 
concept of  optimum  resource  allocation,  in  Chapter 
11  we  shall  set  out  the  conditions  that  must  be 
fulfilled  if  optimum  resource  allocation  is  to  be 
achieved,  in  Chapter  12  we  shall  examine  its  scope 
and  significance,  and  in  Chapter  13  we  shall  com-
ment  on  its  particular  implications  for  the  infra-
structure  of  transport. 
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We  have  deliberately  avoided  using  mathematical 
formulae (2).  This  is  not  to  say  that  we  were  not 
tempted  to  do  so;  but'  we  considered  that  in  our 
report the main emphasis should be laid on practical 
applications  and  that  the  aim  should  be  not  to 
prove  the  theory  but  to  summarize  its  principal 
results  in  language  that  can  be  easily  understood. 
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Some  repetitiOn  will  be  inevitable  for  the  sake  of 
clarity.  It would  be  only  too  easy  to  produce  an 
over-concentrated  report,  but  this  would  merely 
sacrifice  content  to  form  under  a  veneer  of pseudo-
clarity, concealing the essential facts behind formulae 
so  condensed  as  to  be  obscure. 
(')  For the  reasoning  behind  the  propositions,  see  the  liter-
ature  on  the  subject. 
(")  Except  in  a  few  cases. CHAPTER  10 
THE  CONCEPT  OF  OPTIMUM  RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
10.0- SITUATIONS  OF OPTIMUM 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
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The essential  aim  of the  theory of optimum resource 
allocation  is  to  see  how,  given  our present technical 
knowledge,  the  limited  available  resources  (labour, 
natural  wealth  and  capital  equipment)  can  best  be 
used  to  satisfy  human wants. 
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The indices  Ph P2,  ...  ,  Pk,  ...  ,  Pn  may  be  taken  to 
represent  the  situation  of  the  various  final  consum-
ers,  whether  individuals,  communities  or  other 
entities.  These  indice  denote  functions  of  differ-
ent  quantities  capable  of  being  defined  numeri-
cally  in  terms  of the  different  characteristics  of the 
economy  (e.g.  various  levels  of consumption, indices 
of  inequality,  etc.);  each  of  the  functions  increases 
when,  for  each  consumer,  a  given  situation  is  re-
placed  by  a  situation  that  he- deems  preferable. 
Such  indicators can be  termed  preference indices (1). 
Possible 
situations 
FIGURE 1 
Impossible 
situations 
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It is  possible to define the maximum of one of these 
indices,  P  1,  wh1!n  the  values  of  the  other  indices, 
which  we  denot1~ by  PJ,  are  fixed. 
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As  resources  are:  scarce, the maximum of P1  is  finite 
for  any  given  Sl!t  of  Pi.  Hence,  in  the  hyperspace 
of  the  Pk  indices,  an  area  can  be  defined  which 
cannot be attained under any circumstances, no mat-
ter how  society  is  organized. 
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The line above represents topologically the boundary 
between  situations  that  are  attainable  and  situations 
that  are  not.  At  a  point  M  on  this  line  it  is 
impossible  to  find  a  way  in  which  society  can  be 
altered so  that one of the indices - P  1, for example 
- will  increase  while  the  others  are  maintained  at 
the given  values.  All  the  points  on the  boundary-
line  represent  situations  in  which  the  allocation  of 
resources  may  be regarded  as  optimum. 
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The  action  of  any  government  springs  from  the 
belief that certain situations, characterized by certain 
values  of  the  preference  indices,  are  preferable  to 
others.  This amounts to saying that the government 
seeks  to  maximize  a  certain  function  P  of  the 
indices  Pk (2);  this  maximization  corresponds  to 
what the government considers, for  political reasons, 
to  be  the  best  way  of  organizing  society.  The 
choice  of  the  function  P  may  result  explicitly  from 
certain  decisions  or implicitly  from  certain  rules  of 
the  game.  It can  be  assumed  that  the  function  P 
is  generally  an  increasing  function  of  the  various 
Pk  indices. 
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The  theory  of  optimum  resource  allocation  in  its 
most  general  form  assumes  that the  Pk  indices  have 
a  well-defined  form,  as  also  the  function  P,  and 
that  the  function  P  is  an  increasing  functions  of the 
various  Pk  indkes.  It follows  that  the function  P, 
whatever  its  form,  can  only  be  at  a  maximum  at  a 
point  on  the  boundary. 
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Thus  defined,  the  concept  of  optimum  resource 
allocation  implies  only  that  society  is  organized  at 
(')  These  are  referred  to  again  in  Section  12.1. 
(")  This  can  be  expressed  as:  P  =  P(P,,  P,,  ...  ,  P,,  ...  Pn). maximum efficiency, whatever the ultimate objectives 
may  be. 
10.1  - THE  ECONOMIC  THEORY 
OF  OPTIMUM  RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
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In the general form  in  which  we  have  just presented 
it,  the  theory  of  optimum  resource  allocation  has  a 
purely  formal  content,  and  it  is  only  possible  to 
develop  it  further  if  additional  assumptions  are  in-
troduced. 
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These  additional  assumptions  are  that  any  index 
depends  only  on  the  final  consumption  of  the 
corresponding  operator,  and  that the  index  is  never 
a decreasing function of such consumption. 
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Hence,  situations  in  which  the  optimum  allocation 
of  resources  is  attained  are  characterized  by  well-
defined  conditions  which  can  be  stated  in  simple 
terms  and  which  are  valid  whatever  may  be  the 
function  P  that  is  to  be  maximized.  This  theory 
can be extended to  the case of an economy in which 
various  events  are  uncertain (1). 
Possible 
situations 
FIGURE  2 
Impossible 
situations 
10.10  - Optimum  resource  allocation 
in  production  space 
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Let Ot.  02,  ... , On  represent final  aggregate output, 
both  present  and  future. 
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As  before,  we  can distinguish an area of the possible 
and  an  area  of  the  impossible,  and  a  boundary  be-
tween  them that may be taken to  represent situations 
of  maximum  efficiency  as  regards  final  output.  In 
such  situations  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources 
has  been  achieved  as  regards  output. 
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It is  easy to  show the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for  arriving at a certain point P within the space 
of  the  Pk  preference  indices  (fig.  1)  is  that  one 
should  arrive  at  a  point such  as  Q  within  the pro-
duction  space  (fig.  2),  but  that  the  converse  is  not 
true. 
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In  other  words,  optimum  satisfaction  of  wants  Im-
plies  maximum  efficiency  of  production,  but  the 
latter is  not sufficient to ensure that a point has been 
reached  on  the  boundary  between  the  possible  and 
the  impossible  within  the  space  of  the  preference 
indices. 
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The conditions  for  an optimum allocation of resour-
ces  as  regards  output  are  clearly  of  considerable 
importance,  for  they  are  completely  independent 
not  only  of  the  function  of  aggregate  preference  P 
but  also  of  the  various  Pk  indices. 
10.11  - Economically  inefficient  situations 
74 
If, within  the space of the preference indices (fig.  1), 
we  take  a  possible  point  P'  not  on  the  boundary-
line,  we  find  that  there  is  an  infinite  number  of 
possible  displacements  P'P  which  are  such  that  for 
each  of them  all  the  indices  increase,  i.e.  after such 
a  displacement  all  the  operators  are  in  a  situation 
that they deem  preferable. 
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A  similar  statement  may  be  made  with  regard  to  a 
point such  as  Q',  which  is  attainable  but is  not  on 
the  boundary in  the  production space.  There is  an 
infinite  number  of  possible  modifications  of  the 
-+--------------------.  Q1  (')This generalization  plays  an  important role,  particularly 
in  the  concept  of economic  congestion  (see  Sec.  11.6). 
19 economic  system  Q'Q  which  are  such  that  in  the 
displacement  from  Q'  to  Q  all  the  quantities  pro-
duced increase without any  increase in  the resources 
available. 
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Situations  such  as  P'  and  Q'  may  be  regarded  as 
economically inefficient.  We  shall examine later the 
problems  raised  by  the  movement  from  such 
situations  to  situations  where  optimum  allocation  of 
resources  is  attained (1). 
1  0.12  - The  structure  of the  preference  fields 
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Certain  useful  propositions  can  be  derived from  the 
properties of preference fields.  The most important 
property is  that of decreasing marginal utilities.  This 
cannot  be  proved,  but  appears  to  be  borne out by 
observed  data,  at  least  in  situations  that have  been 
properly  studied (2). 
10.2- THE STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION 
78 
For each  productive  activity,  the production  techni-
ques  can be  represented by the relationship between 
the  quantities  produced  and  the  quantities  of  the 
production  factors  employed. 
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From  a  purely  technical  point  of view,  two  sectors 
may  be  distinguished,  the  differentiated  sector  and 
the non-differentiated  sector.  The first  corresponds 
to  activities  in  which  the  best  production  techni-
que (3)  arises  from  juxtaposing  different  units  of 
production,  the  second  to  those  in  which  this  con-
dition is  not met (4). 
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The  differentiated  sector  is  characterized  by  a  con-
vex  production  function  (non-increasing  returns), 
and  the  non-differentiated  sector  by  a  concave 
function  (increasing  returns). 
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Differentiation  implies  divisibility,  since  the  best 
technique  consists  in  dividing  the  aggregate  pro-
duction  system  into  distinct  units  of  production; 
conversely,  non-differentiation  implies  indivisibility, 
since  the  best  technique  here  is  not  divisibility  in 
the  above  sense. 
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Transport  infrastructures  cons1stmg  of  fixed  instal-
lations  and  the  services  connected  with  them  gen-
20 
erally  belong  1to  the  non-differentiated  sector  and 
are  generally  characterized  by  marked indivisibility. 
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But this does not apply to the provision of transport 
services,  once  the  infrastructures  are  in  existence. 
Traffic  on  a  road  is  effected  by  different  vehicles, 
and the activity concerned is therefore differentiated. 
A  large  numb1~r of  railway  transport  services  are 
likewise  differentiated.  Traffic on one railway line, 
for  example,  is  "divisible",  since  the  best  technique 
consists  in  the  use  of different  trains. 
10.3  -CONTINUITIES AND 
DISCONTINUJ'TIES 
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The  theory  of optimum  resource  allocation  can  be 
worked  out,  whether  the  quantities  in  question 
consumptions  or  factors  of  production  - vary 
continuously or not.  If they  do,  the optimum  con-
ditions  give  rise  to  equalities  between  the  first 
derivatives.  If they do not,  the conditions give  rise 
to  inequalities,  the  differences  between  the  terms 
of the inequalitiies  corresponding to economic  rents. 
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In  particular,  factors  of  production  and  products 
may  show  indivisibilities  which  lead  to  discontinui-
ties  in  the  production function.  A  more  important, 
because undoubtedly universal, category of discontin-
uities  arises  because there is,  at  any given  moment, 
a  limited  stock  of capital  goods  (durable factors  of 
production)  which  can only  be increased  by invest-
ment.  Investment  results  from  production  in  the 
present  and  creates  productive  capacity  for  the 
future.  Consequently,  whenever  production  of  a 
particular  item  reaches  a  point  at  which  the  avail-
able  capacity  of  the  durable  factors  of  production 
is  fully  utilized,  the  productive  function  shows  a 
discontinuity. 
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These  discontinuities  complicate,  but  do  not  essen-
tially  change,  the economic nature of the  conditions 
attendant  upon  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources. 
(')  See  particularly  Section  12.3. 
0  From  a  purely  technical  point of view,  it  can  be  shown 
that if there  are decreasing  marginal  utilities  the preference 
curves  are  convex. 
(')  In  the  sense  that,  for  each  industry,  each  output  is  ~he 
maximum  for  given  quantities  of the  factors  of productiOn 
and of the other outputs of that industry. 
(')  These  sectors  cannot  be  demarcated  once  and  for  all; 
the  dividing  line  may  be  modified  by,  for  example,  tech-
nical  progress. CHAPTER  11 
CONDITIONS  OF  OPTIMUM  RESOURCE  ALLOCATION 
11.0  - CRITERIA  FOR  OPTIMUM 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
11.00  - Conditions  of  optimum  resource 
allocation 
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The  conditions  under  which  there  is  an  economic 
situation  of  optimum  resource  allocation  are  as 
follows: 
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a)  There  is  a  single  price  system,  the  same  for 
every  buyer  and  seller  comparable  transactions 
(principle  of  single  prices  and  non-discrimination). 
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b)  This system  is  such that at any place and time 
total  supply  equals  total  demand  for  every  product 
(principle of price-determined equality of supply and 
demand). 
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c)  For  any  operator  making  decisions  on  final 
consumption  the  preferences  index  is  maximum 
when  the  total  value of the  quantities  consumed (1) 
is  equal  to  the income  available to  him.  This con-
dition implies that any operator the marginal utilities 
of  the  different  consumptions  which  can  be  varied 
continuously  should  be  proportional  to  the  cor..: 
responding  prices. 
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d)  In  the  differentiated  sector,  for  any enterprise 
or  unit  of  production (2),  the  investment  and  pro-
duction  programme  characterized  by  present  and 
future  revenue  and  expenditure  is  such  that  the 
discounted  value  of  the net  revenue  is  both nil  and 
maximum,  the  revenue  and  expenditure  being 
calculated  on  the  basis  of  prices  considered  as 
given.  The  rate  of  interest  is  also  considered  as 
given (3). 
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This maximum condition means that the price of any 
output  is  equal  to  its  marginal  cost  if  maximum 
production capacity is  not reached, and to this price 
plus  an  economic  rent  component  if  this  capacity 
is  reached. 
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A  further result is  that, for given outputs of the unit 
of  production  considered,  the  cost  production  must 
be minimum. 
21 
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e)  In  the  non-differentiated  sector  the  condition 
that  the  discounted  net  revenue  be  nil  no  longer 
exists,  but all  the other conditions  remain  the same 
as  long as  the production function is  convex,  that is 
to  say  if  we  are  in  a  situation  of  non-increasing 
marginal  returns. 
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Difficulties  appear  when  there  are  increasing  mar-
ginal  returns.  The  conditions  of  the  first  order 
(stability conditions) (4)  remain the same.  This also 
applies to the conditions of the second order relative 
to  the costs  of production.  For given  quantities  of 
present  or  future  output,  the  discounted  value  of 
the  costs  must,  in  fact,  still  be minimum  at  prices 
of  production factors  considered  as  given. 
(')  Present  and future. 
(')  Irrespective  of whether  it  produces  one  or  more  goods 
and  whether  this  production  is  present  or  future. 
(') If R(t)  and D(t) are revenue and expenditure per unit of 
time, the discounted value V(t) is defined in the most general 
case by the integral 
(I) 
-Jt r i (u) du 
V  (t)  = Jt 
00 
V (r) e  d  r 
in which i(t) is  the continuous rate of interest at the moment 
t  with 
(2)  V (r)  =  R (r) - D (r) 
Naturally,  the  revenue  and  expenditure  are  calculated  at 
optimum  prices  (condition  (a)  in  the  text). 
Equality  (l) implies  that  we  have 
dV(t)  . _ 
(3)  V(t)  =  - d(t} + 1 V(t) 
This  equality  can  be  interpreted  as  meaning  that  in  any 
period  net  revenue  is  equal to the  diminution  in  value  per 
unit  of  time  of  the  good  considered  plus  the  interest  on 
its value at the point in time considered. 
If we  use discontinuous notation, the relation(!) is  written as 
follows: 
vn 
,{4) 
in which I. represents the rate of annual interest from to to t., 
V. the net revenue at the timet., and Vo the discounted value 
at the point  in  time  to. 
(')  From  the  mathematical  point  of  view  the  maximum 
conditions  of  a  continuous  and  differentiable  quantity  F 
include on the  one hand conditions of the first order, which 
express  the  fact  that  the  first  variation  of F  must  be  zero, 
and  conditions  of  the  second  order,  which  imply  that  the 
second variation of F  is  negative.  In the case of a  funtion 
F(x)  with  a  single  variable,  the  condition of the  first  order 
expresses the fact that the tangent to the curve  representing 
the  function  is  horizontal  and  the  condition  of the  second 
order that  the  curve  is  below  this  tangent. 96 
On  the  other  hand,  the  conditions  of  the  second 
order relating  to  the  discounted  net  revenue  do  not 
necessarily  persist.  The  first  differential  must  still 
be  zero  (stability),  but  the  discounted  net  revenue 
may  be  maximum  or  minimum  according  to  the 
case  considered.  Consequently,  the  condition 
according to which the discounted net revenue should 
be  maximum  at  prices  considered  as  given  may  no 
longer  hold;  instead,  the  opposite condition  may be 
valid (1). 
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It  follows  from  this  that  three  points  must  be 
emphasized  for  the non-differentiated  sector: 
1.  All  the  conditions  of  the  first  order  remain 
the  same. 
2.  The costs  calculated  at market prices  must  be 
minimum. 
3.  The  discounted  net  revenue  of  any  unit  of 
of  operation  is  stationary  at  prices  considered  as 
given. 
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From  these  three points  of view,  whose importance 
cannot  be  overestimated,  there  is  no  difference  be-
tween  the  differentiated sector  and the non-differen-
tiated  sector. 
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An essential difference may nevertheless exist.  This 
is; that situations of optimum resource allocation can 
be  situations  of  unstable  equilibrium  in  the  sense 
that in the neighbourhood of such points application 
of the  rule of maximum discounted net revenue can 
have  the  effect  of removing  the  economy  from  the 
situation  of  maximum  efficiency  corresponding  to 
the  allocation  of  revenue  considered.  This  gives 
rise  to  very  serious  problems.  Since,  in  general, 
nothing  can  be said  a  priori  about the  existence  or 
non-existence  of  such  a  possibility  in  the  different 
cases  considered,  special  precautions  must  be  taken 
and  special  rules  applied (2).  This  is  an  essential 
aspect  of  the  non-differentiated  sector (3). 
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As  regards transport, it would seem  that for a  given 
system  of infrastructures increasing marginal  returns 
in  the  supply  of  transport  services  occur  only  in 
relatively  few  cases,  and  that  in  general  marginal 
returns  are  decreasing (4)  ( 5).  It  follows  that  the 
difficulties  we  have  just  indicated  are  practically 
confined  to  the  investment  in  infrastructure.  This 
is the reason why we shall recommend a co-ordinated 
policy with  regard  to  such  investment. 
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These  are the  conditions  for  an  optimum  allocation 
of  resources  on  the  level  of  consumption  and  of 
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production  in  the  differentiated  and  the  non-differ-
entiated  sectors.  They  are  purely  formal  and  are 
not  operational!,  in  that  any  given  situation  will 
usually  not  be  one  of  optimum  allocation  of  re-
sources,  and  consequently  the  optimum  price 
system  will  not  be  known. 
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From  a  practical  point  of  view,  m  any  situation 
where there is  not an optimum allocation of resour-
ces it is  useful  to have operational rules which make 
it  possible  to  take  decisions  that  can  improve  effi-
ciency. 
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Such  rules  are  easily  laid  down  in  the  case  of the 
differentiated  se:ctor  but  are  more  complex,  at least 
as  regards  investment decisions,  in the non-differen-
tiated  sector - the one of special  interest  to  trans-
port  economy,  since  it  includes  all  infrastructures. 
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Before these rules are set out, the concept of distrib-
utable surplus must be defined. 
11.01  - The  concept  of distributable  surplus 
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Let  us  consider  a  given  state  of the economy  and 
envisage  a  feasible  modification  such  that  all  the 
preference indices would retain the same value as  in 
the  initial  situation.  The  distributable  surplus  can 
be  defined  with  respect  to  a  particular  good  (em-
ployed  as  numeraire)  as  the  maximum  increase  in 
the quantity of this  good which the change consider-
ed  can bring about (6).  Thus defined,  the distribut-
able  surplus  is  the  objective  representation  of  the 
psychological  surplus, evaluated in terms  of a  phys-
(')  It  can be shown  that in such an eventuality any decision 
which  would  diminish  the  value  of  the  discounted  net 
revenue  would  still  be  disadvantageous,  but that a  decision 
which  would  increase  the  value  of  the  discounted  net 
revenue  could  be  disadvantageous. 
(")  See  Subsection  11.02. 
(3)  On  the  level  of  practical  application,  the  unrestricted 
validity  of  the  rule  of  maximization  of  discounted  net 
revenue  seems  to  be  generally  accepted.  However,  appli-
cation  of  this  rule  in  all  cases  may  give  quite  inaccurate 
results. 
(')  This  naturally  does  not  imply  that  average  returns  are 
decreasing,  because  the  costs  include  items  which  are 
independent  of  the  volume  of  traffic. 
(")  This  is  a  very  difficult  question  on the  theoretical  and, 
more  particularly,  on  the  practical  level,  and  would  defi-
nitely  be  worth studying systematically in the  light of facts. 
( 8)  The distributable surplus is  therefore a  physical quantity. ical  quantity,  accruing  to  the  whole  of  the  com-
munity  affected  by  the  modification.  It is  imme-
diately  clear  that,  if  this  distributable  surplus  is 
positive,  there  was  no  optimum  allocation  of 
resources in the initial state.  It can in fact be shown 
that  the  necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for 
optimum  allocation  of  resources  is  that,  for  all 
feasible  modifications,  the  distributable  surplus  in 
terms  of  any  good  should  be  negative or nil. 
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It can also be shown that the necessary and sufficient 
condition for optimum allocation of resources is that, 
for  all  feasible  and  reversible (1)  modifications,  the 
first  differential  of  the  distributable  surplus  with 
respect  to  the  modification  should  be  nil,  and  the 
second  differential  should  be  negative  or nil. 
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Naturally,  if  a feasible  modification of the economic 
situation  is  such  that  the  distributable  surplus  is 
positive,  the  change  is  desirable  from  the  point  of 
view  of efficiency,  since  it  enables  each  operator to 
be  placed  in  a  preferred  situation. 
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These  three  propositions  have  a  great  many  appli-
cations  and  they  are quite independent of the struc-
ture  of  the  preference  fields  and  of  the  techniques 
of  production,  i. e.  whether  there  are  diminishing 
returns or not, and whether there is convexity or not. 
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The  propositions  are  obviously  rather  abstract,  but 
they  are  capable  of  supplying  useful  operational 
rules. 
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It  can  be  shown  that  if  for  every  operator  the 
marginal  utilities  of  the  final  goods  and services  are 
proportional to  their prices,  and  if  we  ignore  quan-
tities  higher  than  the  first  order,  the  value  of  the 
distributable  surplus  is  equal  to  the  total  net  value 
of  the  variations in  the  final  outputs (2). 
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Consequently,  if,  for  prices  a,  b  ...  c  of  the  final 
goods  considered  as  given,  the  modification  con-
cerned  creates  value (3),  it  is  advantageous  and 
should be carried out (4).  This proposition can also 
be  applied  to  discrete  variations  as  a  first  approx-
imation (5). 
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If the different  operators  are free  to  distribute  their 
incomes  between  their  different  consumptions,  the 
23 
condition  of  proportionality  of  marginal  utilities  to 
final  prices  will  be satisfied  at least  approximately, 
and  the above proposition will  be applicable. 
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Whether  returns  are  increasing  or  diminishing,  it 
will  then  form  a  criterion  which  is  applicable  in 
general and thus to infrastructure decisions in partic-
(')  Viz.,  capable  of  being  carried  out  in  one  direction  or 
the  opposite. 
(")  In  fact,  where  there  exists  for  all  consumers  (whether 
they  be  individuals  or  collectivities)  a  system  of  prices  a, 
b,  . . .  c  (in  discounted  terms  for  future  consumptions)  of 
the  present or future final  goods  A, B  . . .  C, such that the 
marginal utilities  for each consumer are proportional to the 
corresponding prices, the first differential of the distributable 
surplus  r A  can  be  expressed  by 
l 
d r  A  =  ~[ad  A + b dB + ........................  + c d C] 
where  dA,  dB,  . . .  dC  are  the  variations  of the  final  total 
consumptions  in  the  modification  concerned. 
The  final  goods  include  the  leisure  time  available  to each 
consumer,  which  is  equal to the  total available  time  minus 
the time  spent on work in the  production process. 
The proportionality of utilities to prices amounts to suppos-
ing  that  condition  (c)  of Subsection  11.00  is  fulfilled,  i.e. 
that  the  conditions  for  optimum  allocation  of  resources 
are satisfied  at least  for  the consumption sector.  This  will 
generally  be  the  case  at  all  times  if  the  consumers  have 
freedom of choice. 
The  above  formulation  is,  of  course,  only  strictly  true  of 
marginal  variations  and  cannot  be  used  for  discrete  var-
iations  except  as  a  first  approximation. 
(') That is  to say,  if 
:E  bdB  =  a dA + b dB  + .......  -t- c dC  >  0. 
B 
(') If  the  first  differential  d r A  of  the  distributable 
surplus r A  is nil, the second differential must be considered, 
and it can  be shown  that we,  have 
d2 r  =  _I__ [:E b d2  B + :E  d B d b]  A  a  B  B 
where  d
2B  is  the  second  differential  of  B  and  d  b  is  the 
variation of b  in  the  displacement  concerned. 
The term  b  d
2B  will  be positive  or negative  according to 
whether  the  modification  creates  value  or  not  in  the  pro-
duction  system  at  prices  considered  as  given. 
The expression of the second differential of the distributable 
surplus is  valid in  all cases,  but its  content is  very  complex 
and  in  the  most  general  case  it  can  no  longer  yield  any 
operational rule. 
On  the  other hand,  if  the  marginal  utilities  are  decreasing, 
the  quantity  ::E  d  B  d  b  is  necessarily  negative.  Hence,  if 
::E  b  d
2  B is negative, i.e.  if at prices considered as given the 
modification in  question  does  not create value,  the displace-
ment is  certainly disadvantageous, but if  ::E  b  d
2B is  positive 
no more can be said.  In this case it is  better to do nothing. 
As  uncertainty exists  only  when  the  first  differential  of  the 
distributable  surplus  is  nil,  i.e.  when  we  are  close  to  a 
situation  of maximum  efficiency,  the  absence  of  an  opera-
tional criterion in this case is  no practical disadvantage. 
(
5
)  It should be pointed out here that a  discrete variation in 
the  size  of  an  investment  is  reflected  at  the  level  of con-
sumption  by  generally  small  variations  in  consumption  by 
the final  consumers. ular.  Its  practical  importance (1)  can  therefore 
not be  overemphasized (2). 
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According  to  what  has  been  said,  this  criterion 
applies  even  if  the prices throughout the production 
system  are not optimum, i.e.  if  there is  no  optimum 
allocation  of  resources,  and  whether  returns  are 
increasing  or  decreasing. 
11.02  - Operational  criteria  for  achieving 
a  situation  of optimum  allocation  of resources 
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The  rules  of  a  decentralized  free  market  economy 
can be  defined  as  follows : 
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a)  Maximization  of every  preference index  under 
the  constraint of  a  balanced budget (3),-prices being 
considered as  given, which implies that the consumer 
has  freedom  of  choice  subject  only  to  the  budget 
constraint ; 
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b)  Maximization of the discounted net income for 
every  unit  of  production,  market  prices  being  con-
sidered  as  given,  which  implies  that  the  unit  of 
production  has  freedom  of decision  subject only  to 
technological  constraints ; 
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c)  Price-determined  equality  (the  same  for  all 
operators)  between  supply  and  demand  of  every 
good  at all  times  and places. 
Condition b) implies: 
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i)  That  the  total  cost  defined  as  the  discounted 
value  of  all  present  and  future  expenditure  is 
minimized  in  each production  process; 
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ii)  That  investment  in  durable  goods  is  pushed 
to  the  point  at  which  the sum  of present  marginal 
revenue  and  of  discounted  future  marginal revenues 
(on  the  basis  of  prices  considered  as  constants)  is 
equal to  the present marginal cost of the investment 
plus  the  sum  of  the  discounted  future  marginal 
operating  and  maintenance  expenditures ; 
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iii)  That  current  production  is  developed  to  the 
point  of full  utilization  of the  available  capacity  of 
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durable  factors,  or  to  the  point  at  which  the  price 
is equal to the marginal cost if such a point exists (4). 
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Let  us  consider an economy in  which  marginal  uti-
lities are decreasing and there are no non-differentiat-
ed activities.  It is  possible to show that if,  for given 
preferences  and  given  technology,  this  economy 
observes  the  ruks of a  free  market  economy  which 
we  have  just  stated,  it  evolves  towards  a  single  and 
stable  situation  of  equilibrium  corresponding  to  a 
point  in  the  area  of  maximum  possibilities  in 
the  space  of  the  preference  indices.  A  certain 
distribution  of income corresponds  to  this  point. 
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This proposition is  of very great practical importan-
ce,  since  it  supplies  operational  rules  by  which  a 
situation  of  optimum  resource  allocation  can  be 
achieved.  It st'ill  remains  valid  for  the  non-differ-
entiated  sector  when  the  marginal  returns  are  not 
increasing,  but it may no longer be applicable when 
the  economy  includes  non-differentiated  activities 
and  marginal  returns  are  increasing.  In  this  case 
the  rule  concerning  maximization  of  the  net  dis-
counted  income  of  a  unit  of production  at  current 
prices may not be valid in that it diverts the economy 
from  the conditions  of maximum  efficiency (5). 
(')  Especially  for  the  non-differentiated  sector,  for  which 
the  usual  rule  of  maximization  of  net  discounted  revenue 
is  no longer valid  (see  Subsection  11.00).  The concept of 
distributable  surplus,  and  the  very  simple  and  practical 
expression  of  its  first  differential,  are  then  particularly 
useful. 
(")  To  illustrate  the  application  of  this  criterion,  let  us 
suppose  for  simplicity's  sake  that  all  transport  services  are 
identical  and  that the same  is  true of labour services.  Let 
Q  be  the  total quantity of transport services  consumed  and 
X  the  total quantity of labour supplied,  and let us  suppose 
that the  building  of an infrastructure is  capable  of furnish-
ing  additional  services  dQ1,  dQ.,  . . .  dQ.  by  means  of 
quantities  of labour dX1,  dX.,  . . .  dX. at the periods h, t., 
. . .  t  •.  If q1,  q.  . . .  q. and x1,  x., ...  Xn  are  the  correspond-
ing  final  prices  (discounted  for  future  services),  the  infra-
structure  will  be  advantageous  if 
(q 1dQ1+q2dQ2+  ... +q.dQ.)-(x1dX,+x2dX2+ ... x.dX.)>O 
that is  to  say  if the  discounted  total  value  of the  services 
supplied  is  greater  than  the  discounted  total  expenditure. 
The difference  between these  two terms represents  the final 
benefit  in  money  t1erms  of the  infrastructure  considered. 
(")  The  budget  constraint  means  that  total  (present  and 
future)  expenditure  is  equal  to  total  (present  and  future) 
disposable income, both expressed in present values. 
(')  This  last  proposition  can  be formulated  inversely  by the 
following  proposition:  The price  must  be equal to the mar-
ginal cost plus an element of marginal rent which is  nil when 
the  available  durable  factors  are  not  fully  utilized  and 
which,  in  the  oth~~r  cases,  is  just  high  enough  to  limit 
demand  to  available  capacity. 
(")  This proposition sounds  rather paradoxical,  as  we  are so 
used  to  taking  for granted  the  rule  of maximization of the 
income of an enterprise for prices considered as given.  But 
we  have  indicated  (Subsection  11.00,  condition  c)  that  this 
rule  may  not  apply,  and  it  is  easy  to  quote  very  simple 
examples  to  illustrate  the  possibility. 124 
However,  if  in  the  non-differentiated  sector  and  in 
the  special  cases  of  increasing  marginal  returns,  the 
following  rules  are  applied: 
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d)  for  given  outputs  the  costs  at  current  prices 
are  minimized; 
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e)  only  those  operations  are  carried  out  which 
create  value  at  final  prices  and  final  consumptions 
considered  as  constants;  the  economy  as  a  whole 
will  evolve  in  the  direction  of  optimum  allocation 
of  resources (1). 
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It  is  thus  clear  that  conditions  a),  b),  c),  d)  and 
e)  in  Subsection  11.00  constitute  a  body  of  opera-
tional  rules  whose  application  makes  possible  a 
situation  of  optimum  allocation  of  resources. 
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In  general  these  rules  are  identical for  the  differen-
tiated  and  the  non-differentiated  sectors,  but  when 
there  are  increasing  marginal  returns  certain  of  the 
rules  take  a  different  form. 
11.1  - TRANSPORT  AND  THE  THEORY 
OF  OPTIMUM RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
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Each  mode  of  transport  can  be  divided  into  two 
parts:  first,  infrastructure  and  all  the  management 
services  independent  of  the  volume  of  traffic  asso-
ciated  with  it;  and  secondly,  the  production  of 
transport  services  by  means  of  road  vehicles,  rail-
way rolling stock and inland shipping (2)  (3). 
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All  infrastructures of road,  rail  and  waterway trans-
port  show  very  marked  indivisibility  and  belong  to 
the  non-differentiated  sector. 
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On the other hand, if the infrastructure is  considered 
as  given,  the  supply  of  transport  services  in  road 
haulage  and  inland  shipping,  belongs  as  a  general 
rule  to  the  differentiated  sector. 
132 
As  regards  railways,  indivisibilities,  when  they exist, 
are much less  marked in  the supply of services than 
in  infrastructure  and  the  management  services 
associated  with  the  latter (4).  Furthermore,  numer-
ous  activities  in  the  supply of services  are  differen-
tiated. 
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From  the  point  of  view  of  practical  applications, 
two  factors  play  a  particularly  important  role:  the 
decrease  or the increase  of  the  average  returns,  and 
the  decrease  or  increase  of  the  marginal  returns. 
The importance of the first  stems from  the existence 
of  a  deficit  when  there  is  an  increase  in  average 
returns  and  economically  optimum  management. 
As we have pointed out, the importance of the second 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  certain  rules  of  the  market 
economy  may  not  be  applicable  with  increasing 
marginal  returns. 
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a)  Increasing  average  returns  appear  to  be  the 
general  rule  in  transport infrastructures. 
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In the  supply of services  by  road and  inland water-
ways,  differentiation  in  a  situation of  optimum  allo-
cation  of  resources  implies  constant  or  decreasing 
average returns.  The same is  true of railways when 
there  is  differentiation.  When  there  is  no  differen-
tiation,  the  increase  in  average  returns  appears 
in  general  to  be  much  less  marked  than  for  infra-
structure. 
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b)  If there  is  optimum  allocation  of  resources, 
decreasing marginal returns  appear to  be  the rule in 
supply  of transport  services.  This  is  not  only  the 
case  with  roads  and  inland  waterways,  since  the 
decrease  then  results  from  the  differentiation,  but 
also  with  railways,  at  least  in  the  majority  of 
instances.  Increasing  marginal  returns  seem  in  fact 
to  be  relatively  exceptional  when  rail  services  are 
supplied from  a given infrastructure. 
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All  in  all,  it would  seem  that  increasing  marginal 
returns on a notable scale  can practically only occur 
in  infrastructure  investments. 
(')  In fact the application of criterion e)  which follows  from 
the  reasoning  in  Subsection  11.01  on  the  distributable 
surplus  makes  it  possible  to  overcome  the  considerable 
difficulty  of the  operational  non-validity,  in  the  non-differ-
entiated  sector,  of  the  principle  of  maximization  of  the 
discounted  net  income  at  current  prices. 
(")  The  distinction  in  practice  between  infrastructure  and 
supply  of  services  seems  entirely  justified  for  roads  and 
waterways, but it is,  of course, only theoretical for railways. 
C)  It should  be  pointed  out  here  that  production  of trans-
port services  also  includes  management services  independent 
of traffic. 
(') It  should  be  noted  that  in  the  case  of  railways  the 
division  between  expenditure  connected  with  infrastructure 
and  other  expenditure  independent  of  traffic  is  obviously 
partly conventional. 138 
From  this  it  follows  that  the  operational  rules  of  a 
free  market  economy,  as  we  have  defined  them,  are 
generally  applicable except in  the case of investment 
in  infrastructure (1). 
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It  should  be  pointed  out  that'  the  vitally  important 
decisions  on  infrastructures  are  taken  only  at  the 
time  when  these  are  established  or  closed  down. 
The special difficulties of management with increasing 
marginal  returns  therefore  occur  only  when  a  new 
infrastructure is  established and brought into service. 
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Thus  there is  generally no  real  difficulty  in  applying 
the  criteria  of  optimum  management  to  investment 
decisions  in  transport.  We  have  pointed  out  that 
with  increasing  marginal  returns  the  application  of 
the rules of the free  market economy to  all decisions 
on  investment  or disinvestment  in  infrastructure and 
associated  services  could  lead  to  faulty  decisions. 
A special procedure of co-ordination of infrastruct'ure 
investments  must  therefore be  provided  for  the ben-
efit  of  these  decisions.  This  condition  plays  an 
important  role  in  what  follows. 
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However,  once  an  infrastructure  has  been  set  up, 
and  as  long  as  it  remains  in  service,  the difficulties 
of  optimum  allocation  of  resources  with  increasing 
marginal  returns  practically  cease  to  arise,  and  all 
the  operational  rules  of  a  free  market  economy 
should  be  applicable.  It should  be  borne in  mind 
that,  if  we  consider preferences  and technical  struc-
ture  as  given,  application of  these  rules  will  lead to 
a stable equilibrium which will  at the same time fulfil 
the  conditions  of optimum  resource  allocation (2). 
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The  theory  of  optimum  resource  allocation  regards 
an  existing  infrastructure  as  playing  the  same  role 
as  natural  wealth;  and  it  may  be  claimed  that,  if 
the aim  is  to ensure optimum allocation of resources, 
the  price  of  using  the  infrastructure  to  produce 
transport services  should be independent not only of 
the  investment'  costs,  which  belong  to  the  past,  but 
also  of  operational  costs  independent  of  traffic. 
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Let  us  call  the  optimum  price  for  the  use  of  an 
infrastructure the economic charge; the marginal cost 
of  management  of  the  infrastructure  in  relation  to 
the  traffic,  the  cost  charge;  and  the  excess  of  the 
economic  charge  over  the  cost  charge,  the  cost 
charge,  the  congestion  charge.  The  conditions  of 
optimum  management  of  the  infrastructure  which 
result  from  the general  principles  we  have  indicated 
are  then  as  follows: 
2:6 
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a)  If, at  a price equal t0  the cost charge, demand 
is  below  capacity,  the congestion  charge  should  be 
nil; 
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b)  If, at a  price equal to  the cost charge, demand 
exceeds  capacity,  the  congestion  charge  should  be 
fixed  at  a  level  which  is  such that demand  becomes 
stabilized  at the  level  of  capacity (3). 
11.2  - CONDTTIONS  RELATING TO 
CAP/TAL EQUIPMENT FOR AN OPTIMUM 
ALLOCATION OF  RESOURCES 
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Since  the theory of optimum resource  allocation can 
easily  be  misinterpreted,  we  must  be  very  explicit. 
Two  cases  have  to  be  distinguished,  according  to 
whether  the  equipments  are  divisible  or indivisible. 
These  cases  present  striking  similarities,  but'  are 
nevertheless  not  identical.  The first  is  that  of the 
differentiated  and  the second  that of the  non-differ-
entiated  sector. 
11.20 - Differentiated  sector 
Divisible  equipment 
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In  the  differentiated  sector  the  conditions (4)  cor-
responding to  an optimum allocation of resources are 
the  following: 
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a)  At  the  initial  point  in  time  when  the  pro-
duction  decision  is  made,  the  discounted  value  of 
the  future  net  income  expected  from  an  item  of 
capital  equipment exceeds or equals its  cost  and the 
difference between these two  quantities is  maximum, 
at  market  prices  considered  as  given; 
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b)  At  the  initial  point  in  time,  the  cost  of  any 
item  of  capital  equipment (5)  equals  the  sum  of 
the discounted values of its expected future marginal 
net  revenue; 
(')  See  Subsection  11.02. 
(")  See  Subsection  11.00. 
(')  When demand is  subject to chance fluctuations  it  should 
be  considered  as  a  probability (see  Sec.  11.6). 
(')  For the  sake  of clarity,  these  various  conditions  are  set 
out  separately,  but  they  are  not  all  independent  of  each 
other. 
(")  Viz.,  the  market  price  for  any  component  of equipment 
(such  as  a  particular  machine)  and  the  marginal  cost  for 
every  whole  (such  as  a  factory). 150 
c)  At  any  time,  the  price  of  utilization  of  any 
item of capital equipment equates supply and demand 
for  the utilization  of that item; 
151 
d)  At  all  times  the  price  of  an  item  of  capital 
equipment  is  equal  to  the  discounted  value  of  the 
future  net  income  to  be derived  from  it ; 
152 
e)  At  the  initial  point  in  time,  the  equipment's 
output  is  such  that  its  marginal  cost  is  equal to  the 
market price,  and the discounted costs of production 
are  exactly  covered  by  the discounted  revenue from 
the  output  at  market  prices. 
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Conditions  a)  and  c)  follow  from  the  fact  that  to 
arrive  at  a  situation  of  optimum  allocation  of  re-
sources  in  the  differentiated  sector it is  sufficient  to 
apply  the  rules  of a free  market economy,  in partic-
ular  to  maximize  incomes  (the  market  prices  being 
considered  as  given)  and  to  equate  supply  and 
demand  through  price. 
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Condition  b)  ts  a  natural  consequence  of  condition 
a). 
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Condition  c)  means  that  at  all  times  the  optimum 
price for  the  utilization of an item  of  capital equip-
ment is  in  the  nature of  an economic rent,  the level 
of  which  is  fixed  by  confronting the available quan-
tity  of  the  item  with  the  demand  for  its  utilization. 
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Condition  d)  means  that  at  all  times  the  decrease 
in  the  value  of  the  item,  i.e.  its  amortization,  is 
equal to its  utilization value as  determined by condi-
tion  c)  minus  the  interest  on  its  value (1).  If the 
forecasts  were  correct,  the value  of the  item  at  any 
given  time is  equal to its  residual value, i.e.  its initial 
cost  minus  the  total  of  the  successive  amortizations. 
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We  therefore see  that it is  the  scarcity rent attaching 
to  the  item  which  ensures  coverage  of  the  relevant 
financial  charges  but  that,  in  terms  of  cause  and 
effect,  the  utilization  value  determines  the  amorti-
zation,  not  the  reverse. 
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The  optimum  amortization  from  the  point  of  view 
of  optimum  resource  allocation  is  determined  by 
the  scarcity  rent  and  equals  this  rent  minus  interest 
charges. 
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From  this  angle,  all  the  amortization  rules  usually 
employed  are  purely  conventional.  They  may  have 
their  advantages  for  industrial  accounting  but  they 
have  no  real  economic  meaning  and,  moreover,  the 
actual  amortization can only  be  effected in the  light 
of the results of exploitation which themselves follow 
from  condition c),  i.e.  from  the demand situation for 
the goods produced with the aid of the capital equip-
ment. 
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Condition  d)  is  naturally  closely  linked  with  condi-
tion  c),  since  both these relations  determine  amorti-
zation  from  two  different  formal  angles. 
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If,  on  the  average,  returns  from  a  given  type  of 
capital equipment are such that it is  still  capable of 
producing income after complete amortization of the 
initial  cost (2),  there  would  be  an  advantage  in 
increasing  production,  and  vice  versa.  The  final 
result of these  actions  and reactions will  be  that the 
discounted  value  of the net returns  actually  derived 
from  a  given  item  of  capital  equipment  will  differ 
little  from  its  cost. 
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Condition c) stems from  the fact that the production 
of  the  services,  supplied  by  the  capital  equipment, 
takes  place  in  distinct  production  units  and  that 
competition,  if  present,  tends  to  ensure  optimum 
dimensions  for  these  units  which  are  such  that 
discounted  costs  are  exactly  covered  by  discounted 
revenue  at  market  prices. 
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All  these  conditions  and  their  interpretation  are 
relatively  complex.  But the  case  of  the non-differ-
entiated  sector  is  still  more  difficult  and  is  partic-
ularly  germane  to  transport  economy,  since  the 
whole infrastructure of transport falls within the non-
differentiated  sector. 
11.21  - Non-differentiated  sector  -
Transport  infrastructure 
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In the case of a transport infrastructure,  and  taking 
account of the  associated  costs  of  management,  the 
(')  The full  significance  of this  proposition becomes clear if 
we  refer to the points in footnote (")  on page 21.  Condition 
d)  is  expressed  by condition  (1) of this  footnote  and condi-
tion  (3),  to  which  the  comments  in  the  text  apply,  follows 
from  this  condition (1). 
(2)  According  to  the  principles  we  have  just  indicated,  with 
amortization  determined  at  all  times  by  the  utilization 
price  which  equates  supply  and  demand. conditions  of  optimum  allocation  of  resources  are 
as  follows: 
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a)  At  the  initial  point  in  time  when  the  decision 
is  taken to  establish an  infrastructure, the discounted 
net  total  value  of the  future  final  services  expected 
to  be  derived  from  it  should  exceed  its  investment 
costs  plus  the  discounted  value  of  the  management 
costs  independent of traffic (1),  the prices considered 
being  at  all  times  those  at  the  stage  of  final  con-
sumption.  This  condition  simply  expresses  the  fact 
that the  corresponding  distributable  surplus  must be 
positive.  The  optimum  size  of  the  infrastructure 
must  be  such  that  the  corresponding  distributable 
surplus,  which  represents  the  total  benefit  derived 
from  the  infrastructure,  is  maximum; 
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b)  At  the  initial  point in  time. the  marginal  cost 
of  building the infrastructure in  relation  to  its  capa-
city  plus  the  marginal  discounted  value,  in  relation 
to  capacity, of the management costs independent of 
traffic  is  generally  equal (2)  to  the  sum  of  the 
discounted  values  of  the  congestion  charges,  i.e.  of 
the  expected  future  marginal  net  income  from  the 
infrastructure; 
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c)  At  any  later  period  the  optimum  price  for 
using  the  infrastructure,  i.e.  the  economic  charge, 
is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  cost  charge  and  the 
congestion  charge (3); 
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d)  At  any  time  the  residual  value  of  the  infra-
structure  is  equal  to  the  excess  of  the  discounted 
value  of  the  congestion  charges  over the discounted 
value  of the  management  costs  independent  of traf-
fic; 
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e)  The  marginal  value,  in  relation  to  capacity, 
of the sum  of the cost of establishing the infrastruc-
ture  and  the  discounted  value  of  the  management 
costs  independent  of traffic  is  not  necessarily  equal 
to  the  average  value  of  this  sum  per unit  of capa-
city (4). 
170 
If the  first  element  is  smaller  than  the  second  there 
is  a  deficit,  and  this  deficit  is  a  negative  rent. 
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For optimum allocation of resources this deficit must 
be financed  by taxes on rents  which  are such  as  not 
to  modify  marginal  behaviours  in  any  way.  Such 
taxes  are  said  to  be  neutral. 
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All  these  conditions  can  cause  real  difficulties  only 
at  the  time  of the investment  decisions,  in  calculat-
ing  the  distributable  surplus  and,  during  the  period 
of operation, in  the financing of the deficit. 
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Remarks  similar  to  those  already  made  concerning 
the  capital  equipment  of  the  differentiated  sector 
can,  of  course,  be  made  about  the  interdependence 
of  the  different  criteria  of  optimum  management. 
However,  there  are  two  essential  differences: 
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I.  There  is  no  tendency  here  towards  equality 
of  the  discounted  value  of  the  congestion  charges 
with  the  sum  oJf  the  cost  of  investment  and  the 
discounted  value  of  the  management  costs  indepen-
dent  of  traffic.  There  is  only  equality  of  the 
discounted  value of the  congestion  charges  per unit 
of  capacity  with  the  marginal  value,  in  relation  to 
capacity,  of the  sum  of  the  cost  of  investment  and 
the  discounted  value  of  the  management  costs 
independent  of  traffic. 
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2.  There  is  no  tendency  towards  equality  of 
average  values  and  marginal  values,  in  relation  to 
capacity,  of the  sum  of the  cost  of investment  and 
the discounted value of the management costs.  The 
marginal  value  will  be  less  than  the  average  value 
if  there  are increasing  returns. 
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The above  remarks  are  essential  for  an  understand-
ing of the inaccuracies in certain very commonly held 
viewpoints.  It is  the complexity of the  interplay of 
the first three conditions a), b) and c) which explains 
a  very  great  part of the difficulties  met  with  in  the 
practical  applications  of  the  theory (5). 
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Condition  b),  a consequence of condition  a), is  gen-
erally  the  only  one  to  receive  attention,  although 
c)  plays  a  vital  role.  The  precise  implications  of 
a),  particularly with  regard  to c),  are  generally  not 
clearly  explained. 
(')  All  these  costs  corresponding  to  the  original  fa~tors of 
production,  i.e.  to  the  quantities  of  labour  supphed  (see 
Subsec.  11.01), so that utilities and disutilities must be  comp-
ared  at  the  level  of final  consumption  (see  Subsec.  11.01). 
(")  See  condition  c)  of Subsection  11.20. 
(")  As  defined  in  Section  11.0. 
(')  For  instance,  such  will  not  be  the  case  when  theoret-
ically  optimum  capacity  is  below  the  mini~um 'Yhi~~ can 
technically  be  achiev,ed,  or when  there  are dtscontmuttles. 
(')  See  for  instance  Section  12.4  and  Subsections  13.20, 
13.22  and  13.23. 178 
Condition  d),  which  is  very  important,  Is  dealt  with 
in  the  following  section. 
179 
Conditions  a),  b),  c) and  d) occur in  quite  a similar 
way  in  the  differentiated  and  the  non-differentiated 
sectors.  The  essential  result  is  that  the  utilization 
value  of  an  item  of  capital  equipment  can  follow 
only  from  the  confrontation  of  supply  and  demand. 
Admittedly,  in  a  situation  of optimum  allocation  of 
resources,  the  marginal  cost  of  all  equipment (1)  is 
equal  to  the  discounted  value  of  future  marginal 
income  therefrom.  But  this  equality  is  an  overall 
one  and  does  not  permit  the  optimum  utilization 
value  of  the  equipment  to  be  determined  from  its 
original  value.  In  view  of  its  practical  importance 
the  question  will  be  discussed  below  in  some 
detail n. 
11.3  - INCREASING  RETURNS 
AND  THE ECONOMIC  DEFICIT 
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There  are  increasing  average  returns  if  the  total 
cost  of  production  increases  less  than  proportiona-
tely  to  production. 
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When  production  makes  use  of  capital  equipment 
it  must  be  defined  as  the  total  of  all  the  outputs 
considered,  both  present  and  future,  and  the  total 
cost  must be defined  as  the sum  of the  present and 
discounted  future  expenditures  incurred  by  these 
outputs.  Similarly,  in  the case of linked production 
all  the  quantities  produced  should  be considered  at 
the  same  time  as  the  total  expenditure.  There are 
increasing  returns  if,  when  all  the  outputs  are  mul-
tiplied  by  a  given  factor  k),  the  total  cost  of 
production  grows  less  than  proportionately  to  k). 
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Increasing  returns  provoke  a  deficit  if  prices  and 
outputs  are  determined  in  conformity  with  the 
criteria of optimum  resource  allocation.  The exact 
nature of this deficit must be studied, for it plays an 
important  part  in  what  follows. 
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In  its  basic  economic  sense  the  deficit  is  defined  as 
the  sum  of  all  present  and  discounted  future  eco-
nomic  expenditures for  all  outputs considered minus 
the  sum  of  all  present  and  discounted  future  eco-
nomic  revenues  at  prices  corresponding  to  an  opti-
mum  allocation  of  ressources.  Such  a  definition  is 
strictly  valid  only  at  the  point  in  time  when  the 
production  process  commences,  or at the entry into 
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service of the  item of capital equipment.  At a later 
date,  the  definition  of  the  deficit  brings  in  a  term 
which  is  economically  arbitrary but which  could  be 
fixed  at  the  non-amortized  value  of  the  equipment. 
The  deficit  must  then  be  defined  as  the  sum  of  all 
present  and  future  discounted  expenditures  plus  the 
non-amortized  part  of  the  initial  investment  and 
minus  the discounted  value of all  present and  future 
revenue C). 
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The existence of a deficit is  linked with the existence 
of  increasing  returns  and  not  with  that  of  "fixed 
costs".  According  to  a  widely-held  opinion,  the 
application  of  criteria  ensuring  an  optimum  alloca-
tion  of  ressources  would  lead  to  a  deficit  equal  to 
the "fixed costs" of production,  such  "fixed  costs" 
being  implicitly  defined  as  that  part  of  total  cost 
not  covered  by  revenue  from  prices  equal  to  the 
marginal  costs (4).  This  view,  even  if  it  were  true 
in a general way,  would obviously lead to  the  incor-
rect  conclusion  that  practically  every  unit  of  pro-
duction,  whether in the differentiated  sector or not, 
would  incur  a  deficit  if  the  criteria  of  optimum 
resource  allocation were  applied to  it.  This reason-
ing  rests  on  a  faulty  interpretation  of  the  rules  for 
prices  and  production  implied  by  those  criteria (5). 
The  criteria  do  not  in  fact  imply  that  the  price 
should  be  equal  to  the  marginal  cost  plus.  They 
demand that it should be  equal to  the marginal cost 
plus  a  marginal  rent component.  Under conditions 
of optimum allocation of resources and of continuity, 
the revenue  from  all  present  and  discounted  future 
marginal  rents  is  just equal  to  the  marginal  invest-
ment  cost  of  additional  capacity  (capacity  being 
expressed in units of production) (6). 
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If we  adopt this  correct interpretation, the optimum 
prices can be seen to involve a deficit only in certain 
(')  Equal  to  its  average  cost  in  the  case  of  the  capital 
equipment of the differentiated sector. 
(")  See  in  particular  Subsections  12.22  and  13.10. 
(")  The problem  of defining  the deficit  will  be  examined  in 
Part  11  of the  report  (see  page  82,  footnote ('). 
(')  Viz.,  the  partial derivative of the  total cost  with  respect 
to a  particular type  of production in  a  particular J?eriod,  if 
this  partial  derivative  exists.  In  the  case  of  multiple  pro-
duction  it  is  quite  possible  that such  partial  derivatives  do 
not  exist.  As  we  will  show  in  Subsection  12.40  this  does 
not in  any  way alter the  fact  that the  prices  corresponding 
to  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources  are  perfectly  well 
defined. 
(')  Another mistake often made is  to assume that total cost, 
and  consequently  the  deficit  and  amortization  of the  initial 
investment,  can  be  determined  separately  for  each  separate 
period  of time.  No  such  determination  is  possible  on  the 
basis  of economic criteria. 
(
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)  See  Subsection  11.02  and Section  11.2. very  special  circumstances.  In  fact,  capacity  or 
current  production  must  be  subject  to  decreasing 
marginal  cost,  or  the  total  production  cost  must 
include  a  constant component (due  to  an  indivisible 
factor).  The size  of the deficit for any given output 
can  be  derived  immediately  from  these  features  of 
the  cost  function. 
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As  regards  the  definition  of  the  deficit  in  the  eco-
nomic  sense,  three  remarks  of  some  importance for 
the  subsequent  analyses  should  be made  here : 
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1.  The  total  deficit  is  defined  as  the  sum  of 
discounted  deficits  for  all  the  present  and  future 
periods  considered.  The deficit  for  each  period  is 
defined  as  the  difference  between  expenditure  and 
revenue. 
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If there  is  a  possibility  of  borrowing,  no  special 
significance  can  be  attached  in  practice  to  this 
pattern of deficits  expected for  each future  year  (or 
for  any  other  period),  since  the  pattern  can  be 
changed at  will  by floating loans or obtaining credit. 
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2.  Economic  theory  provides  no  method  of  im-
puting  the  total  economic  deficit  as  defined  above 
to  the different outputs in  each future period and for 
each  different  type.  The same  applies  to  the  total 
cost.  We  will  come  back to this  point  in  the  next 
section. 
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3.  The  real  financial  deficit  recorded  during  the 
whole  future  period  is  not  necessarily  equal  to  the 
deficit  foreseen,  for  the  forecasts  may  have  been 
inaccurate. 
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In  the  following  parts  of this  report we  shall  show 
that the building of infrastructure in the inland trans-
port  sector  yields  generally  increasing  returns.  In 
fact the total investment cost grows less than propor-
tionately  to  capacity.  This  is  the case  in  all  three 
modes  of inland  transport.  However,  the existence 
of  increasing  returns  in  infrastructure by  no  means 
implies  that  competition  is  excluded  within  and 
between  all  the types  of inland  transport.  In both 
road  and  inland  waterway  transport,  it  is  possi-
ble  - and  is  in  fact  current  practice - to  exploit 
infrastructure  as  a  distinct  "industry", separate from 
the  provision  of  transport  services.  By  charging 
prices  for  the  use  of  infrastructure  which,  for  the 
individual  carrier,  do  not  reflect  the  increasing 
returns  from  that  infrastructure,  road  and  inland 
waterway  transport  are  reduced  to  a  situation  of 
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"institutional  convexity" (1).  Competition  is  then 
possible  in  these~  sectors.  ln  the  case  of  the  rail-
ways  a  solution of this  type  seems impracticable for 
technical  reasons:  decentralized  operation  of  trans-
port  services  by  competing  operators  on  one  and 
the  same  network  is  impossible. 
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We  have  already  shown  that  there  are basic:  econo-
mic  reasons  for  considering  infrastructure  and 
transport  services  separately,  not  only  on the plane 
of pure and  applied  economic  theory,  but also,  and 
particularly, with  regard to  practical problems.  The 
distinction  between  these  two  stages  in  the  process 
of the production of transport services will  therefore 
be  made  everywhere  in  the  rest  of the  report.  A 
theoretical  analysis  of  the  problems  peculiar  to 
infrastructure  will  be  submitted  in  the  last  chapter 
of  this  Part. 
11.4  - CONVEXITY,  STABLE 
EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY 
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If the  rules  of the free  market  economy  as  set out 
above (2)  are observed (3),  a  decentralized  regime  in 
transport  can  give  rise  to  situations  of  unstable 
equilibrium  only  when  there  are  increasing  mar-
ginal  returns - which,  generally speaking,  can only 
occur  in  practice  for  decisions  of  investment  in 
transport  infrastructure (4).  We  have  also  pointed 
out  that,  for  a  given  system  of infrastructures,  the 
stable equilibrium resulting from  application of these 
rules  would  correspond  to  a  situation  of optimum 
resource  allocation  which  is  in  accordance  with  the 
interest  of  the community,  in  so  far,  of course,  as 
maximum efficiency of the economy is  aimed at. 
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This  being so,  once infrastructures exist,  application 
of  the  optimum  prices  as  defined  cannot  have  in-
jurious  consequences  for  the  community  from  the 
(')  This  is  naturally  the  case  if the  prices  correspond to an 
optimum  allocation  of  resources,  for  they  are  then  inde-
pendent  of infrastructure  costs  and  hence  of the  increasing 
returns  for this  infrastructure. 
(")  See  Subsection  ll1.02. 
(")  We shall study later the cases of uneconomic competition 
and  abuse  of dominant  positions,  in  which  these  rules  are 
not  observed. 
(')  In  fact,  as  we  have  already pointed out,  in  the  field  of 
current operation, i.e.  for  a  given equipment (in  the case  of 
transport  for  a  given  infrastructure),  increasing  marginal 
returns  may  be  considered  unlikely.  On  the  other  hand, 
for  the  construction  of  indivisible  equipment,  particulary 
infrastructure,  margjnal  returns  can  increase.  This  is  one 
of  the  reasons  why  investment  in  infrastructure  must  be 
centralized. point of view  of economic  efficiency (1)  - quite the 
contrary! 
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In  fact,  if  two  modes  of  transport  compete  over  a 
given  route  there  can  only be optimum allocation  of 
resources  in  one  of  the  three  following  cases: 
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a)  The two  modes  are in  a situation of decreasing 
or constant marginal returns on  the  route,  and equi-
librium  is  stable; 
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b)  One  mode  only  is  in  a  situation  of  increasing 
marginal  returns,  the  other  being  in  a  situation  of 
decreasing marginal returns,  and equilibrium may be 
unstable; 
198 
c)  The production of substitutable services is  con-
centrated in  one only of the two  modes (2). 
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Application  of the  rules  of  a  free  market  and  com-
petitive economy is  not incompatible with the criteria 
of  optimum  resource  allocation  except  in  case  b }, 
in which marginal returns are increasing in one mode 
of  transport.  But,  as  we  have  just  recalled,  this 
practically  never  occurs  in  the  supply  of  transport 
services  from  given  infrastructures. 
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Hence,  if  a  new  infrastructure  is  built  and  traffic  is 
transferred  to  it  to  the  detriment  of  older  infra-
structures,  the  loss  of  traffic  cannot  be  considered 
undesirable  from  the  point  of  view  of  economic 
efficiency,  because  it  would  simply  be  due  to  the 
impossibility  of  meeting  the  financial  burdens  of 
the  old  infrastructures. 
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The resulting decline in  the rent components can lead 
to  "losses of capital" and financial  difficulties.  But, 
from  the economic point of view,  the losses  are only 
apparent  and  correspond  in  reality  to  a  more  effi-
cient  economy.  These  conclusions  are  valid  whe-
ther the decision  to  build  the  new  infrastructure was 
correct  or  not ('). 
202 
If we  consider  that  increasing  marginal  returns  are 
generally  encountered  only  in  connection with  infra-
structures,  we  see  that  the  danger of instability  and 
inefficiency  is,  in  practice,  only  very  marked  when 
decisions  to  invest  or  disinvest  in  infrastructure  are 
taken;  but  then  it  is  unfortunately  only  too  real. 
Decisions  which  are  economically  faulty  are  then 
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bound  to  have  very  unpleasant  economic  conse-
quences. 
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When,  for  one  reason  or  another,  mistakes  have 
been  made,  nothing  would  be  more regrettable  than 
to  oppose  an  optimum  economic  management, 
whatever  harmful  economic  consequences  it  might 
appear  (but  only  appear)  to  have. 
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It  must  be  realized  that  optimum  decisions  on 
investment  or  disinvestment  in  infrastructure  cannot 
be  arrived  at  by  applying  the  usual  criteria  of  a 
price-based  decentralized  economy,  and  this  is  why 
we  go  on to  recommend co-ordination of infrastruc-
ture  investments. 
11.5  - TOTAL  BENEFITS AND  SURPLUSES 
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The total  benefit  for  a  "final consumer" from  utili-
zation  of  an  infrastructure,  expressed  in  money,  is 
equal  to  the  most  that  user  would  be  prepared  to 
pay  to  retain  the  advantage  of  utilization.  The 
surplus  is  equal  to  this  total  benefit  minus  what 
the  user  actually  pays.  In  a  situation  of optimum 
resource  allocation  the  surplus  thus  equal  to  the 
total  benefit  less  the  price  corresponding  to  an 
optimum  allocation  of resources. 
206 
At the outset the  total  benefit from  an infrastructure 
is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  discounted  total  benefits 
for  the  different  users. 
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At  least  as  a  first  approximation,  the  distributable 
surplus (4)  in  money  terms  corresponding  to  the 
establishment of  an  infrastructure can be considered 
as  equal  to  its  total  benefit  less  the  sum  of  its 
investment  cost  and  the  discounted  value  of  its 
management  costs  independent  of  traffic. 
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If it  were possible to  levy  neutral  taxes on the  rents 
of  the  final  users  there  would  be  no  deficit.  But 
(')  The  social  aspects  will  be  examined  later. 
(')  Case  b) shows that it  is  wrong to claim, as  is  often done, 
that  whenever  a  sector  is  subject  to  increasing  marginal 
returns  at  the  optimum  level  of  production,  the  principle 
of  minimization  of  costs  would  necessarily  entail  concen-
trating  all  the  output  of the  sector  in  a  single  unit  of  pro-
duction. 
(")  This  question  of  loss  of  traffic  will  be  examined  again 
in  Part II,  in particular from the angle  of the  deficit. 
(')  As  defined  in  Section  11.1. such  a  levy  meets  with  a  great  many  difficulties. 
The discounted  revenue from  the congestion charges 
would  only  cover the  marginal  value  of the  costs  of 
establishing and operating the infrastructure.  Hence 
a  deficit,  consideration  of  which  will  play  an  im-
portant part in  what follows. 
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The practical difficulties in  evaluating the consumers' 
surplus  are  well  known.  They are particulary com-
plex  in  the  case  of  a  sector  which  produces  not  a 
final  good  but  a  factor  of  production.  The  con-
sumers' surplus is  then  the  maximum sum which the 
final  consumers  would  be  prepared  to  pay  to 
prevent  the  effect  that  elimination  of  the  factor 
would  have  on  the  prices  of the  final  goods.  It is 
important  to  emphasize  here  that  the  surpluses 
connected  with  the  various  stages  of  the  production 
process  ("the  producers'  surplus"  and  "consumers' 
surplus") cannot be  added together,  since this would 
lead to  duplication.  It should  also  be  noted that in 
general the consumers' surpluses relating to  different 
final  goods  (or different  factors  of production)  can-
not  be  added together either.  For two  complemen-
tary  goods,  the  total  surplus  is  lower  than  the  sum 
of  their individual  surpluses.  For two  substitutable 
goods,  the total  surplus  is  higher  than  that  sum (1). 
11.6  - CONGESTION -
PHYSICAL AND ECONOMIC 
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The concept  of  congestion,  and  its  implications  for 
the operational rules of optimum resource allocation, 
call  for  some  comment. 
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The sight  of  empty  seats  in  a  train  may  lead  us  to 
conclude  the  existence  of  a  situation  of  increasing 
returns,  in  which  the  optimum  tariff  would  be 
equal  to  the  marginal  cost,  that is  to  say  extremely 
low.  Thus,  in  the  case of a  traveller  arriving  at  a 
station  when  there  are  still  empty  seats  in  a  train 
about  to  leave,  we  may  be  tempted  to  think  that, 
since  the  marginal  cost  of  the  transport  is  lower 
than  the  price  of  the  ticket,  it  might  be  wortwhile 
granting  him  a  reduction  to  persuade  him  to  take 
the  train. 
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However,  the  situation  must  be  interpreted  in  eco-
nomic  terms.  If the  railway  system  is  managed  in 
such  a  way  (as  in  fact  it is,  expressly  or by impli-
cation)  that  the  probability  of  being  unable  to 
carry  a  seated  passenger  is  fairly  low  (probability 
of  failure),  it  is  certain  that  when  p  =  1 :  1 000, 
for  instance,  999  times  out  of  1 000  there  will 
be  empty  seats  in  the  train. 
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Nevertheless,  in  such  a  situation  the  train  must  be 
regarded  as  being  fully  utilized  in  economic  terms, 
and  hence  there  is  no  reason  to  grant  our traveller 
a  reduction.  The  explanation  for  this  is  that  the 
service  sold  by  the  railway  company  is  transport 
plus  the certainty of transportation,  and  in  fact  the 
tariff ensures equality between the expected demand 
and  the  capacity  of  the  train,  with  the  probability 
of  insufficient  capacity  reduced  to  p.  A  careful 
distinction  must therefore be made between  full  uti-
lization  (congestion)  in  the  economic  and  in  the 
physical sense,  or,  in  more technical terms,  between 
the  real  non-increase in  average  or marginal returns 
and  their  apparent increase. 
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These considerations can, of course, be applied with-
out difficulty to transport infrastructure.  They show 
that  it  is  not  possible  to  conclude  economic  non-
congestion  from  apparent  non-congestion. 
11.7  -REALIZATION OF  THE 
CONDITIONS  OF OPTIMUM 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
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To  achieve  optimum  resource  allocation,  two  basic 
procedures  can  be  applied  a  pnon.  The  first  is 
to have the system of optimum conditions formulated 
and  applied  by  a  central  agency,  the  second  is  to 
organize  the  economy  on  a  decentralized  bases  and 
apply  the  operational  rules  we  have  indicated (2). 
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From  a  strictly  logical  point  of view,  the  two  solu-
tions  are  equivalent  in  that they do  not involve  any 
contradiction.  But  on  the  technical  plane  the  firs£ 
presents  two  intrinsic  difficulties:  how  to  keep  the 
central  office  informed  of  the  preference  indices 
of  the  operators  and  the  functions  of  production, 
and  how to  resollve  a  system of  equations containing 
very  many  unknown  quantities (<).  These  two 
difficulties  are  practically  insurmountable,  even  with 
the  aid  of  the  most  powerful  means  of  calculation 
available  today. 
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The second  solution  therefore  appears  preferable  to 
the  first,  irrespective  of  whether  the  means  of  pro-
duction  are  privately or publicly  owned. 
Cl  Some aspects of the consumers' surplus which  are  partic-
ularly  important  in  transport  will  be  examined  in  Section 
22.2. 
(")  See  Subsection  11.02. 
(')  Strictly  speaking,  such  a  system  would  include  tens  of 
millions of equations with hundreds of millions of unknowns. 218 
However,  various  degrees  of  decentralization  can be 
imagined.  Choices in  this respect must take account 
of  ph~sical or _economic  indivisibilities  and  the psy-
chological,  sociOlogical  and  political  circumstances. 
This  is  why  an  economy  organized  on  the  principle 
?f  ~ec~ntralization must  operate  in  an  appropriate 
mstitutional  framework  which  is  such  that  various 
operators  apply  the  rules  we  have  specified  above, 
some  of  which  differ  according  to  whether  they 
concern  the  differentiated  or  the  non-differentiated 
sector. 
219 
In all  the differentiated fields  (which include produc-
!ion  of  transport  services  on  the  basis  of  existing 
Infrastructures,  with  the exception  of  the  rail  servi-
ces,  for  which  there  may  be  increasing  marginal 
returns),  application  of the  rules  of the  free  market 
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economy cannot fail to lead to situations of optimum 
allocation  of  resources (1). 
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As  we  have  already  pointed  out,  these  rules  cannot 
be  applied  as  they  stand  to  the  transport  infra-
structures themselves,  since the rule of maximization 
of the  discounted  net income  at  current prices is  no 
longer  necessarily  valid.  Hence  the  only  possible 
procedure  is  to  centralize  decisions  on  investment 
or disin~estment in infrastructure.  But this question 
only  anses  at  the  time  when  the  decision  is  taken 
to  build  an  infrastructure.  After  the  decision  has 
been taken, the situation is  generally one of constant 
or decreasing  marginal  returns (2) 
(')  See  Subsection  11.02. 
(")  Viz.,  conditions  of convexity. CHAPTER  12 
SCOPE  AND SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  CONDITIONS 
OF OPTIMUM  RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
12.0  - GENERAL 
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The  conditions  we  have  just  outlined  - or at  any 
rate most of them - are very simple,  but difficulties 
may arise if they are wrongly interpreted.  We there-
fore  believe  that  an  exposition  of  the  practical 
significance  of these  conditions  will  be of use  here. 
12.1  - THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF OPTIMUM 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
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It follows  from  what has been said that an optimum 
allocation  of  resources  implies  no  more  than  that 
the  economy  is  using  its  productive  capacity  at 
maximum  efficiency,  i.e.  in  such  a way  that there is 
no  possibility  of  achieving  a  better  result  with  the 
same means.  This criterion does not define a partic-
ular  situation  of  the  economy.  i.e.  a  specific  com-
bination  of  goods  and  services  produced  and  con-
sumed,  in  the  present  or in  the  future.  It implies 
only  that  the  preferences  of  society,  whatever  ele-
ments  these  comprise  (notably,  individual  and  col-
lective wants), should be satisfied  as  fully  as  possible 
by  the  available  resources of society  (i.e.  the factors 
of  production:  labour,  natural  wealth  and  existing 
capital  assets).  If  the  economy  is  to  meet  the 
requirement of maximum efficiency as defined above, 
a  number  of  conditions  must  be  fulfilled,  and  it is 
these  that  constitute  the  criterion  of  optimum  re-
source  allocat'ion. 
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Assuming that preference indices  can  be  defined for 
the  various  consumers,  whoever  they  may  be (1), 
and  that  the  index  for  each  consumer is  dependent 
only  on  his  final  consumption,  the  conditions  for 
an  optimum  allocation  of  resources  are  particu-
larly  simple  and  practical. 
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The conditions  relating to  the production sector are, 
moreover,  untrammelled  by  any  assumption  as  re-
gards  preference  indices.  They  are  related  to  the 
boundary of all  possible combinations of final  goods 
and  services  which  could  be produced  now  and  in 
the  future,  given  the  productive  resources  available 
to  society  at  present.  This  boundary-line  itself 
denotes all  combinations of goods and services which 
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are  such  that  production  of  any  one  component 
cannot  be  increased  without  reducing  production of 
other  components.  Thus  the  boundary  links  all 
attainable  situations  of  maximum  efficiency.  Na-
turally  any  policy  which  seeks  to  be  economically 
efficient  should  take  into  account  the  c:onditions 
characterizing this  boundary. 
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Optimum  allocation  of  resources  implies  that  all 
the  available  factors  of  production  are  utilized  to 
the  full  and  at  maximum  efficiency.  1bus,  full 
employment is  one of the conditions of an  optimum 
allocation of resources.  Similarly, since a policy aim-
ed  at  stimulating  economic  growth  implies  an  opti-
mum utilization of resources and technical knowledge, 
it must include the conditions of an optimum alloca-
tion  of  resources. 
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In the  case  of the  preference  indices  of the  various 
consumers,  we  have  shown  it  to  be  possible  to 
define,  just  as  for  physical  quantities,  an  area  of 
maximum possibilities which is the boundary between 
the  possible  and  the  impossible.  At  any  point  on 
this  boundary  the  preference  index  of  any  operator 
must  be  at'  the  maximum  when  the  other  indices 
have  given  values.  And  any  economic  policy  that 
seeks to allow for the preferences of final consumers, 
whether  these  consumers  be  individuals  or  private 
or public groups,  must,  of course,  take into  account 
the  conditions  characterizing  this  boundary. 
227 
Consideration  of the  preference  indices  is  based  on 
no  other  assumption  than  that  any  operator  gives 
preference  to  whatever  he  deems  preferable.  This 
assumption is,  in turn, based only on the assumption 
that ordered fields  of choice exist.  This amounts to 
supposing  that,  for  any  final  consumer (whether  an 
individual or entity of any sort), the various possible 
groups of consumptions can be arranged in  order of 
preference.  Hence, it is  possible to define a prefer-
ence  index  (or  preference  function)  for  each  oper-
ator  which  is  such  that  this  index  increases  when 
a  given  consumption  is  replaced  by  a  consumption 
the  operator prefers. 
(') That is,  if one:  can  assume that ordered preference fields 
exist. 228 
It is  also  important to  emphasize that the conditions 
found  for  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources  may 
be  deduced  without  taking  any  account  of  the 
"social  welfare"  function (1)  (which  gives  rise  to  a 
great  number  of  well-known  difficulties  that  do  not 
fall  directly  within  the  scope  of  the  present 
inquiry),  but  that  if  the  social  welfare  function  is 
taken  into  account it must  be  an increasing function 
of the preference indices of the various operators (2). 
For any distribution of income there is  one, and only 
one, situation of optimum resource allocation.  There-
fore,  in  so  far  as  the  distribution  of  income  is 
regarded  as  equitable,  there  can  be  no  contradiction 
between  the  conditions for  equity  and the conditions 
for  an  optimum  allocation  of resources. 
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In fact,  although  in  theory  the  conditions  of  max-
imum  efficiency  corresponding  to  any  given  dis-
tribution  of  income  can  always  be  determined,  in 
practice difficulties  arise when the aim  is  to  achieve, 
in  a  "neutral"  manner  from  the  point  of  view  of 
optimum  resource  allocation,  such  transfers  of 
income  as  are  considered  desirable;  we  shall  give 
many  examples  of  this  later on. 
12.2  - THE  CONDITIONS FOR 
OPTIMUM MANAGEMENT 
12.20 - The  marginal  conditions 
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If the  conditions  for  an  optimum  allocation  of  re-
sources  are  fulfilled,  all  the  marginal  equivalences 
of  all  goods  and  services,  considered  in  pairs,  are 
equal  for  all  operators  taking  decisions  on  con-
sumption  and  for  all  units  of  production  when  the 
corresponding  quantities  are  continuously  variable. 
These  marginal  equivalences  are  equal  to  the  ratios 
of  the  corresponding  prices. 
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This  is  so  in  both  the non-differentiated  and  in  the 
differentiated  sector.  Utilization  of  a  sigle  price 
system  by  all  economic  agents,  consumers  or  pro-
ducers,  is  thus  seen  to  be  an  essential  condition  for 
optimum  allocation  of resources. 
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If optimum  allocation  of resources  is  not attained in 
the production sector, equality of the marginal equiv-
alences  is  not  attained,  and  it is  no  longer  possible 
to give  a univocal definition of the marginal cost of a 
particular output, since this can only be done if costs 
are  minimized. 
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Even  so,  consideration of the  various  marginal  costs 
for  the  different  factors  can,  of  course,  provide  in-
formation  which  is  useful  in  guiding  the  production 
process  towards  greater  efficiency.  But  as  long  as 
marginal  costs  have  not  been  equalized,  use  of  the 
marginal  cost  to  fix  the  optimum  selling  price  has 
no  objective  basis,  and  the  error  is  the  greater,  the 
greater  the  divergence. 
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It follows  from  this  that  prices  can  only  have  their 
full  economic  significance  when  costs  are  as  low  as 
possible. 
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When  the factors  of production are  not continuously 
variable,  price  and  marginal  cost  are  no  longer 
equal.  This  is  the  case,  for  instance,  when  an  in-
frastructure  is  fully  utilized;  here  the  optimum  price 
is  equal to  the  sum  of the  cost  charge  and  the  con-
gestion  charge (3). 
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Consequently,  it  would  seem  preferable  to  reject 
the  usual  formulation  of  the condition  for  an  opti-
(')  This is  the  function  P  mentioned  in  Section  10.0. 
(")  Whether  these  indices  refer  to  individual  consumers  or 
to  entities  of  any  sort  that  take  decisions  on  consumption. 
C)  The  marginal  cost  of  current  output  is  defined  as  the 
partial  derivative  of  the  cost  function  with  respect  to 
current  output.  Given  the  capacity  of the  durable  factors 
of  production,  it  is  generally  defined  only  up  to  the  point 
of full  utilization  of these  factors  (for  a  discussion  of the 
concept  of  full  utilization  in  the  relevant  economic  sense, 
see  Section  11. 6).  At  the  point  of  full  utilization  in  the 
physical  sense,  only  the  partial  derivative  in  the  negative 
direction will  generally be defined.  When the text refers to 
"marginal  cost  at  the  point  of  full  utilization",  it  is  this 
derivative  in  the negative  direction that is  meant.  To avoid 
the  necessity  of  introducing  a  scarcity  rent  not  having  the 
nature  of  a  cost,  some  writers  say  that  when  output 
approaches  the  limit  of  full  utilization  the  marginal  cost 
will  in general  rise  very steeply,  reflecting the  fact  that the 
cost  of producing  an  additional  unit  (i.e.  the  cost  in  terms 
of  the  variable  factors  of  production)  increases  rapidly  as 
the  limit  of  capacity  becomes  more  and  more  of  a  bottle-
neck.  Unless  factor  proportions  are  completely  rigid,  this 
means  that  the  optimum  output  condition,  formulated  as 
the  equality  between  marginal  cost  and  price,  could  like-
wise  be  applied.  This  argument  is,  however,  almost 
meaningless  from  a  practical  point  of view,  and  it  is  even 
highly misleading, because the measurement of the marginal 
cost function close to the point of full utilization is  obviously 
subject to a  very high probability of error.  In practice, the 
marginal  cost  function  can  be  (and  in  fact  usually  is) 
approximated  by  a  constant  only  up  to  the  point  of  full 
capacity  in  the  economic  sense.  Beyond  this  point,  any 
attempt  to  regard  the  scarcity  rent  as  a  cost  makes  no 
economic sense.  In fact, at the  limit of capacity it  is  gener-
ally  not  possible  to  define  the  optimum  condition  for  a 
given  enterprise  in  terms  of equality  between  marginal  cost 
and price;  this  condition  should  be  formulated  as  indicated 
in  the  text.  It follows  from  this  that  the  optimum  price 
will  generally  exceed  marginal  cost  whenever  production 
takes  place  at  the  point  of full  utilization  of capacity. mum  allocation  of  resources  (i.e.  that output should 
be  pushed  to  the  point  where  the  marginal  cost  is 
equal  to  the  price  of the  product) - a  formulation 
which  may  be  inaccurate - and  to  retain  the  cor-
rect  proposition,  which  consists  of  the  following 
conditions: 
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a)  The  marginal  investment  cost  of  the  equip-
ment  is  equal  to  the  discounted  value  of  its  future 
net  marginal  receipts; 
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b)  Production should take place at the point where 
the  existing  durable  factors  are  fully  utilized,  if  the 
marginal cost  at  that point is  equal to,  or less  than, 
the  price  which  equates  supply  and  demand; other-
wise, production should take place at the point where 
the  marginal  cost  is  equal  to  the  price. 
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Here  we  might  emphasize  once  more  that  these 
conditions  cannot  exert  their  full  effect,  from  the 
point of view  of optimum resource allocation,  unless 
the  total  cost  of  production  is  minimized  at  the 
same  time. 
12.21  Minimization  of costs 
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The  various  points  dealt  with  above  lead  to  the 
conclusion that optimum resource allocation can only 
be  achieved  if  each  production  unit  minimizes  the 
total cost of its production - expressed in discounted 
value  and  taking  all  prices  as  constants  for  the 
purposes  of  such  calculations (1). 
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There would  be  little need  to  discuss  cost minimiza-
tion  here,  were  it not for the fact  that this principle, 
which is  an  essential criterion for optimum allocation 
of  resources,  is  often  disregarded  in  applying  eco-
nomic  theory (2). 
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In  fact,  where  practical  applications  are  concerned, 
it  is  important  to  stress  the  need  for  cost  minimi-
zation,  and  to  consider it as  a  separate  requirement 
that  even  takes  precedence  to  some  extent,  both 
theoretically  and  practically,  over  the  other  maxi-
mum  conditions  corresponding  to  an  optimum  allo-
cation  of  resources.  As  we  have  just  shown,  the 
"marginal"  conditions  can  only  play  their  full  part 
if  the  condition  of  cost  minimization  is  fulfilled. 
If this  is  not  the  case,  the  formal  conditions  of 
equality  between  prices  and  marginal  costs  lose 
some  of  their  effectiveness;  moreover,  it  is  then  no 
longer  possible  to  give  a  univocal  definition  of 
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marginal  costs.  For this  reason,  cost  mm1m1zation 
may be regarded as  having a certain logical priority, 
and  it  must  be  clearly  understood  that  in  practice, 
if costs  are not minimized,  most  of the criteria cor-
responding  to  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources 
can  have  only  a  very  limited  effect. 
243 
Cost  minimization  is  also  a  requirement  of  great 
practical  importance,  in  that  constant'  readjustment 
and  constant  pressure  are  needed  to  ensure  that 
production  actually  takes  place  at  minimum  total 
cost.  To disregard  these  conditions  in one  way  or 
another  involves  the  very  real  danger  of  a  serious 
misallocation of resources. 
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For all  these  reasons, when the criteria for optimum 
allocation  of resources  are  to  be  applied,  it  is  im-
portant that the principle of cost minimization should 
be  emphasized. 
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The  most  important  practical  problems  raised  by 
cost  minimization  are  of  an  institutional  and  tech-
nical  nature,  because  it  calls  for  a  continuous  re-
adjustment to changing conditions, the rapid adoption 
of new techniquc!s,  and  a  constant effort  to  develop 
such  new  techniques.  It is  in  fact  largely  because 
of  the  problems  they  pose  with  regard  tu  cost 
minimization  that  the  dynamic  aspects  of optimum 
resource allocation play an essential role. 
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The  economic  system  should  be  organized  so  as 
to  exert  the greatest  possible  pressure  in  favour  of 
cost  minimization,  interpreted in  this  general  dyna-
mic  sense.  Competition  need  not  be  perfect  in 
order  to  be  effective.  Even  if  there  are  no  pro-
ducts  that  are  perfect  substitutes  (such  as  a  homo-
geneous commodity produced by various independent 
operators),  competition may exert sufficient  pressure 
to  ensure  that  costs  are  minimized.  Nevertheless, 
competition  is  not  always  sufficiently  powerful,  nor 
can it always exist,  because there may be, for exam-
ple,  positions  of  substantial  monopoly  power  that 
are  the  result  of  inherent  economic  facts,  such  as 
increasing  returns.  In  such  cases  it  would  be 
necessary to devise appropriate institutional measures 
by which sufficient pressure could be exerted to bring 
about  cost  minimization.  This  point  will  be  im-
portant in  the  subsequent  parts  of this  report. 
(') Total  cost  must  be  defined  as  the  sum  of  present  and 
discounted  future  ,expenditure  incurred  in  the  production 
process.  The length of the  period to be taken into account 
depends  upon  the  economic  life  of  the  capital  equipment 
or upon  the  economic  horizon,  whichever  is  the  shorter. 
(")  For example, much of the literature emphasizes marginal 
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It  is  also  worth  mentioning  that  the  theory  of 
optimum  resource  allocation  presupposes  a  study 
of the optimum conditions for  utilization of available 
resources,  quantities  of  which  are  limited,  the  aim 
being  to  satisfy  demand  as  fully  as  technical  know-
ledge  permits.  But  it  is  clear  that  in  a  dynamic 
situation  such  technical  knowledge  can no longer be 
taken  as  a  constant.  This  raises  a  major problem, 
that  of  technical  progress;  rapid  technical  progress 
can  only  be  achieved  within  an  appropriat'e  institu-
tional  setting. 
12.22  - Price-determined  equality 
of supply  and  demand 
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As  we  have  shown,  in  a  situation  of  optimum  re-
source  allocation  everything  happens  as  t'hough 
there  were  explicitly  or  implicitly  a  single  price 
system  for  all  economic  agents,  representing  their 
marginal  equivalences. 
249 
This price system is such that, for each good, demand 
is  equal  to  supply  at  any  one  time  or place.  This 
condition,  which  is  essential  for  optimum  allocation 
of resources,  is  all  too  often  misunderstood. 
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It  implies,  that,  in  every  production  process,  the 
price  must  be  equal  to  the  marginal  cost  of  pro-
duction  excluding  any  return  on  durable  equipment 
if  that  equipment  is  not  fully  utilized (1),  and  that, 
if  this  is  not  so,  the  price  must  be  equal  to  this 
marginal cost plus  a rent just large enough to  ensure 
that  demand  is  equal  to  productive  capacity. 
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Thus  the optimum price  of  utilization  of an  item  of 
capital equipment  is  the sum  of two  components: 
i)  The  marginal  cost  of  production,  and 
ii)  A  marginal  rent. 
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The  second  component  is  nil  when  capacity  is  not 
fully  utilized;  otherwise,  it is  just  large  enough  to 
limit  demand  to  the  available  capacit'y  of  the 
equipment.  This component is  therefore determined 
by  comparing  the  available  quantity  of  the  capital 
equipment  with  the  demand  for  the  product. 
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It should  be  emphasized  that the second component 
is  not  a  "cost" in  any  sense  of  the  term,  nor can it 
be interpreted as  a cost.  It is  a pure scarcity price, 
serving  to  limit  demand to  the  available  capacity of 
the capital equipment.  Of course, as  the investment 
37 
decision has  normally been taken in such a way  that 
the discounted value of these  rents  per unit of capa-
city  is  equal to  the marginal  cost  of  the  equipment, 
this  component  will  not  always  be  nil  - in  fact, 
not  usually  - for  if  that  were  so  the  investment 
decision  would  have  been  incorrect. 
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From  this  analysis (2),  two  important  conclusions 
can  be  drawn  with  regard  to  the  optimum  price. 
The  first  is  that  the  optimum  price  is  usually  not 
equal to  the  marginal cost.  This should be obvious 
from  what  has  just been  said,  but  it  is  nevertheless 
worth  emphasizing  because  the opposite  opinion  is 
very  widely  held.  The  second  is  that  it  is  not 
usually  possible  to  determine  the  optimum  price 
at  a  given  moment  simply  from  cost  factors.  This 
is  because the  rent component of the optimum price 
cannot,  by  its  very  nature,  be  determined from  cost 
factors. 
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It follows  that  it  is  also  not  usually  possible  to  fix 
an  optimum price and output policy  by determining 
the production price a  priori from  the marginal cost 
(or  any  other  measure  of  cost)  and  leaving  output 
to  be  determined  by  the  demand  at  that  price. 
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Of course,  it  is  generally  possible  to  determine  the 
pattern of the rent component in  time if the demand 
and  cost  conditions  are  specified.  This  is,  for 
example,  what happens in the case of capital equip-
ment  with  a  constant rate  of  output.  In that case, 
the  rent is  fixed,  on the average,  at a level  which  is 
such  that  the  marginal  equipment cost can  be  seen 
to  be  equal  to  the  discounted  value  of  the  rents. 
If this  discontend  value  remained,  on  the  average, 
higher  than  the  cost,  output  would  be  increased; 
in  the  opposite  case  it  would  be  decreased.  But 
only  the  averages  are  then  equal,  whereas  optimum 
allocation of resources  requires  - and  efficiency is, 
of  course,  in  the  interest  of  society  - that  the 
price  of  an  item  of  capital  equipment  at  any  one 
moment  should  be  such  as  to  ensure  that  demand 
is  equal  to  capacity. 
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The  rent  component  makes  it possible to  cover,  on 
the one hand, amortization and the interest on capital 
not due for  repayment  and,  on  the  other,  the fixed 
costs  that  are  not  dependent  on  the  volume  of 
production.  But  the  best  schedule  amortization 
cannot  be  det~rmined a  priori.  It  must  be  fixed 
(')  In  the  economic  sense  of the  term  (see  Sec.  11.5). 
(")  This  is  very  important  for  the  purposes  of  diagnosi.ng 
uneconomic  competition  and  fixing  upper  and  lower  pnce 
limits. at each  period in  terms  of the price that will  equate 
demand  with  capacity. 
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It is  thus clear, that if the optimum production price 
is  stable,  the  following  conditions  should  also  be 
satisfied: 
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a)  Demand is  constant or is  continuously increas-
ing (1).  If demand decreases  at  any  particular time, 
the existing capacity of the capital equipment will no 
longer  be fully  utilized;  in  order  to  ensure  its  full 
utilization,  the  price  will  have  to  be  lowered  (and 
consequently  the  rent component of the  price); 
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b)  All  past  and  present  investment  decisions  are 
correct.  This  in turn  implies  perfect  forecasting; 
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~)  The  capital  equipment  is  continuously  divis-
Ible.  When  this  condition  is  not  fulfilled  capacity 
(and  therefore  rent)  will  vary  over a period of time 
if demand is  constant; but if demand is  continuously 
increasing,  capacity  cannot  be  fully  adapted  to 
demand at any one moment,  and  rent will  therefore 
vary  again. 
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These  three  conditions  are,  of  course,  highly  unre-
alistic,  especially  the  second  (that  all  past  and 
present  investment  decisions  are  correct).  More-
over, it is  particularly unlikely that the first condition 
(constant or continuously increasing demand) will be 
satisfied  in  respect of services  that cannot be stored 
and  for  the different  quantities  of  which,  produced 
at  different  times,  there  are  no  perfect  substitutes. 
Also,  there are  several cases  in  which  the condition 
that the capital  equipment  be continuously  divisible 
may  not be  met;  one  of these  is  the case  of  infra:.. 
structure,  which  we  shall  examine  later. 
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The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  all  this  is  that 
the  rent  component,  and  therefore  the  optimum 
price,  is  generally  not  constant,  and  that  the  rent 
component  cannot  usually  be  determined  from  cost 
factors  alone.  For  a  given  available  capacity  of 
equipment  - regardless  of whether  it  is  the  result 
of  correct  or incorrect  investment  decisions  - the 
optimum  price  is  determined  by  comparing  the  in-
tensity  of  demand  with  that  capacity.  Marginal 
cost  determines  the  optimum  price  only  when  the 
available  capacity  is  not  fully  utilized;  but we  have 
shown that this  is  not general. 
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With  this  analysis  in  mind,  the  problem  of  peak 
demand  presents  little  difficulty.  The  criteria  of 
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optimum  resource  allocation  imply  that  at  times 
of  peak demand,  when  capacity  is  presumably fully 
utilized,  prices  should  be  fixed  at  a  level  which  is 
such  as  to  limit demand to the  available capacity; at 
times when demand is  slack and capacity is  not fully 
utilized,  prices  should  simply  be  equal  to  marginal 
costs.  Investment  in  additional  capacity  should  be 
undertaken  if  the  expected  additional  revenue,  i.e. 
the  sum of discounted future  marginal rents, exceeds 
the  marginal  investment  cost. 
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Only  one  problem  arises  here:  in  pncmg output at 
times  of  peak  demand  and  at  times  when  demand 
is  slack,  account  should  be  taken  of  the  elasticity 
of  substitution.  For simplicity's  sake  we  have  not 
mentioned  this  consideration  before.  The  prices 
should  be  such  that  capacity  will  remain  fully  uti-
lized  at times of peak demand (i.e.  the price should 
not  be so high  as  to  induce  a  shift  of demand  that 
will  reduce  utilization  to  a  point  below  capacity) 
and  no  excess  demand  will  develop  at  times  when 
demand  is  less  intense.  For  the  rest,  the  above 
conclusions  can  be  applied  without  modification. 
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When  demand  tends  to fluctuate,  prices  should  be 
highly  flexible.  Flexibility  has  obvious  advantages, 
which  will  be  discussed  with  particular reference  to 
transport services  in  Parts II and Ill of this  report. 
It ensures that capacity is fully utilized at times when 
demand  is  weak.  It does  this  in  two  ways:  firstly, 
with  flexible  prices  the  selling  price of  output pro-
duced at these times of slack demand is low because 
it is  equal only to  the marginal cost;  secondly,  with 
flexible  prices  the  selling  price  of output  produced 
at  times  of peak  demand  is  high,  which  may  auto-
matically  induce  a  shift  of  demand  towars  periods 
when  utilization  of  capacity  is  low.  Furthermore, 
at  times  of  peak  demand  such  flexibility  makes  it 
possible to use the  price system  to  ration the  avail-
able  capacity (i.e.  by  means  of the  rent component) 
and  avoid  adopting  other  rationing  methods  which 
not  only  distort  investment  decisions  (since  these 
depend  on  the  rent  component)  but  may  also  be 
less  efficient from  a general economic point of view. 
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This analysis applies in  toto to  all  capital equipment, 
whether  movables  such  as  lorries  and  locomotives 
or fixed infrastructure installations such as  roads and 
railway  lines.  lLater  in  this  report  a  special  study 
will  be made of the case of infrastructure, for  which 
the  analysis  is  particularly  important. 
{')  Strictly  speaking,  it  is  sufficient  to  assume  that  demand 
never decreases  faster  than  the natural rate of deterioration 
of the capital equipment. 12.23  - Investment  and  operation 
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The price  and  output  policy  implied by  the criteria 
of optimum  resource  allocation can be derived from 
the  general  theory.  We  have  shown that the prices 
and  quantities  corresponding  to  an  optimum  allo-
cation  of resources  - investment in  durable  assets, 
and  current  output  and  current  price  - are  de-
termined  simultaneously  for  all  present  and  future 
periods  that  are  linked  by  the  common  utilization 
of  capital  equipment. 
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This  interdependence  becomes  clearly  evident  when 
it  is  remembered  that investment depends on output 
and  price  in  the current  period  and  in  all  relevant 
future  periods.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  it  is  none 
the  less  essential  to  define  separately  the  optimum 
conditions for, on the one hand, investment in capital 
equipment and,  on the other, the price and quantity 
of current output.  This approach is  inspired by the 
fact  that  these  two  aspects  of  the  total  problem 
represent two  apparently  distinct types  of decisions, 
both  of  which  must  be  taken  in  the  present'.  It 
must,  however,  be constantly borne in mind that the 
two  types  are  interdependent. 
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When  we  examine  current  output  and  price,  the 
available  capacity  of  the capital  equipment is  taken 
as  given.  In  this  context,  and  in  a  situation  of 
optimum resource allocation,  the optimum price and 
output  can,  as  we  have  seen,  be  regarded  as  de-
pending  on  two  conditions: 
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1.  Output  is  equal  to  the  quantity  demanded  at 
the  price charged. 
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2.  The price  must be  equal  to  the  marginal  cost 
of output if capacity is not fully utilized at that price; 
if  capacity  is  fully  utilized,  the  price  must  exceed 
the  marginal  cost by  an amount sufficient to ensure 
that  demand  remains  at  the  level  of  current  pro-
ductive  capacity. 
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Investment  policy  should  satisfy  the  condition  of 
equality  between  marginal  investment  cost  and 
marginal  value of the  sum  of  discounted future  rev-
enue,  prices  being  taken  as  constant. 
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The above  conditions  relate  to  a  situation in  which 
optimum  allocation  of  resources  is  achieved.  The 
operational  rules  that  should  be  adopted  in  order 
to  arrive  at  such  a  situation  are  somewhat  more 
39 
complex,  and  differ  according  to  whether  one  is 
dealing  with  the  differentiated  or  the  non-differen-
tiated  sector (1). 
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In the  case of transport,  economies  of scale  do  not 
seem  particulary  important  except  where  infra-
structure  is  concerned;  such  economies  can,  more-
over,  only  be made  at the  moment  when  decisions 
are  taken  to  install  or  to  close  down.  From  this 
it is  obvious that management of the current output 
of transport services  is  generally  much  simpler  and 
raises  far  fewer  difficulties,  at  least  on  a  general 
line. 
12.24 - Only  the  future  counts 
276 
Where optimum allocation of resources is concerned, 
only the future is relevant.  A  decision can only be 
beneficial  if  it  takes  account of the future  alone  -
the  immediate  as  well  as  the  future. 
277 
In consequence, the principles of an optimum policy 
must be determined  quite independently of the past, 
i.e.  of  past  costs. 
278 
This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the  past  is  to 
be  ignored  entirely:  virtually  no  forecast  can  be 
made  without  taking  the  past  as  a  basis.  Conse-
quently, although only the future must be considered 
when  an  optimum  policy  is  formulated,  the  past 
plays  a  part by providing information on the  future 
and can and must be used to check forecasts. 
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If,  moreover,  the  forecasts  made  in  the  past  have 
been  correct,  we  find  that  what  cost  a  lot  is  still 
worth  a  lot'.  But this  in no  way  detracts  from  the 
value  of  an  asset equals  the  discounted  value  of  its 
future  income  and  thus  depends  on  such  income 
alone. 
12.3  - INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
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In  any  situation  other  than  one  of  maximum  effi-
ciency,  economic  theory  shows  that there  are ways 
in which the economy can be modified in accordance 
with  environmental  conditions,  and which  are  such 
that,  as  a  result,  all  operators  will  find  themselves 
in  a  situation  that  is  preferable. 
(
1
)  See  Subsection  11.02. 281 
In pratice, however, it  is  usually very difficult to find 
modifications  that  will  benefit  everyone  and  also  be 
politically  acceptable  and  sociologically  attainable. 
For one thing,  the  legitimacy  of certain  existing  sit-
uations  may  be  disputed  - they  may  arise  from 
positions  of  de  facto  or  de  jure  monopoly  power; 
also,  the  distributable  surplus  that  it is  possible  to 
obtain  may  be  apportioned  in  very  different  ways, 
depending  on  the  methods  envisaged. 
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It is  a  fact  - and  a  very  important  one  - that 
the  creation  of  an  efficient  economy  raises  very 
many  ethical  problems  connected  with  the  distri-
bution of incomes.  The system  adopted to promote 
efficiency may be thought not to result in  an ethically 
acceptable distribution.  The equation of supply and 
demand  by  price  (i.e.  the  rationing  by  price  of 
an  almost  limitless  demand  for  scarce  resources), 
which  is  necessary  to  achieve  efficiency,  is  only 
ethically  acceptable  if  the  distribution  of  incomes 
can  be  considered  "right".  Similarly,  the  "capital 
losses"  inevitably  incurred  when  the  economy  is 
transformed  in  a  way  that  is  beneficial  to  society 
as  a  whole,  but  which  puts  the  whole  burden  of 
progress on certain people only, may also be deemed 
unacceptable  for  ethical  reasons.  Compensation 
for  such capital losses will then be deemed necessary. 
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In  theory,  it  is  possible,  to  achieve  any  particular 
distribution  or redistribution  of incomes  that society 
desires,  and  to  obtain  all  the resources  necessary  to 
satisfy  collective  wants  if  this  is  thought  advisable, 
by transfers of income that do not affect the marginal 
decisions  of  economic  agents  (consumers  or  pro-
ducers),  i.e.  by transfers  of "rent" income  that may 
be  termed  "neutral transfers".  But this  assumption 
is,  admittedly,  unrealistic;  it  can  only  serve  to 
separate  the  problems  of  financing  collective  wants 
and  of  income  distribution  from  the  aspects  of 
economic  efficiency  with  which  this  report  is  con-
cerned. 
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We  shall  examine  later (1)  some  aspects  of the link 
that may  exist in  practice,  through the price syst'em, 
between  economic  efficiency  and  the  question  of 
income  distribution  or  other  questions  when  this 
assumption  of  neutral  transfers  is  not made. 
12.4  - IMPUTATION OF COSTS 
12.40 - Imputation  of costs  to different 
outputs at  a  given  moment 
285 
Linked production occurs  when  two  or more  goods, 
which  are  not  perfect  substitutes  for  each  other  ~t 
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either  the  consumption or the  production  stage,  are 
obtained  by  the  same  production  process,  i.e.  by 
processes  using  at  least  one  factor  of  production  in 
common.  On  a  formal  level,  linked  production  is 
entirely analogous to  production of a single  homoge-
neous  good  ove:r  a  period  of  time  with  the  aid  of 
capital  equipment.  The  former  case  raises  the 
problem  of  imputation  of costs  to  different  outputs 
at  a  given  moment,  the latter the problem of impu-
tation  of  equipment  costs  over  a  period  of  time. 
In practice the two  problems are indissolubly bound 
up  together,  but  for  the  sake  of  clarity  it  will  be 
advisable to study them separately. 
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There  are  two  types  of linked  production,  differing 
both in nature and origin.  However, since they give 
rise  to exactly the same problems  of imputation  no 
distinction  will  be  made  between  them  in  this 
report.  Nevertheless,  a  brief  analysis  of  the  two 
types  can  profitably  be  given  here,  since  their 
differentiation  plays  a  part  in  discussions  of  t'rans-
poit  policy (2). 
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The  first  type  of  linked  production  occurs  when 
the various categories of output make use of exactly 
the same aspect of the factor of production they have 
in  common.  For  example,  all  the  categories  of 
traffic  on a  particular road  at  a  given  moment  are 
using the common factor "road" in exactly the same 
way.  The  various  services  produced  by  the  road 
(i.e.  the  passage  afforded  to  the  various  categories 
of  traffic)  can  be  substituted  for  each  other  to  a 
certain extent, and are mutually exclusive.  Common 
production will  therefore generally take place only if 
the  common  factor  is  subject to  increasing  returns. 
If it  is  not, the goods and services could just as  well 
be  produced  separately,  and  one  would  then  be 
dealing  with  the differentiated sector,  which  is  char-
acterized  by  constant  or  decreasing  returns.  A 
problem of imputation  therefore  arises,  because the 
prices  corresponding  to  an  optimum  allocation  of 
resources occasion a deficit which can only be shared 
out  among  the various  categories  of traffic  by  con-
ventional  means. 
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The second  type  of  linked  production  occurs  when 
the various  categories  of output make use  of differ-
ent  aspects  of  the  factor  of  production  they  have 
in common.  One example of this  is  the production 
of  coke  and  gas  at  a  gasworks.  Another example 
is  the  capital  equipment employed  in  production  at 
(')  See  Qlapter 21. 
(")  In  the  literature  on  this  subject  the  two  types  of linked 
production are often given  special names,  such  as  "common 
production" and "joint production" respectively. different  times.  Examples  of  linked  production 
in  the  customary  sense  are  the irrigation  and  traffic 
functions  of  certain  canals,  and  rail  transport  in 
opposite directions effected by the same rolling stock. 
The  services  rendered  by  a  common  factor  are 
imperfect  substitutes  in  production,  and  they  may 
even  be  available  only  in  fixed,  or  virtually  fixed, 
proportions.  A  problem of imputation may  arise in 
the  latter  case  as  in  the  former. 
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In  both  types  of  linked  production,  the  optimum 
prices  can  only  be  arrived  at  by  considering  the 
entire  combined  output. 
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Let  us  begin  by  considering  the  output  of  a  road, 
as  an  example  of  linked  production  of  the  first 
type.  If there  is  no  congestion,  the separate prices 
are  equal  to  the  marginal  costs  of  production,  but 
the  level  of the  marginal  cost  may depend upon the 
volume  of  total  output,  since  common  production 
implies  increasing  returns  to  the  common  factor. 
If there  is  congestion,  the  optimum  prices  depend 
upon  the  contribution  of  each  category  of  vehicles 
to  the  congestion. 
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Similarly,  in  the  second  type  of  linked  production, 
the optimum prices of the different services rendered 
by  the  common  factor  depend  on  the  demand  for 
these  different  services.  If the  aim  is  to  achieve 
optimum  allocation  of resources,  and  if  the  compo-
sition  of  demand  is  variable  (as,  for  example,  in 
the  case  of  transport  in  opposite  directions),  prices 
should  be  flexible  so  as  to ensure optimum  output. 
In  addition,  the  criteria  of optimum  resource  allo-
cation require that every aspect of the price for their 
utilization  should  be  equal  to  the  marginal  cost (1). 
In  certain  cases,  particularly  if  the  proportions  are 
fixed  or almost  fixed  (as  in  the  case of transport in 
opposite  directions),  great  differences  may  result 
between the optimum prices of the separate outputs. 
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In conclusion,  when  different goods  or different ser-
vices  are  produced  by  the  same  process,  the  total 
cost  must  be  defined  as  the  sum  of  all  expenses 
incurred  in  the  process.  The prices  of the  various 
categories of output can only be determined simulta-
neously  and  by  imposing  the  condition  that supply 
and  demand  be  equal.  A  problem  of  imputation 
arises  if  the  prices  corresponding  to  an  optimum 
allocation  of  resources  occasion  a  deficit.  This 
problem  is  the  same  for  the  two  types  of  linked 
production  that  have  been  analysed  above.  The 
problems of imputing the deficit  to  the various cate-
gories  of  output will  be  examined  in  Part 11  of this 
report (2). 
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12.41  - Imputation  of costs  zn  time, 
and  amortization 
293 
According  to  a  widespread  misapprehension,  the 
prices  that would  correspond to  an  optimum  alloca-
tion  of  resources  can  be  determined  by  distributing 
the  total cost of production among the  various  com-
ponents  of  output (R).  This  view  is  incorrect  for 
several  reasons.  The  three  basic  fallacies  involved 
are  the  following: 
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1.  The  idea  that  an  optimum  allocation  of  re-
sources  requires  that  total  discounted  revenue  be 
equal  to  total  discounted  cost.  This  view  is  erro-
neous.  As  we  have  seen,  a  sector  will  incur  a 
surplus  or  a  deficit  according  to  whether  it  is  sub-
ject  to  decreasing  or  increasing  returns.  Only  in 
the  special  case  of  constant  returns  coupled  with 
consistently correct forecasting of future  demand  (so 
that the  capacity of the  capital equipment  is  always 
perfectly  adapted  to  demand)  will  total  revenue  be 
equal  to  total  cost  at  optimum  prices (4). 
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2.  The  idea  that  the  prices  corresponding  to  an 
optimum  allocation  of  resources  can  be  determined 
by  distributing  the  total  cost  of  production  among 
the various  components of output, the price of each 
component being fixed  so  as  to equal the average of 
the  "total cost" per separate  component  thus  deter-
mined.  The only problems  which  should  arise in  a 
distribution of the total cost  in  this  way  concern the 
prices  of the  common factors  employed for  the pro-
duction  of  several  different  components  of  output. 
This  is  the case  with  the  capital equipment for  out-
puts  produced  at  different  times,  and  with  the 
common  factors  employed  in  linked  production. 
The distribution  of these  elements  of  the  total  cost 
among  the  various  components  of  output  is  com-
monly  referred to  as  "amortization" in  the  first  case 
(capital  equipment)  and  "imputation"  in  the  second 
(common  factors) (5). 
(')  Viz.,  to  the  partial  derivative  of the  total  cost,  the  ca-
pacity of the  common  factors  being  taken  as  constant. 
(")  See  Section  24.4. 
(")  We  have  defined  total  cost  as  the  sum  of  present  and 
discounted  future  economic  expenditure  incurred  in  the 
production  of all  the  outputs  in  question. 
(')  In  a  situation of competition, the surplus the sector may 
achieve  in  the  case  of decreasing  average  returns  takes  the 
form  of  rent  payments  that  will  be  considered  as  a  pro-
duction  cost  by  the  individual  operators.  For  each  indi-
vidual  operator total cost  will  equal total revenue,  provided 
his  forecasts  with  respect  to  future  prices  are  consistently 
correct  (so  that  capacity  is  always  perfectly  adapted  to 
demand). 
(")  A  special  analysis  of  such  imputation  was  given  in 
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This  view  is  also  erroneous.  The  optimum  prices 
are  simply  not equal to  the average distributed costs, 
whatever  the  method  of  distribution  adopted,  except 
in  very  special  cases. 
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3.  The  idea  that  the  prices  corresponding  to  an 
optimum  allocation  of  resources  can  be  determined 
from  past expenditure.  This  idea is  not  an  absolu-
tely  essential  element  of  the  point  of  view  in  ques-
tion,  but  it  is  practically  always  linked  to  it.  It 
implies  that  distribution  of  the  total  cost  takes 
place  not  as  a  function  of  future  prospects  but  on 
the  basis  of  past  costs.  The method  used  consists 
in  charging  each  successive  period  of the  economic 
life  of  an  item  of capital  equipment  with  a  part of 
its  initial  investment  cost.  The initial  cost  and  the 
length  of  the  economic  life  of the  asset  in  question 
may be  adjusted  in  the  course of time, but this does 
not  change  the  fundamental  fact  that  this  method 
is  essentially  based on  past  expenditure.  Whatever 
practical  advantages  it  may  have,  this  is  a fatal  flaw 
from  the  point  of  view  of  both  pure  and  applied 
economic  theory.  Past  expenditure  is  completely 
irrelevant  to  present  decisions,  whether  they  are 
based on the criteria of optimum resource  allocation 
or on the (often  coincident)  requirement of maximi-
zation  of  net  discounted  revenue (1).  To  be  sure, 
past  experience  does  generally  provide  information 
of use in guiding present decisions.  But this certain-
ly  does  not  mean  that  current  prices  should  be 
based on  past expenditure,  no  matter how  the latter 
are  "corrected"  to  allow  for  changed  economic 
conditions. 
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In  view  of  these  three  basic  fallacies,  there  would 
seem  to  be  little  point  in  going  further  into  the 
method of price determination based on amortization 
and  imputation.  It  may  none  the  less  be  useful  to 
examine  a  few  related  points,  which  will  play  an 
important  role  in  Parts  II and Ill of this  report. 
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In  the  first  place  they  are  important  because  the 
method  under  review  springs  from  a  very  common 
misinterpretation  of  economic  theory  which  has 
often  had  a  great and,  it  is  to  be feared,  a  serious-
ly  misleading  influence  on  economic  decisions. 
There is  therefore  every  reason  to  reiterate that this 
view  is  erroneous and leads,  as  can be demonstrated, 
to  incorrect  conclusions  on  many  points  we  shall 
have  to  consider. 
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There  is  also  another  reason  why  this  matter  is 
important.  We  have  already seen that, if the price, 
investment  and  output criteria  of  optimum  resource 
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allocation  are  applied  to  a  sector  of  the  e:conomy 
which  is  subject  to  increasing  average  returns,  that 
sector  will  incur  a  deficit.  In the  transport  sector, 
this  is  valid  particularly  for  infrastructure.  Conse-
quently,  if  the  criteria  of  optimum  resource  allo-
cation  are  applied  to  infrastructure -- the  criteria 
concerning investment as well as those concerning the 
prices  to be charged  for  its  utilization  - a  deficit 
may  be  incurred  in  operation  of  the  infrastructure. 
In  Part  II  we  shall  discuss  the  reasons  why  it  is 
important  to  impose  the  constraint  of  budgetary 
equilibrium  on  infrastructure,  even  though  this 
distorts  the optimum  allocation of resources..  With-
out  at  this  point going  into  the question  of budget-
ary  equilibrium  itself,  we  might  point  out  that  it 
would  entail  an  additional  charge  on  the  users  of 
infrastructure  (additional,  that  is,  to  the  optimum 
charges).  It might then be thought that these  addi-
tional  charges  could  be  determined  by  the  method 
mentioned  above  for  amortization  and  imputation 
of  the  total  cost  of infrastructure. 
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In  discussing  this  approach,  one  point  should  be 
made  at  the  outset.  Budgetary  equilibrium  is  an 
additional constraint; it  does  not replace the  criteria 
of optimum  resource  allocation.  This  implies  that 
the charges for the utilization of infrastructure should 
in any case not be lower than those corresponding to 
an  optimum  allocation  of  resources  without  the 
constraint  of  budgetary  equilibrium.  Consequently, 
whatever  may  be  the  merits  or  demerits  of  any 
particular  method  of  imputation  and  amortization, 
the  method  adopted  must  always  be  supplemented 
by a procedure that will make it impossible for prices 
to  be  reduced  below  the  optimum level. 
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For the  rest,  economic theory does not permit more 
than  the  general  conclusion  that  any  method  of 
amortization  and  imputation  is  arbitrary (2). 
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One final  point  should  be  mentioned  here,  since  it 
is  particulary  important,  not  so  much for  transport 
infrastructure as  for services.  The method discussed 
in the present se-Ction,  which  consists in  determining 
the  prices  of output  by  a  distribution  of the  total 
cost,  leads  to,  or  is  at  least  commonly  associated 
with,  a  particular  conception  of  price  and  output 
policy.  The  distribution  of  total  cost  is  usually 
undertaken in order to establish a set of prices which 
are to be kept constant as  long as  there is  no change 
in  cost  and  demand  conditions  that  is  likely  to  be 
(') See  Subsection  12.34. 
(') This  matter  will  be  examined  in  detail  and  in  a  more 
general  way  in  Part  11  (see  Sec.  24.4). more  than  temporary.  Unforeseen  fluctuations  of 
demand  musrl  be  met  so,lely  by  adjustments  of 
supply,  which  will  depend  on  the  extent  to  which 
existing  capacity  can  accommodate  fluctuations  of 
demand  at  predetermined  prices.  If  demand 
outruns existing capacity, a system of rationing must 
be  adopted  to  apportion  the  insufficient  output 
among  the  users;  otherwise  some  such  system  will 
develop  spontaneously  - for  example,  the  system 
of  rationing  by  queue  that  is  well  known  in  urban 
passenger  transport. 
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From  an  economic  point of  view,  the  drawback  of 
this  method  of  determining  the  prices  of  output  is 
that  it  prevents  optimum  utilization  of  capacity  at 
certain  times  whilst  at  others  it  may  lead  to  some 
system  of  rationing  demand,  the  economic  disad-
vantages of which are obvious.  These points, which 
involve  the  merits  and  demerits  of price  flexibility, 
will  be  dealt  with  again  in  the  subsequent  parts  of 
this  report. 
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To  conclude :  when  production  is  effected  with  the 
aid of capital equipment, the total cost of production 
during  any  given  period  can only  be  determined  by 
charging  part  of  the  price  of  the  equipment  to  the 
output produced during the same period.  Economic 
theory shows  that,  assuming this  to  be possible,  such 
an  imputation  could  only  be  made  a  posteriori  -
if  done  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  optimum 
allocation  of  resources  - for  it  would  be  necessary 
to  know  the  prices  for  each  commodity  that  equate 
supply  with  demand  at  any  one  moment.  This 
means  that  amortization  depends  essentially  on  the 
various  price  developments.  There  is,  in  fact,  no 
other criterion  than  the  conventional  one  for  deter-
mining the best rate of amortization a priori,  i.e.  the 
optimum imputation based  on  a  knowledge  of  costs 
alone.  Any imputation of this  kind  must  therefore 
always  be arbitrary  and meaningless  if  the aim  is  to 
achieve  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources.  This 
conclusion  is  also  valid  in  the  case  of  linked  pro-
duction. CHAPTER  13 
APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF OPTIMUM 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION TO  INFRASTRUCTURE 
13.0  - General 
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Although  all  essential  propositions  concerning  du-
rable  factors  of  production  in  general  have  already 
been  given,  it  would  appear profitable to sum them 
up and comment on them briefly for the special case 
of infrastructure. 
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Infrastructure  mainly  consists  of  fixed  installations 
with  a long economic life.  Furthermore, it is  gener-
ally  characterized  by  marked  indivisibility  and  in-
creasing  returns.  Finally,  its  production  is  not  ho-
mogeneous.  For instance,  the  passage  of a  private 
car  and  that  of  a  truck  along  one  and  the  same 
road  are not  identical  services. 
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The conditions  of  an  optimum  allocation  of resour-
ces  with  respect to capital equipment,  as  applied  to 
the special cases of the non-differentiated sector and 
related  productions,  are  therefore  very  important 
factors  in  decisions  on infrastructure investment and 
management. 
13.1  - INVESTMENT 
13.10  - Investment  decisions 
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The social  value of  an infrastructure is  equal to the 
discounted total benefits connected with its use, these 
benefits  being  considered  at  the  final  consumption 
stage.  The social  value of the infrastructure is  nat-
urally  a  function  of  its  capacity,  as  are  also  its 
construction  costs. 
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Hence,  a  correct  investment  decision  presupposes: 
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a)  That  the  social  value  of  the  infrastructure  is 
greater  than  the  sum  of  its  investment  cost  and  of 
the discounted value of the operating costs; 
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b)  That  the  difference  is  maximum,  the  calcu-
lation  being  made  for  final  prices  considered  as 
given. 
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The  two  conditions  a)  and  b)  determine  1the  opti-
mum  size  of  the  infrastructure. 
314 
In cases where infrastructure is  likely to vary contin-
uously,  the  se:cond  condition  implies  marginal 
equalities.  The  most  important  of  these  for  what 
follows  is  equality  between  the  marginal  cost  of 
the  infrastructur'e  and  its  discounted  marginal  ben-
efits,  minus  the  discounted  marginal  costs  of  utili-
zation,  all  calculated  in  relation  to  the  capacity  of 
the  infrastructure (1 ). 
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The calculations for every new project of investment 
in  infrastructure must be made in  isolation, but must 
take  account  of the  extent  to which  the  new  infra-
structure complements or can replace others,  partic-
ularly  as  regards  the traffic  it  may  be  expected  to 
carry and the variations  in  traffic it will  involve  for 
the  older  infrastructures.  Account  should  also  be 
taken not only of the cost of the new investment and 
its  discounted  operating  costs,  but  also  of  the 
existing  infrastructure  which  it  can  supplement  or 
replace. 
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The equality  between,  on the one  hand,  the  sum  of 
the  marginal  investment  costs  of  the  infrastructure 
and the discounted operating costs,  and on the other 
hand  the  discounted  optimum  charges  implies  that, 
although  the  capacity of the  infrastructure can  vary 
continuously,  it  is  impossible that there should never 
be congestion.  This means that the optimum charge 
will  be greater  than  the  cost  charge  during  at  least 
part of the life  of the infrastructure.  But if there is 
a  minimum  size  of the  infrastructure below  which  it 
is  impossible to go,  and if the economically optimum 
size  were  smaller  than  this  minimum,  the  equality 
mentioned  would  no  longer  apply and the  establish-
ment  and  operation  of  an  infrastructure  could  be 
advantageous  even  though  it  would  never  be  fully 
utilized. 
13. I 1  - Investment  criteria  and  the  deficit 
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First a distinction must be made between, on the one 
hand,  the  establishment  of the  infrastructure  and  its 
(')  See  in  particular  Subsection  11.02,  and  Sections  11.1, 
11.2. subsequent operation in  so  far as  this  is  independent 
of traffic,  and,  on the other hand, the production of 
transport services with the help of the infrastructure. 
Once  the  infrastructure  has  been  established  and  is 
maintained in  working condition,  it  is  like  any other 
form  of  natural  wealth.  It  exists,  and  there  is  no 
reason  to  make it  play any one  particular role. 
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As  with  every  form  of natural  wealth  its  utilization 
can  give  rise  tu  an  economic  rent  which  we  have 
called  congestion  charge,  if  demand at a  tariff equal 
to  the  cost  charge  exceeds  capacity.  The only  dif-
ference  between infrastructure and natural wealth -
admittedly  a  fundamental  one  - is  that  the  latter 
is  a  free  gift  of  nature  whereas  infrastructure  not 
only  involves  expenditure  for  its  construction  but 
also  continues to  call for operating expenditure inde-
pendent  of  all  traffic.  This  operating  expenditure 
is  naturally  not  investment  expenditure;  but in  fact 
it  plays  a  quite  comparable role  for,  being indepen-
dent  of  traffic,  it  stems  simply  from  the  earlier 
investment  decision,  at  least  for  such  time  as  no 
decision  has  been  taken  to  close  down  the  infra-
structure. 
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This being so,  the capitalized value of the congestion 
charge  may  very  easily  be lower  than  the  value  of 
the  initial investment costs  plus the discounted value 
of  the  operating  expenditure  independent  of traffic. 
We  can  doubtless  consider  such  to  be  the  usual 
case (1). 
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We  have  already  said  that  the  whole  of  the  infra-
structure  and  the  associated  operating  services  is 
generally  subject  to  increasing  average  returns.  A 
supplementary  outlay  at  the  start  generally  effects 
a more than proportional increase in the present and 
future  capacity  of  the  infrastructure.  The  result 
is  that  if  the  infrastructure  investment  is  made  in 
conformity  with  the  criteria  of  optimum  resource 
allocation,  and  if  the  users  pay  prices  established 
on the  same  basis (2),  the  infrastructure will  incur a 
deficit C).  It  should  be  emphasized  that  the  size 
of  the  deficit  is  determined  solely  by  the  technical 
characteristics  of  the  infrastructure,  that  is  to  say 
be  the extent to  which its  establishment is  subject to 
increasing  average  returns  or,  in  other  words,  by 
the extent to  which the initial expenditure, consisting 
of  both  the  establishment  costs  and  the  discounted 
operating costs independent of traffic, grows less than 
proportionately  to  capacity (4). 
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The  cost  charges  are  not  sufficient  to  cover  the 
operating  costs(").  From  this  it  follows  that  the 
sum  of the  investment cost and the discounted oper-
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ating  costs  which  depend  purely  on  capacity  can 
be  covered  only  by  congestion  charges,  and if  there 
are  increasing  average  returns  in  the building of the 
infrastructure  this  sum  is  covered  only  partially  by 
these  charges. 
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From  the  angle  of  the  theory  of  optimum  resource 
allocation  the  deficit  does  not  pose  any  particular 
problems.  It  has  to  be  financed  with  the  help  of 
neutral  transfers  (i.e.,  transfers which  do  not modify 
marginal behaviours),  and these are in  theory always 
possible (6).  This  will  be the  case  whenever  trans-
fers  of  income  are  transfers  of rents (7).  The  opti-
mum  investment  in  the  infrastructure,  as  well  as 
the optimum  prices  to  be charged  users,  are  deter-
mined by the criteria of optimum resource allocation, 
which  do  not in  any way  postulate "budgetary equi-
librium" 
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These conditions  are essential,  and  any policy which 
tried  to  cover  the  deficit  by  applying  higher  tariffs 
than  the  economic  charges  corresponding  to  an 
optimum  allocation  of  resources  would,  from  this 
point  of  view,  merely  jeopardize  efficient  manage-
ment 
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Since,  in  any  case,  at the  time when  the investment 
decision  is  made  the  discounted  benefits  for  final 
direct or indirect users  must be at least equal to the 
investment  cost  plus  the discounted  operating  costs, 
it is  not impossible in principle to levy the resources 
needed to cover the deficit from the surpluses of the 
direct  or  indirect  users,  on  condition,  once  again, 
that  this  levy  is  a  standard  amount,  for  example  a 
tax  giving  the  right  to  use  the  infrastructure  inde-
pendent of the extent of such use (8). 
(')  This  proposition  naturally  has  a  qualitative  character, 
with  no  implications  as  to  orders  of  magnitude  (see  Sub-
section  24.47). 
(")  See  Subsection  13.20. 
(")  This will  be  so  unless  future  demand has  been  consider-
ably  underestimated,  making  effective  congestion  charges 
notably  higher  than  those  taken  into  account  at  the  time 
of investment. 
(')  The  effective  size  of  this  deficit  will  be  studied  below 
(see  Subsection  24.47).  It is  clear  that  the  practical  im-
portance of all  considerations  concerning the  deficit  depend 
on it. 
(")  There is  no difference between expenditure on the upkeep 
of  a  road,  which  is  essentially  investment,  and  the  initial 
expenditure  on  building  it.  The  problems  arising,  and 
their solution,  are  exactly  the  same. 
(
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)  See  Subsection  23.30  for  a  more  detailed  study  of this 
point. 
(")  We  shall  revert  to  this  later. 
(') The  neutrality of this  method is  of course  quite  relative 
for,  strictly  speaking,  such  a  lump-sum  tax  cannot  be 
considered  as  neutral  vis-a-vis  potential  users. 325 
However,  in  applied economics the question presents 
itself  differently.  In  fact,  the  financing  of  the  def-
icit  with  the  help  of  neutral  transfers  of  income 
is  a  source  of  many  problems.  However,  argu-
ments  can  be  advanced  for  imposing  the  constraint 
of  budgetary  equilibrium  on  infrastructure.  The 
reasons  for  doing  this,  and  its  consequences,  will  be 
examined  later (1). 
13.2  - CHARGES  FOR  THE  USE 
OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
13.20  - Optimum  charge  levels  for  infrastructure 
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The  operating  cost  of  infrastructure  consists  on the 
one  hand  of the  running  costs,  including  the cost of 
ancillary services such as  safety installations, lighting, 
etc., which are in practice inseparable from  the infra-
structure  itself,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  costs 
depending  on  traffic. 
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At any given  time,  the  marginal cost of management 
of  the  infrastructure,  calculated  in  relation  to  the 
traffic,  is  called  the  cost  charge (2).  The  optimum 
management conditions of infrastructure correspond-
ing  to  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources  differ 
according  to  whether,  at  a  tariff  equal  to  the  cost 
charge,  is  below  or above  capacity,  i.e.  whether  or 
not  there  is  congestion.  The  optimum  tariff  for 
use  of  the  infrastructure  is  called  the  economic 
charge. 
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If there  is  no  congestion,  the  economic  charge  is 
equal  to  the  cost  charge.  If there  is  congestion, 
the  economic  charge  equates  demand  with  capacity. 
Following  the  definition  of saturation,  the  economic 
charge is  higher than the cost charge, and the differ-
ence  has  been  called  the  congestion  charge (2). 
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It will  be  obvious  that the congestion  charge  varies 
with  the intensity of demand in relation to  the exist-
ing  capacity  of  the  infrastructure.  The  congestion 
charge  is  therefore  a  scarcity rent. 
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The  concepts  of  "full  utilization"  and "congestion'• 
of  the  infrastructure  must  always  be interpreted  in 
the  economic  and  not in  the physical  sense (3).  An 
item  of  capital  equipment  such  as  infrastructure  is 
considered  as  being  fully  utilized  in  the  economic 
sense  when  the probability of full  utilization  reaches 
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a  certain  level,  determined  on  the  basis  of  practical 
considerations (4). 
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When  the  level  of  full  utilization  is  exceeded,  which 
is  generally  the  case  if  rationing  is  effected  not  by 
price  but  by  queuing,  we  shall  use  the  term  "con-
gestion"  in  this  report. 
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It  must  be  clearly  understood  that  once  the  infra-
structure  is  built  the  only  absolute  necessity  from 
the  angle  of  optimum  resource  allocation  (whether 
the  initial  calculations  and  forecasts  were  right  or 
not)  is  to  use  it  to  the  best  advantage.  Conse-
quently,  the  congestion  charge  should  be  imposed 
only  if demand at a charge equal to  the  cost  charge 
exceeds  the  capacity  of  the  infrastructure,  and  it 
should  then  be  fixed  at  such  a  level  that  demand 
equals  capacity. 
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We  would  recall  that the  necessary  corollary of the 
principle  "only  the  future  counts" (5)  is  that  the 
optimum tariff system  at  any  given  moment is  inde-
pendent  of  past  costs,  i.e.  of  past  expenditure. 
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The  optimum  tariff  for  the  use  of  a  tunnel,  for 
instance,  has  nothing to do  with  the cost of building 
it.  The  optimum  tariff  is  the  one  which  limits 
demand  to  the  capacity  of  the  tunnel. 
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If,  at  a  tariff  equal  to  the  cost  charge,  which  is 
generally very  low,  demand is  below  the capacity of 
the  tunnel,  the optimum tariff for  its  use  will  be the 
cost  charge.  But  if,  at  a  tariff  equal  to  the  cost 
charge,  demand exceeds capacity, the optimum tariff 
is  the  one which  equates  demand  with  the  capacity 
of  the  tunnel. 
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The same applies to optimum allocation of resources 
for  parking  in  cities.  For  a  given  probability  of 
congestion  p,  for  example  1 :  1 000,  parking  on 
the public highway should be free if there is only one 
chance  in  a  thousand of a  driver  not  finding  room 
at  a  given  time  and  place.  Parking  should  be 
charged for  if  this  is  not the case,  and the  optimum 
(')  See  in  particular  Sections,  23.3  and  24.4. 
(")  See  Subsection  11.1. 
(")  See  the  general  information  already  given  in  Section 
11.6. 
(•)  The search for the optimum economic value of the prob-
ability  of  congestion  is,  of  course,  outside  the  scope  of 
this  study. 
(")  See  Subsection  12.24. tariff  is  the  one  which  reduces  demand  to  such  a 
level  that  there  is  only  one  chance  in  a  thousand 
of our driver  not finding  a  place free. 
337 
The  same  is  also  true  of  motorways.  Let us  again 
suppose  that  the  desired  probability  of  congestion 
p  =  1 :  1 000,  which  means  that  we  are  aiming 
for  conditions  which  are  such  that  there  will  only 
be  one chance  in  a  thousand  of  a  motorist's  being 
obliged  to  drive  at  less  than the normal speed.  At 
any  given  time  and  on  a  given  day  the  optimum 
tariff  for  using  the  motorway  is  the  one  at  which 
the probability is  less  than  1 :  1 000.  It is  reduced 
to the cost charge - which is  generally very low -
if,  at  a  tariff  equal  to  this  charge,  traffic  is  such 
that  the  probability  is  actually  less  than  1 :  1 000. 
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In  all  cases,  to  ensure  optimum  allocation  of  re-
sources  the  fundamental  rule in  formulating  a  tariff 
must  be  based  on  a  comparison  between  capacity 
and  demand (1). 
13.21  - The  congestion  charge 
is  a  rent  and  not  a  cost 
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From  what  we  have  just  said,  it  follows  that  the 
congestion  charge  is  a  rent  and not a  cost (2).  The 
capacity  of  an  existing  infrastructure  at  any  time 
should  be  considered  as  a  given  quantity.  Hence, 
the  congestion  charge  is  entirely  determined  by 
demand,  and  can  in  no  way  be  considered  as  a 
production  cost. 
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It cannot  therefore  be  admitted,  explicitly  or impli-
citly,  that  the  optimum  tariff  for  use  of  the  infra-
structure could  be  calculated  simply  by  considering 
the  investment  costs. 
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This error originates in a wrong interpretation at the 
time  of the investment decision  of equality between 
the  sum  of  the  marginal  investment  cost  of  infra-
structure and the discounted marginal operating costs 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  discounted  marginal 
benefits  from  the  infrastructure  on  the  other,  all 
calculated in relation to capacity (3). 
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Because the first  term  of  this  equation is  actually  a 
cost,  the  second  term  is  often  interpreted  as  a  sum 
of costs.  But such  an interpretation is  purely  con-
ventional and can only lead to confusion. 
47 
343 
In  fact,  from  this  interpretation  of the benefits  and 
operating  costs  we  deduce  that  a  congestion  charge 
equal  to the  marginal benefit minus  the cost  charge 
would  itself  be  a  cost  and therefore could be calcu-
lated  simply  on  the  basis  of  the  investment  costs. 
This is  incorrect,  since the congestion charge always 
depends essentially on demand.  It can also  be said 
that  at  all  times  and  by  definition  the  discounted 
marginal  benefit  from  the  infrastructure  is  equal  to 
the  discounted  marginal  utility.  It  follows  from 
this  equality  that  the  marginal  benefit  from  utiliza-
tion  is  always  equal  to  the  reduction  in  discounted 
value  plus  the  interest  on  the  discounted  value. 
The interpretation  we  mention  is  tantamount to re-
garding the variation of the discounted benefit  as  an 
amortization,  which it is  not. 
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In fact  it  cannot in  any way  be  concluded  that  the 
congestion  charge  is  a  cost.  Because  two  magni-
tudes  are  equal under certain conditions  we  cannot 
conclude  that  they  are identical,  nor a  fortiori  that 
their  elements  are  identical  when  these  magnitudes 
are  themselves  integrals.  The  congestion  charge  is 
essentially  an economic  rent,  and  from  this  follows 
the proposition  - essential  for  any  policy  of opti-
mum  management  of  existing  infrastructures  -
that the optimum value of the congestion charge, and 
consequently  the  optimum  tariffs  for  the  use  of 
an infrastructure,  cannot be determined on the basis 
of the  investment  costs. 
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It  can  further  be  said  that  the  optimum  marginal 
depreciation  of  an  investment  in  infrastructure (4) 
cannot  be  determined  from  a  priori  considerations. 
It can only be deduced from  the congestion  charge, 
which  cannot  be  deduced  from  depreciation  value 
calculated  a  priori. 
346 
The  optimum  congestion  charge  cannot  therefore 
be  calculated  from  the  depreciation.  In  reality, 
the  optimum  marginal  depreciation  can  only  be 
(')  Naturally,  these  observations  are  not  valid  only  for 
transport  infrastructures;  they  could  also  be  applied,  for 
instance,  to  the  optimum  operation  of  hydroelectric  dams. 
(")  The congestion charge is,  of course, considered here from 
the  point  of  view  of  management  of  the  infrastructure. 
From the  user's  angle,  the  congestion  charge  is  a  cost. 
(")  Calculated  in  relation  to  capacity,  the  marginal  benefit 
from  the  infrastructure  at  any given  time  is  nil  if it  is  not 
fully  utilised,  and  it  is  equal  to  the  economic  charge  if  it 
is  fully  utilised. 
(')  Calculated, of course,  in relation  to  capacity. determined  from  the  optimum  congestion  charge, 
which  itself  results  from  the comparison at  all  times 
of demand  and  the  capacity of the infrastructure (1). 
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In  general,  the  optimum  charge  can  only  be inter-
preted conventionally in the sense of a cost when the 
initial calculations for  the infrastructure were correct 
and  the  forecasts  on  which  they  were  based  were 
accurate. 
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Even  if  these  two  conditions  are  present,  the  con-
gestion  charge  always  retains its  character as  a pure 
marginal  rent,  and  this  rent is  determined by  equat-
ing  demand  with  the  existing  capacity  of  the  infra-
structure  through  a  tariff  equal  to  the  economic 
charge.  The  interpretation  of  optimum  congestion 
charge  as  a  cost  is  completely  conventional.  Its 
only  interest  is  academic;  it  presents  no  practical 
advantage.  On  the  contrary,  it  complicates  all 
questions  quite  needlessly  and  can  only  lead  oper-
ators to  take wrong decisions. 
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A  fortiori,  if the two conditions of correct calculation 
and  perfect  forecasting  are  not  fulfilled  - as  is 
generally  the  case  in  actual  fact  - the  congestion 
charge  can  no  longer  be  interpreted  in  any  way  as 
a  cost,  even  within  a  framework  of  formal  equa-
lity (2). 
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Moreover,  we  must  add  that  although  the  marginal 
utility  of  the use  of  infrastructure equal  to  the eco-
nomic  charge can be conventionally interpreted as  a 
cost,  this  interpretation  is  no  longer  possible for  the 
total  benefit.  It  IS  therefore  only  possible 
marginally. 
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Accordingly,  any  system  of  tariffs  for  use  of  an 
infrastructure  which  is  based  on  investment  costs 
makes  no  sense  economically. 
352 
From  the  point  of  view  of  optimum  management, 
investment  costs  should  only  be  considered  once -
when  the  decision  is  taken  to build  the  infrastruc-
ture (3).  They  are  then,  of  course,  of  prime  im-
portance. 
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Hence  there  are  two  decisive  reasons  why  the 
congestion  charge  cannot  be  interpreted  as  a  cost, 
even  conventionally on the  pretext  that,  at  the  time 
of  the  investment  decision,  there  is  a  relationship 
between  the  cost  of  the  marginal  investment  in  re-
lation  to  capacity  and  the  expected  future  revenues 
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from  the  congestion  charge.  The  first  reason  is 
. that  there  is  no  guarantee  that  the  forecasts  will 
prove  right.  If they  are  wrong  - as  they  usually 
are (4)  - the congestion charge is  determined exclu-
sively  by  actual  demand  and  actual  capac:ity,  and 
the cost of past investment does not affect the issue. 
In  the  second  place,  the  fact  that  the  sum  of the 
discounted  congestion  charges  throughout  the whole 
economic life of the infrastructure can be represented 
as  a  cost  is  no  indication  of what  the  appropriate 
level  of the  congestion  charge  must bt:  at any given 
time. 
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Consequently,  the  congestion  charge  cannot  be 
considered as a cost.  It is  a pure scarcity price, an 
economic  rent which  is  determined  by  the level  of 
demand,  that  is  to  say  the  volume  of  traffic,  in 
relation to  the existing capacity of the infrastructure. 
From  this  it again  follows  that  the  optimum  tariff 
level for  the use of an infrastructure cannot be deter-
mined  from  investment  costs. 
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This proposition enables us to form a judgment, from 
the point of view  of optimum resource allocation, on 
two  suggested  methods  of fixing  tariffs  for  the use 
of infrastructures:  the  development  cost  and  calcu-
lated total cost methods. 
13.22  - The  development  cost  method 
356 
This  method  will  be  analysed in  detail later.  How-
ever,  it  appears  advisable  to  say  a  few  words about 
(')  This optimum marginal depreciation can easily be shown 
to  be  equal  to  the  congestion  charge  minus  the  marginal 
cost  of  operation,  calculated  in  relation  to  capacity,  and 
minus  the  interest  on  the  non-depreciated  marginal  value 
of  the  investment.  Hence,  when  the  congestion  charge  is 
nil  the  optimum  marginal  depreciation  is  negative  (these 
properties  follow  directly  from  footnote  ("),  p.  21). 
('1  Of  terms  which  are  themselves  integrals  of  marginal 
elements. 
(")  The  only  theoretical  case  in  which  the  optimum  con-
gestion  charge  could  be  determined  from  the  investment 
costs  is  where  the  depreciation  of  these  costs  could  be 
determined  a  priori.  This  is  true  of  a  permanent  system 
of perfect forecasting applied to an infrastructure of infinite 
duration  for  which  the  initial  calculations  were  perfect. 
Depreciation would then be equal to zero and the congestion 
charge  would  be  formally  equal  to  the  marginal  manage-
ment  cost  in  relation  to  capacity  plus  the  interest  on  the 
investment  cost  of the  infrastructure.  This  purely  theoret-
ical  case  is  of  no  practical  interest,  for  it  corresponds  to 
hypotheses  which  are  never  fulfilled  in  reality.  Moreover, 
even  if  they  were  fulfilled,  the  congestion  charge  would 
still  be  a  rent, not a  cost. 
(')  For  instance,  since  the  volume  of  traffic  fluctuates 
markedly  from  one  season  to  another  and  from  one  hour 
to  another,  correct  forecasts  of  the  level  of  demand  for 
the  whole  of  the:  infrastructure's  life  will  be  rendered 
impossible  by  the  length  of  that  life. it  here,  purely  from  the  point  of  view  of  optimum 
resource  allocation. 
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Contrary to  what  we  said  above (1)  it  has  been sug-
gested  that the  optimum  tariff  for  the  use  of infra-
structure,  and  in  particular  the  congestion  charge 
element,  could  be  deduced  from  a  specific  concept 
of  cost  known  as  "development  cost".  There  are 
many  variants of this  theory but they all  seem to be 
based  on  the  following  definition:  "the development 
cost is  the quotient resulting when the total discount-
ed  cost  of  additional  capacities  of  infrastructure  is 
divided  by  the  discounted sum  of revenue  from  the 
resulting  additional  traffic".  In  another  variant the 
divisor is  the sum of the discounted additional future 
capacities  created  by  the  marginal  infrastructure 
investment.  In other words,  the  capacity  is  consid-
ered  instead  of  the  actual  traffic. 
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This  last  formulation  assumes  equality  between  the 
economic  charges  and the  marginal value,  calculated 
in  relation  to  the  capacity,  of  the  sum  of  the  costs 
of  establishment  and  the  operating  costs;  and  the 
optimum charge  can be  derived  from  this,  provided 
the  marginal  benefit  is  considered  as  a  constant (2). 
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In the case of the first  variant the derivation is  more 
complex, but it still rests on a certain convention, viz. 
that the  charges  are  constant (3). 
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The different variants of the development cost theory 
are  presented  as  having  the  advantage  of  enabling 
the  optimum  charge  to  be  calculated  solely  on  the 
basis  of  costs;  and  it  is  certain  that  if  this  formu-
lation  were  valid  such  a  calculation  would  be 
possible. 
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Thus  the  theory  of  development  cost  assumes  that 
the optimum tariff level for an existing infrastructure 
can  be  determined  from  investment  costs.  Such  a 
convention can be justified where the capital involved 
is  sufficiently  small  for  the  period  of less  than  full 
utilisation  to  be  fairly  short and where each  supple-
mentary unit represents only a fraction of the overall 
production  capacity.  These  conditions  are  approx-
imately  fulfilled  as  regards,  for  instance,  railway 
rolling  stock  and  even  the  generation  of  electricity 
in  thermal  power  stations;  they  are  not  fulfilled  in 
the  case  of  transport  infrastructure (4). 
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For  infrastructures  with  a  fairly  long  life,  whether 
motorways  or  tunnels  in  the  case  of  transport,  or 
dams  in  the  case  of  electricity  generation,  there  is 
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no  economic  advantage  in  stipulating  a  constant 
charge  for  the  life  of the  infrastructure;  as  soon  as 
it exists  it  should  be  used  in  the  best  manner  pos-
sible, i.e. only the cost charge should be charged and 
no  additional  charge  until  demand  at  a  price equal 
to the cost  charge exceeds  the  capacity of the infra-
structure. 
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The  development  cost  theory  may  look  like  a 
dynamic  one  which  tends  to  facilitate  development. 
But in  reality it  is  based on a static assumption,  and 
its  application  can  only  hinder  development  by 
artificially  and  uneconomically  limiting  the  use  of 
infrastructures  when  they  are  not  fully  utilized. 
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The  theory  of  development  cost  does  not  find  its 
justification  in  the  economic  theory  of  optimum 
management.  It rests  on  a  pure convention  whose 
economic  soundness  in  the  case  of  transport  infra-
structures  is  debatable,  to  say  the least. 
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In  practice,  application  of  this  theory  would  entail 
very  many  calculations,  one  for  each  transport 
infrastructure,  and  these  calculations  would  be  use-
less  in  determining  an  optimum  management  policy 
for  existing  infrastructures;  this  must  be  based  on 
(')  See  Subsection  13.20. 
e)  The  resulting  equation  is  written: 
t  r  r 
f 
1  -Jt
0
t(u)du 
<p(r)e  dr 
to 
d  - - -
---- [C0  + D0  + F0] 
d9 
where  (t)  is  the  marginal  benefit  in  relation  to  capacity, 
i  the  rate  of  interest,  and  0  the  capacity,  and  Cr.,  Do, 
Fo  represent respectively the  discounted cost of construction, 
operation  costs  depending  on  traffic,  and  operation  costs 
independent  of traffic.  If q:>(t)  is  considered  as  a  constant, 
we  can  deduce  for the  charge which is  equal to  it  the  value 
d  - - -
p  = 
- [Co  +  Do  +  Fo]  dE> 
ftte  - r  r i(u)du 
}to  )to  dr 
a  relation  which  can  again be  written 
l'l[C0  + 0 0  + f 0 ] 
'~  J:', e' -J,['"~" '' 
in  which  ~ e  represents  the  variation  of the  capacity  and 
~ [Co  +  D.,  +  F  .. ] represents the  total additional costs. 
(")  Some  authors  admittedly use  the  development  cost  term-
inology  in  quite  a  different  way,  excluding  any 
convention  of  constant  charges.  In  this  case  what  they 
are  actually  considering  are  marginal  costs  in  the  usual 
sense.  It would  then  be  preferable  to  keep  to  the  classic 
terminology  and  avoid  the  development  cost  terminology. 
In  the  most  authoritative  circles,  the  development  cost 
terminology  is  closely  linked  with  a  hypothesis  of constant 
charges.  We  therefore  think  it  preferable  to  reserve  the 
terminology  for  this  conception,  which  is,  in  any  case,  the 
one  studied  here. other  elements.  It  may  be  doubte~ moreover, 
whether  such  calculations  can  be  sufficiently  accu-
rate  to  yield  anything  more  precise  than  orders  of 
magnitude. 
366 
If it  is  a  question  of  building  a  new  infrastructure, 
calculations  are  obviously  necessary,  as  we  have 
pointed  out.  But  these  calculations  are  very  dif-
ferent  from  those  suggested  by  the  develop-
ment  cost  theory.  They  are  calculations  in 
terms  of  discounted  time-streams  which  in  no 
way  imply  - in  fact,  exclude  - any  assumption 
of  constancy  for  the  marginal  utility  of  the  infra-
structure. 
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In  any  case  the  development  cost  theory,  as  advo-
cated  for  transport  infrastructures,  is  presented  in 
greatly  varying  forms.  Some  of these  take  account 
of  actual  traffic  and  others  of  the  capacity  of  the 
infrastructure.  In some the calculations are itemized, 
in  others  there  are  overall  calculations  by  sector. 
The  absence  of  any  common  formulation  is  really 
only  the  consequence  of the  conventional  and  arbi-
trary  character of the  point of departure  and  of the 
very  obvious  difficulties  involved  in  the applications. 
368 
To sum up purely from the point of view of optimum 
resource  allocation,  it  can  be  said  that  development 
cost  only  coincides  with  the  optimum  tariff  for  the 
use  of  infrastructure  when  the  congestion  charge  is 
constant,  which  is  the  case  only  in  very  special 
circumstances  - in  particular,  demand  must  be 
stable  in  time  (or  increase  continuously)  and  the 
capital equipment must be perfectly divisible.  Since 
none  of  these  conditions  is  even  anything  like  ful-
filled  in  the  case  of infrastructure,  development  cost 
is  not  compatible  with  the  criteria  of  optimum  re-
source  allocation.  Of  course,  this  does  not  mean 
that the  concept  cannot have  other advantages  of  a 
practical  nature.  The  various  aspects  of  the 
question  will  be  examined  and  a  general  assessment 
submitted  in  Part Ill, in  which  the  various  possible 
systems  of fixing  tariffs  for  the  use  of  infrastructure 
will  be  studied. 
13.23  - The  calculated  total  cost  method 
369 
Like  the  development  cost  method,  the  calculated 
total cost method is  a way of computing the optimum 
charges  from  investment  costs,  but on  very  different 
principles. 
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The  method  proceeds  from  a  correct  premise  but 
arrives  at  a wrong conclusion.  The correct premise 
is  that competition  may  be  distorted  if  some  modes 
of  transport  are  relieved  of  the  financial  burdens 
connected  with  their  infrastructures  whilst  other 
modes  have  to  c:arry  them.  The wrong  conclusion 
is  that the values of all existing infrastructures should 
be  recalculated  to  enable  a  tariff level  for  their use 
to  be  worked  out  which  allows  for  the  financial 
charges  corresponding to  the values  thus  calculated. 
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The theory of calculated total  cost ignores the basic 
economic  principle  that only  the  future  counts  for 
optimum  managt:ment  of  the  economy (1).  It also 
ignores  the  conclusion  of  economic  theory  that  the 
optimum charge for  an infrastructure is  independent 
of the financial charges of the investments (2). 
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For  each  extstmg  transport  infrastructure,  applica-
tion of the calculated total cost method would entail 
almost  as  much  work  as  the calculations for  a  fresh 
project.  Hence  the  method  would  be  inoperable, 
because  such  a  task  is  virtually  impossible.  Fur-
thermore,  it  would  be  based  on  pure  conventions, 
since no  rule of imputation whatever can be justified 
by  the  theory  of  optimum  resource  allocation.  Fi-
nally,  it  would  be useless,  because  the  rules  of opti-
mum  management  of  an  existing  infrastructure  are 
independent  of  any  consideration  of  the  past  costs 
necessary to create the infrastructure or of the future 
costs  necessary to  replace or extend it. 
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The  methods  proposed  under  the  calculated  total 
cost theory are very varied - because, in actual fact, 
the problem  as  posed does  not allow  of  any rational 
solution. 
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Like  the  development  cost  theory,  the  calculated 
total  cost  theory  implies  calculations  which  are  as 
difficult  to  perform  correctly  as  they  are  useless  for 
an  optimum  management  of  infrastructures.  More-
over,  the  theory  is  based  on  an  error.,  i.e.  that  the 
optimum  tariff  level  for  a  transport  infrastructure 
can  be  established  from  past,  present  or  future 
investment  costs. 
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Like  the  development  cost  method,  the  calculated 
total  cost  method  will  be  subjected  to  a  more  com-
prehensive  analysis,  from  other  angles  than  that  of 
(')  See  Subsection  12.24. 
(")  See  Subsection  13.20. optimum  resource  allocation.  As  we  shall  see,  the 
fact  that  the  calculated  total  cost  method  cannot be 
justified from  the  point of view  of optimum resource 
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allocation  does  not mean that it  cannot have certain 
practical  advantages.  An  analysis  and  a  general 
appraisal of the method will be presented in Part Ill. CHAPTER  14 
SUMMARY OF  THE FIRST PART 
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Since  the  propositions  we  have  described  are  com-
plex,  it  would  perhaps not be  out of place to  give  a 
brief summary of the  main  ones  here. 
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I.  Efficiency  is  only one objective  among others; 
but  where  it  is  aimed  at,  either for  its  own  sake or 
as  a  condition  for  the  achievement  of other  objec-
tives,  the  theory  of  optimum  resource  allocation 
supplies  a  framework  for  thinking  and  an  indispen-
sable guide for practical applications. 
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2.  The  conditions  of  any  situation  of  maximum 
efficiency  can  be  defined  objectively,  either  purely 
from  the  point  of  view  of  efficiency  of production, 
or  from  the  wider  point  of  view  of  satisfaction  of 
wants. 
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From  the  first  point  of  view,  there  is  maximum 
efficiency  if it is  not  possible to produce more with 
the  resources  used,  and  from  the second  if  it  is  not 
possible  to improve the situation of every consumer, 
whether a given  individual or a community,  without 
injuring  some  other  consumer. 
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In other words,  if  we  ar~ in a situation of maximum 
efficiency  we  a),"e  at  the  borderline between  what  is 
possible  and  what  is  impossible,  which  means  that 
we  are  making  the  most  of the  available  resources. 
It is  not  possible  to be  in  a  situation  of maximum 
efficiency  from  the  point  of view  of satisfaction  of 
wants  without  being  in  a  similar  situation  from  the 
point  of  view  of  production. 
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The concept of optimum resource allocation does not 
in  principle  prejudice  the  distribution  of  incomes, 
which  in  theory  can  vary  very  widely  without 
jeopardizing  efficiency. 
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3.  The  theory  of  optimum  resource  allocation 
supplies  very  useful  criteria  for  optimum  manage-
ment  of  the  economy  in  general  and  transport  in 
particular.  Application  of  all  these  criteria  can 
result  in  the optimum price system  corresponding to 
an  optimum  allocation  of  resources. 
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4.  The indications  of the  theory  differ  according 
to  whether  the  production  operations  are  largely 
"divisible" or largely  "indivisible".  From the tech-
nical angle we  are in the first situation if an optimum 
allocation  of  resources  implies  the  use  of  distinct 
units of production (differentiated sector), and in the 
second  if  use  of  a  single  unit of  production  (non-
differentiated  sec:tor)  is  more  advantageous. 
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In  the  differentiated  sector  there  is  <:onvexity,  i.e. 
non-increasing  marginal  returns,  and  in  the  non-
differentiated  sector,  convexity  or conc:avity,  i.e.  de-
creasing or increasing marginal returns. 
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5.  The  structure  of  inland  transport  is  very 
complex  in  that  it  can  be broken  down  into  parts 
some  of  which  belong  to  the  differentiated  sector, 
others  to  the  non-differentiated  sector. 
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It  would  appear  useful  to  distinguish,  on  !the  one 
hand,  the  infrastructures  or  fixed  installations  and 
the  management  services  associated  with  them  -
where  these  are  independent  of the volume  of traf-
fic  - and,  on the other hand, the supply of trans-
port  services  with  the  help  of  these  infrastructures 
and  the  associated  services  considered  as  a  given 
quantity.  The distinction  is  clearcut  for  roads  and 
waterways but more difficult in  the case of railways. 
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Generally  speaking,  transport  infrastructures  belong 
to the non-differentiated sector and are characterized 
by increasing returns in  relation to  capacity. 
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However,  services  rendered belong to  the differenti-
ated sector,  at  any rate in  road transport and inland 
waterways.  This  is  also the case with  a large num-
ber  of  rail  transport  services;  but  where  there  are 
economies of scale in the supply of rail services, such 
supply  comes  under  the  non-differentiated  sector. 
Where they  exist,  these  economies  of scale  seem  to 
be  much  less  marked  than  in  rail  infrastructures. 
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On  the  level  of  pure  as  well  as  applied  economic 
theory,  analysis  :shows  that  there  are  fundamental 
economic  reasons  for  separately considering,  on the 
one hand infrastmcture and  the  associated operating services  independent of the volume of traffic,  and on 
the other supply of transport services.  Parts 11  and 
Ill will  show  that  this  distinction  is  even  more  use-
ful if we consider the practical methods to be applied. 
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6.  Whether it  is  a question of infrastructures or of 
transport services, one of the essential rules for opti-
mum  allocation  of  resources  is  that  costs  must  be 
m1mmum.  The cost of a given  operation is  defined 
as  the  discounted  sum  of all  the present  and  future 
expenditure  it  entails. 
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The  minimization  of  costs  must  be  understood  as 
applying  to  outputs  regarded  as  given,  and  it  must 
be  carried  out  by  considering  the  price  system  uti-
lized  as  a  given  quantity. 
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7.  Both  in  the  differentiated  and  non-differenti-
ated sectors, optimum operation implies a free choice 
by  users  of  the  mode  of  transport  and  the  carrier, 
and  a  price  which  equates  demand  with  capacity. 
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This  second condition,  which  is  too  often  neglected, 
would seem to be essential for an optimum allocation 
of resources. 
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8.  The  social  value  of  an  infrastructure  can  be 
defined  as  the  total  discounted  monetary  value  it 
represents  for  the  whole  body  of  final  consumers, 
whether these  are individuals or communities.  This 
value  depends  on  the  other  existing  infrastructures. 
The  criterion  for  investment  in  an  infrastructure  is 
that  the  social  value  of  the  latter  should  be higher 
than  the  sum  of  the  construction  cost  and  the 
discounted  difference  must  be  maximum. 
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This criterion implies that at the time of the decision 
to  invest,  the  marginal  social  value,  calculated  in 
relation  to capacity,  should be equal to  the marginal 
construction  cost,  also  calculated  in  relation  to 
capacity,  and  the  subsequent  discounted  operating 
costs. 
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Any  calculation  of  investment  for  a  new  infra-
structure  must  take  account  of  the  existing  infra-
structures  complementary  to  or  substitutable  for  it 
from  the twofold  viewpoint of traffic  as  a whole and 
of  operating costs independent of traffic. 
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In  general,  this  calculation  can  only  be  performed 
correctly in  the  context of a co-ordination of invest-
ments. 
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Transport  infrastructures  are  generally  marked  by 
extensive  indivisibilities  and  increasing  average  re-
turns.  It  follows  from  this  that  optimum  manage-
ment can give  rise to a  deficit which  would have to 
be financed  by neutral transfers of income.  On the 
other  hand,  the  marginal  returns  can  be  increasing. 
The  rule  of  maximization  of  the  discounted  net 
income  at  market  prices  may  thus  be  found  inap-
plicable. 
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The  second  difficulty  may  be  met  by  applying  the 
criteria  we  have  set  out.  The  first  raises  serious 
practical  difficulties  and  will  be  examined  in  Pans 
11  and  Ill. 
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9.  Once  an  infrastructure  has  been  brought  into 
service,  its  optimum  management  is  independent of 
its  investment costs. 
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The  optimum  charge  consists  of  two  component's: 
a  cost  charge  and  a  congestion  charge.  The  cost 
charge  is  equal  to  the  marginal  cost  calculated  in 
relation to  the traffic.  The congestion charge is  the 
excess  of the economic charge over the cost  charge, 
and  is  nil  if  demand  at  a  tariff  equal  to  the  cost 
charge is  lower than capacity.  If it is  not, the con-
gestion  charge  must  be  fixed  at  such  a  level  that 
demand  shall  be  equal  to  capacity.  There  is  then 
full  utilization.  When  this  happens  the  optimum 
tariff for use of the infrastructure is  not equal to the 
marginal  cost  but  to  the  marginal  cost  plus  the 
congestion  charge. 
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Full  utilization  must  be  understood  not  in  the  phy-
sical  sense  but  in  the  economic  sense  of  a  proba-
bility  of congestion  of a  given  value.  At any  time 
the economic charge for the use of an infrastructure, 
i.e.  the  optimum  price  from  the  angle  of optimum 
resource  allocation,  is  quite  independent of past  in-
vestment cost and  also of the future investment cost 
of  any  other  infrastructure. 
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Depreciation of the investment cost must result from 
consideration  of the  economic  charge  and  not  vice 
versa.  In other words,  the economic charge cannot 
result  from  a  priori  consideration  of  a  pattern  of 
depreciation  which  is  judged to  be optimum.  Such 
a  calculation  would  necessarily  rest  on  an  arbitrary 
convention,  and  would  not  be  in  conformity  with 
optimum  resource  allocation. 404 
10.  For  transport  services  in  the  differentiated 
sector,  the  optimum rule  of management (investment 
and  operation)  is  the  maximization,  at  tariffs  con-
sidered  as  given  amounts,  of  the  total  net  revenue, 
i.e.  of  the  discounted  difference  between  expected 
future  receipts  and  expenditure. 
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11.  For transport services in  the non-differentiated 
sector  the  rules  are:  minimization  of  costs  in  the 
sense  we  have  mentioned;  and  expansion  of output 
wherever  this  expansion  gives  rise  to  an  overall  in-
crease in  value of the final  consumptions at the final 
prices. 
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12.  The  application  of  this  body  of  rules  leads 
to  a  situation  of  optimum  allocation  of  resources 
which  effects  a  stable  equilibrium. 
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13.  In all  cases  the  optimum tariffs  for  transport 
services  must be the result of equating demand with 
capacity.  In no  case can they be calculated simply 
on  the  basis  of costs. 
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From  this  point  of  view,  the  two  methods  of  de-
velopment  cost  and  total  calculated  cost  appear  to 
be incompatible  with  an  optimum  allocation  of  re-
sources  in  infrastructure. PART  /1 
CRITERIA  AND  OPTIONS  IN  TRANSPORT  POLICY 
CHAPTER  20 
INTRODUCTION 
20.0  - GENERAL 
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The  present  Part  of  this  report  deals  with  the 
general  principles  underlying  transport  policy.  Its 
purpose  is  not  to  arrive  at  any  specific  conclusions 
as  to  the  policy  to  be  followed,  but  simply  to  lay 
the  foundations  for  an  analysis  of  specific  systems 
and  for  the  formulation  of  a  policy.  The  general 
considerations  put  forward  will  enable  a  number 
of  possible  policy  alternatives  to  be  examined  in 
Part  Ill. 
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We  shall  consider  two  different  aspects  of  our 
subject: criteria and options in transport policy.  The 
criteria  correspond  to  the  conditions  necessary  for 
the  attainment  of  such  of  the  ultimate  objectives  of 
society  as  have,  or may have,  a bearing on  transport 
policy.  The  options  are  choices  which  must  be 
made  between  general  principles  in  the  light  of 
these  criteria,  and  which  are  connected  with  the 
organization  of  the  transport  sector  and  the  policy 
of  public  authorities  in  this  field. 
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As  was  said  in  the  General  Introduction,  we  shall 
devote  particular  attention  to  the  implications of the 
criterion  of  optimum  resource  allocation.  This 
criterion  is  not  as  narrow  as  it  is  often  thought  to 
be.  In  the  general  form  in  which  we  have  analysed 
it  in  Part  I.  it  means  simply  that  the  objectives 
of  society,  whatever  they  may  be,  must  be  attained 
as  efficiently  as  possible. 
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The  principal  options  will  be  introduced  in  the 
following  section.  It  should  be  remembered  that 
our  discussion  of  these  options,  as  of  the  various 
systems  examined  in  Part  III,  proceeds  primarily 
from  the  assumption  of  full  employment  and 
relatively  steady  economic  growth.  Some  of  the 
problems  raised  by  this  twofold  assumption  will 
be  discussed  later (1 ). 
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20.1  -· THE PRINCIPAL  OPTIONS 
413 
At  the  back  of  the  various  options  considered  in 
the  present  Part  is  a  distinction  between  two  main 
types  of  organization:  the  centralized  and  the  de-
centralized  regime.  In  actual  fact,  the  organization 
of  the  economy,  or  even  of  a  specific  sector,  will 
seldom  - if  ever  - correspond  exactly  to  one  or 
other  of  these  two  regimes  in  its  pure  form,  as 
practically  all  existing  organizations  have  some 
features  of  both.  These  concepts  are  nevertheless 
useful  for  an  analysis  of  transport  policy,  because 
the  degree  of  centralization  or  decentralization 
inherent  in  any  particular  system  is  bound  to  have 
important  implications,  not  only  economic  (in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  word  "economic")  but  also 
sociological,  political  and  institutional  implications. 
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On  a  purely  formal  level,  the  two  regimes  are  very 
similar.  The  criteria  that  must  be  satisfied  to 
achieve  an optimum allocation of resources comprise 
certain  conditions  of  operation  of  the  economic 
system,  conditions  which  could,  theoretically,  be 
met  equally  well  by  either  a  centralized  or a  decen-
tralized  regime.  Both  types  of  regime  inevitably 
include  a  system  of  constraints  by  which  operators 
are  induced  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  criteria. 
In  a  centralized  regime,  these  constraints  take  the 
form  of administrative  rules  and  regulations,  or of a 
procedure by  which  decisions  taken  at a  lo-:ver  level 
must  be  ratified  by  the  central  authonty.  A 
completely  decentralized  regime,  on  the other hand, 
leaves  all  authority  and  powers  of  independent 
decision  in  the  hands  of  the  operators,  constraint 
generally  being  exercized  by  a  system  of  monetary 
incentives  and  deterrents  - within  an  appropriate 
institutional  framework  - by  which  operators  are 
induced  to  conform  to  the  criteria. 
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Although  the  purely  formal  differences  between  the 
two  regimes  may  be  relatively  slight,  they  are  of 
great  importance  in  practice.  With  a  completely 
(')  See  Chapter  21. decentralized  regime,  it  is  in  principle  only  possible 
to  attain  such  objectives  as  are  compatible  with  the 
play  of  monetary  incentives  and  deterrents  within 
an  appropriate institutional  framework.  A  comple-
tely  centralized  regime  has  the  advantage  of  being 
able,  in  principle,  to  permit  the  pursuit  of  any 
objective  compatible  with  the  system  of  deterrents 
it  employs.  It has,  however,  one drawback,  in  that 
any type of centralized regime is inevitably character-
ized  by  a  certain  lack  of  flexibility.  Moreover, 
with  centralization  there  is  always  a  risk  of 
inefficiency and abuse of administrative power.  For 
these  reasons,  especially  the  latter,  we  shall  point 
out  repeatedly  in  the  following  chapters  that  in  a 
centralized  regime  the  rules  should be  simple,  clear, 
and  not  arbitrary,  and  their  implementation  should 
allow  of objective  control. 
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In  practice,  the  decentralized  regime  takes  the  form 
of  a  competitive  system.  As  we  have  seen  in 
Part I, this system is generally feasible only in sectors 
where  total  production  can  be  split  up  among 
separate  units  without  impairing  efficiency (1)  (2). 
This  is  an  obvious  limitation  of  the  system.  But 
where it  can function  effectively it has the  advantage 
of flexibility,  and the pressure exerted by competition 
(assuming  the  absence  of  a  recession)  strongly 
stimulates  cost  minimization  and  efficiency.  We 
have  already  pointed  out C)  that  the  condition  of 
convexity  cannot  be  satisfied  in  the  case  of  infra-
structure  any  more  than  in  that  of  the  provision 
of  transport  services  by  the  railways (4).  Hence,  if 
each  mode  of transport is  considered  separately, the 
choice  between  provision  of  services  under  a 
centralized  regime  and  under a  decentralized  regime 
will  in  general  arise  only  in  connection  with  road 
and  inland  waterway  transport.  In the  countries  of 
the  Community,  these  two  modes  of  transport  are, 
in  fact,  decentrally  organized.  We  shall  call  them 
the  competitive  modes (5)  ( 6). 
20.2  - INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND  TRANSPORT SERVICES 
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We  shall make a distinction (as we have already done 
to  some  extent  in  Part  I)  between  two  stages  of 
the production process in the internal transport sector, 
i.e.  between  infrastructure  and  transport  services. 
In  principle,  we  shall  use  the  term  "infrastructure" 
to  denote  all  fixed  installations  used  in  transport (1). 
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In  the  case  of  roads  and  inland  waterways,  this 
distinction  largely  corresponds  to  the  institutional 
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division  that  exists  in  practice  between,  on the one 
hand,  roads,  canals  and  generally  all  infrastructures 
operated  by  the  public  authorities  (i.e:.  by the  state 
or by regional and local authorities) and, on ;the other 
hand,  vehicles  and  vessels,  which  in  most  countries 
are  owned  and  operated  either  wholly  or partly  by 
private  enterprise. 
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In the  case of railways  the boundary between infra-
structure  and  transport services  is  more  difficult  to 
define, because in practice infrastructure and transport 
operations  are  managed  as  a  single  administrative 
unit,  owing  to  the  practical  impossibility  of  de-
centralizing  rail  transport  in  the way  that  transport 
by  road  and  inland  waterway  is  decentralized. 
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When we  deal, in subsequent sections, with economic 
decisions  that  are  important  for  infrastructure  and 
transport services,  and with the organization of these 
fields  and  the  relevant  policy,  we  shall  always  treat 
the  activities  connected  with  each  of  the  two  fields 
as  an  economic  whole.  Thus,  management  of 
infrastructure  will  be  taken  as  including  the  con-
struction,  renewal,  maintenance  and  operation  of 
fixed  assets,  as  well  as  imposition  of  the  charges 
to  be  made  for  using  them.  Similarly,  under 
management  of  transport  services  we  shall  include 
investment  in  vehicles  or  vessels,  their  current 
operation  and  management,  and  the  fixing  of trans-
port  tariffs. 
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The principal  economic characteristics distinguishing 
infrastructure from  transport services will be describ-
ed  in  detail  later  on (8).  Here  we  shall  confine 
ourselves to  mentioning certain points,  the economic 
significance  and  implications  of  which  will  also  be 
dealt  with  later. 
(')  In  other  words  it  cannot  be  adopted,  unless  ~pecial 
provisions  are  made,  in  the  sectors  where  econolll!es  of 
scale  are  such  that production  must be  concentrated m  one 
or  a  few  units  only,  to  ensure  maximum  efficiency  (i.e. 
minimization of total cost). 
(")  These  sectors  are  the  differentiated  sectors  as  defined 
in  Part I. 
(")  See  Part I. 
(')  For  the  distinction  between  infrastructure  and  transport 
services,  see  Section  20.2. 
( 5)  They are, at any  rate, virtually competitive. 
( 6)  See Section 25.1  for general observations on centralization 
and decentralization  as  applied  in  these  modes of transport. 
(')  This  distinction  is  often  drawn  in  very  differe~t. w~ys. 
For instance,  some  transport  experts  exclude  electnfication 
installations  from  infrastructure,  whereas  the  present  report 
includes them. 
(")  See  Section  23.0. 422 
In the first  place,  an  essential element in  the concept 
of  infrastructure  is  the  fact  that  the  activities 
concerned  involve  factors  of  production  with  an 
exceptionally  long  economic  life.  Secondly,  these 
factors  are also  largely unique,  in  that no  immediate 
and  perfect  substitution  is  possible  between  separate 
elements of infrastructure.  Thirdly, the construction 
of  infrastructure  is  usually  subject  to  economies  of 
scale;  and fourthly,  the separate  parts of a  network 
are  highly  complementary.  These  features  will  be 
seen  to  have  important  consequences,  in  particular 
for  the  prices  to  be  charged  for  utilization  of infra-
structure;  they  do  not  apply  to  the  production  of 
transport services - at least,  not  all,  or to the same 
extent. 
20.3  -PLAN OF PART Il 
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In  view  of  the  observations  made  in  the  previous 
sections, the present Part will be arranged as  follows: 
Chapter  21  will  be  devoted  to  an  examination  of 
the  objectives  of  transport  policy,  and  especially 
to  the  objective  of  optimum  resource  allocation  in 
the  sense  of  this  report.  The  specific  criteria  for 
an optimum allocation of resources will  be compared 
with  the  various  objectives  that  are  commonly 
assigned  to  transport policy. 
424 
Chapter  22  will  contain  a  short  restatement  of the 
criteria,  which  we  considered  in  greater  detail,  but 
from  a  purely  theoretical  point  of  view,  in  Part I. 
Special  attention  will  be  paid  to  a  number  of 
questions  of particular importance to transport. 
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In Chapter 23  a few  special problems will be studied 
with reference to the particular case of infrastructure, 
because  its  distinct  economic  characteristics  make 
separate  treatment  necessary. 
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The  real  substance  of  Part  II  will  be  found  in 
Chapters  24  and 25.  They deal  with  those options 
for  the  organization  and  management  of infrastruc-
ture  and  transport  services  respectively  that  we 
consider  to be  essential  in  an  economic  analysis  of 
transport policy.  Certain options will  not be  exam-
ined  at  all;  others  will  not  be  examined  in  detail. 
We have had to be selective because of the very great 
number of factors  that,  rightly or wrongly,  influence 
transport  policy  as  applied  in  the  various  countries 
or  proposed  by  the  numerous  groups  actively 
interested  in  the  matter.  Our  selection  has  been 
made according to the inherent economic significance 
of the options in question,  and has not been influen-
ced  by  our  agreement  or  disagreement  with  the 
propositions  involved.  All  the  options  considered 
will  be  critically  analysed,  and  the  conclusions  will, 
in  some cases, be mainly negative. 
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As  we  have  already  stated,  our aim  is  not to  arrive 
at  definite  conclusions  - except  where  these  arise 
naturally  from  strictly  logical  considerations  - but 
to analyse the various options and the systems derived 
from  them,  to  indicate  their  economic  aspects,  and 
to point out the assumptions implicit in them or any 
inconsistencies there may be.  It is  in  this light that 
our selection of the options to  be dealt with and our 
analysis  of  them  in  the  following  chapters  should 
be  viewed. CHAPTER  21 
THE  OBJECTIVES  OF  TRANSPORT POLICY 
21.0  - GENERAL 
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We  have  already  emphasized  in  the  General  Intro-
duction  that  the  chief  criterion  of  our  analysis 
would  be  optimum  allocation  of  resources.  Before 
we  study  the  various  options  for  transport  and  the 
systems  corresponding to  them,  it  would seem useful 
to examine briefly the relations between the objective 
of  efficiency  achieved  by  optimum  allocation  of 
ressources  and  the  numerous  other objectives  which 
transport policy helps  or could  help to  achieve. 
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As  we  also  pointed out in  the General  Introduction, 
it is  often said that the objective of optimum resource 
allocation  would  not  take  account  of  important 
general aims of economic and social policy and could 
even  be  in  conflict  with  them.  It is  claimed  that 
an  optimum  allocation  of  ressources  would  merely 
imply the fixing  of certain rules  for  the organization 
of  the  market;  these  would  tend  to  give  preference 
to  the  competitive  system  and  to  exclude  any  other 
policy. 
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This  interpretation  is  incorrect.  The  objective: 
optimum  resource  allocation,  as  analysed  in  the 
preceding  Part  of  this  report,  is  basically  no  more 
than  the objective : economic  efficiency,  in  the most 
general sense of that term.  The criteria it  furnishes 
and  their  various  implications  as  to  the  policy  to 
be  followed  do  not  prescribe  any  specific  structure 
for  the  economy.  Their  aim  is  simply  to  preclude 
situations  in  which  the  same  level  of  economic 
welfare  could  be  attained  by  using  fewer  resources, 
or,  in  other words,  situations in  which  a higher level 
of  welfare  could  be  achieved  by  more  efficient 
application of the existing resources. 
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When  the  objective  of  optimum  resource  allocation 
is  interpreted  in  the  general  sense  just  mentioned, 
there  can  be  no  intrinsic  incompatibility  between 
it  and  the  other objectives  of  the  community.  Opti-
mum  resource  allocation  is  not  an  aim  in  itself.  In 
fact,  it simply  amounts to the general  condition that 
the  community's  other  aims  must  be  achieved  in 
such  a  way  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  obtain 
the  same  results  by  more  efficient  means,  i.e.  by 
using  fewer  resources.  Moreover,  the  economic 
concepts on which the Treaty of Rome is  based, and 
which  appear in many of its  provisions,  seem clearly 
to  postulate  the  requirement  of efficiency. 
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However,  the  criteria  and  methods  which  economic 
theory  suggests  to  ensure  an  optimum  allocation  of 
resources  are  strictly  valid  only  on  clearly  defined 
hypotheses  which  may  perhaps  not  be  satisfied  if 
objectives  other than efficiency  are  pursued.  Thus, 
although  the  operation  of  a  free  market  economy, 
based  on  the  price  system,  can  lead  to  an  optimum 
allocation  of resources,  it  could  result  in  a  distribu-
tion  of income  which  would  be  considered  undesir-
able  if  a  certain  form  of  income  distribution  is 
held  to  be  a  primary  objective.  The  extent  to 
which  there  may  be  incompatibility  between  the 
requirement  of  efficiency  and  the  other  objectives 
essentially  depends  on  the  individual  case;  conflicts 
may  be  of  a  minor  nature,  or  they  may  concern 
vital  points. 
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In the case of distribution of income, and irrespective 
of  any  ethical  conception  of  an  ideal  distribution, 
one  fact  dominates  the  whole  question.  Only  that 
which is  produced can be distributed.  Consequently, 
if equity requires a certain distribution of income (1), 
it  also  implies  a  certain  concern  for  efficiency. 
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Of  course,  the  possible  conflict  between  efficiency 
and  the  other conceivable  objectives  is  not  the only 
one  to  be  considered.  Objectives  other  than  effi-
ciency  may  not  always  be  compatible  with  each 
other;  and the  community's  field  of preference  may 
not  be  perfectly ordered.  However,  these  problems 
will  not  be  studied  here,  since  they  lie  outside  the 
specific  province  of  this  report. 
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In  itself,  the  objective  of  optimum  resource  alloca-
tion  in  no  way  conflicts  with  the  notion  of  public 
intervention  -- rather  the  reverse.  Whereas  a 
completely  centralized  regime  could  satisfy  the 
criteria  of optimum  resource  allocation,  a  decentra-
lized  regime  would be incapable of doing so  without 
public  intervention. 
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This is  not the place to list the many fields  in which 
such  intervention  is  indispensable  to  achieve  an 
optimum  allocation  of  resources.  But  such  is 
certainly the case with the objectives of full  employ-
(')  The distribution of income will be studied in  Se:ction 21.5. ment  and  economic  growth,  which  are  implied  by 
an  optimum  allocation  of resources  and which,  as  a 
rule,  are  not  automatically  achieved  without deliber-
ate  action  by  the  public  authorities. 
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Similarly,  an  optimum  allocation  of resources  in  no 
way  implies that only individual preferences are taken 
into  consideration.  The  collective  preferences  of 
society for community services can and must be taken 
into  account,  exactly  like  individual  preferences, 
when  defining  an  efficient  system. 
438 
These various facts having been brought out, the next 
step  is  to  analyse  the  objectives  of the  policy  to  be 
followed  in  a  particular  economic  sector,  such  as 
transport. 
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To begin with,  it is  manifestly impossible to  analyse, 
within  the  narrow  limits  of  a  particular  sector,  all 
the aspects of the  economic system in general which 
are likely to have repercussions on that sector but are 
not  specific  to  it.  Such  general  aspects  include 
the  macro-economic  policies  aimed  at  ensuring  full 
employment, rapid economic growth and the internal 
and  external  balance  of  the  economy.  Another 
aspect  is  that of fiscal  policy,  which  stems  from  the 
public  authorities'  need  to  obtain  adequate  revenue. 
Although  policies  of this  kind can have a very great 
impact on the particular sector concerned - in this 
case transport - there is  no  reason to include them 
in  a  partial  analysis,  except where they have  special 
implications  for  that  sector. 
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The concrete requirements of an efficient organization 
of the  transport  sector  based  on  optimum  resource 
allocation  may  differ  according  to  whether  or  not 
the  general  macro-economic  policy  succeeds  in 
establishing  and  maintaining  full  employment  and 
relatively  steady  economic  growth.  As  we  pointed 
out in the General Introduction, our analysis assumes 
that the policy does in  fact succeed in attaining these 
objectives.  The conclusions of our report are there-
fore  valid  as  a  whole  only  on the  twofold  premise 
of  full  employment  and  relatively  steady  economic 
growth (1).  This  twofold  hypothesis  may  involve 
a  serious  gap  which  should  be  bridged  as  soon  as 
possible  by  a  separate  analysis  of  transport  policy, 
appropriate  for  a  period  of  general  recession  or of 
a notable slowdown in  growth. 
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Apart from  the objectives of anticyclical and general 
growth  policies,  the  collective  objectives  we  shall 
examine  are  those  where  transport  is  considered  to 
play  a  special  role.  Understandably,  these  are 
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primarily  objectives  whose  attainment  depends  very 
closely  on the  existence  of  infrastructure  and  rolling 
stock  capacities,  e.g.  the  development  of  backward 
regions, town and country planning, the decongestion 
of  urban  areas  and,  also,  geographical  integration 
at European level.  Then there  are objectives which 
are  outside  the  transport  sector,  such  as  support 
policies  for  certain  special  categories  of  passengers 
and  of  goods  - policies  of  which  tariff  measures 
are the instrument.  In one way or another, most of 
these  objectives  concern  income  distribution.  This 
aspect  deserves  very special  attention,  since  it  is  the 
only  possible  source  of  real  conflicts  between  the 
functioning of a  free  market economy  leading to  an 
optimum allocation of resources and other objectives 
of  society (2). 
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Finally,  without  discussing  the  value  of the  various 
general  objectives  as  such  (since  economic  analysis 
cannot  judge  the  aims  to  be  pursued),  we  will  con-
sider whether or not they  can be  achieved  by  a free 
market economy operating in  an  appropriate institu-
tional  framework  and,  if  not,  whether  they  can  in 
fact  attained more efficiently by centralized measures 
in the transport field.  Analysis would seem to prove 
that, in certain cases at least, the conflict between the 
various conceivable objectives and efficiency is  much 
less  pronounced  than  is  generally  thought,  for  the 
simple  reason that attainment of any  objective  is,  at 
any  rate  partly,  linked  with  the  efficiency  of  the 
economic  system.  To  take  only  one  example,  no 
social policy will  be able fully to attain its  objectives 
if  it  is  not based on  an  efficient  economy. 
21.1  - ANT/CYCLICAL POLICIES 
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Since  we  have  decided  not  to  consider  macro-
economic objectives in this report, we  will make only 
a  few  remarks  about  anticyclical  policies. 
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It  should  first  be  emphasized  that  the  transport 
sector,  and  more  particularly  the  infrastructure  of 
transport,  has  traditionally  been  a  very  important 
instrument of both short-term  and  long-term  macro-
economic  policy. 
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In  the  field  of  anticyclical  policy  a  speed-up  or 
slowdown of overall spending has often been brought 
about  by  varying  public  expenditure  on  infrastruc-
(') It is  well  known that simultaneous achievement  of these 
objectives  raises  different  problems,  but the  study  of  these 
problems  is  outside  the  scope  of  the  report. 
(
2
)  See  Section  21.5. ture.  The  reason  is  that  in  most  countries  the 
infrastructure  of  roads  and  inland  waterways  are 
entirely,  or  almost  entirely,  financed  via  the  state 
budget  and  thus  become  a  component  of  total 
expenditure  which  can  be  manipulated  fairly  easily 
by  the  public  authorities. 
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It  is  doubtful  whether  such  discrimination,  which 
is  essentially  pragmatic,  can  be  justified  economi-
cally.  In  fact  there  is  a  good  case  to  be  made for 
the  argument  that  expenditure  on  infrastructure 
should  as  far  as  possible  not  be  used  as  a  special 
instrument  of  anticyclical  policy.  We  shall  come 
back to  this  point in  a somewhat broader context (1) 
further  on  in  this  Part,  and  also  at  several  points 
in  Part Ill when  examining the systems of budgetary 
equilibrium  for  infrastructure (2). 
21.2  ~  GROWTH POLICIES 
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The  existence  of  appropriate  transport  capacities, 
and  particularly  of  adequate  infrastructure,  is  a 
precondition  for  the  development  of  industry  and 
trade.  Consequently,  there  are  good  reasons  for 
paying  very  special  attention  to  infrastructure. 
Conversely,  the  objectives  of economic  development 
and  growth  must  be taken  into  consideration  when 
defining  a  policy for  infrastructure.  We  shall  come 
back  to  this  point  when  we  study  the  criteria  for 
investment  in  infrastructure (3)  and  the  various 
policies for the transport sector (4).  It will  be shown 
then,  that  the  criteria  of  optimum  allocation  of 
resources may be considered to  go  a long way in the 
desired  direction.  The  investment  criteria  take 
account  of all  the  benefits,  including  the  surpluses, 
expected  to  accrue  from  the  infrastructure  in 
question.  It is  only  when  the  development  object-
ives  go  further  that  these  criteria  no  longer  appear 
sufficient (5). 
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In  the  following  chapters  we  shall  show (6)  that 
several  arguments  can  be  advanced  for  imposing 
more  restrictive  conditions  on  investment  in  infra-
structure  by  stipulating  that  the  expenditure  be 
financed  by  charges on  the  users  - in  other words, 
that  budgetary  equilibrium  should  be  assured.  But 
it  will  be  stressed  that,  whatever may  be the advan-
tages  and  disadvantages  of  the  requirement  of 
budgetary  equilibrium,  this  additional  constraint 
should  never  be  imposed  on  purely  local  networks, 
where  social  considerations  may  well  have  prior-
ity (7),  or  on  underdeveloped  areas,  where  the 
external  benefits  of  infrastructure  can  be  relatively 
high (8). 
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Growth  policies  also  take  into  consideration  urban 
decongestion,  regional  development  and  industrial 
decentralization.  It is  clear  that  transport  policy 
plays  an  important part in  these  fields  and  that the 
underlying  motives,  particularly  for  the  building  of 
infrastructure,  are  not  always  purely  economic  in 
the  strict  sense  of  the  term.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  transport  policy  can  be  used  to  help  the 
economic development of regions  whose  standard of 
living is  relatively low and also to promote industrial 
decentralization.  Furthermore,  the extremely  acute 
problem  of  urban  congestion  is,  or  should  be,  a 
major concern of the public authorities. 
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According to the criteria of optimum resource alloca-
tion,  an  infrastructure  should  be  built  only  if  the 
sum  of  all  discounted  future  benefits,  including  the 
surpluses  and  the  external  effects,  is  expected  to 
cover  the  sum  of  investment  cost  and  operating 
costs (9),  the  difference  being  maximum. 
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As  regards  regional  economic  development  and 
industrial  decentralization,  it  is  possible  to imagine 
a  policy  which  would  apparently  disregard  this 
requirement,  particularly  if  the  development  of  a 
certain region only reached "take-off" after a certain 
time. 
452 
During  the  initial  phase,  adequate  infrastructures 
must be available, but they will be underutilized and 
consequently  will  bring  in  relatively  little  direct 
revenue.  However,  the  apparent  conflict  between 
public policy and the investment criteria correspond-
ing  to  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources  might 
be  due  simply  to the fact  that the  period  to  which 
the  calculation  of  costs  and  benefits  is  limited  is, 
in  fact,  too  short.  If the  investment  criterion  is 
correctly  applied  and  gives  negative  results,  and  it 
is  nevertheless  decided  to  carry  out  a  particular 
infrastructure project - that is  to  say,  even  though 
(I)  See  particularly  Subsection  23.32. 
(")  See  Sections  31.3  and  31.4. 
(")  See  Section  24.1. 
(')  See  Chapters  31  and  32. 
( 5)  Which  is  conco!ivable  only  in  the  case  of  a  deliberate 
redistribution  of  income  in  favour  of  certain  regions,  a 
situation  which  we  shall  examine  in  Section  21.5. 
(")  See  especially  Section  23.3. 
(')  See  Subsection  23.31. 
(")  See  Subsection  31.40. 
(")  For the  sake  of convenience,  "operating  costs"  is  inter-
preted  as  the  discounted  value  of the  future  operating and 
maintenance  costs  minus  the  discounted  residual  value  of 
the  equipment  at the  end  of its  expected  economic  life. the  direct  and  indirect  benefits  do  not  appear  to 
justify the investment -- we  are  faced  with  a  social 
policy  or  political  objectives  which  do  not  come 
within  the  scope of our analysis.  However,  we  are 
inclined  to  think  that  such  cases  are  exceptional. 
It would  seem  that  much  greater importance  should 
be  attached  to  projects  which  do  satisfy  the  invest-
ment  criteria  of optimum  resource  allocation but do 
not  satisfy  the  stricter  requirement  of  budgetary 
equilibrium.  We  have  already  noted  that  there  are 
good reasons for  not imposing this further constraint 
in the context of a development policy.  The problem 
will  be  examined more closely in  Part Ill (1). 
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However, in the field  of transport services, arguments 
can  be  advanced  against  a  policy  of  relatively  low 
freight  rates for underdeveloped  areas - the sort of 
rates  which  can  result  especially  from  policies  of 
"price  alignment" (2).  In  fact,  such  policies  may 
retard rather than stimulate the development of these 
areas,  by reducing the geographical protection which 
their  industry  is  allowed  by  the  costs  of  transport 
to  and  from  more  advanced  industrial  centres. 
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As  regards  the  problem  of  urban  congestion,  there 
does  not  seem  to  be  any  contradiction  between  a 
policy  of  reducing  the  excessive  density  of  traffic 
in  certain built-up areas and the criteria of optimum 
resource  allocation.  On  the  contrary,  as  we  shall 
endeavour  to  show  in  the  following  chapters, 
application  of  these  criteria  could  greatly  help  to 
solve  this  problem.  For  instance,  the  necessary 
funds  could  be  raised  by  the  practical  system  of 
economic  charges (
3
). 
2_1.3  EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
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In past centuries  the  construction  of large  networks 
of  communication  was  inspired  to  a  considerable 
extent by  the desire to unify the national territory on 
the  political,  cultural  and  economic  planes.  This 
unification  was  largely  attained  only  through  the 
building of important railway and waterway networks 
and,  more  recently,  by  the  rapid  development  of 
highway  systems. 
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Similar  problems  arise  today  on  a  European  scale. 
A  great  deal  remains  to  be  done  t~ achieve 
European  integration  in  the  transport  fteld,  the 
problem  at  the  moment  is  not  so  much  to  remodel 
the  economic  face  of  the  national  territories  by 
building  entirely  new  networks  of  communication 
as  to  make  gradual  - albeit  extremely  important 
- additions  to  the  existing  structure. 
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The  transition  from  national  transport policies  to  a 
Community  policy  raises  a  multitude  of  important 
questions which can hardly be studied in this  report. 
We  must emphasize, however, that difficult problems 
of adaptation will  arise and will necessitate  a certain 
transitional  period.  These  problems  are  due  espe-
cially to the fact  that the public authorities intervene 
on the  transport  market  in  most  Member  States  of 
the  Community,  whereas  at  the  same time  the  pol-
icies  pursued  is  different  in  almost  all  these  coun-
tries.  If it  is  desired  to  avoid  the  introduction  or 
consolidation  of  policies  whose  aim  is  national 
protection  or the  protection  of  particular industries, 
the  problems  of  transition  will  have  to  be  resolved 
by Community  action. 
458 
Generally  speaking,  however,  there  is  hardly  any 
conflict  in  principle between  the  objective  of Euro-
pean  integration  and  that  of  efficiency.  A  major 
aim  of European integration  is  increased  efficiency; 
and this is  the primary condition for implementation 
of  any  policy  whatsoever. 
21.4  - TARIFF  SUPPORT 
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Transport  policy  can  also  be  used  to  achieve  spe-
cific  objectives  in  other  sectors.  Examples  are  the 
public service obligations to which the railways have 
often been subjected: reduced rates for certain classes 
of  freight  (in  particular  agricultural  produce)  or 
categories  of  passengers  (aged  people  or  disabled 
ex-servicemen;  season  tickets  which  will  inevitably 
be  used  at  rush  hours,  etc.).  Other  examples  are: 
uniformity  of  tariffs,  although  optimum  economic 
rates (4)  are different in various places and at various 
times;  policies  for  protecting  a  country's  ports  etc. 
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Whatever  the  merits  or demerits  of these  objectives 
in  themselves,  one may doubt  the  effectiveness  of  a 
policy  which  tries  to  achieve  them  by  imposing 
obligations  on  the  transport  sector.  As  a  rule, 
indirect  measures  of  this  type  impair  an  optimum 
allocation of resources.  In other words, they reduce 
the efficiency of the economic system  (i.e.  the stand-
ard  of  living  obtainable  with  the  given  resources 
(
1
)  See  especially  Section  31.4. 
f)  Of the  type  mentioned  in  the  ECSC  Treaty. 
(")  See  Section 24.2  and Subsection 24.45, where we  propose 
that  tariffs  for  the  use  of  infrastructures  and  in  particular 
road  infrastructures  be  differentiated  according  to  at  least 
three  principal  catagories  of  network:  main,  urban  and 
suburban,  and  local. 
(')  See  Subsection  22.11. of  the  community)  by  comparison  with  a  situation 
where  the  same  objectives  would  be  attained  by 
direct methods.  A  further disadvantage is  that they 
entail  all  sorts  of compensatory measures  which  can 
result  in  cumulating  rather  than  correcting  distor-
tions,  mainly  because  they  lead  to  an  intractable 
situation,  with  all  its  concomitant  risks  of errors  of 
economic and political judgment (1).  For this reason 
we  are inclined to advise against these indirect meth-
ods,  unless  more  direct  ones  are  manifestly 
impossible  or  impractical. 
21.5  - DISTRIBUTION OF  INCOME 
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Policies  connected  with  income  distribution  may 
either  directly  concern  the transport  sector  itself or 
make  use  of  transport  policy  to  bring  about  a 
redistribution of income in other sectors.  As regards 
the  latter case,  the above  remarks concerning public 
service  obligations  are  highly  relevant.  However, 
there  are  special  reasons  for  analysing  this  problem 
separately, since the objectives of income distribution 
may  conflict  with  the  working  of  a  decentralized 
economy. 
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On the  strictly  theoretical  plane there  is  no  conflict 
between  the  criteria of optimum  resource  allocation 
and  whatever  norms  societv  accepts  as  regards  the 
distribution  of  income.  But  the  same  can  only  be 
true in  practice if any given  redistribution of income 
can be  achieved by methods which  do  not affect the 
conditions  of  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources. 
That  is  to  say,  it  must  be  possible  to  carry  out 
transfers of rents  in  a  neutral manner, i.e.  so  as  not 
to  affect  the  economic  alternatives  available  to 
operators  under  a  price  system  which  satisfies  the 
criteria of optimum resource allocation. 
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This  condition  is  not  fulfilled  in  practice.  Almost 
all the practical measures of income redistribution (2) 
distort  various  conditions  of  economic  choice  and 
can  clash  with  the  criteria  of  optimum  resource 
allocation.  But this  does  not mean that the  choice 
of  what  method  is  to  be  used  to  bring  about  a 
specific  redistribution of incomes  is  immaterial from 
the  angle  of  economic  efficiency.  In  attaining  the 
ends  concerned,  some  methods  cause  very  much 
greater distortions  than  are strictly necessary. 
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The  same  conclusion  applies  to  the  measures  fre-
quently advocated as  methods of supporting carriers' 
incomes  in  certain situations  such  as  excessive com-
petition, general recession or structural change.  We 
shall  come  back to  these  questions  in  the  following 
chapters.  In  particular,  we  shall  briefly  examine 
the social  problems caused by recession  and adapta-
tion  to  structural changes (3).  We shall  suggest that 
it  is  preferable  to  adopt those  measures  which least 
distort  the  optimum  allocation  of  resources  and 
which,  when  there  are  structural  changes,  facilitate 
and,  if  possible,  stimulate  rather  than  impede  the 
necessary  adaptation. 
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These  considerations  also  apply  both  to  the serious 
problems  of  adaptation  which  may  be  involved  in 
the  transition  from  national  transport  policies  as 
practised at present to  a common transport policy at 
European level,  and to  the  resulting social  problems 
for  various  sections  of society,  either directly within 
transport  or  indirectly  in  regions  affected  by  the 
changed  transport  system. 
(')  See  Section  22.4. 
(")  Taxes  or  subsidies  on  income,  on  special  categories  of 
expenditure,  on  property,  etc. 
(")  See  Section  25.4. CHAPTER  22 
THE  CRITERIA  OF OPTIMUM  RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
22.0  - PLAN  OF  THE  CHAPTER 
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The  present  chapter will  deal  only  with  the  criteria 
for  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources  and  the 
problems  that  arise  when  they  are  applied  to  the 
transport  sector.  We  shall  not  consider  here  the 
other  criteria  that  may  be  relevant  to  transport 
policy (1). 
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The criteria  for  an  optimum  allocation  of ressources 
have  been  worked  out  in  some  detail  in  Part  I. 
It will  therefore be  sufficient if,  before going further, 
we  give  here  a  short  recapitulation of these  criteria, 
on which  our study  is  based.  They may be divided 
into  two  main  groups:  those  concerning investments 
in  capital  equipment,  and  those  concerning  current 
operations (2).  In the  present  chapter we  shall  not 
make  any  explicit  reference  to  the  analysis  given  in 
Part  I,  because  the  whole  of  the  discussion  that 
follows  constitutes  a  general  commentary  on  the 
conclusions reached in that Part. 
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In  view  of  the  confusion  surrounding  the  concepts 
of  the  surpluses  and  external  effects,  two  short 
sections will  be devoted to a definition of these terms 
and to  a general analysis of their implications for  an 
optimum  allocation  of  resources (3). 
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A  final  section  will  deal  with  points connected with 
the "relative optimum" or  "second-best".  The  aim 
will be to define the optimum conditions when certain 
constraints  are  imposed  upon  transport  and/or 
when  other  sectors  of  the  economy  do  not observe 
the  rules  for  an  optimum  allocation of resources. 
22.1  - INVESTMENT CRITERIA 
AND CRITERIA  FOR  CURRENT 
OPERATIONS 
22.10  - Investment  criteria 
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The basic  principle  of  optimum  resource  allocation 
with  regard  to  investment  in  durable  assets  (capital 
equipment) (4),  the  size  of  which  can  be  varied 
continuously,  may  be  summarized  as  follows:  the 
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difference  between  the  discounted  future  benefits 
(i.e.  of  utilities  expressed  in  money  terms)  expected 
to  arise  directly  or  indirectly  from  an  investment 
project  and  the  sum  of  the  investment  cost  and 
discounted  operating  costs  should  be  positive  and 
maximum,  all  prices  being  considered  as  given  for 
the  purpose  of  the  investment  calculations. 
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This  general  criterion  implies  in particular that: 
i)  The sum of the investment cost and discounted 
operating costs  should  be  minimized; 
ii)  Investment  in  capital  equipment,  the  size  of 
which  can be varied  continuously,  should be  pushed 
to  a point where the sum of future  marginal benefits 
derived  from  the  investment  (expressed  in  discount-
ed  value)  is  equal  to  the  discounted  value  of  the 
operating  costs  that  are  independent  of traffic. 
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In  addition,  capital  equipment  should  at  all  times 
satisfy  the  following  criterion  concerning  the  possi-
bility of disinvestment:  an item of capital equipment 
should be maintained in its present employment only 
if the sum of discounted future  benefits from  it is  at 
least equal to its opportunity cost (i.e., to its value in 
its  best  alternative  employment). 
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Benefits  and costs,  in the sense in which these terms 
are used here in  connection with investment criteria, 
include  not only  the revenues  actually obtained  and 
the  charges  actually paid, but also  all  rents,  positive 
as  well  as  negative,  that  accrue  to  the final  consu-
mers. 
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The  investment  criterion  could  be  reformulated  as 
follows:  the  net  sum  of  all  rents,  positive  as  well 
as  negative,  which  would  vanish  if  the  activity  in 
question did  not  take  place,  should  be  positive  and 
maximum. 
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It  should  be  pointed  out  that,  in  considering  the 
marginal  conditions of optimum investment,  there is 
(') See  Chapter 21. 
(")  See  Section  22.1. 
(")  See  Sections  22.2  and  22.3. 
(')  In  all  that follows,  the  term "durable" should of course 
be understood in the economic and not in the physical sense. 
Factors of production  may continue to exist in the  physical 
sense  after they  have  been  withdrawn  from  the  production 
process. no  need  to  introduce  the  surpluses,  since  the  actual 
price  paid  by  the  users  reflects  the  full  marginal 
benefit  derived  from  the  project. 
22.11  - Criteria  for  current  operations 
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The  basic  criterion  is  similar to  that  for  investment 
in  capital  equipment:  the  difference . between  the 
sum  of  the  discounted  benefits,  derived  from  any 
particular  output,  and  the  total  direct  cost  of that 
output  (defined  as  the  sum  of the  values  at market 
prices  of  the  non-durable  factors  of  production 
actually sacrificed in production, plus the discounted 
value  of  the  actual  deterioration  of  the  durable 
assets  due  to  their utilization in  the production pro-
cess)  should  be  positive  and  maximum. 
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The  following  implications  may  be  noted,  in 
particular: 
i)  Any  output  should  be  produced  at  minimum 
total  direct  cost,  as  just  defined; 
ii)  Output should be equal  to  demand,  at a  price 
equal to the sum  of the marginal cost of that output 
and  any marginal rents that may accrue to the dura-
ble  assets  and  the indivisible  assets  employed  in  the 
production  process. 
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We  have  shown  in  Part  I  that  marginal  cost  is 
defined  as  the  additional  cost  occasioned  by  the 
production  of  an  additional  unit  of  production. 
The  second  component  of  the  optimum  price  -
namely  the  marginal  rent  which  accrues  to  the 
existing durable factors  and the indivisible factors -
is  nil  when  those  factors  are  not  fully  utilized; 
otherwise,  it  is  just high  enough  to limit  demand to 
the capacity available (1 ). 
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With  regard  to  infrastructure,  the  following  termi-
nology  has  been  adopted.  The two  components of 
the  optimum  charges  to  be  imposed  on  the  users 
of infrastructure - the marginal cost utilization and 
the  marginal  rent  - are  termed  respectively  the 
"cost charge" and the  "congestion  charge".  The 
latter is  a scarcity price which is  nil when the infra-
structure  is  not fully  utilized  in  the economic sense. 
Otherwise,  it  is  just  high  enough  to  prevent  con-
gestion.  The  sum  of  the  cost  charge  and  the 
congestion  charge  has  been  termed  the  "economic 
charge". 
22.2  THE SURPLUSES 
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The  prices  paid  by  the  users  of a  certain  product 
generally  do  not  reflect  the  total  benefits  (i.e.  the 
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money  value  of  the  total  utility)  that  they  derive 
from  the  product.  These  total  benefits  can  be 
defined  as  the  maximum  sum  the  users  would  be 
willing  to  pay  for  the  product  in  question  if  they 
were  given  a  choice between getting it at that price 
or not getting :it  at all.  The difference  between  the 
total benefits and the sum  actually paid by the users 
constitutes  the  consumers'  surplus. 
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As we have already mentioned (2),  the surpluses may 
have  to  be  taken  into  account  in  applying  the 
investment  criteria  and  the  criteria  for  current 
operations.  This  may  be  the  case,  in  particular, 
when  a  project  will  not  produce  sufficient  revenue 
to  cover  the  sum  of  the  investment  cost  and  the 
discounted  operating  costs,  with  the  output  priced 
according  to  the  criteria  of optimum  resource  allo-
cation.  Although  such  a  project  would  incur  a 
deficit,  it  may  nevertheless  be  worth  undertaking if 
the  surpluses  are  greater  than  the  deficit (3).  This 
may  happen in certain  rather special  situations  (in-
creasing  returns)  which  occur  particularly  in  the 
field  of  infrastructure.  The  question  of  the  sur-
pluses  is  therefore of some importance to our study. 
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However,  the  definition  and  evaluation  of  the  sur-
pluses  raise  a  number  of  highly  complex  problems, 
both  theoretical  and  practical. 
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In the first place, there is  the risk of underestimating 
or  overestimating (4)  the  value  of  the  surpluses. 
Underestimation  may  occur if  the surplus  is  simply 
taken as  being the additional net revenue that would 
be  obtained  by  a  monopolist  pursuing  a  policy  of 
perfect  discrimination.  This  method  would  inevit-
ably  leave  out  of  account  all  the  surpluses  created 
at  earlier  and  later  stages  of  the  total  production 
process,  of  which  the  sector  concerned  is  a  part. 
Such  underestimation  only  occurs,  however,  when 
the surpluses in question have not already been taken 
into  account  in  calculating the monopolist's  surplus. 
On the other hand, if the total psychological surplus 
is  calculated  as  the  sum  of  the  additional  revenues 
obtained  by  perfect  discrimination  at  each  of  the 
successive  stages  of  the  total  production  process 
(i.e.  the process that begins  with  the original factors 
of  production  and  ends  when  the  product  reaches 
the  final  consumers),  there  will  be a  lot  of double-
counting.  The  correct  solution  is  to  consider  only 
(')  The  concepts  of  "full  utilization"  and  "congestion" 
must  always  be  interpreted  in  the  economic  and  not  in 
the  physical  sens(:  (see  Part 1). 
(")  See  Section  22  .. 1. 
(")  For a  definition  of deficit,  see  Subsection  24.40. 
(')  In  particular by  double-counting. the  sum  of  all  the  benefits  accruing  to  the  final 
consumers  (i.e.  the  final  utilities  expressed  in  money 
terms),  which  would  vanish  if  the  economic  activity 
in  question  were  eliminated. 
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The correct  solution  thus  defined  obviously  presents 
a  great  number  of  practical  difficulties.  For  one 
thing,  it  makes  it  necessary  to  define  the  best 
possible  alternative  situation  for  all  the  sectors  of 
the  economy  that  are  directly  or indirectly  affected 
by  the  existence  (or  the  elimination)  of  the  sector 
in  question;  and  it  is  also  necessary  to  assess  the 
difference between the welfare of the final consumers 
in  the  two  situations  under  consideration. 
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It  is  quite  obvious  that  this  concept of total  benefit 
cannot  possibly  be  applied  in  practice without some 
rather  drastic  simplifications  and  approximations (1). 
In  this  report  we  shall  not  go  into  the  problems 
involved  in  finding  practical  methods  of  assessing 
the  surpluses.  Certain  aspects  of this  question will, 
however,  be  dealt  with  in  the  following  chapters (2). 
Actually,  where  transport  policy  is  concerned,  the 
surpluses  need  only  be  considered  explicitly  with 
regard  to  infrastructure. 
22.3  - EXTERNAL  EFFECTS 
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A  sector  of the  economy  such  as  internal  transport 
generates  what  may  be  called  external  effects  if, 
besides  its  main output,  it  produces  other goods  or 
services  (external  benefits)  or  if  it  occasions  costs 
m  another sector  (external  costs). 
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A  classic  example  of  external  costs  is  that  of  the 
damage  and  nuisance  caused  by  smoke  and  noise. 
With  regard  to  external  benefits,  one  may  cite  the 
case  of canals,  which  are  usually constructed prima-
rily  for  shipping  purposes  but  may  also  perform 
irrigation  or  other  functions.  Conversely,  a  dyke 
constructed  primarily  for  protection  against  floods 
could  also  serve  as  the  foundation  for  a  road. 
These  illustrations  show  that  external  benefits  are 
usually  associated  with  cases  of joint  production (1): 
the  factors of production employed in transport have 
a  secondary  function  which  leads  to  the  creation of 
benefits  outside  the  sphere  of  transport. 
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A  special  problem  arises  here  with  regard  to  distri-
bution  of the total  cost of  a  sector  among  the  joint 
services  it  produces.  An  example  of  this  is  the 
distribution of the  investment cost of a canal among 
its  various  functions.  This  problem  will  be  con-
sidered briefly at a later stage (4). 
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In  principle,  if  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources 
is  to  be achieved,  external effects  must be  taken into 
account  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  the  costs  and 
benefits  connected  with  the  sector  itself.  A  full 
discussion of the practical difficulties  involved  would 
be  outside  the  scope  of this  report.  Some  aspects 
of  the  question  will,  however,  be  considered  in  a 
later  section (5). 
22.4  - PROBLEMS OF  THE 
"SECOND-BEST" 
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Apart  from  the  difficulties  encountered  on  the 
practical  level,  the  criteria  of  optimum  resource 
allocation  may  have  to  be  reformulated  to  some 
extent in the following  cases: 
i)  If other sectors of the economy, outside internal 
transport, do  not conform to these  criteria; 
ii)  If  internal  transport  is  subject  to  certain 
constraints,  such  as  the  requirement  of  budgetary 
equilibrium (6). 
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In the first case, that of the "imperfect environment", 
the  criteria  of optimum  resource  allocation  are  not 
necessarily  valid  without  modification  for  internal 
transport because, if the other sectors of the economy 
do  not  apply  those  criteria,  prices  will  no  longer 
correctly  reflect  the  cost  and  scarcity  relationships 
between  transport  and  other  goods  and  services. 
The  actual  importance  of  the  distortions  that  may 
result  in  the  sector  which  applies  these  criteria  is 
a question of fact that cannot be evaluated objectively 
without  a  mass  of information  that is  not  available. 
In the second case, that of constraints imposed upon 
internal  transport,  the  optimum  criteria  may  be 
impossible  to  satisfy  completely. 
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Determination of the  optimum criteria  to  be  applied 
in  these  cases  is  usually  referred  to  as  the  problem 
of the "relative optimum" or  "second-best".  Sec-
ond-best  solutions  are  in  most  cases  extremely 
complex.  Even if they can be defined  in theory,  in 
practice they  are  generally  much  too  complicated  to 
(')  It would  appear  that  a  reasonably  approximate  caicyla-
tion  of  part  of  the  benefits  is  often  possible  - especially 
of the part that takes the form of a  sav~ng in  t~e users' time 
or money  resulting  from  the  constructiOn  of  mfrastructure. 
(")  See  particularly  Sections  23.1,  24.1  and  24.4. 
Cl  For  a  definition  of joint  production,  see  Part  I. 
(')  See  Subsection  24.43. 
(')  See  Section  24.1. 
(")  See  Section  24.4. be  adopted  without  modification.  Because  of  this 
complexity,  the  problem  of  the  second-best  is  often 
put forward  as  an  argument against any policy based 
on  the  criteria  of optimum  resource  allocation. 
493 
This  point of view  is  highly  debatable.  In the first 
place,  it  ignores  the  fact  that  some  of  the  optimum 
conditions  may  not  be  affected  at  all;  this  may  be 
the  case,  for  example,  with  cost  minimization.  Sec-
ondly,  the second-best solution can often be achieved 
reasonably  satisfactorily,  and  in  some  cases  it  may 
be  best  to  apply  the  criteria  of  optimum  resource 
allocation  without  any  modification  at  all. 
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The problems posed by  the relative optimum, assum-
ing  the existence  of  constraints,  will  be  studied later 
with  reference  to the  particular cases of stabilization 
and  budgetary  equilibrium (1).  These  are  the  most 
important  examples  of  constraints  that  may  be 
imposed  on  internal  transport. 
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As  for  the  problem  of the  imperfect  environment,  a 
good  case  can  be  made  for  disregarding  this  when 
the  optimum  transport  policy  has  to  be worked out 
(provided that all  modes of transport are included in 
the  transport  sector,  so  that  no  means  of  transport 
form  part  of  the  imperfect  environment).  Two 
arguments  can  be  advanced  in  favour  of  this  pro-
position.  The  first  is  a  general  consideration.  If 
deviations  from  the  optimum  rules  in  other  sectors 
are  considered  as  an  accepted  fact,  and  if  policy  is 
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directed towards  mitigating  the  consequences  of this 
situation  by  introducing  compensatory  distortions 
in  the transport  sector,  we  run the risk of becoming 
involved  in  a  vicious  circle of measures  designed  to 
provide  compensation  in  one  sector  for  distortions 
that exist in  other sectors or are created by  the very 
process  that  is  intended  to  correct  them.  The 
second  objection  results  from  the  fact  that,  as  far 
as  one  can  judge,  the  price  elasticity  of  the  total 
demand  for  transport is  relatively weak in  the short 
and  medium  term  (again,  if one considers  all  modes 
of  transport).  The  elasticities  of  substitution  are 
much  higher  within  the  transport  sector.  Conse-
quently,  it is  as  a rule far more important to ensure 
optimum  price  relationships  within  the  transport 
sector  than  it  is  to  secure  an "optimum",  which  is 
bound  to  be  only  a  second-best,  with  respect  to 
other sectors of the economy. 
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However  important  these  arguments  may  be,  the 
problem  of  the  imperfect  environment,  in  so  far  as 
it concerns the relations between the transport sector 
as  a  whole  and  the  other  sectors  of  the  economy, 
will  be  disregarded  in  the  subsequent  sections  of 
this  report.  Nevertheless,  we  shall briefly discuss (
2
) 
the  serious  problems  that  may  arise  if  some  modes 
of  transport  are  considered  while  others,  such  as 
pipelines,  coastal  shipping,  etc.,  are  left  out  of 
account. 
(')  See  Sections  24.3  and  24.4. 
(")  See  Subsection  25.32. CHAPTER  23 
THE  SPECIAL  PROBLEMS OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
23.0  - GENERAL 
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Application of the  criteria of economic efficiency  to 
transport  raises  many  questions  of  a  practical  na-
ture.  Outside  the  field  of  infrastructure,  these 
mainly  concern  the  institutional  means  of  ensuring 
application  of  the  criteria,  the  constraints  imposed 
on  this  by  reality,  and,  where  other  criteria  are 
explicitly  considered,  the  possible  conflicts  between 
efficiency  and  other objectives  such  as  equity.  All 
these  questions,  in  so  far  as  they  concern  general 
policy  options  for  transport,  will  be  studied  in  this 
Part (1).  Some  specific  policies  will  be  examined 
in  Part  Ill. 
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However,  certain  aspects  of infrastructure  call for  a 
special analysis of the repercussions of the criteria of 
optimum  resource  allocation  themselves.  Infra-
structure  has  at  least  two  features  which  justify 
examination:  it  consists  mainly  of  highly  durable 
assets,  and  it  is  subject  to  important  indivisibilities 
- both  terms  being  understood  in  the  economic 
sense.  Questions  relating  to  the  durability  of 
infrastructure,  and  to  the  connection  between  indi-
visibility  and increasing returns (economies of scale), 
are  briefly  summarized  in  the  following  two  sec-
tions (2). 
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A  third  aspect  still  remains  to  be studied  in  detail. 
If the charges to be paid by the users of infrastructure 
correspond  only  to  the  economic  charges (3),  infra-
structure could operate  at  a  deficit  in  the  sense  that 
the sum of investment cost  and  discounted operating 
costs will  not be covered by total revenue, i.e.  by the 
sum  of  all  discounted  economic  charges  levied 
throughout the whole economic life of the equipment. 
The  question  of  whether  there  will  in practice be a 
deficit  or  not  largely  depends  on  the  investment 
policy  followed.  If the  expansion  of  infrastructure 
is slow it may reach or approach economic saturation, 
and  revenue  from  the  congestion  charges  will  be 
relatively  high.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  investment 
expands sufficiently to  satisfy the criteria of optimum 
resource  allocation,  the  corresponding prices  will  be 
relatively  low  and  there may  be  a  deficit.  We have 
shown  that,  because  of  increasing  returns  to 
investment  in  infrastructure,  a  policy  of  optimum 
investment  would  in  fact  lead  to  such  a  deficit. 
The various  problems connected with  the deficit will 
be studied later (4). 
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23.1  -ECONOMIC DURABILITY 
OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
500 
The exceptionally long economic  life  of  a large  part 
of  the  assets  considered  as  constituting  the  infra-
structure  of  internal  transport  is  one  of  its  most 
striking  features. 
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This  is  the  reason  for  certain  special  difficulties. 
To  apply  the  investment  criteria,  an  estimate  of 
future  demand  and  costs  is  needed,  and  this  will 
obviously  be  the  more  difficult,  the  longer  the 
economic  life  of the  equipment  considered.  More-
over,  the long life  of infrastructure implies  that only 
a small part needs replacing each year.  Consequent-
ly,  the  available  capacity  is  very  largely  a  datum 
from  the  past  which  can  be  influenced  by  present 
decisions  only in  the direction of expansion.  Disin-
vestment  by  taking  infrastructure  out  of  service 
before  the  end  of  its  technical  life  will  occur 
relatively  rarely. 
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There is  one last point which will  play an important 
role  in  the  study  of the  deficit  and  of  the  various 
interpretations  of  the  notion  of  budgetary  equilib-
rium.  The  older  an  element  of  infrastructure  is, 
the more  the  price  which would  have  to be paid at 
the present time to build equal or equivalent capacity 
can  diverge  from  the  initial  investment  cost.  This 
may  be  due  to  inflation,  technical  progress,  or any 
other cause of changes  in  money  costs (5). 
23.2  - ECONOMIC  INDIVISIBILITY 
OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
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Indivisibility  in  the  physical  sense  occurs  when  a 
factor  of  production  is  available  only  in  units  of  a 
specific discrete size.  The total production capacity 
of such a factor can vary only by discrete quantities 
and  not  continuously.  Indivisibilities  can  occur 
(')  See  Chapter  24  for  infrastructure  and  Chapter  25  for 
transport  services. 
(")  For the question  of economies of scale see  Part I. 
(')  See  Subsection  22.11. 
(')  See  Section  23.3. 
(")  See  Section  24.4. both  for  durable  factors,  such  as  rolling  stock,  and 
for factors which  are not durable, such  as  a General 
Manager,  if his  services  can  be  dispensed  with  at 
short notice,  in  which  case  he  is  not durable in  the 
economic  sense  of  the  term.  But  it  should  be: 
noted  that  indivisibilities  are  important  from  the 
point of view  of policy only if  they are considerable 
in  relation  to  total  demand.  It  follows  that  in 
transport  services  - where  indivisibilities  of rolling 
stock  are  obviously  very  low  in  relation  to  total 
demand  - the  problem  can  be ignored,  but  that it 
may play a role in  infrastructure. 
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Indivisibilities  in  the  physical  sense  of  the  term  do 
exist  in  infrastructure.  Most  projects  have  a  spe-
cific minimum size:  a two-lane highway, a single-track 
railway,  a  canal  of  specific  depth  and  width,  a 
minimum  electrification  project,  etc.  Even  if 
demand  is  weak,  it  may  be  justified on the  basis  of 
the  investment  criteria (1)  to  construct  infrastructure 
which  wiii  operate  at  a deficit, if the prices  paid by 
users  are  equal  to  the economic charges. 
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If the minimum size of the infrastructure has already 
been  attained,  the  problem  of  physical  indivisibility 
no  longer  seems  to  be  serious.  In  many  cases, 
the capacity to  be built may vary almost continuously 
for  any  dimensions  above  the minimum.  But there 
remains  another form  of  discontinuity  in  infrastruc-
ture  capacity  which  also  comes  under  the  concept 
of economic  indivisibility. 
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This  second  form  of  discontinuity  results  from  the 
economies  of  scale  in  the  construction  of  infra-
structure:  a large capacity is  often relatively cheaper 
to build than a smaller one.  It is  important to note 
that  the  more  important  economies  of  scale  occur 
when the infrastructure is being built.  Once a certain 
infrastructure  exists,  extensions  of  capacity  can  no 
longer be provided at a marginal cost of construction 
as  low  as  would  have  been  possible  if  the  same 
additional  capacity had  been  built  at  the same time 
as  the  existing  infrastructure.  Economies  of  scale 
in  the  building  of  infrastructure  are  of  a  special 
kind:  they  reflect  the savings  resulting from  building 
a  particular  capacity  in  one  operation  rather  than 
gradually  as  demand  increases.  For instance,  it  is 
cheaper  to  build  one  four-lane  highway  than  two 
two-lane  highways,  but  a  four-lane  highway  built  in 
two  stages  could  cost  as  much  as,  or even  more (2) 
than,  two  separate  two-lane  highways.  A  rational 
policy for  investment in  infrastructure in  an expand-
ing  economy  might  therefore  be  to  push  extension 
of capacity to the  point where there would  be some 
surplus capacity during the initial period, rather than 
to  adapt  capacity  gradually  to  increasing  demand. 
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Economies of scale  in  the  building of infrastructures 
thus give  rise  to a form of indivisibility whose effects 
are very  like  those  of physical  indivisibility (3). 
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What  are  the  consequences  of  economic  indivisi-
bility?  In the first  place,  the congestion charges may 
~>how  a  rather  special  pattern  in  time.  In  an 
expanding  economy,  congestion  charges  will  be  nil 
during  the  period  following  expansion  oJf  capacity 
and for as  long  as  the infrastructure is  not yet fully 
utilized (4).  As  soon  as  capacity  is  b1~ing  fully 
utilized  in  the  economic  sense,  congestion  charges 
will  begin to increase,  and they will go  on increasing 
until  capacity is  again  expanded, when  the:y  wiii  fall 
back to a lower value,  perhaps to zero.  This aspect 
of economic  indivisibility  will  be  examined  later (5) 
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The second  possible  consequence  of economic  indi-
visibility  is  that  operation  of  the  infrastructure 
concerned is  likely to  produce  a deficit  in  the  sense 
defined  above  if  the  charges  paid  by  the  users  are 
equal  to  the  economic  charges.  In  the:  case  of 
physical indivisibility,  a  deficit  will  occur in  a  situa-
tion of stable demand if the indivisibl.e  infrastructure 
is  not  fully  used.  The  congestion  charges,  deter-
mined  in  conformity  with  the  criteria  of  optimum 
resource  allocation,  will  then  be  nil,  so  that  the 
optimum  prices  paid  by  users  will  consist  solely  of 
cost  charges.  It is  evident that the  total  discounted 
revenue obtained by making users  pay only  the cost 
charges  (corresponding  to  the  marginal  cost  of 
utilization)  will  be  inadequate  to  cover  the  cost  of 
the  initial  investment  plus  the  discounted  cost  of 
operation  and  maintenance,  revenue  as  well  as  costs 
being  calculated  over  the  whole  life  of  the  infra-
structure.  A  road,  a  canal  and,  in  general,  all 
durable  assets,  deteriorate  as  a  function  of  their 
economic  age  as  well  as  from  wear  and  tear. 
Consequently,  if  users  are  only  charged  the  direct 
cost  they  cause,  the  investment  cost  plus  the  dis-
counted  operating  expenditure  will  not  be  covered. 
Hence,  there  will  be  a  deficit  in  the  sense  defined 
above.  At the  same time,  if  the  investment criteria 
are  followed,  we  shall  be  led  to  build  the  infra-
structure in question provided the discounted benefits 
lrom its  use,  including  the  surpluses  created,  exceed 
(')  That  is  to  say  if  the  sum  of  the  discounted  benefits 
including  the  surpluses,  is  greater  than  the  sum  of  the 
investment cost and discounted operating costs, the difference 
being  at its  maximum. 
e)  Because  of  th~:  increase  in  ground  rents  resulting  from 
the  first  investment. 
(")  It may  usefully  be  pointed  out  that  economies  of  scale 
in  infrastructures  are  the  more  marked, the  lower the  rate 
of  discount  and  the  higher  the  rate  of  growth  of  traffic. 
(')  See  Part I. 
(')  See  Section  24.3. its  total  discounted  cost,  the  difference  being  maxi-
mum.  Even  if  the  infrastructure  considered  is  not 
fully  utilized  and  the  optimum  price  for  its  use  is 
consequently  very  low,  the  surpluses  may  be  high 
enough  to  justify  the  investment.  The existence  of 
such  over-capacity can be  considered  as  the price of 
progress,  since  any  bottlenecks  in  infrastructure  are 
likely to strongly impede the advance of the economy 
as  a  whole. 
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The  same  phenomenon,  i.e.  that  the  sum  of 
discounted  economic  charges  is  not  sufficient  to 
cover  the sum  of the investment  cost  and operating 
expenditure,  occurs  in  the  other  case  of  economic 
indivisibility,  which  is  linked  with  the  existence  of 
economies  of  scale  in  the  construction  of  infra-
structure.  The  criteria  of  optimum  resource  allo-
cation  imply  that  investment  would  have  to  be 
continued up  to  the  point where  its  marginal cost is 
equal  to  the  sum  of discounted  future  revenue  from 
the  marginal  investment (1).  However,  because  of 
economies  of  scale,  the  marginal  cost  of investment 
is  lower  than  its  average  cost,  so  that  a  policy  of 
investment  and  prices  based  on the  criteria  of opti-
mum  resource  allocation  will  generally  lead  to  a 
financial  deficit (2). 
23.3  - THE  PROBLEM OF  THE  DEFICIT 
23.30  - General 
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We  have  shown  in  the  preceding  sections  that  the 
infrastructure  of  transport,  if  managed  according  to 
the investment and pricing rules corresponding to an 
optimum  allocation  of  resources,  may  incur  a 
deficit.  This  deficit  raises  various  problems,  which 
will  be  discussed  briefly  in  this  section.  Their 
implications  as  to  the  policy  to  be followed  will  be 
analysed  in  the following  chapter,  which  deals  with 
options  for  infrastructure. 
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One  preliminary  comment  is  required.  The  total 
deficit  to be  expected  when  a  specific  infrastructure 
investment  is  made  and  users  are  charged  prices 
equal  to  the  economic  charges  can  be  clearly 
defined.  It is  quite  simply  the  difference  between 
the  discounted  value  of  the  investment  cost  plus 
operating  expenditure  and  the  discounted  value  of 
the revenue from  all future economic charges.  How-
ever  this  definition  is  insufficient  to  determine 
the deficit  to  be  covered  each  year,  and it  does  not 
give  any  indication  how  the  total  deficit  should  be 
apportioned  among  the  various  categories  of  users. 
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These questions will  be examined in connection with 
the  option  of  budgetary  equilibrium (3).  In  the 
present  section,  the  annual  deficit  is  assumed  to  be 
completely  defined {4). 
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The  first  problem  which  arises  in  connection  with 
the deficit  is  that  it must  be covered in one way or 
another.  It  follows  from  the  theory  of  optimum 
resource allocation (5)  that the deficit  as  just defined 
should  be covered  by  means  of taxes  which  do  not 
distort  economic  decisions,  for  instance  a  fixed  poll 
tax  or a  tax  differentiated  according  to  the  age  or 
height  of the  taxpayer.  Such  taxes,  which  do  not 
affect  optimum  resource  allocation,  may  be  quite 
unacceptable  from  the point of view  of equity.  In 
other words,  considerations  of equity cannot be left 
out  of  account  in  examining  ways  of  covering  the 
deficit  on infrastructure (6). 
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It is  sometimes  claimed  that considerations  of opti-
mum  resource  allocation  would  favour  the  deficit's 
being  borne  by  the  users  of  infrastructure  rather 
than  financed  out  of  the  budget,  i.e.  from  general 
taxation.  The argument runs as follows:  taxes which 
are neutral from  the economic point of view may be 
unacceptable  from  the  point  of view  of equity,  but 
all  other  methods  of  financing  the  deficit  lead  to 
distortions  of  the  conditions  of  optimum  resource 
allocation.  According  to  this  argument  the  distor-
tions  caused  by  financing  the  deficit  from  public 
funds  ("external distortions") would be more serious 
than those caused  by imposing adequate charges on 
the  users  of infrastructure  ("internal distortions"). 
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As  a  general  proposition,  the  argument  is  difficult 
to  sustain.  In  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge 
it hardly  seems  possible  to  prove  that,  of  all  prac-
ticable  methods  of  raising  the  required  funds,  the 
least  inefficient one would  be  to  impose the charges 
on  the  users  of  the  infrastructure.  This  does  not 
mean  that such  charges  should not  be  imposed,  but 
simply  that  they  could  not  be  justified  by  the 
reasoning  we  have  just given. 
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The second  problem concerning the deficit is  mainly 
of  a  political  and  sociological  nature,  although  it 
can  have considerable consequences on the practical 
economic  plane,  particularly  as  regards  investments 
(')  See  Subsection  22.10. 
(')  See  Part I  and Subsection  24.40. 
(')  See  Section  24.4. 
(')  See  Part I  and  Subsection  24.40. 
(')  See  Part  I. 
(')  See  Subsection  23.31. in  infrastructure.  The  essential  point  is  the  follow·· 
ing.  Financing the  deficit  out  of  funds  other  than 
those  obtained  from  charges  on  the  users  of  infra-
structure  - which  in  practice  means  the  State 
budget  - implies  that  investment  decisions  in· the 
area  of  infrastructure  are  subject  to  the  limitations 
of  the  public  budget  and  could  be  misdirected 
through the action of pressure groups (1). 
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The third  aspect  of the deficit which  must  be  exam-
ined  concerns  the  railways,  where  infrastructure 
and  transport  services  are  managed  as  one  unit. 
Since  it  is  difficult in  practice to  separate the  deficit 
attributable  to  infrastructure  from  a  possible  deficit 
in  other  fields  of  railway  operation,  covering  the 
deficit  from  public  funds  is  likely  to  weaken  the 
incentive  towards  efficient  management (2). 
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It may  be  superfluous  to  emphasize  once  again  that 
our analysis  is  essentially limited  to  determining the 
conditions and consequences of applying the rules of 
optimum  resource  allocation  in  the  strict  economic 
sense of the term.  If the investment in infrastructure 
can  depend on other considerations,  the problem of 
the deficit as  set out below appears in a very different 
light (3). 
23.31  - The  deficit  in  relation 
to  problems  of equity 
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We  may  begin  our  analysis  by  considering  the 
argument  that  an  economic  activity  which  does  not 
produce external effects of production or consumption 
should cover its  "total costs" (4)  from revenue.  This 
well  worn  thesis  seems  to  follow  from  the  idea -
a  rather tempting one,  at least  in  a  general way -
that  each  individual  consumer  and  each  group  of 
consumers  collectively  should  bear  the  cost  of 
everything they  consume (5). 
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Even if this proposition is  accepted, certain questions 
remain  open  as  to  what  it  signifies  in  practice.  In 
particular,  what  does  it  imply  with  regard  to  the 
allocation of costs which can undoubtedly be imputed 
to  a certain collectivity - for  instance,  all  the users 
of  infrastructure  - but  which  cannot  be  imputed 
directly to its individual members or to homogeneous 
groups  within  that  collectivity?  This  question  is 
of  fundamental  importance  for  the  problem  of the 
deficit.  On the basis  of the conditions  of optimum 
resource allocation,  the deficit  cannot be imputed to 
the  individual  users  of infrastructure  for  the  simple 
reason  that  all  costs  which  can  be imputed  directly 
have  already  been  eliminated.  After all,  the deficit 
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is  defined  as  the  difference  between  the  investment 
cost plus the discounted future operating expenditure 
and  the  discounted  revenue  derived  from  the  eco-
nomic  charges  during the entire economic life  of the 
infrastructure.  These  revenues  include  the  directly 
imputable  costs,  i.e.  the  marginal  costs  of using  the 
infrastructure. 
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This  problem  can  be  solved  in  various  ways,  which 
will  be  analysed  later (!').  The  deficit  has  to  be 
apportioned  between  transport  and  the  other  uses 
of infrastructure, between the three modes  of  inland 
transport,  between  the  regional  components  of  the 
infrastructures,  and  between  the  various  categories 
of  users.  Furthermore,  it  must  be  apportioned  in 
time  between  the  users. 
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We  have  hardly  any  exact  information  as  to  which 
criteria  are  generally  accepted  for  apportionment of 
the deficit  or which  would  be the most  appropriate 
from  the  equity  angle.  In  this  field  our  thinking 
would  seem  to  be  largely  conditioned  by  practical 
possibilities  and  the  requirements  of economic  effi-
ciency.  This  reduces  the  question  to  one  of  eco-
nomic  and  institutional  efficiency,  which  we  shall 
examine  in  the  next chapter. 
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But  one  final  comment  may  be  made.  However 
vague  may  be  the consequences  of the  proposition 
that  all  consumption  should  be  paid  for  by  those 
who  benefit  from  it,  it  does  seem  to  imply  as 
complete  as  possible  an  imputation of  costs:  to  the 
transport sector as  a  whole,  to  each mode of trans-
port  separately,  to  each  part  of  the  infrastructure 
network,  and  to  each  type  of  service  provided.  If 
it  is  considered  fair  that  every  economic  operator 
and every group of such operators should be charged 
all  the costs which  can be imputed directly to them, 
a  maximum  imputation of the deficit  would  also  be 
necessary (1).  However,  we  shall  see  below (8)  that 
(')  See  Subsection  23.32. 
(')  See  Subsection  23.33. 
(')  See  Subsection  23.34. 
(•)  See  Subsection  24.41. 
( 5)  This view is, of course, acceptable only if the distribution 
of income  can  be::  regarded  as  corresponding to  the  ethical 
ideals  of  the  society  considered;  this  obviously  raises  a 
host of problems  which  cannot  be  examined in this report. 
(")  See  Subsection  24.42. 
(') The term maximum is  used intentionally to indicate that 
total  apportionment to the individual  user is  impossible,  by 
definition  of the  deficit.  But  this  does  not preclude  certain 
elements  of  costs  being  imputed  to  specific  categories  of 
users,  for  exampl<e  the  costs  of  a  mode  of  transport  to all 
the  users  of it. 
(
8
)  See  Subsections  24.42  to  24.46. the  possibilities  of  imputing  costs  are  very  limited, 
particularly  when  different  types  of  services  are 
produced  on  the  same  network.  For  this  reason 
especially,  the  apportionment  between  users  of  the 
infrastructure  of  investment  cost  and  management 
expenditure  independent  of  traffic  will  always  be 
largely  arbitrary. 
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On  the  other  hand,  it  is  generally  possible  without 
being  arbitrary  to  apportion  such  costs  between  the 
regional  components  of  infrastructure.  But  does 
the  principle  of  maximum  imputation  imply  that 
spatially  these  costs  must  be  apportioned  on  a 
completely  unequal  basis?  This  is  very  doubtful, 
because  the  benefits  from  the  various  elements  of 
an  infrastructure  network  can  be  interdependent (1). 
Where  the  economic  links  between  various  parts 
of  a  region  are  so  close  that  the  division  of  its 
infrastructure  into  several  networks  would  be  mean-
ingless  - these  regions  can  be  very  vast  and  can 
even  extend  bevond  national  frontiers  - it  would 
seem  that equity demands not a maximum degree of 
inequality  but  rather  the  establishment  of  uniform 
charges  giving  the  right  to  utilize  the  infrastructure 
at  any point on the network.  However,  as  we shall 
see  below,  there  are  good  reasons  for  classifying 
networks  in  at  least  three  general  types,  possessing 
specific  economic  characteristics  which  can  justi-
fiably be recognized from the point of view of equity, 
as  well  as  from  other  points  of  view.  These  are 
main  (national)  networks,  urban  and  suburban  net-
works,  and local  networks.  This form  of inequality 
will  be  examined  in  the  following  chapter (2). 
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We  shall  show  that such "differentiation" of charges 
for  the  use  of infrastructure  is  certainly  possible  in 
practice,  but  that  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the 
deficit  on  infrastructures  of  local  networks  should 
be  met  by  the users,  since  this  type  presents  fairly 
marked features which  are not specifically economic. 
Similar  considerations  also  apply  to  underdeveloped 
regions (3)  ( 4). 
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It would seem that the following - quite provisional 
- conclusion  could  be  drawn  from  the  above 
remarks.  Considerations of equity appear to favour 
imposing on the transport sector - and in particular 
upon infrastructure, where the problem of the deficit 
arises  - the  rule  of  budgetary  equilibrium,  whose 
exact  content,  which  will  be  examined  later,  is  in 
any  case  not  clearly  determined  by  the  idea  of 
equity  itself.  This  general  principle  is  compatible 
with  broad  equalization  in  space  of  the  deficits 
appertaining to the different parts of the infrastructure 
network  within  each  mode  of  internal  transport, 
inequality  subsisting  only  between  the  three  sub-
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networks  which  we  distinguished  above.  However, 
considerations of both equity and economics prescribe 
that  local  networks  - and  all  networks  in  under-
developed regions - shoud be exempt from  the  rule 
of  budgetary  equilibrium,  and  that  the  deficit  on 
them  should  be  met  from  public  funds. 
23.32  - The  deficit  and  investment  decisions 
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Infrastructure  investment  decisions  are  largely  a 
matter for  the public sector.  The infrastructures of 
road  transport  and  inland  waterways  come  directly 
under  the  public  authorities,  either central or local; 
and,  to  achieve  the  necessary  co-ordination (5), 
investments  in  railway  infrastructure  should  also  be 
subject  to  some  public  control.  We  have  already 
pointed  out (H)  that  the  rules  to  be  applied  by  the 
authorities  should  be  practical,  relatively  simple, 
non-arbitrary  and  susceptible  of  objective  control. 
Do  the  criteria  mentioned  in  the  preceding  sections 
fulfil  these  conditions ? 
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The investment  criteria  to  be  applied  by  the  public 
authorities,  as  resulting  from  optimum  resource 
allocation,  are  unambiguous  and  give  rise  to  no 
difficulty  in  theory.  However,  if  the  system  of 
charges  for  the  use  of  infrastructure  leads  to  a 
deficit  which  must  be  covered  from  public  funds, 
there  may  be  a  danger  of  these  criteria  not  being 
correctly  and  consistently  applied.  This  danger, 
the result of several causes which will now be exam-
ined,  would  not  exist  if  the  criteria  of  optimum 
resource  allocation  in  the  matter  of  infrastructure 
investment were easy to apply and perfectly objective, 
i.e.  not subject to  individual judgment.  But such  is 
not the case.  The criteria are not easy to apply and 
cannot be  checked objectively,  because they  call  for 
estimates of benefits  and future  costs  over very long 
periods. 
(')  See  Section  24.1. 
(')  See  Subsection  24.45. 
(')  From  the  angle  of  political  equity,  each  region  of  a 
country  may  be  held  to  have  a  right  to  a  minimum  ..  of 
transport  facilities  in  the  sa~e way  as. rural .  c?mmun~t1~s 
are entitled to have schools.  Smce there  IS  a  m1mmum  hm1t 
to the dimensions  of infrastructures (see  Subsec.  2?.02),  the 
infrastructures  of  thinly  pop~lated regions  may  be .  ~f!Ila­
nently  underutilized.  Imposition  of . budgetary  eqmhbnui_D 
in  these  cases  would  result  both  m  waste  of  economiC 
resources  - since  the  consequent  tolls  would  hinder  good 
utilization  of  the  infrastructure  - and  a  financial  burden 
for  the  inhabitants  of  the  regions  concerned  which  would 
doubtless  be  excessive. 
(')  A  detailed study of underdevelopment is naturally outside 
the  province of this report. 
(")  See  Section  24.1. 
(")  See  Section  20.1. 528 
Hence,  the  process  of  making  decisions  on  invest-
ment  in infrastructure can be  influenced  by political 
and  social  pressures  and  institutional  factors.  Cer-
tain  pressures  are  bound  to  be  exerted in  this  field, 
where  private interests  have much to gain  and much 
to  lose.  But  a  tariff  policy  which  implies  subsidies 
from  the  government  is  likely  to  strengthen  these 
pressures.  Users  of  infrastructures,  knowing  that 
any  expansion of them  brings  down  the level  of the 
congestion  charges  and  also  that  any  deficit  will  be 
covered  otherwise  than by charges  upon themselves, 
will  fight  for  the  infrastructure investment  program-
me  which  best  serves  their  interests  but  does  not 
:necessarily  conform  to  the  criteria  of  optimum 
resource  allocation.  On  the  other  hand,  there is  a 
danger  of  the  expansion  of  infrastructure  being 
unduly  hampered  by  the  limitations  of the  national 
budget. 
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This  last  point,  which  is  of  an  institutional  nature, 
may  well  be  the  most  important  one  in  practice. 
Unjustified  investment  in  infrastructure  may  well 
occur,  but  underinvestment,  particularly  in  roads, 
would  seem  to  be  the  most  serious  danger  in  the 
present  situation.  Great  progress  would  therefore 
be  made  towards  optimum  resource  allocation  if 
roads  were  freed  from  national  budget  constraints 
by  "defiscalizing"  the  charges  which  weigh  on 
infrastructure  users,  i.e.  by  financing  highway 
expenditure - however defined - from taxes which 
would  no  longer  have  a  fiscal  character  but would 
be considered as  prices (1). 
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These considerations all  argue in favour of clear and 
objective rules, "transparent" institutional procedures, 
and  some  autonomy  for  the  decision-making  au-
thorities  in  their  relations  with  the  governments. 
In  practice,  the  investment  criteria  of  optimum 
resource  allocation  do  not  satisfy  these  conditions, 
notably  because their  application  produces a  deficit, 
which  must  be  covered,  and  requires  an  evaluation 
of  the  benefits.  This  is  why  all  the  operational 
rules  which  we  examine in  the following  chapter are 
necessarily  compromises  between  the  desire  to 
satisfy  the  correct  economic  criteria  of  optimum 
resource  allocation  as  fully  as  possible and  the need 
for  practical  procedures  which  may depart from  the 
optimum  but  not  too  widely.  It should  be  pointed 
out here  that  very  great  losses  of social  returns  can 
result  from  insufficient,  excessive  or  badly  directed 
investment  in  the  infrastructure of land  transport. 
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A  possible  compromise  could  be  found  along  the 
following  lines.  Apart  from  cases  where  social 
considerations are  dominant (2),  infrastructure invest-
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ments would  be made only if the relevant investment 
and  operating  expenditures  could  be  covered  by 
actual  revenue  from  the  charges  on  users.  This 
rule deviates from the investment criteria of optimum 
resource  allocation  chiefly  in  disregarding  all  the 
surpluses which cannot be collected through charges. 
Admittedly, as  an operational criterion for investment 
it is  far  from  complete (3),  but it has the advantage 
that direct revenue is a more objective and in practice 
less  arbitrary  measure  than  total  benefit  which 
includes  the  surpluses  that  are  difficult  to  evaluate 
with  accuracy. 
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Imposition  of  the  rule  of budgetary  equilibrium  on 
infrastructure  enables  investment  to  be  freed  from 
national budget constraints - which is economically 
desirable  - and  frustrates,  at least to  some  extent, 
the action of pressure groups. 
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The requirement of budgetary equilibrium c:an  cause 
particularly  serious  distortions  to  optimum  utiliza-
tion  of infrastructure  if the forecasts  on  which  the 
original investment decision was based prove to have 
been  incorrect,  and  especially  if  they  were  over-
optimistic.  In  this  case  the  need  to  balance  the 
budget  would  mean  imposing  prices  much  higher 
than  the  economic  charge,  and this  would  lead to  a 
particularly  serious  waste  of  available  capacities. 
Two  solutions  are possible here:  the first  is  to open 
the  way  to  exceptional and specific government aids 
in all  such  cases;  the  second  is  to  apply the rule of 
budgetary equilibrium only to infrastructure networks 
as  a  whole  and not  to  their separate parts.  In this 
case  inaccurate  forecasts  would  be  likely  to  cancel 
each  other  out.  The  various  aspects  of  these  two 
( 1)  Irrespective  of where  it  is  used  in  this  report,  the  term 
"defiscalization"  should  not  necessarily  be  equated  with  a 
reduction of the charges on infrastructure users.  Moreover, 
it  goes  without  saying  that,  under  any  "defiscalization", 
transport  would continue to be  as  liable to general taxation 
as  any  other  sector  of  the  economy.  "Defiscalization"  of 
the  charges  on  road  users,  and  the  freeing  of  investments 
in  roads  from  national  budget  restrictions,  should  be inter-
preted in a  limited sense.  Such measures in  no way reduce 
the  importance  of  the  investment  criteria  resulting  from 
optimum  resource  allocation  or  of  the  co-ordination  of 
investments.  These  requirements  always  remain  wholly 
valid for roads and  for the other modes of inland transport. 
Any  anticyclical  measures  which  might  be  taken  by 
governments  will  apply  to  roads  as  well  as  to  other 
investments;  but, under the  "defiscalization" envisaged  here, 
infrastructure  investment  would  no  longer  have  to  bear 
almost the  whole  burden of such anti-inflationary measures, 
as  is  now the case  in certain countries.  Investment  in  infra-
structure would  be placed on the same footing  as  the  other 
sectors  of the  economy, instead  of being  considered  as  the 
instrument  and  object  par excellence  of anticyclical  policy. 
(')  Such  as  local  networks  and  the  entire  infrastructure  of 
underdeveloped  regions. 
(")  See  Section  24.4. solutions  will  be  examined  in  the  following  chap-
ter (I). 
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One  last  point  should  be  mentioned  here.  There 
is  an  alleged further argument in favour of the budg-
etary  equilibrium  rule,  based  on  faulty  economic 
reasoning.  It  is  often  claimed  that  a  policy  of 
financing  the  deficit  of  infrastructure  from  public 
funds  would  lead  to  a  division  of traffic  among  the 
three  modes  of  transport  which  would  be  contrary 
to  optimum  resource  allocation.  This  contention 
is  based  on  the  following  reasoning.  Since  none  of 
the  competing  modes  of inland  transport  can  cover 
the  investment  costs  plus  the  discounted  operating 
expenditure  for  its  infrastructure  from  charges  on 
users,  and  since  the  deficits  have  not  the  same 
relative  importance  within  each  mode  of  transport, 
a  system  of  economic  charges  would  lead  to  a 
distribution of traffic not consonant with the "relative 
costs"  of  the  competing  services.  Consequently 
there would be  no  "equality of conditions of compe-
tition",  and  hence  no  optimum  distribution  of 
traffic (2) 
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This argument is  based on an incorrect interpretation 
of  the  criteria  of  optimum  resource  allocation. 
These  criteria  include  certain  rules  for  investment 
in  infrastructure.  Once  an  infrastructure  exists  -
and whether  the  original  investment  decision  was  or 
was  not  in  conformity  with  optimum  resource  allo-
cation  - the  optimum  charges  for  using  it  are 
those  we  have  called  "economic  charges".  Conse-
quently,  it  cannot  reasonably  be  claimed  that  this 
system  of charges - whether it  leads to  a  deficit or 
a  surplus,  or  just  manages  to  achieve  budgetary 
equilibrium -- would create a distortion in  the sense 
that  there  would  be  deviations  from  the  optimum 
distribution  of traffic  between  the  competing  modes 
of  transport. 
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However,  those  who  allege  that  the  system  of  eco-
nomic  charges  engenders  a  distortion because of the 
deficits  it  implies  may,  in  the  last  analysis,  be 
justified  from  another  angle.  Given  the  difficulties 
involved in applying the criteria of optimum resource 
allocation  to  infrastructure  investments,  particularly 
as  regards  the  assessment  of benefits,  the  authorities 
might  well  accept,  as  an  approxima~e. solution,  ~n 
investment policy aimed simply at avoidmg economic 
congestion.  Actually,  such  a  policy  could  have 
unwelcome  consequences  because  of  the  resulting 
investment  decisions  by  users. 
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Fixing charges at  the  relatively low !eve!  c?rrespond-
ing  to  optimum  resource  allocatiOn  Without  the 
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deficit being covered by the users is,  in fact,  likely to 
provoke demand for transport which would not have 
arisen  if the level  of charges  had been  sufficient  to 
cover the investment  cost plus  discounted  operating 
expenditure  of  the  infrastructure.  In  particular, 
users  of the  infrastructure may  be  led  to  base their 
investment decisions,  especially those concerning the 
location  of  industry,  on  the  hypothesis  that  there 
will  always  be  sufficient  infrastructure  at  charges 
which  are  low  in  relation  to  these  costs.  Conse-
quently,  if  the  authorities  pursued  an  investment 
policy aimed simply at avoiding economic congestion, 
while  exempting  users  from  covering  the  deficit, 
infrastructure  investment  could  result  which  would 
not  be  justified  by  the criteria of optimum  resource 
allocation. 
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It is  clear that  this  line  of reasoning brings  us  back 
to  considerations  of  an  economic,  institutional  and 
sociological  nature  similar  to  those  which,  as  we 
have  already  pointed  out,  argue  for  imposing  the 
rule  of  budgetary  equilibrium  on  the  infrastructure 
of  inland  transport. 
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Consequently,  we  may  conclude  by  saying  that 
certain  economic,  political,  social  and  institutional 
factors  seem  to  favour  the imposition on infrastruc-
ture of the rule of budgetary equilibrium (the content 
of  which  we  will  define  more  precisely  below), 
except  in  those  cases  where  social  considerations 
argue  against  it (l). 
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Regional  equalization  of  charges  within  each  great 
sub-network would  not conflict with  these economic, 
political  and  institutional  arguments.  It would  ~n 
fact  serve  to  mitigate some of the harmful economic 
consequences  of  too  strict  an  application  of  the  re-
quirement  of  budgetary  equilibrium. 
23.33  - Special  problems  of  the  deficit 
in  the  case  of  railways 
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The  deficit  brings  up  a  number of  special problems 
in  the case of the railways, where, for valid technical 
and  economic  reasons,  infrastructure  and  transport 
C)  See  Ssection  24.4. 
(')  Of  course,  the  question  of  equality  of  treatment  may 
present  itself  very  differently  from  t_he  .  ~ngle 
of  distribution  of  income  than  from  that  of  mstitutwnal 
conditions  of  competition.  We  are  only  dealing  here  with 
equality  of  treatment  in  relation  to  optimum  resource 
allocation. 
C)  Especially  local  networks  and  all  communications  in 
underdeveloped  regions. services  are administered  as  one unit.  If the deficit 
of  infrastructure  were  to  be  financed  from  public 
funds  rather  than  from  charges  on  users,  some 
separation  between  infrastructure  and the other rail-
way  operations  might  seem  inevitable,  at  least  at 
the level of investment decisions and financial admin-
istration.  Such  a  separation  would,  moreover,  be 
necessary  to  some  extent  even  if  the  infrastructure 
deficit were eliminated by the requirement of budget-
ary  equilibrium.  We  shall  show  in  the  following 
chapter  that  co-ordination  of  infrastructure  invest-
ments  appears generally  to  be  a  necessary condition 
of a  rational  transport  policy (1).  However,  if  the 
deficit  were  financed  by  subsidies,  central  co-ordi-
nation of the infrastructure investment of the railways 
or the other modes of transport would not be enough. 
Financing  of  the  infrastructure  deficit  from  public 
funds  would entail both a  more strict public  control 
over investment decisions  and  a complete separation 
of  infrastructure  from  transport services  in  the  rail-
way  accounts. 
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If we  do  assume  that  the  deficit  is  financed  from 
public  funds,  decisions  on  investment  in  infrastruc-
ture  can  hardly  be  left  entirely  to  those  who  are 
already responsible for actually running the railways. 
Such  a  mixture  of  responsibilities  - towards  the 
railways  on the one hand  and the taxpayers on the 
other - is  hardly likely to  be conducive to  optimal 
decisions.  Extensive public  control  might  therefore 
be  necessary  to  counter  any  tendency  on  the  part 
of the  railways  to  make excessive claims in the mat-
ter  of  infrastructure  investments.  Moreover,  the 
fact of combining under the same administration and 
the same system of accounting one component which 
would  be  subsidized  infrastructure,  and  one  which 
would  be expected to be self-sufficient - the trans-
port services - certainly does not meet the essential 
requirement  of  any  centralized  regime,  i.e.  that  its 
functioning should be "transparent" and in conform-
ity  with  criteria,  the  content  and  consequences  of 
which  can  be  easily  and  objectively  checked.  In 
the  situation  envisaged  here,  the  main  risk  inherent 
in insufficiently transparent procedures would be that 
of  confusion  between  two  possible  causes  of  the 
railways'  deficit:  on the one hand the consequences 
of  optimum  resource  allocation  as  regards  infra-
structure,  and  on  the other inefficient  management. 
It  would  seem  essential  that  these  two  sources  of 
deficit should be rigidly separated if the infrastructure 
is  partly financed  by  subsidies. 
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However, the separation of infrastructure from other 
operations,  even  if it  is  only done at the  accounting 
level,  raises  certain problems.  This comes  out very 
clearly  in  the  numerous  studies  on  this  matter. 
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These  propose  conventional  solutions  for  separating 
the  two  accounts  relating  respectively  to  infrastruc-
tures and to transport services.  The solutions not only 
differ  greatly  in  detail  but  often  also  diverge  on 
important  points,  such  as  whether  electrification 
should  be  included  under  infrastructure  or  under 
services.  We  have  already  mentioned  the  problem 
in  the introduction to  the present' Part { 2),  where we 
defined  infrastructure  as  denoting  all  fixed  installa-
tions  used  in  transport.  This definition is  of course 
a  convention.  The  problem  is  of no  great  impor-
tance  for  most  practical  issues,  but  it  does  raise 
some  serious  questions  when  the  infrastructure  is 
financed  to  any  extent  by  the  State  while  other 
expenditure  remains  in  principle  a  charge  on  the 
railways  and  thus  ultimately  on  transport  users. 
Under these  circumstances,  and  taking into  account 
the  risk  of  distortion  of conditions  of  competition, 
the  separation  which  would  be  necessary  in  the 
financial  administration  of  the  railways  between 
infrastructure  and  transport  services  appears  to 
constitute  a  serious  problem  in  connection  with  the 
deficit. 
23.34 - Summary 
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The  summary  of  this  section  can  be  brief.  The 
deficit  occurring  through  the  application  to  infra-
structure of the  criteria of optimum resource alloca-
tion  raises  certain  basic  problems  which  cannot  be 
resolved  in  practice  except  by  methods  to  some 
extent inconsistf:nt  with  those criteria. 
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The method  examined  consists  in  imposing  the  rule 
of budgetary equilibrium on all  infrastructure, except 
local  networks  and  all  infrastructure  in  underdeve-
loped  regions. 
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In theory,  budgetary equilibrium  is  compatible with 
optimum  charges  if  it  is  achieved  by  imposing  on 
users lump-sum charges which do not distort marginal 
conditions.  In  practice,  however,  this  method  can 
be  applied  only  within  narrow  limits,  particularly 
because  of  the  problems  of  equity  it  poses  - as 
also  does  the  financing  of  the  deficit  from  public 
funds.  This  conflict,  and  the  compromise  it 
necessitates  between  requirements  which  are  partly 
incompatible,  is  at  the  very  root  of  the  economic 
problems  of  infrastructure  which  will  be  examined 
in the following  chapter. 
(') See  Section  24.1. 
(")  See  Section  20.2. 547 
The  problems  connected  with  the  deficit  and  the 
suggested  solutions  have  been  examined  primarily 
from  the  angle  of  optimum  resource  allocation. 
However,  as  indicated  in  the  Introduction  to  this 
Part (1),  infrastructure policy may well be considered 
to  be essentially a matter of public concern, in which 
objectives  other than efficiency may play a role,  and 
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sometimes  even  a  predominant  one (2).  In  this 
context the problems of the deficit as  analysed above 
would  hardly  arise  at  all. 
C)  See  especially  Section  20.0,  also  Chapter 21. 
(")  In  particular  the  political  and  economic  unity  of  the 
nation, regional  policy objectives,  etc. CHAPTER  24 
OPTIONS  FOR  INFRASTRUCTURE 
24.0 -- PLAN OF  THE  CHAPTER 
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In the Introduction to  this Part (1 ),  we  saw that there 
are  considerable  economic  differences  between 
infrastructure  and  transport  services.  Similar  dif-
ferences  exist  in  the  way  production  is  organized. 
Transport operations - at least in road haulage and 
inland  waterway  transport  - can  generally  be 
organized  without  centralization ;  but  where  infra-
structure  is  concerned  the  possibilities,  as  well  as 
the  economic  advantages,  of  decentralization  are 
limited.  Moreover,  as  we  shall see  in the following 
section, the economic nature of infrastructure renders 
a  high  degree  of centralization desirable. 
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In  our  study  of  the  options  for  infrastructure,  it is 
useful  once  again  to  distinguish  between  investment 
policy  and  charging policy.  The options for invest-
ment  will  be  discussed  in  Section  24.1  on  "The 
co-ordination of investments in infrastructure".  This 
heading  anticipates  the  conclusion  of  our  analysis, 
which  is  that  investments  in  infrastructure  must 
necessarily  be  co-ordinated  in  the  interests  of eco-
nomic  efficiency.  The  question  of the  best  way  of 
arriving  at  decisions  regarding  investment  in  infra-
structure  presents  many  difficulties,  especially  on  a 
practical  level,  but  neither  the  principle  of  co-
ordination  nor  the  economic  criteria  to  be  adopted 
can be seriously disputed. 
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Charging  policy,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  more 
controversial  matter  because  of  the  conflicting  de-
mands  outlined  in  the  preceding  chapter (2).  A 
logical  examination  of  the  various  policy  options 
should start with the system of economic charges that 
is  derived  from  the  criteria  of  optimum  resource 
allocation.  The principal  advantages  and  disadvan-
tages of this option will be discussed in Section 24.2, 
in  which  we  shall  consider various  practical  points, 
such  as  the  limited  possibilities  of  differentiating 
such  charges. 
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We  have  seen (3)  that  economic  charges  do  not 
remain  constant.  Since  the  congestion  charge  is  a 
function of the degree of utilization of infrastructure, 
the optimum charges vary with demand.  Moreover, 
economic  charges  fluctuate  even  in  the  long  term, 
owing  to1  economic  indivisibilities.  It  has  been 
suggested  that  such  fluctuations  could be  eliminated 
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or reduced if the charges for the use of infrastructure 
were  stabilized.  This  possibility  will  be  examined 
in  Section  24.3. 
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The  option  of  budgetary  equilibrium  will  be  con-
sidered  in  Section  24.4,  where  we  shall  show  that 
it covers  a  great  many  possible  systems,  de:pending 
on  the  interpretation  given  to  the  concept  of  the 
"total  cost"  to  be  met  out  of revenue  and  on  the 
method  by  which  t'he  "total  cost"  of  infrastructure 
is  apportioned among the various categories of users. 
553 
In this  chapter we  shall not deal with  the  rules  that 
should apply to prices and investment if infrastructure 
is  governed by criteria other than those necessary to 
ensure  an  optimum  a.llocation  of  resources.  A 
discussion  of  these  other  criteria  will  be  found  in 
Chapter  21. 
24.1  -THE CO-ORDINATION OF 
INVESTMENTS  IN  INFRASTRUCTURE 
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Decisions  concerning  investments  in  infrastructure 
are,  of  necessity,,  centralized.  In  all  the  countries 
of the  Community,  the public authorities  themselves 
are  usually  directly  responsible  for  constructing and 
operating the infrastructure in two of the three modes 
of  inland  transport,  while  in  the  third  (railways)  a 
measure  of  public  control  is  exercised  over  invest-
ments in  infrastructure. 
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This situation is  no mere institutional peculiadty due 
to  historical  developments  alone.  On the  contrary, 
there  are  strong  economic  arguments  for  a  high 
degree  of  centralization  where  investment  decisions 
regarding  infrastructure  are  concerned.  In the  first 
place,  the fact  that  infrastructure  is  subject  to  eco-
nomic  indivisibilities  makes  large-scale  investments 
necessary.  Secondly, the fact that the separate parts 
of  an  infrastructure  network  are  closely  interrelated 
in  each  mode  of  transport  makes  it . necessary  to 
centralize  investment  decisions  to  some  extent. 
Thirdly,  the  benefits  derived  from  competing  infra-
structures  (for  example,  a  road  and  a  railway  line 
(') See  Section  20.2  .. 
(")  See  Section  23.3. 
(")  See  Section  23.2. running  parallel  to  each  other)  are  not  independent, 
and  therefore  investment  decisions  concerning  the 
infrastructures  of  competing  modes  of  transport 
should  even  be  co-ordinated  with  each  other. 
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What  rules  ought  to  be  observed when  decisions  are 
taken  about  investment  in  infrastructure?  The  in-
vestment criteria derived from the theory of optimum 
resource allocation have been summarized in previous 
chapters (1).  The  practical  difficulties  in  applying 
these  criteria  are  well  known.  It  is  necessary  to 
estimate  future  demand,  future  costs  and,  above  all, 
benefits;  to  determine  the  external  effects  of  the 
infrastructure  and  its  probable  economic  life  (for 
which  technical progress mustfirst be assessed); and 
to  choose  an  appropriate  rate  of interest for  use  in 
discounting  future  costs  and  benefits. 
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These  are  exceedingly  complex  problems  which 
cannot be  dealt  with  in jhis report.  They  are to  a 
large  extent  inherent  in  the  nature  of  investment, 
and  arise  regardless  of  the  policy  pursued.  Insti-
tutional  rules  may,  of  course,  act  as  incentives,  but 
the  fundamental  problems  remain  and  there  is  no 
institutional  procedure  by  which  they  can  be  elimi-
nated. 
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The  main  point  to  be  considered  here  is  the  con-
nection  between  different  investment  projects. 
Investments  in  infrastructure  obviously  cannot  take 
place  independently  in  separate  parts  of  a  single 
network.  The  very  fact  that  the  infrastructure 
forms  a  technical  and  economic  unit  means  that it 
is  vital  for  the  investments  within  each  mode  of 
transport  to  be  co-ordinated.  In  economic  terms, 
one  may  say  that  the  services  performed  by  the 
separate  parts  of  a  network  are  highly  complemen-
tary,  and that the benefits derived  from  the different 
parts  of  a  network  are  therefore  interdependent. 
Hence  it  is  clear  that,  even  if  it  were  technically 
possible  to  decentralize  investment  decisions,  and 
even if  the adoption of different charges for separate 
elements of infrastructure were  not bound to lead  to 
prohibitively  high  collecting  costs,  such  decentrali-
zation  would  not  produce  an  optimum  pattern  of 
investment.  This conclusion does not depend on the 
problem  of  surpluses (2);  it  remains  valid  even  if 
the  latter  are  entirely  disregarded. 
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Similar  arguments  may  be  put  forward  when  the 
investments  concern  the  infrastructure  of  different 
modes  of  transport.  In the first  place,  the  services 
provided  by  the  various  modes  are  often  comple-
mentary,  in  which  case the arguments that have just 
been  advanced  for  co-ordinating  all  the investments 
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within  a  single  network  are  equally  valid  for  co-
ordinating  investments  between  different  networks. 
Secondly,  the investments in  infrastructure  also  need 
to  be  co-ordinated  if  the  services  provided  by  the 
different  modes  of  transport  are  interchangeable,  as 
is  very  often  the  case.  This  can  be  seen  from  the 
example  of  two  competing  projects,  either of which 
might  create  future  benefits  sufficient  to  justify  the 
investment.  However,  once  one of the  projects  has 
been started the other may perhaps no  longer satisfy 
the  investment  criteria:  the  expected volume  of traf-
fic  will  in  fact be  shared between the two  competing 
infrastructures.  Consequently,  the  infrastructure 
that  is  built  first  may  cause  the  competing  project 
to  be  cancelled,  even  though  the  latter  might  have 
been  able  to produce  a  greater total  benefit,  had it 
been  carried  out  before  the  other.  This  argument 
again  demonstrates  the  need  for  infrastructure 
investments to be  co-ordinated,  not only within each 
of  the  modes  of  inland  transport  but  also  between 
competing  modes. 
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This general conclusion holds  good,  whatever charg-
ing  system  for  the  use  of  infrastructure  may  be 
adopted.  Centralized  co-ordination  of  investments 
follows  inevitably from  the special economic features 
of  infrastructure,  i.e.  the  complementary  nature  of 
the components of infrastructure within each network 
and, to some extent, between different networks, and 
the interdependence of the total benefits derived from 
competing  projects.  There  is  no  policy  governing 
charges  for  the  use  of infrastructure,  and  no  "rule" 
such  as  that of budgetary equilibrium, that can take 
the  place  of  investment  co-ordination,  which  alone 
enables the indirect effects of a specific project to be 
taken  into  account. 
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The  institutional  implications  of  this  situation  will 
be  analysed  more  fully  in  Part Ill. 
24.2  - THE  OPTION OF  ECONOMIC 
CHARGES 
24.20 - General 
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The  option  that  consists  in  imposing  only  the  eco-
nomic  charges  on  the  users  of  infrastructure,  in 
contrast  to  a  policy  that  would  also  impose  the 
constraint  of budgetary  equilibrium,  springs  directly 
(1)  See  particularly  Subsection  22.1 0. 
(')  See  Section  22.2. from the criteria that must be observed if an optimum 
allocation  of  resources  is  to  be  achieved (1).  Since 
these  criteria  comprise  not  only  rules  governing 
charges  but  also  rules  for  investments,  the charging 
system  corresponding  to  the  option  of  economic 
charges  must  be  accompanied  by  a  separate  pro-
cedure  for  making  decisions  on  investment  in  infra-
structure C"l 
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In  our  analysis  of  the  option  of  economic  charges, 
existing  infrastructure  and  the  pattern  of  new  in-
vestments  will  be  taken  as  given.  Whether  the 
infrastructure  is  optimal  or whether it  is  ill-adapted 
to  present  and  future  demand,  the  option  of 
economic  charges  presupposes  that  in  any  case  the 
best  possible  use  must be  made of the infrastructure 
as  it  stands.  This  objective  cannot  be  attained 
unless  the  charges  for  its  use  are  equal  to  the 
economic  charges. 
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There are  two  questions  that should now  be consid-
ered:  how  far  can  the  system  0f  economic  charges 
be  applied  in  practice,  and  what  are  its  advantages 
and  disadvantages? 
24.21  - Application 
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It may be recalled that the economic charge consists 
of  two  components:  the  cost  charge,  which is  equal 
to the marginal cost of utilization, and the congestion 
charge,  which  is  nil  when  the  existing  infrastructure 
is  not  fully  utilized  (in  the  economic  sense)  at  a 
charge  equal  to  the  cost  charge,  and  is  otherwise 
just  high  enough  to  limit  demand  to  the  capacity 
available. 
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In  practice  it  would  not  be  impossible  to  levy 
charges  corresponding  fairly  closely  to  the  cost 
charges.  The  marginal  cost  of  utilization  of  the 
infrastructure is  probably to some extent independent 
of  the  degree  of  utilization.  Presumably  it  is  also 
more or less  uniform  for  large  classes  of infrastruc-
ture  items  within  each  mode of transport.  At least 
as  a  first  approximation,  we  may  therefore  assume 
that  the  cost  charges  do  not  differ  appreciably  in 
time  and  space,  which  simplifies  their  practical 
application.  In a single network they are not neces-
sarily  identical for  the  different categories of traffic, 
but  it  should  not  be  impossible  to  devise  a  system 
of charges  that would  allow  for  the  differences.  In 
the  case  of  the  railways  and  inland  waterways,  this 
would  not  present  any  problems.  In  the  case  of 
the  roads,  the  taxes  on  motor  fuels,  together  with 
those  on  vehicles,  could  probably  be  manipulated 
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in  such  a  way  as  to  achieve  a  reasonably  good 
approximation of the cost  charges. 
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The  congestion  charges  present  more  difficulties. 
They  are,  after  all,  pure scarcity  rents  varying  with 
fluctuations  of  traffic  whenever  a  particular  infra-
structure  is  fully  utilized  in  the  economic  sense (3). 
Charges  for  the  use  of  infrastructure  based  on  the 
pure charges (as  defined by economic theory) would 
have  to  be  highly  differentiated  both  in  time  and 
space,  and  it  is  obviously  impossible  in  practice  to 
differentiate  the  actual  charges  made  on  the  users 
of  infrastructure  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  the 
congestion  charges.  There are,  however,  a  number 
of ways in which a solution can be found that comes 
close to the theoretical ideal (4). 
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It  might  in  the  first  place  be  possible  to  levy 
specific  charges  for  using  individual  infrastructures 
or road  networks  where  economic  congestion  tends 
to be particularly great.  Such congestion may occur 
either because the investment in infrastructure is  less 
than  optimum,  or because  additional  investment  is 
exceptionally  expensive  per unit of capacity. 
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An example of  such  an  approximate solution would 
be a specific charge on urban road traffic.  Another 
might  be  to levy  specific  charges  at  those  times  -
hours,  days  or  seasons  - when  infrastructure  is 
used most intensively. 
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In both these cases the specific charges (5)  would have 
to  be fixed  in  such  a  way  as  to regularize  demand 
while at the same time ensuring that the traffic peaks 
are not simply transferred from one time to  another 
or from  one  infrastructure  to  another.  This  could 
be done by adopting a system of charges that would 
allow  for  the  various  elasticities  of substitution  and 
be based on reasonably reliable estimates of the pat-
tern  of demand  over  a  period  of time. 
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A special case of this is the possible distortion of the 
optimum division of traffic  among competing modes 
of transport, resulting from the imposition of specific 
charges (6)  on  the  infrastructure  of  one  mode  of 
internal transport but not on that of its  direct corn-
(')  As  summarized  in Subsection  22.11. 
(")  So,  for that matter,  must  all  the other charging systems. 
(")  See  Part I. 
(')  Generally speaking,  in  choosing a solution it  is  of course 
advisable to take costs of collection into account, as regards 
both  cost  charges  and  congestion  charges. 
(")  As referred  to  in  the  preceding  paragraphs. 
(
8
)  As  set  out in  the  preceding  paragraphs. petitors.  This  is  particularly  important  when  one 
of the modes of transport caa differentiate its charges 
to  a  greater  extent  than its  competitors.  A  certain 
distortion  may  occur  if  the  differentiation  of  the 
charges  is  not  limited  to  the  level  that  can  be 
practised  by  the  mode  of  transport  that  is  the 
"weakest"  in  this  respect,  i.e.  the roads (1 ). 
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For  obvious  reasons,  the  roads  are  faced  with  the 
~ost  dif~icult problem in applying congestion charges 
m  practice.  If the  railways  are  not  subjected  to 
public  service  obligations  - in  which  case  their 
freedom  to  differentiate  charges  according  to  the 
degree  of  economic  congestion  will  be  restricted  -
and  especially if  they  are not subsidized, they will  in 
any  case  tend  to  operate  their  infrastructure  as  if 
economic  charges  were  imposed  on  them  for  its 
use.  For  inland  waterways,  the  practical  problems 
co~nected with differentiation of charges are not very 
senous.  On  the  other  hand,  where  the  roads  are 
concerned,  the  possibilities  of  differentiation  appear 
to  be  limited  to  a  relatively  rough  subdivision (2)  of 
the  total  network.  In  Part Ill (3)  we  shall  consider 
briefly  the  effects  on  competition  of  this  limited 
possibility of differentiating the charges for the roads. 
24.22  - Advantages  and  disadvantages 
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The  advantages  of  the  option  of  economic  charges 
are.  quite  clear.  They  can  be  summed  up  by 
saymg that the economic charges ensure an optimum 
utilization  of  the  existing  infrastructure.  In  cases 
where  the  infrastructure  is  not  fully  utilized  in  the 
economic  sense,  the  absence  of  any  charge  except 
the  cost  component  leads  to  maximum  economic 
utilization  of  a  factor  of  production  which  does  not 
occasion any  economic costs other than the marginal 
use  costs.  Imposing  congestion  charges  on  infra-
structures  that  are  fully  utilized  in  the  economic 
sense  is  an  effective  way  of  rationing  demand  and 
reducing  it  to  the  level  of  the  available  capacity. 
The  congestion  charge  does  not  in  itself  constitute 
a  real  obstacle  to  the  utilization  of infrastructure  if 
traffic  is  considered  as  a  whole,  and  in  that  sense 
it  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  burden on  all  the users 
collectively.  In  fact  without  the  charge  demand 
wo~ld fall  spontaneously  owing  to  the  congestion, 
which  would  confront all  users  with  costs similar to, 
perhaps  much  higher  than,  the  congestion  charge 
(through  waiting,  etc.);  such  congestion  is  a  much 
less  beneficial  and  efficient  way  of  limiting  overall 
demand  at  any  one  moment (4).  The  system  of 
economic  charges  may  also  have  advantages  where 
certain  conceptions  of  equity  are  concerned. 
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The  disadvantages  of  the  option of  economic  char-
g~s _were  mentioned  above  in  dealing  with  the defi-
cit (").  If  investment  policy  is  carried  out  in 
accordance  with  the  criteria  of  optimum  resource 
allocation,  the  fact  that  the  users  of  infrastructures 
are  only  charged  the  economic  charges  may  bring 
about  ~ deficit.  In  view  of  the  present  inadequacy 
of the  mfrastructure it is,  however,  not at  all  certain 
that  imposing  the  economic  charges  alone  would 
actually  cause  a  deficit  in  every  case.  Where  the 
roads  are  concerned,  particularly,  there  is  no  doubt 
that  investment,  both  in  urban  areas  and  in  main 
networks,  is  far  below  the  level  that  would  be 
required  if  the  criteria  of  optimum  resource  alloca-
tion  were  applied.  The  congestion  charges  may 
~herefore  well  be  high  and,  if  they  were  actually 
Imposed,  the  revenue  from  them  might  well  be 
sufficient  to  eliminate  the  deficit,  however  defined. 
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However,  deficits  can  occur  in  other  modes  of 
transport.  There  may  in  any  case  be  a  deficit  if 
investment  in  infrastructure  comes  close  to  the 
economically  optimum  level.  Such  deficits  have 
three  major  drawbacks: 
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i)  If they  are  financed  from  public  funds,  this 
may  conflict  with  certain  conceptions  of  equity; 
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ii)  If investment  is  divorced  from  the  revenue  it 
is  intended to produce, the sector becomes dependent 
on the national budget,  and there  is  therefore  a risk 
that investments in  infrastructure may be inadequate 
owing  to  restrictions  imposed  by  the budget,  or ill-
directed  owing  to  political  decisions  taken  under 
the  influence  of  pressure  groups; 
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iii)  In  the  case  of  the  railways,  the fact  that  the 
deficit  is  financed  from  public  funds  may  impair 
economic  efficiency  in  so  far  as  the  real  infra-
structure  deficit  cannot  in  practice  be  distinguished 
sufficiently  clearly  from  a  deficit  attributable  to 
inefficient  operation. 
(')  Problems  connected  with  the  differentiation  of  charges 
will  be  discussed  in  Section  32.4. 
(")  Of the  type  mentioned previously:  main  networks,  urban 
and  suburban  networks,  local  networks.  In  present  condi-
tions,  the  highest  congestion  charges  would  probably  be 
those  for  the  second  class  of  roads,  and  the  lowest  those 
for  the  last  class,  which  might even  be  nil. 
C)  See  Chapter  31. 
(')  The  two  systems  are,  however,  not  equivalent  in  the 
eyes  of the  actual  users  of the  infrastructure. 
(
5
)  See  Section  23.3. 579 
In  certain  cases,  however,  these  disadvantages  lose 
much  of  their  force  and  there  can  be  undeniable 
advantages  in  adopting  the  system  of  economic 
charges.  This  applies  particularly to  local networks 
and  to  all  infrastructure  in  underdeveloped  regions. 
In  the  latter  case,  the  system  of  economic  charges 
appears  to  be  the only one  compatible with  a deve-
lopment  policy. 
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One  final  drawback  which  is  sometimes  advanced 
as  an argument against this option is  the fact that the 
charges  would  rise  progressively from  the  relatively 
low  level  equal  to  the  cost  charge  alone,  which 
would  prevail  as  long  as  the  infrastructure were not 
fully  utilized  in  the  economic  sense,  to  levels  that 
might  perhaps be very  high,  as  economic congestion 
was  approached.  We  shall  show  that this  objection 
is  not  justified,  particularly  if  investment  is  carried 
out  in  accordance  with  the  criteria  necessary  to 
ensure  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources  and  if, 
therefore,  the  danger  of  congestion  is  never  very 
great.  But  even  if  these  two  conditions  are  not 
fulfilled,  stabilization  of  charges  does  not  seem 
particularly useful - as  we  shall see in the following 
section.  Stable  charges  would  hinder  the  optimum 
uilization  of  infrastructure  when  demand  at  a  price 
equal to the cost charge is less than capacity, whereas 
if the infrastructure were fully  utilized stable charges 
would  be  unable  to  prevent  congestion  and  the 
burdens  this  would  lay  upon  users. 
24.23  - The practical need for  equalization 
of charges,  and its  consequences 
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In practice, however, a certain stabilization of charges 
must  take  place,  since  the  charges  cannot  be  fully 
differentiated  for  each  individual  element  of  infra-
structure  - especially  where  the  roads  are  con-
cerned  - and  must  be  equalized  to  some  extent. 
Such  equalization  then  raises  another  problem:  at 
what  level  should  the  uniform  charges  within  a 
broad  division  of  infrastructure  be  fixed?  For 
example,  for  all  main  arterial  roads  within  one 
country  or  region?  These  large  divisions  - the 
only  ones  eligible  for  consideration  in  practice  -
are  bound  to  include  roads  that  are  used  to  very 
different  extents.  It  does  not  seem  possible  to 
calculate  an  "average"  congestion  charge  without 
introducing many  arbitrary elements,  and  the  results 
of  such  calculations  do  not  make  much  economic 
sense.  Therefore,  both  on  institutional  grounds 
(the lack of criteria that are simple, not arbitrary and 
susceptible  of  objective  checking)  and  for  economic 
reasons  (the  fact  that  a  system  of  "average"  con-
gestion  charges  is  not  economically  justifiable),  the 
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system  of economic  charges  would  seem  in  practice 
to  offer  one  or other of the following  options. 
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The first option would consist in  imposing no charge 
for  the  use  of  infrastructure,  except: 
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i)  Cost  charges  wherever  these  can  be  imposed 
without  prohibitive  collection  costs; 
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ii)  Congestion  charges  only  for  categories  of 
infrastructure  for  the  use  of  which  specific:  charges 
can  be  levied,  in  so  far  as  these  categori(:s  are  in 
fact  seriously congested in the economic sense of the 
term,  for instance the roads in  most urban and sub-
urban  areas. 
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This  option,  which  will  be  referred  to  as  the 
"practical  system  of  economic  charges"  and  which 
follows  directly (1)  from  economic  theory,  is  con-
sistent with the view  that investment in infrastructure 
should be  a  public  responsibility  and  can largely be 
justified  by  considerations  other  than  economic 
efficiency (2). 
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The  second  option  includes  all  systems  !that  add 
another  constraint  to  the  charges  for  the  use  of 
infrastructure  in  stipulating  that  a  balanced  budget 
must be achieved by means of these charges.  Since 
this  option  is  not  as  clearly  defined  as  the  first,  a 
preliminary  study  of  its  principal  variants  will  be 
made in  the last section of the present chapter, when 
we  shall  also  discuss  the  problems  connected  with 
regional  equalization  of  the  charges  to  be  paid  by 
the  users  of infrastructure (3). 
24.3  - THE  OPTION OF ST  ABILIZA  TION 
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We  have  already  shown  how  economic  charges 
develop over a period of time when, in  an expanding 
economy,  capadty  is  increased  by  discontinuous 
steps (4).  We  saw  that,  whereas  the  cost  charge 
probably  does  not  usually  vary  very  much  with  the 
total  volume  of traffic,  the  congestion charge,  which 
is  a price  that reflects the scarcity of available capa-
city,  may  tend  to  fluctuate.  We  have  shown  that 
the congestion charge is  nil as  long as  capacity is  not 
(')  See  Section  31.0. 
(")  See  Chapter 21. 
(")  See  Subsection  24.45. 
(')  See  Section  23 .2. fully  utilized  in  the  economic  sense,  and  that it then 
rises  progressively  as  traffic  expands  and  as  the 
existing  capacity  becomes  fully  utilized  in  the  eco-
nomic  sense,  falling  sharply  back  to  a  lower  level 
as  soon  as  capacity  is  increased.  In  reality,  of 
course,  the  time-pattern  curve  is  far  more  complex 
than  this.  The  expansion  of demand  is  not  simply 
reflected  in  a  gradual  rise  in  the  level  of  the  con-
gestion  charges  as  soon  as  full  economic  utilization 
of  existing  capacity  has  been  attained.  Seasonal 
and  other  short-term  variations  are  superimposed 
upon  long-term  development,  the  trend  in  demand 
will  show certain fluctuations,  and technical progress 
may  change  the  entire  picture.  Nevertheless,  the 
yearly average level of the charges for  any particular 
infrastructure  will  tend  to  be  noticeably  higher  just 
before  capacity  is  increased  than  immediately  after. 
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It  has  often  been  argued  that  it  is  economically 
undesirable  that  the  charges  should  develop  on this 
pattern,  because  the  result  is  instability.  This 
argument  can  have  two  very  different  implications. 
It  might  mean  that  the  volume  of  invesments  in 
capacity should be  such that the average level of the 
congestion charges does  not change perceptibly from 
one  year  to  another.  Bearing  in  mind  economic 
indivisibilities,  this  objective  could  generally  only 
be  attained  in  an  expanding  economy  if  capacity 
were  increased as  soon  as  it was  fully  utilized in the 
economic sense,  which would imply that the effective 
level  of  the  congestion  charges  was  nil.  But  the 
argument might equally well mean that charges ought 
to  be  stabilized,  regardless  of  the  volume  of invest-
ments  in  capacity.  Only  the  second  interpretation 
will  be  considered  here,  because  the  first  appears 
unrealistic. 
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Is  it  advisable  to  stabilize  the  congestion charges for 
a  given  available  capacity?  Stabilization  should  be 
taken  to  mean  that  the  charges  would  have  to  be 
fixed  at  a  certain  average  level,  the  high  charges 
existing  at  times  of  intense  traffic  being  reduced  to 
the  average  level  and  the  low  charges  prevailing  at 
times  of  surplus  capacity  being  raised  to  that  same 
level. 
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Limitation  of  the  charges  at  times  of  intense  traffic 
would  not  seem  to  be  very  desirable.  Since  the 
intensity of demand must be  taken as  given,  the cost 
of  congestion  will  be  borne  by  the  users  anyway, 
either in  the  form  of  congestion  charges  which  limit 
demand  to  the  capacity  available,  or in  the  form _of 
delays,  etc.  In  any  case,  the  ina~equate  capa_c~ty 
will  have  to  be  rationed  somehow;  If  the authontles 
are  reluctant  to  impose  charges  high  enough  to  do 
this  other methods will  have to  be employed - and 
' 
these will  generally be less efficient economically and 
also largely arbitrary.  For example, congestion may 
simply  be  allowed  to  get  worse,  and  the  policy  of 
"first  come,  first  served",  the  policy  of  the  queue, 
will  be  adopted, even  though  it  makes  no  economic 
sense. 
591 
The  case  for  rmsmg  the  nil  congestion  charges  to 
an  average  level  at  times  when  there  is  a  surplus 
of  capacity  may  seem,  at  first  sight,  rather  more 
convincing.  It  is  sometimes  argued  that  the 
existence of nil congestion charges is  likely to  induce 
the  users  to  take  investment  decisions  - particu-
larly with regard to  the siting of enterprises - based 
on  the  unjustified  expectation  that  the  congestion 
charges  will  remain  nil.  When  the  charges  rise, 
such investment decisions  will  turn out to  have been 
incorrect.  This  argument  for  some  stabilization  of 
charges  may  not  always  be  entirely  invalid,  but  it 
undoubtedly  has  its  limitations.  In  cases  where 
the  congestion  charges  will  remain  nil  for  longer 
than the economic life of the users' investment, there 
is  no  reason  to  levy  charges  that  might  prevent 
better use being  made of the  existing  infrastructure. 
Moreover, there is  in any case no point in correcting 
the  users'  mistaken  extrapolations of existing  condi-
tions (1)  by  uneconomic  means  such  as  the  levying 
of charges  when  the  infrastructure concerned  is  not 
yet  fully  utilized;  it  would  be better  to  avoid  s~ch 
errors of extrapolation by improving the informatiOn 
available  to  the  users (2).  Since  the  site  of  an 
enterprise cannot be decided  without serious c?nsid-
eration,  the  latter  method  cannot  be  reJected 
a  priori  as  unrealistic,  at  least  in  so  far  as  the 
congestion charges can be held to exert an important 
influence on decisions  of industrial  location. 
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The  relevance  of the  above considerations  might  be 
questioned  on  the  ground  that  in  practice  cha_rges 
for the utilization of infrastructure cannot be precisely 
adapted to the relation existing between demand and 
available  capacity  at  any  one  moment  and  for  any 
one  object  of  infrastructure.  A  high  degree  of 
equalization of charges,  both in time and space, may 
therefore  be  a  practical  necessity.  Even  so,  some 
differentiation  will  still  always  be  possible.  Since 
such  practical  possibilities  do  exist,  it  is  irnport~nt 
to  realize  that the  stabilization  of charges - unhke 
the variation of economic tolls over a period of time 
- cannot  be  deduced  from  considerations  relating 
to  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources. 
(')  Viz.,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  users  expect  the  charges 
to  remain nil. 
(')  For possible ways of improving the  flow  of information, 
see  Subsections  33.10  and  33.20. 593 
The  conclusion  is  purposely  stated  in  this  negative 
fashion.  Stabilization  does  not  appear  to  be  desir-
able  in  itself,  and  it  therefore  seems  unreasonable 
to  depart  from  the  system  of  economic  charges  in 
order to  achieve  it.  But other constraints may  have 
to  be  imposed  on  the  charging  system,  so  that  a 
certain  deviation  from  the  economic charges may  be 
necessary  in  any  case.  An  important  example  of 
such  constraints  is  the  requirement  of  budgetary 
equilibrium,  which  we  shall  discuss  in  the  next 
section. 
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Of  course,  some  of  the  above  considerations  may 
no  longer  be  wholly  valid  if  the  two  general  condi-
tions  assumed  in  the  present  report  - full 
employment  and  relatively  steady  economic  growth 
- are not fulfilled. 
24.4  - THE  OPTION OF BUDGETARY 
EQUILIBRIUM 
24.40  - General 
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The deficit  that  will  be incurred in  the operation of 
infrastructure  when  the  users  pay  charges  equal  to 
the  economic  charges  gives  rise  to  a  number  of 
problems which have already been discussed in some 
detail.  The  option  we  shall  now  consider  aims  at 
avoiding these disadvantages by imposing the general 
requirement  of  budgetary  equilibrium.  The  main 
reasons  for which  it may be desirable to  impose this 
constraint  have  been  examined  in  the  preceding 
chapter (1). 
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For  a  proper  understanding  of  the  option  under 
review,  it  is  essential  to  realize  that the  concept  of 
budgetary  equilibrium  is  extremely  ambiguous (2). 
It may  be interpreted  in  different  ways,  depending 
on the reason for which it is imposed; moreover, even 
consideration  of  the  various  objectives  that  can  be 
pursued under the constraint of budgetary equilibrium 
does  not  always  result  in  a  single,  unambiguous 
definition  of this  concept  as  it  affects  each of them. 
Budgetary  equilibrium  must  therefore  be  regarded 
as  a  generic  term  covering  a  large  number  of dif-
ferent  systems  which  may  have  very  dissimilar 
economic  characteristics  and effects.  Some of these 
systems  will  be  analysed  in  more  detail  in  Part Ill. 
In the present section  we  propose to study the most 
important questions posed by the principle of budget-
ary  equilibrium,  and  to  indicate  the  main  ways  in 
which  this  principle  can be  applied  in  practice. 
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Practically  speaking,  budgetary  equilibrium  entails 
determination of the total sum that must be provided 
in  any one year by the total revenue from the charges 
paid  by  the  useTs  in  that  same  year.  In what  fol-
lows,  this  total  sum  will  be  termed  the "total cost". 
To determine the total cost, it is  usually necessary (3) 
to  adopt an  amortization  convention  with  a  view  to 
distributing  over  a  period  of  time  the  cost  both  of 
the  initial  investments  and  of  renewal  and  mainte-
nance  operations that may  take  several years (4). 
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It might  be  thought  that  reducing  the  problem  of 
defining  budgetary  equilibrium  to  that  of  defining 
the  "total  cost"  is  a  mere  semantic  substitution. 
But  this  question  is  in  fact  highly  relevant  to 
discussions  as  to  the  policy  to  be  pursued.,  because 
the concept of "total cost", especially with  regard to 
the  methods  of  amortization  it  generally  involves, 
is  often  approached from  a point of view  that .leaves 
little  room  for  discussion  or  even  for  objective 
analysis. 
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The main  aim  of the present section is  to show that 
the idea  of  "total cost"  can be interpreted in  many 
different  ways,  and  that  many  of  these  interpre-
(')  See  Section  23.3. 
(")  On  the  purely  formal  level,  the  definition  of  budgetary 
equilibrium  does  not  present  any  difficulty.  The  most 
general  definition  is  the  following:  budgetary  equilibrium 
is  attained  when  at  any  moment  the  sum  of  discounted 
future  revenues  (excluding  subsidies),  plus  the  assets  or 
minus  the  liabilities  at  that  moment,  is  at  least  equal  to 
the  sum  of  all  discounted  future  expenditure.  Budgetary 
equilibrium  is  thus  perfectly  defined,  since,  at  the  moment 
When  it is first  imposed, the value of the assets  or liabilities 
is  known.  But  the interpretation to be  given  to the  concept 
thus  depends  on  the  definition  of  a  constant,  which  is 
essentially  arbitrary.  In  fact,  at  the  initial  moment,  this 
constant may be regarded in different ways according to the 
point  of  view  adopted  - as  the  "market  value"  of  the 
existing  infrastructure,  the  unamortized value of the capital, 
the  replacement  value,  etc.  In  Part  Ill  we  shall  analyse 
some  specific  versions  of  budgetary  equilibrium,  notably 
budgetary equilibrium with the possibility of borrowing and 
budgetary  equilibrium  without  the  possibility  of borrowing. 
(")  Except in the case of the system of budgetary equilibrium 
without  the  possibility  of  borrowing,  which  will  be  dealt 
with  in  Chapter  31  (Section  31.4). 
(')  The  overall  deficit  is  the  difference,  at  any  particular 
moment,  between  all  discounted  future  expenditure  and  all 
discounted  future  revenue  (excluding  subsidies),  account 
being  taken  of  a  constant  representing  the  value  of  the 
assets  or liabilities  at that  moment.  The  annual  deficit  is 
the  difference  between  the  "total  cost",  determined  con-
ventionally  as  indicated  in  the  text,  and  the  reve:nue  from 
the  economic  charges  in  a  particular  year.  For  the  sake 
of simplicity,  the adjectives "overall" or  "annual''  are  not 
used  in  the  report  unless  their  omission  might  lead  to 
confusion.  It should  generally  be  clear  from  the  context 
which  deficit  is  meant;  whenever  this  may not  be  clear,  a 
special  indication  is  given. tations  may  be  acceptable  in  view  of  the  particular 
purpose  for  which  the  concept  is  then  to  be  used, 
but that they are all  fundamentally arbitrary.  There 
is  no  one  concept of "total cost" which can meet all 
demands  and  solve  all  problems. 
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No  solution  can  be  obtained  by  seeking  to  define 
the  "true  economic  cost"  of  using  infrastructure, 
taking  investment  expenditure  into  account,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  no  such  cost  exists.  The  only 
cost  that  can  justly  be  imputed  to  the  users  of 
infrastructure in  any particular period is  the marginal 
cost  of  utilization. 
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The  problem  of  defining  budgetary  equilibrium  is 
largely  a  practical,  institutional  and  political  one, 
because  the  purposes  budgetary  equilibrium  is  in-
tended  to  serve  are themselves  practical, institutional 
and  political (1).  The  purely  economic  aspect  of 
the  problem  simply  consists  in  looking  for  the  best 
ways  of  avoiding  the  disadvantages  associated  with 
the  system  of  economic  charges  while  at  the  same 
time  minimizing the distortion of optimum allocation 
of  resources  that  may  result  when  the  condition  of 
budgetary  equilibrium  is  imposed. 
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Since  the various objectives for which this constraint 
is  imposed  may  be inconsistent with  one  another or 
not  always  clearly  defined,  many  alternative  inter-
pretations  are  possible,  but none of  them can  claim 
to  be  the  only  correct  one.  The  aim  is  not,  and 
cannot  be,  to  find  a  definition  that  is  scientifically 
exact,  because  all  propositions  derived  from  the 
idea  of  budgetary  equilibrium  are practical compro-
mises  and  all  the  methods  of  amortization  are  con-
ventional  in  character. 
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The  charging  system  consistent  with  an  optimum 
allocation of resources  is  perfectly  clear:  it  does  not 
in  any  way  imply  that  budgetary  equilibrium  must 
be assured.  Budgetary equilibrium is  thought neces-
sary  because  the existence  of  a  deficit  poses  certain 
problems.  It may  be  considered  unfair  to  put  all 
or  any  of  the  burden  of  infrastructure  upon  the 
taxpayers  as  a  whole.  Moreover,  incorrect  invest-
ments  in  infrastructure may be made,  as  a  result of 
the political pressures that are brought to bear where 
any  sort of  public  expenditure is  concerned;  and,  in 
the  case  of  the  railways,  the  subsidies  intended  to 
finance  the  deficit of infrastructure may also be used 
to  cover  inefficient  operation,  and  may  therefore, 
perhaps, enable such inefficiency to continue.  These 
are  political,  institutional  and  social  realities  which 
economic  theory  must  accept  and  which  cannot be 
judged  solely  from  the  point  of  view  of  optimum 
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resource  allocation.  All  that  economic  theory  can 
do  is  analyse  the  various  policies  put  forward,  see 
whether  they  are  reasonable  and  likely  to  have  the 
desired  results,  and  find  out  how  they  will  affect 
economic  efficiency. 
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One  last  preliminary  comment  concerns  the  rela-
tionship  between  the  system  of  charges  and  the 
criteria  of  investment.  It is  clear  that  these,  taken 
together,  must  be  consistent.  If budgetary  equilib-
rium  is  imposed,  it  must  be  assured  by  keeping 
investments  in  infrastructure  within  certain  limits. 
This  necessitates  keeping  the  volume  of  investment 
below  the  level  that  would  be  achieved  if  the 
investment  criteria  corresponding  to  an  optimum 
allocation  of  ressources  were  adopted.  For  these 
criteria  take  into  account  not  only  the  revenue  that 
can  actually  be  obtained  from  charges  paid  by  the 
users,  but also the surpluses which  are  generally not 
completely  recoverable.  In  practice,  surpluses  can 
only  be  converted  into  actual  revenue  to  a  very 
limited  extent.  If budgetary  equilibrium  is  to  be 
ensured,  the  charges  made  for  the  use  of  infra-
structure  could  obviously  not  be  such  as  to  enable 
such surpluses to be recovered, except very generally, 
and  in  any  case  only  partially.  The  option  of 
budgetary  equilibrium  must  therefore  be  judged  not 
only  in  the  light  of the  repercussions  it  would have 
on the use of existing infrastructures, but also  by its 
tffects on  the volume and direction of investment in 
infrastructure. 
24.41  - Definition  of "total  cost" 
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In studying  the  effects  of budgetary  equilibrium  on 
investment in infrastructure, it is  logical to start with 
a definition of "total cost" that would be in  keeping 
with the investment criteria attendant on an optimum 
allocation  of  resources.  In  this  sense,  "total  cost" 
can  be  defined  as  the  initial  cost  of  investment, 
minus  the  discounted  residual  value  of  the  infra-
structure  at  the  end  of  its  economic  life,  plus  all 
discounted  future  operating  costs.  Budgetary  equi-
librium could then be said to imply that the charges 
made for the use  of infrastructure are  such that the 
total discounted revenue obtained from these charges, 
calculated over the entire economic life of the infra-
structure,  is  at  least  equal to  the  cost thus  defined. 
This  definition  involves  certain  more  or  less 
subjective  judgments,  particularly  as  regards  future 
operating  costs,- the  length  of  the  asset's  economic 
life,  and its residual value at the end of its economic 
life.  But this  is  unavoidable. 
(')  See  Section  23.3. 606 
Apart  from  requmng  these  judgments,  the  above 
definition of budgetary equilibrium leaves two impor-
tant groups of problems unsolved.  In the first place, 
it  is  obvious  that  if  budgetary equilibrium  is  defined 
in  this  way,  the  future  charging  pattern  remains 
indeterminate.  Except  in  the  limiting  case  of  a 
permanent  regime,  there  is  an  infinite  number  of 
charging  systems  that  may  satisfy  the  condition  of 
budgetary  equilibrium.  This  is  true  both  for  the 
distribution  of  costs  over  a  period  of  time  (the 
problem  of  amortization)  and  for  the  distribution 
of costs  among  the  various  categories  of  users  (the 
problem  of  "imputation").  Additional  conditions 
must  therefore be imposed in  order to determine the 
charging system (1). 
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Secondly,  although  budgetary  equilibrium  can  be 
precisely  defined  at  the  moment  the  investment  is 
made n.  it  is  not  at  all  clear  how  it  should  be 
defined  when  it  is  introduced  during  the  economic 
life  of  the  infrastructure.  As  we  have  already 
shown,  this  would  involve  an  indeterminate  compo-
nent,  i.e.  the  value  - positive  or negative  - that 
should  be  set  upon  the  infrastructure  at  that partic-
ular  moment.  When  the  infrastructure  is  being 
built,  this  constant  is  equal  to  the  capital  invested, 
but it  is  no  longer precisely defined  if  the constraint 
of  budgetary equilibrium  is  introduced  subsequently. 
Thus,  when  budgetary  equilibrium  is  accepted,  it  is 
necessary  to  define  the  constant  which  is  inevitably 
involved  as  soon  as  the  system  is  introduced.  This 
is  a  problem  of  transition.  Even  if  the  condition 
of  budgetary  equilibrium  has  been  imposed  at  the 
outset,  a  similar  problem  may  also  arise  if  demand 
and  cost  conditions  become  so  different  from  what 
was  foreseen  that  it  may  be  thought  desirable  to 
adjust  the  charging  system  originally  envisaged,  i.e. 
to  cease  to  regard budgetary equilibrium  as  a condi-
tion  to be applied  rigorously. 
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The  different  ways  of  determining  the  value  of  the 
existing durable assets, such as  the methods involving 
historic  cost  or  replacement  cost,  correspond  to  a 
number of possible  policies  that will  be discussed  in 
Part  Ill.  We  shall  see  there  that  most  of  them 
involve  some  process  of  amortization.  This  is  why 
the  problem of distribution of costs over a period of 
time  - the problem  of  amortization - will  also be 
considered  in  Part Ill.  In the following  subsections 
this distribution will be assumed to have been decided, 
which  means  that the  "total cost" for  any particular 
year,  and  consequently  the  deficit  for  that year,  are 
taken  as  given.  We  shall  therefore  only  consider 
the  problems  raised  by  the  "imputation"  of  the 
deficit  to  the  various  categories  of  infrastructure 
users. 
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24.42  - Apportionment of the  deficit 
on  infrastructure 
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When  budgetary  equilibrium  is  required,  1the  deficit 
must  be  covered  by charges  paid by the  users,  who 
can be divided  into  several distinct  categories.  The 
question therefore arises  as  to how the deficit should 
be apportioned among these categories.  In the usual 
terminology,  the  problem  is  th;tt  of "imputation  of 
the total cost of infrastructure" to  the various categ-
ories of users.  The term "imputation" is,  however, 
rather  unfortunate  here,  since  it  suggests  that  there 
can  be  objective  economic  criteria  for  apportioning 
the  "total cost"  among the categories.  In fact  such 
criteria only exist when the "total cost:"  is  covered by 
the  revenue  from  the  economic  charges,  but  these 
criteria  are  not  relevant  to  the  deficit.  Any  rule 
concerning  the  way  in  which  the  deficit  is  to  be 
apportioned  -- however  necessary  it  may  be  in 
order to  define  the  system  of budgetary  equilibrium 
- is  adequate  from  the  point  of view  of optimum 
resource  allocation;  the latter requires  only  that the 
method of apportionment, whatever it may be,  must 
avoid  distorting  the  conditions  of  competition,  i.e. 
it  must  be  "neutral" (3).  This  basic  property  will 
be extremely important in the analysis of the various 
systems  in  Part Ill. 
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The problem  of apportioning  the  deficit  can  gener-
ally be broken down as  follows: 
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i)  Apportionment  of  the  deficit  among  transport 
and  the  other functions  of infrastructure,  which  can 
be called its "external effects" (4); 
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ii)  Apportionment  of  the  deficit  incurred  by  the 
transport  function  among  the  users  of  lthe  three 
modes of inland transport.  Should there be budget-
ary  equilibrium  for  the  inland  transport  sector  as 
a  whole,  or for  each  mode  separately (5)? 
(')  These  problems  will  be  examined  in  Subsection  24.42 
sqq.  (imputation)  and  Section  31.2  amortization). 
(")  The definition  is  then  as  follows:  budgetary equilibrium 
exists when the sum of all discounted future revenue arising 
from  use  of the  infrastructure  is  equal  to the  sum  of the 
initial  investment  cost,  minus  the  discounted  residual  value 
of  the  infrastructure  at  the  end  of its  economic:  life,  and 
discounted  future  management costs. 
(")  This  does  not,  of  course,  imply  that  all  the  rules  are 
equally  desirable  when  considered  from  other  points  of 
view,  such  as  that  of  distribution  of  income.  But  these 
other  considerations  are  disregarded  in  the  present  chapter. 
(')  See  Subsection  24.43. 
(")  See  Subsection  24.44. 613 
iii)  Apportionment of the  deficit  of a  given  mode 
of  transport  among  the  regional  components  of  in-
frastructure:  how much equalization or differentiation 
should  there  be (1)? 
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iv)  Apportionment of the deficit of one particular 
mode  of  transport  among  the  various  categories  of 
users,  the users  being grouped according to  the type 
of  transport  service  performed  (passengers  and 
freight,  different  types  of freight,  traffic  in  different 
directions,  etc.) (2). 
24.43  - Apportionment of  the  deficit  between 
transport  and  the  other  functions 
of infrastructure 
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The functions  of infrastructure that cannot be called 
transport  functions  in  the  true  sense  of  the  term 
are  particularly  important  in  urban  and  suburban 
areas;  roads,  especially,  perform a great many other 
services (3).  Canals  and  other  waterways  can  also 
serve  various  purposes;  for  example,  in  addition  to 
shipping,  they  may  be  used  for  irrigation  or  the 
production  of  hydroelectric  power. 
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When  the  infrastructure has  such  multiple functions, 
we  have  a  case  of  joint  production.  Apart  from 
the  marginal  use  costs,  which  can  be  imputed 
precisely  to  each  separate  function,  the  investment 
cost and  such  operating costs  as  are  independent of 
traffic  are  joint  costs. 
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It  is  commonly  argued  that  joint  costs  cannot  be 
apportioned among services produced simultaneously 
on  the  basis  of  economic  criteria  alone.  This  is 
quite  correct,  but it  is  not  relevant  here.  The cost 
charges  to  be  levied  for  each  service,  as  also  the 
congestion  charges,  if  any,  are  perfectly  defined (4). 
Hence it is  only the deficit - should there be one -
that must be apportioned on the basis of economically 
arbitrary  conventions (5). 
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These  conventions,  however  arbitrary  they  may  be, 
are of particular importance in the case of the option 
of  budgetary  equilibrium,  since  the  total  sum  to  be 
covered  by  transport  remains  indeterminate  as  long 
as  it  is  not  known  what  part  of  the  infrastructure 
deficit  - however that deficit  may be calculated -
should  be  imputed  to  the  other  functions.  If the 
rule  of  budgetary  equilibrium  is  to  be  applied  to 
these  categories  of  infrastructure,  a  reasonable 
convention  for  apportioning  the  relevant  costs  will 
85 
have  to  be  adopted.  Such  a  convention  should 
above  all  be  simple  and  clear,  and  should  avoid 
complicated  calculations. 
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It is  often  pointed out that roads  and  railways  fulfil 
external functions of another sort; for example,  they 
are of special  importance in wartime or other times 
of  national  emergency,  and  are  used  in  preserving 
law  and  order.  For  practical  purposes  it  would 
seem  reasonable  to  disregard  this  aspect,  because 
there  is  usually  no sound  and  objective  method  for 
making calculations in  such matters.  Perhaps much 
the best convention therefore consists in  disregarding 
these  functions  completely. 
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In  conclusion,  we  may  say  that  the  external  effects 
pose  certain  problems  which  are  in  principle  com-
pletely  insoluble,  and  which,  precisely  because  they 
are  economically  arbitrary,  should  not be  made the 
object  of  complicated  technical  calculations.  The 
specific  objectives  to  which  budgetary  equilibrium 
is  applied  do  not  require  very  precise  definition, 
because  extensive  equalization  of  charges  is  neces-
sary  anyway.  Consequently,  the  conventions  to  be 
adopted should be reasonable and, above all,  simple, 
clear  and  objective.  Also,  the  different  situations 
of the competing modes of transport should be taken 
into  account,  and  the  conventions  for  them  should 
be  equivalent,  in  order  to  avoid  distortion  of  the 
conditions  of competition.  The  conventions  should 
also  be  formulated  in  such  a  way  that the  external 
effects  do  not  give  the  various  pressure  groups  -
which  the  rule  of budgetary equilibrium  is  expressly 
designed  to  neutralize  - an  excuse  for  becoming 
influential  again  in  the  field  of  infrastructure. 
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It  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of  this  report  to 
analyse  the numerous solutions that are  practised or 
have  been  proposed.  Our  problem  is  one  of 
practical policy and also,  to  some extent, of political 
judgment, since economic considerations alone cannot 
(')  See  Subsection  24.45. 
(")  See  Subsection  24.46. 
(")  Urban  roads  serve  numerous  purposes  in  addition  to 
transport in  the strict sense.  For example, they are used for 
the  movement  of  pedestrians,  for  postal  services,  and 
public  events.  Moreover,  it  is  obvious  that,  even  if  there 
were  no  motorized  traffic,  there  would  have  to  be  clear 
spaces  between  buildings. 
(')  The  congestion  charges  are  in  fact  nil  when. the  available 
capacity  is  not  fully  uti!ized  in  the  econ~m1c  sense.'  and 
otherwise  they  are  just  h1gh  enough  to  avmd  congestion. 
C)  We  are only concerned  ~ere with  ~onventions that  sa~isfy 
the  condition  of  economic  neutrality;  such  conventiOns 
can be  perfectly  determined from  considerations  other than 
the optimum allocation of resources (see  footnote  ("),  p.  84). provide  a  precise  answer.  The choice of  a  suitable 
convention  is  a political choice  which  must be made 
in  the full  knowledge that it is  economically arbitrary. 
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Nevertheless,  it  may  be  possible  in  a  few  words  to 
indicate the type of solution that would be compatible 
both with the criteria of optimum resource allocation 
and with the various practical considerations we have 
mentioned.  Such  remarks  must  not  be  taken  as 
recommending  any  specific,  detailed  system,  but 
simply  as  suggesting  a  possible  approach  to  the 
problem. 
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1.  The  charges  to  be  made  for  the  different 
functions  of  infrastructure  should  be  at  least  equal 
to  the  corresponding economic charges.  If the total 
sum  of the  discounted  economic  charges  covers  the 
sum  of the initial  investment  and discounted operat-
ing  costs,  there  is  no  problem  of  cost  allocation. 
This may be the case with urban and suburban road 
networks.  In  view  of  the  present  congestion,  the 
economic  charges  on  urban  transport  should 
doubtless  make  it  possible  to  cover  most  of  the 
"total  cost"  of  these  roads  without  taking  their 
other functions  into  account  (i.e.  their non-transport 
functions) (1). 
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2.  If the  economic  charges  leave  a  deficit,  the 
latter  can  be  allocated  in  a  way  that  will  take 
account  of the total  benefits. 
625 
For example, in the case of a canal that is  used both 
for  the  production  of  hydroelectric  power  and  for 
irrigation, without a charge being made on the users, 
the  .  "total  cost"  of  the  canal,  however  defined, 
should  be  apportioned  in  such  a  way  that  none  of 
its  functions  has  to  bear an  amount greater than the 
sum of the rents created by that function (2).  If the 
investment decision has been correct, the sum of the 
rents  created  is  greater  than  the  "total cost"  of the 
canal.  In  that  case,  allocation  of  the  "total  cost" 
in  proportion  to  the  rents  created  would  be  an 
acceptable  conventional  solution. 
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Such  a  solution  cannot  be  applied  rigorously,  for 
generally the rents  created cannot be assessed objec-
tively,  at  least  not  as  a  whole.  However,  it  is 
usually possible to find approximate solutions.  Thus 
the rents created by the irrigation function of a canal 
could be evaluated approximately by considering the 
interest  rate  and  the  increase  in  the  value  of  land 
resulting  from  construction  of the canal. 
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24.44  - Apportionment of the  deficit  among 
the  three  modes  of inland  transport 
627 
In  reviewing  the  various  arguments  for  budgetary 
equilibrium (3),  one can  only  conclude  that  they  all 
support  the  view  that  it  should  be  applied  to  each 
mode  of  transport  separately.  If the  principle  of 
equity is  accepted for the transport sector as  a whole, 
it can  be  logically  extended  to  each  of the  separate 
modes of transport.  The political and social factors 
that  might  lead  to  a  misdirection  of  investment  in 
infrastructure would also seem to support application 
of this rule to each separate mode.  But the strongest 
argument  for  such  an  application  arises  from  the 
special  problems  inherent in  the  railways'  deficit (4). 
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Separate application would only cease to be indicated 
if  the  sole  aim  of  budgetary  equilibrium  were  to 
provide  the  resources  necessary  for  investments  in 
infrastructure and for its maintenance and thus avoid 
putting the burden of these  on the national budget. 
But  other  arguments  have  been  put forward  which 
would  also  seem  to  plead  for  covering  the  various 
deficits  separately (5). 
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The demand for budgetary equilibrium for each mode 
of  transport  is  often declared  to  be a  logical  conse-
quence  of  the  principle  of  equality  of  treatment: 
the  competing  modes  of inland  transport should  be 
given  equal  starting-conditions.  This  formula  gives 
rise  to numerous  difficulties  of interpretation.  For 
example, equality of treatment is used as  an argument 
both in favour of the demand for budgetary equilib-
rium  for each  mode of transport and  also  in  favour 
of the idea of equal charges.  Each of these systems 
bases itself on the principle of equality of treatment, 
but  interprets  it  differently.  The  principle  itself 
cannot tell us which interpretation should bt: adopted; 
the  answer  can  only  be  found  within  a  particular 
legal  system. 
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One  final  problem may  be mentioned in  connection 
with  apportioning  costs  of  infrastructures  that  are 
common  to  two  or more  modes  of transport,  such 
as  subways,  bridges,  level  crossings,  etc.  This 
problem  is  similar to that of the external  effects (6). 
Here,  too,  certain  conventions  of  an  essentially 
arbitrary  nature  must  be  adopted,  whic:h  should 
(")  Mentioned in footnote(")  on p.  85. 
(")  In that case the rents are equal to the total benefits, since 
the oharges  imposed are  nil  (see  Part I, Sec.  11.5). 
(")  See  Section  23.3. 
(') See  Subsection  23.33. 
(")  See  Section  23.3. 
(")  See  Subsection  24.43. follow  the  principle  mentioned  in  the  preceding 
subsection,  i.e.  that they  should  be  simple  ones  that 
can  be  applied  objectively  in  all  cases.  For  the 
reasons  stated  above e),  we  shall  not  discuss  the 
various  conventions  which  have  been  proposed. 
24.45  - Apportionment of  the  deficit 
of one  particular  mode  of transport  among 
the  regional  components  of  infrastructure. 
Regional  inequality  of  charges 
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Regional  inequality  of  charges  within  one  mode 
of  transport is  a much  more  controversial issue  than 
the  view  that  the  rule  of  budgetary  equilibrium 
should be  applied to  each mode of internal transport 
separately.  Leaving  aside  the  practical  problems 
involved,  complete  regional  inequality  is  entirely 
justified  where  cost  charges  and  congestion  charges 
are  concerned.  But this  is  not  true of the  separate 
deficits  of  the  individual  parts of  a  network,  i.e.  the 
difference  between  the  investment  cost  plus  the 
discounted operating cost and the discounted revenue 
from  the  economic  charges (2).  In dealing with the 
co-ordination  of  investments  in  infrastructure (3)  we 
have shown that the benefits derived from the differ-
ent  parts  of  a  single  network  are  highly  interde-
pendent,  so  that  the  imposition  of  budgetary  equi-
librium  on  each  part  separately  can  hardly  mean 
much  anyway.  Moreover,  most  of  the  arguments 
advanced  in  favour  of budgetary equilibrium  do  not 
require  it  to  be  applied  separately  to  each  of  the 
parts  of  a  network (4). 
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At this  point in  our  study,  it  may  suffice  to  repeat 
the  conclusions  already  stated (5).  Regional equali-
zation  of the  deficit  is  compatible  with  the  various 
objectives  of  budgetary  equilibrium,  and  serves  also 
to  mitigate  some  of  the  harmful  economic  conse-
quences  of  applying  this  requirement  too  narrowly. 
It seems,  however,  appropriate to make a distinction 
at least between the three categories of infrastructure 
we  have  already  mentioned,  namely  main  networks, 
urban  and  suburban  networks,  and  local  networks. 
The  condition  of  budgetary  equilibrium  could  be 
applied  to  the  first  two  categories  separately,  while 
the  third  could  be  exempted  from  this  requirement 
altogether (6).  This would mean that within a certain 
region  the charges  imposed on one particular categ-
ory  of  infrastructure  users,  such  as  private  cars, 
would  be  the  same  throughout the  region,  but there 
might  be  some  differentiation  according  to  where 
the  vehicles  were  used:  low  charges,  or none  at  all, 
for  local  roads,  normal  charges  for  main  highways, 
and  higher  charges  in  towns. 
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These schemes could not be carried out without first 
solving  two  difficult  problems.  The  first  concerns 
the  practical possibility of differentiating the charges 
to  be  paid by users,  which  is  a problem that is  only 
important  for  the  roads.  The  second  concerns  the 
size  and  delimitation  of  the  regions  within  which 
charges  should  be  equalized. 
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The  first  problem  does  not  appear  to  be  insoluble. 
It would  not  be  impossible,  for  example,  to  differ-
entiate  charges  by  imposing  different  licence  rates 
for  urban  and  suburban  traffic,  traffic  on  main 
highways,  and  local  traffic  respectively.  It  is  not 
the  aim  of  this  report  to  offer  detailed  practical 
solutions,  but it is  worth pointing out that consider-
able  research has  been done in this  field  and several 
proposals  have  been  put  forward  by  which  the 
charges  paid  by  road  users  could  be  differentiated 
along the broad lines envisaged above (1). 
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The second problem, which concerns the delimitation 
of  the  regions  within  which  charges  are  to  be 
equalized, is  much more fundamental and, in  various 
respects,  more  difficult.  Without  claiming  to  deal 
exhaustively  with  the  matter,  we  should  like  to 
mention  a  few  important  points.  The  size  of  the 
area within  which  charges  are to  be equalized must 
depend  primarily  on  the  degree  of  economic  inter-
dependence  of  the  various  parts  of  a  network.  If 
the  services  performed  by  these  parts  are  highly 
complementary,  it  is  economically  pointless,  and 
!Jerhaps  inequitable,  to  apply  the  condition  of 
budgetary equilibrium to each part separately.  More-
over,  the  area  within  which  charges  are  to  be 
equalized should be large enough to  eliminate, or at 
least  to  mitigate,  the  economically  harmful  effects 
of  applying  budgetary  equilibrium  on  too  small  a 
scale (8).  It is  also  clear that equalization must  not 
(')  See  Subsection  24.43. 
(
2
)  See  Section  24.2. 
(')  See  Section  24.1. 
(')  The argument envisaging  the  curbing  of pressure  groups 
is  an  exception. 
(
5
)  See  Section  23.3. 
(")  See  footnote  ('),  p.  71. 
(') It  has,  for  example,  been  suggested  that  vehicles 
travelling  in  areas  of  dense  traffic  might  be  fitted  with 
meters,  which  would  work  on  magnetic  impulses  emitted 
by  wires  in  or  on  the  road;  the  impulses  could  be  varied 
according to the route taken and the density of traffic. 
(')  See  Subsection  24.45.  Obviously the  extent  to  which the 
rule  of budgetary equilibrium, if applied  in  a  highly  "non-
equalized"  manner,  would  lead  to  economic  distortions 
depends  upon  the  particular  version  of  budgetary  equilib-
rium  considered;  if  it  is  based  on  historic  cost,  quite  dif-
ferent  distortions  may occur than  if  it  is  based  on replace-
ment  cost,  while  the  system  of  budgetary  equilibrium 
without  possibility  of  borrowing  may  give  rise  to  other 
distortions  again  (see  Ch.  31). be  pushed  so  far  that  the  constraint  of  bude:etarv 
equilibrium  can  no  longer  constitute  an  eff'ective 
barrier  against  activities  by  pressure  groups  which 
might  result  in  misdirection  of  investments  in  infra-
structure. 
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For  the  railways  and  roads,  the  existing  national 
networks  - possibly  subdivided  into  a  number  of 
large  regions  in  the  case  of the  bigger  countries  -
might  be  taken  as  suitable  starting-points.  When 
regional  economic  interdependence  and  the  corre-
sponding traffic flows  extend beyond national bound-
aries  - a  development  that is  not  unlikely  in  view 
of European economic integration - rearrangement 
of the  regions  may  be  advisable.  It does not neces-
sarily  follow  from  what  has  been  said  that  the 
boundaries  of  the  regions,  or  the  subdivisions  of 
regions  within  the  bigger  countries,  should  be  the 
same for  all  three modes of transport (1). 
637 
In  the case  of inland  waterways,  some national net-
works  might  prove  to  be  too  small  to  permit of the 
minimum  degree  of  charge  equalization  necessary 
to  avoid  serious  economic distortions.  In that case, 
budgetary  equilibrium  could  be  applied  to  larger 
units  comprising  several  networks  or  parts  of  net-
works. 
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Similar  observations  can  also  be  made  with  regard 
to  special infrastructures such  as  transalpine tunnels. 
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In any  case,  the  precise  boundaries  of  the  different 
areas  within  which  charges  are  to  be equalized  can 
only  be  defined  if  specific  cases  are  first  examined 
in the light of all  the basic facts  of the problem. 
24.46  ~  Apportionment of the  deficit 
among  the  various  categories  of users 
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It  is  often  maintained  that  the  "total  cost" (2)  of 
infrastructure which  is  to  be covered by the charges 
paid  by  the  users  could be  precisely imputed to  the 
different  services  by  the  following  method:  each 
category  of  users  would  have  to  bear  the  marginal 
use  costs  that  are  directly  imputable  to  it,  the 
remainder  being  distributed  in  proportion  to  the 
utilization  of  capacity,  which  is  a  function  of  the 
average  distance travelled,  the size  of the  vehicle,  its 
average  speed,  etc. 
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But this  is  merely  a  convention  which,  whatever its 
merits,  cannot  be  deduced  from  the  criteria  for  an 
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optimum  allocation  of  resources.  These:  criteria 
imply  no  more  than  that  each  category  of  users 
should pay an e:conomic  charge made up of the cost 
charge  and the  congestion charge; the relative  value 
of  the  latter  varies  for  the  different  categories  of 
users  in  strict proportion to  the extent to  which  the 
capacity is  utilized  by each of them, and its absolute 
value  depends  solely  upon  the  extent  to  which  the 
capacity  is  utilized  by  all  the  users  together.  In 
other  words,  this  absolute  value  is  nil  when  the 
capacity  is  not  fully  utilized  in  the  economic  sense 
of  the  term,  and  otherwise  is  just  high  enough  to 
prevent economic congestion.  If  the total discounted 
revenue,  derived  from  the  economic  charges  thus 
determined, is less  th~n the "total cost"' to be charged 
to  the  users,  there is  a  deficit.  The apportionment 
of the  deficit  is  economically  arbitrary. 
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It is  thus  not possible  to  deduce  any  particular rule 
for  apportioning  the  deficit  from  considerations  of 
cost or from  relationships  of cause and effect  where 
costs  are  concerned,  nor to work  out a  method  of 
apportionment from the criteria of optimum resource 
allocation;  these  criteria  imply only  that  the system 
of  charges  must  avoid  distorting  the  conditions  of 
competition between the users of infrastructure. 
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The  principle  of equality  of treatment  is  also  often 
invoked in this connection.  But this concept, as  we 
have shown (3), poses many problems.  For instance, 
it is  sometimes  said  that,  if  there  is  to  be  equality 
of  treatment,  the  charges  for  transport  services 
performed  in  opposite  directions  or  at  different 
times  must  be  identical.  It  is  clear  that  such 
equality  is  not  implicit  in  an optimum  allocation  of 
resources,  and  that  this  view  is  incorrect  whenever 
the  traffic  flows  - and  therefore the  pure tolls  -
are  not  equal.  This  example  serves  again  to  de-
monstrate  the  dangers  of  misinterpretation  inherent 
in  the  concept  of "equality  of  treatment". 
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Various  other  methods  have  been  suggested  for 
apportioning  the  infrastructure  deficit  among  the 
different  categories  of  users.  For  instance,  it  has 
been suggested that the deficit should be apportioned 
according to the elasticity of demand.  This method, 
it  is  claimed,  would  make  it  possible  to  minimize 
distortions  of  an  optimum  allocation  of ressources; 
but  this  is  disputable.  In  any  case,  although  it 
might theoreticaHy be possible to define an optimum 
(')  In  certain  cases:  the  competitive  position  of  the  three 
modes of transport might indicate that their regional  bound-
aries  should  be  the  same. 
(")  See  Subsection  24.40. 
(")  See  Subsection  24.44. tariff  system  that  would  amount  to  a  "second-best" 
if  budgetary  equilibrium  were  required,  it  has  not 
proved  possible  to  give  it  a  practical  form.  Also, 
to differentiate charges may be inequitable in  certain 
cases.  Irrespective  of  the  many difficulties  that can 
arise, this method could in practice only be employed 
where  operation  of  the  infrastructure  and 
production  of  transport  services  are  in  the  same 
hands,  as  in  the  case  of  the  railways.  We  shall 
see (1)  that, in  the present circumstances, the railways 
will  probably  only  be  able  to  achieve  budgetary 
equilibrium  if  they  are  authorized  to  differentiate 
their  freight  rates  to  some  extent.  But  such  dif-
ferentiation  may  have  obvious  disadvantages,  which 
we  shall  consider later when  dealing  with  the  abuse 
of  dominant  positions  and  with  dumping  based  on 
domestic  subsidies.  In  any  case,  a  method  that 
involves taking the elasticities of demand into account 
generally  cannot  provide  a  satisfactory  solution  for 
roads  and  inland  waterways. 
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Several  other  proposals  have  been  made.  It  has 
been  suggested,  for  instance,  that  the  deficit  should 
be  apportioned on the principle of equal charges for 
substitutable  services (2).  Another  solution  would 
be  to  apportion  the  costs  that  cannot  be  directly 
imputed  to  the  individual  user  in  proportion  to  the 
marginal  use  costs. 
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The first  method obviously does  not provide a com-
plete  solution.  It  requires  only  that  the  charges 
for  the  use  of  infrastructure should be the same for 
all  types  of  transport  that  can  be  substituted  for 
each other.  This  applies particularly to the charges 
for  competing  services  provided  by  different  modes 
of transport.  But the method cannot tell us  in what 
proportions the  charges should be distributed among 
the different categories of users within one particular 
mode  of  transport.  It  has  other  drawbacks  too. 
However  conceived,  the  principle  of  equality  of 
charges  will  usually  conflict  with  the  principle  of 
budgetary  equilibrium  for  each  mode  of  transport 
separately (2).  Also,  the adoption of such  a method 
itself  poses  other  problems.  for  it  means  that  the 
concept  of  substitutable  types  of  transport  must 
first  be defined  and transport divided  into  categories 
according  to  this  definition. 
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The other proposal,  that  the  total  sum  to  be  borne 
by  the  users  of  one  particular  mode  of  transport 
should  be  distributed  in  proportion  to  the  cost 
charges,  may provide a  solution.  According to  this 
proposal,  the  various  categories  of  traffic  would  be 
reduced  to  a  common  denominator  by  conversion 
factors  based  on  the  relative  importance  of  the 
marginal  use  costs  occasioned  by  each  category. 
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The total  sum  to  be  borne by  the  users of the  infra-
structure  would  then  be  apportioned  according  to 
these  conversion  factors. 
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This  system  would,  however,  have  one  serious 
disadvantage,  in  that  it  would  make  the  charges 
entirely dependent on  the cost  charge.  This  is  only 
one component of the optimum charge for  the use of 
infrastructure  derived  from  the  criteria  of  optimum 
resource  allocation;  moreover,  in  some  cases  it  is 
of  very  little  importance e).  It  would  seem  more 
logical and more in  keeping with the  requirements of 
optimum resource  allocation if the congestion charge 
(i.e.  the  contribution  to  economic  saturation)  was 
also  taken  into  account  when  the  total  sum  to  be 
borne  by  the  infrastructure  users  is  apportioned 
among  them. 
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This  question  is  of  fundamental  importance.  Ac-
cording to  certain  studies that have  been made with 
regard to the roads, if the infrastructure charges were 
simply  distributed  in  proportion  to  the  marginal 
use  costs,  they  would  be  borne  almost  entirely  by 
trucks.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  infrastructure 
charges  were  distributed  in  proportion  to  the  con-
gestion  caused  by  each  category  of  traffic,  a  sub-
stantial  amount  would  have  to  be borne  by  private 
cars. 
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A  difficulty  that  arises  if  both  components  of  the 
optimum  charges  are  taken  into  account,  i.e.  cost 
charge  and  congestion  charge,  concerns  the  relative 
weight  to  be  given  to  each  of  them  in  fixing  the 
conversion  factors  for  the  various  categories  of 
traffic.  The  congestion  charge  varies  with  the 
degree  of  utilization  of  the  existing  capacity,  being 
nil  for  all  types  of traffic  when  capacity is  not fully 
utilized,  and  otherwise  just  high  enough  to  prevent 
economic congestion.  If the conversion factors were 
to  be  based  on  the  economic  charges,  they  would 
vary  with  the  degree  of  utilization  of  the  existing 
capacity  of  the  infrastructure (4).  Such  a  solution 
would  hardly  be  feasible,  since  it  necessitates  a high 
degree  of  differentiation  of  charges  both  in  time 
and  space. 
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A more practical solution would be to group together 
all  transport  effected  during  a  specified  period  (one 
(')  See  Section  32.4: 
(")  See  Subsection  24.44. 
(")  For instance,  when  capacity  is  fully  utilized. 
(')  This is because, as we  pointed out earlier, the relationship 
between  cost  charge  and congestion  charge  is  not the  same 
for all  categories of traffic. year)  on  a fgiven  network  (for  example,  a  network 
of  main  highways  or  an  urban  and  suburban  net-
work).  The total amount to  be charged to  the users 
of  the  roads  in  question  would  then  be  apportioned 
by  assessing  the  volume  of  traffic  for  each  category 
of  users.  There  would  be  no  difficulty  in  appor-
tioning  the  part  of  this  total  sum  that  represented 
the  marginal  use  costs.  The  remainder  could  be 
distributed  in  proportion  to  the  use  made  of  the 
capacity  by  each  category  of traffic,  this  being  cal-
culated  from  various  technical  factors  (density, 
average  speed  of  the  various  classes  of  vehicles, 
etc.).  The  charges  for  the  different  categories  of 
users  would  thus  be  made  up  of  two  components: 
one  would  be  the  marginal  use  cost,  and  the  other 
would  be  a  function  of  an  appropriate  congestion 
index (1). 
652 
We  are  fully  aware  of  the  arbitrary  nature  of  this 
convention.  But  it  has  at  least  the  advantage  of 
being  clear  and  feasible;  it also  seems  to  be  quite 
acceptable. 
24.47  - The  policy  of budgetary  equilibrium 
and  the  importance  of the  deficit 
653 
In the preceding subsections we have tried to indicate 
the  reasons  for  a  policy  of  budgetary  equilibrium, 
and  the  various  forms  such  a  policy  may  take.  In 
practice,  this  policy  can  appear  in  a  very  different 
light depending on the  size  of the  deficit  that would 
result  from  a  system  of  charges  corresponding  to 
an  optimum  allocation  of  resources.  The  smaller 
the deficit,  the smaller will  be the disadvantages of a 
policy  of  budgetary  equilibrium (=!). 
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Two  considerations  of  great  practical  importance 
should  be  mentioned  here.  Firstly,  the  deficit  to 
be  expected  for  the  existing  infrastructures  is  com-
paratively  small  or  even  non-existent  when  the 
installations  have  already  been  depreciated,  either 
in  the  normal  way  or owing  to  the  effects  of infla-
tion,  or  when  the  investments  have  been  financed 
by  public  funds (3).  This  is  the  case  with  most  of 
the  existing  installations.  Where  the  roads  are 
concerned, the inadequacy of some of the main road 
networks  and of most  urban and suburban networks 
even  prompts the conclusion that the optimum policy 
at  the  present  time  would  lead  not to  a  deficit  but 
to  a  relatively  large  rent,  on  account  of  the  high 
value  of  the  economic  charges (4).  For  all  such 
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installations it  would therefore seem  that, in practice, 
the  principle  of  budgetary  equilibrium  can  be 
combined  with  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources. 
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Secondly,  when:  the  installations  to  be  constructed 
are  concerned,  the information currently available  is 
completely  inadequate for  the  purpose of estimating 
the size  of the probable deficit.  Two  points should 
in  any  case  be  made  here.  Firstly,  the  deficit {5) 
may  be  much  smaller  than  is  generally  thought (6). 
Secondly,  application  of the  principle:  of  budgetary 
equilibrium  to  each  mode  of  transport  separately 
may  lead  to a considerable distortion of competition 
between  them  if  the  deficit  is  relatively 
much greater for one of them.  This would no doubt 
be  the  case  with  the  railwavs  and  the  roads  if  the 
roads  were  developed,  as  seems  desirable,  in  accor-
dance with the investment criteria we have mentioned. 
If this  were  done,  the  conditions  of  competition 
would  certainly  not  be  distorted  to  the  detriment 
of  the  roads (1). 
(') It should  be  noted  that these  charges  may  be  similar  to 
the  economic  charges,  particularly  if  the  infrastructure  is 
fully  utilized.  The  economic  charges  then  consist  of  two 
components,  cost  charge  and  congestion  charge,  the  latter 
being  a  function  of the  traffic  congestion  caused  by  each 
of  the  various  categories  of traffic. 
(')  There are various ways of applying a  policy of budgetary 
equilibrium;  we  shall consider these in  Chapter 31,  together 
with  the  influence  of  various  factors  such  as  the  rate  at 
which  the  infrastructure  is  being  developed,  the  rate  of 
interest,  the  rate  of inflation,  technical  progress,  etc. 
(")  By  definition,  there  can  be  no deficit  in  the  system  of 
budgetary  equilibrium  without  the  possibility  of borrowing 
which  is  discussed  in  Chapter  31  (Sec.  31.4). 
(')  The economic  charges  do not  simply  consist  of the  cost 
charges  - a  common  misapprehension  - but  include  also 
the  congestion  charges.  The  latter  are  in  fact  a  very 
important  component  of  the  charges  for  the  use  of  infra-
structure  corresponding  to  an  optimum  allocation  of 
resources.  This  is  particularly  true  of  any  infrastructure 
that is  being fully  utilized. 
(')  The  discounted  value  of the  revenue  expected  from  the 
congestion charges must be equal to the marginal investment 
cost.  Consequently,  the  size  of the  total  discounted  deficit 
for the whole economic life of the infrastructure is  determin-
ed  solely  by  the  difference  between  the  average  and  the 
marginal  investment  cost,  i.e.  by  the  extent  to  which  the 
construction  of the  infrastructure  shows  increasing  returns. 
(
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)  This  may  be  the  case  with  the  railways  when  the  net-
work  is  relatively  dense.  It  may  also  be  the  case  with 
motorways  in  level  country.  One  may  also  add  that,  for 
the  whole  of  a  vast  region,  the  overall  cost  of  the  total 
transport  capacity  of  the  infrastructure  of  one  particular 
mode of transport may be  subject to the  law of diminishing 
returns,  since  the~  more  the  network  expands  the  less 
favourable  will  be  the  sites  that  have  to  be  used. 
C)  Generally  speaking,  in  the  case  of  two  modes  of 
transport  with  different  growth rates,  the  greater the  differ-
ence  in  growth  rates  the  greater  would  be  the  distortions 
in  the  conditions of competition and in the optimum condi-
tions resulting from  the constraint of budgetary equilibrium. 656 
It follows  clearly from  all  this  that the choice of the 
policy to be adopted depends to a great extent on the 
size  of  the  deficits  that  would  occur with  optimum 
management  of  the  three  main  modes  of  transport: 
roads,  railways  and inland waterways.  If the deficit 
is  very  high,  and  if  it  is  very  different  in  size  for 
the  three  modes,  the  practical  system  of  economic 
charges  may  seem  preferable.  If  the  deficit  is 
relatively  small  or  about  the  same  for  the  three 
modes of transport,  budgetary equilibrium may seem 
the  best  solution. 
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Unfortunately,  the  data  at  present  available  are 
comparatively  incomplete,  and  special studies would 
be required.  The importance of such studies cannot 
be over-estimated, where the conclusions to be drawn 
from  the  present  report  are  concerned.  We  think, 
however,  that there would be  no  difficulty in  obtain-
ing fairly quickly such rough data as  would be needed 
before  the  essential  decisions  could  be  taken. 
24.48  - Summary 
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The  option  of  budgetary  equilibrium  can  be  inter-
preted  in  many  different  ways.  There  are  a  great 
number  of  different  versions,  depending  on  the 
conventions  adopted  with  regard  to  the  "total cost" 
of  the  infrastructure  that  should  be  covered  each 
year,  and  on  the  way  the  "total cost" is  apportioned 
among the various types of services performed by the 
infrastructure. 
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It has  been  shown  in  the preceding  subsections  that 
these  conventions  are  to  a  great extent  arbitrary  as 
far  as  optimum  allocation of resources  is  concerned; 
they  are  essentially  political  choices,  and  depend 
partly  upon  the  general  objectives  pursued.  This 
statement  could  be  taken  as  our  final  conclusion 
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regarding  the  option of  budgetary equilibrium,  since 
the  choice  of  the  objectives  of  transport  policy  is 
clearly  outside  the  scope  of  this  report. 
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In  Part Ill we  shall  nevertheless  consider a  number 
of  particular  systems  of  budgetary  equilibrium. 
There  are  two  reasons  for  approaching  the  subject 
in  this  way.  The  first  is  that,  rightly  or  wrongly, 
economic  arguments  have  been  put forward  in  sup-
port of certain systems,  and these arguments deserve 
serious  study.  The  second  reason  is  that,  in  the 
absence of precise economic criteria, one could adopt 
the  following  general  principles:  technical  and 
institutional  simplicity,  clarity  in  the  solutions 
proposed,  and  a  minimum  of  arbitrary  elements. 
The  various  systems  of  budgetary  equilibrium  will 
also  be  examined  from  this  angle (1). 
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In  exammmg  these  various  systems  in  Part  Ill we 
shall  deal  particularly  with  one  point  that  appears 
fundamental:  the  definition  of  the  "total  cost"  of 
infrastructure  to  be  covered  each  year  by  means  of 
charges  paid  by  the users.  On the other hand,  the 
problem  already  discussed  in  this  chapter,  that  of 
apportioning  this  "total  cost"  among  the  various 
types  of  services  performed  by  the  infrastructure  of 
each  mode  of  inland  transport,  will  not  be  studied 
specially  with  respect'  to  each  of  the  systems  dis-
cussed.  On  this  point,  we  shall  simply  refer  to 
the  general  analysis  given  in  the  present chapter. 
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Finally,  the  size  of  the  deficit  accompanying  an 
optimum  allocation  of  resources  will  have  to  be 
regarded  as  an  essential  factor  influencing  the  de-
cisions  to  be  taken.  The  practical  conclusions  will 
vary  according  as  the  deficit  is  large  or small. 
(')  Naturally.  these  general  principles  are  equally  valid  for 
the  other  systems  for  operating  infrastructure. CHAPTER 25 
OPTIONS FOR  TRANSPORT SERVICES 
25.0  - GENERAL 
25.00  - General  features  of transport 
services  in  contrast  to  infrastructure 
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We  have already pointed out on several occasions (1) 
that infrastructure and transport services are two very 
distinct  fields  of  transport  policy,  both  because  of 
existing  institutional  differences  a:nd  for  reasons 
inherent in  their respective  economic natures.  This 
difference appears especially on a fundamental point, 
namely  the  extent  to  which  decentralization  is  pos-
sible  and  desirable  in  each of the  two  fields. 
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In  the  previous  chapter  we  saw  that  infrastructure 
must  necessarily  be  highly  centralized.  In  fact,  in 
all  Community  countries  road  and  inland  waterway 
infrastructure  is  provided  for  users  by  the  public 
authorities, while  investment in railway infrastructure 
is  subject  to  more  or  less  extensive  government 
control.  This  is  justified  by  economic  considera-
tions:  infrastructure  investment  shows  very  marked 
indivisibilities  and  the  total  benefits  attaching  to 
different parts of the networks  are in  general closely 
interdependent.  From this  arises  the  need for some 
central co-ordination of investments.  Moreover, the 
prices to  be  paid for  the use of infrastructure, where 
this  is  made available  to  users by the  public author-
ities,  must  be  determined  on  the  basis  of  explicit 
rules. 
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The economic  structure and  the  present institutional 
system  are  quite  different  for  transport  services. 
There is  no  technical need for completely centralized 
operation  in  road  transport  or  inland  waterways. 
For  these  two  modes  of  transport  investments  in 
equipment  are  divisible  and,  above  certain  dimen-
sions,  concentration  of  operations  does  not  result 
in any notable economies of scale e).  The operation 
of  rail  services  is  centralized,  but  at  present,  in 
contrast to  what used to happen before road haulage 
became  a  serious  competitor,  these  services  are 
exposed,  at  least potentially and often in  actual fact, 
to  direct  competition from  one or both  of the  other 
two  modes  of  internal  transport. 
25.01  - Plan  of the  chapter 
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These few  remarks  suffice  to  show  that in  transport 
services  it  is  not  possible  to  rule  out a  priori  either 
92 
of the two  extreme options as  to  organization of the 
sectors concerned, i.e.  the centralized and the decen-
tralized regimes.  However, apart from a few  general 
comments  intended  only  to  show  their  essential 
features,  we  shall  not examine or compare these  two 
extreme  options  as  such,  simply  because  this  would 
have  hardly  any  practical  significance.  Neither 
regime  is  acceptable  in  the  pure  state  nor  are  they 
actually  applied as  such in  any country.  AH  actual 
policies  are  mixed. 
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The practical problem is  therefore not one of choos-
ing between a  completely centralized and completely 
decentralized  organization  but  of  finding  an 
appropriate  intermediate  regime  by  weighing  the 
advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  two  extreme 
options.  The purpose of this  chapter is  to indicate 
some major aspects which are relevant to  an analysis 
of the practical systems we  shall examine in  Part Ill, 
first  as  regards  investment  in  rolling  stock  and 
barges (3),  and  then  as  regards  the  fixing  of  tariffs 
for  transport  services (4). 
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The  following  section  will  briefly  recapitulate  the 
criteria.  In  this  chapter,  as  in  the  preceding  one, 
we  shall  confine  ourselves  mainly  to  the  criteria of 
optimum  resource  allocation.  But  the  choice  of a 
specific  set  of  criteria  does  not  imply  the  choice of 
a  regime,  although  one  regime  may  be  better  fitted 
than another to  meet a certain set of criteria.  From 
the  angle of the basic economic criteria, and even of 
the formulation of the  direct conditions for  optimum 
resource allocation, the two  extreme regimes strongly 
resemble  each  other.  The  difference  between  them 
lies  in  their  approach  to  the attainment of optimum 
conditions.  Both  must  rely  on certain  rules  for  the 
guidance  of  decision-makers;  but  in  a  decentralized 
regime  these  rules  are  supposed  to  be  enforced 
primarily  by  the  working  of  the  market,  while  the 
centralized  regime  operates  mainly  with  the  aid  of 
administrative  rules.  The  optimum  "mix"  of  cen-
tralized  and  decentralized  procedures  can  be 
(')  See  Part  J  and  Chapter  20. 
0  If  such  economies  existed,  a  constant  and  irresistible 
trend  towards  concentration  would  be  noted  whc:rever  it 
was  not  checked  by  public  measures.  Of  ':ourse,  even  in 
the  absence of economies of scale, concentration  may occur 
for  other  reasons;  for  instance,  it  could  result  from 
endeavours  to  achic~ve  dominant  positions  on  the  market. 
(")  See  Section  25.2. 
(')  See  Section  25.3. determined by considering the  advantages  and disad-
vantages  of  the  two  systems  in  meeting  the  various 
conditions  of  optimum  resource  allocation. 
669 
The case of  a general recession and its  consequences 
for  transport  policy  merits  separate  attention,  both 
because it  is  of fundamental  importance and because 
it  presents  certain  very  distinct  features  which  may 
require  a  different  policy  from  the one  most  appro-
priate  when  there  is  no  recession.  Today,  when 
all  our  countries  are  firmly  committed  to  full  em-
ployment  and economic growth,  the  transport policy 
should  in  principle  be  based on the assumption of a 
steadily  expanding  economy.  The  fact  that  this 
report concentrates chiefly  on  questions  of transport 
policy  in  the  context  of  a  steadily  expanding 
economy  does  not  mean  that  the  implications  of  a 
recession  should  be  neglected  but  only  that  such  a 
situation  must  be  considered  as  a  fundamentally 
different  one,  for  which  special  remedial  measures 
may  be  necessary.  Although  the  report  is  thus 
generally  limited  to  an  examination  of  transport 
policy  in  a  situation  of  full  employment  and  steady 
growth,  a few  remarks will  be  made on the  cases of 
recession  and  marked  slowdown  in  growth (1).  In 
addition,  the  problems  of  adaptation  to  structural 
changes  will  be  tackled.  In  many  respects  these 
have  consequences  similar  to  those  of  a  general 
recession. 
25.02  - The  criteria 
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The fact  that we  shall  mainly confine ourselves here 
to  problems concerning strictly economic criteria, i.e. 
those  of  optimum  resource  allocation,  in  no  way 
implies that we contest the importance or justification 
of  other  objectives,  or  consider  them  of  little  rele-
vance.  It means  simply  that our analysis  is  limited 
to  the study of transport policy as related to optimum 
resource  allocation e). 
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In  discussing  infrastructure  we  have  pointed  out 
often,  and  very  explicitly,  with  regard  to  all  the 
proposals  formulated,  that  consideration  of  other 
objectives of national policy could lead to a different 
view  of  things.  We  must  make  similar  reservations 
in  discussing transport services,  but they  will  be less 
important, at least as regards the transport of freight, 
which is  more  particularly the  subject of this  report. 
In  the  case  of  infrastructure  the  strictly  economic 
considerations  arising  from  the  criteria  of optimum 
resource  allocation  are  somewhat restricted in  scope. 
In  various  ways  the deficit  and the  related questions 
of  the  surpluses,  as  well  as  the  practical  need  for 
spatial equalization of  charges,  preclude strict  appli-
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cation  of  the  criteria  in  practice.  These  special 
aspects  of  infrastructure  and  the  possible  conflict 
between  optimum  resource  allocation  and  institu-
tional  considerations,  particularly  as  regards  the 
deficit,  leave  a  certain  margin  for  political  choices 
in which other objectives of general policy are bound 
to  play  a  part. 
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These problems  are  much less  important in  the case 
of  transport  services.  The  criteria  of optimum  re-
source  allocation  can  in  principle  be  applied  in  a 
straightforward  fashion.  If other objectives  prevail 
over  the  purely  economic  criteria,  this  is  because 
the  responsible  authorities  have  implicitly  judged 
that the pursuit of these other objectives via transport 
policy is  more important than the distortions likely to 
arise  in  the  transport  sector  as  a  result.  The 
justification of such requirements certainly cannot be 
disputed  a  priori,  since  they  derive  from  criteria 
other  than  those  of  optimum  resource  allocation. 
In  particular,  considerations  of  regional  policy  and 
income distribution - and more generally the social 
consequences  of  a  transport  policy  based  on  the 
criteria  of  optimum  resource  allocation  - may 
supply valid reasons for adopting a policy calculated 
to modify the conditions of an optimum allocation of 
resources.  But  these  considerations  need  not 
necessarily lead to  such  a  policy.  We  have already 
pointed out that all  transfers of rents are in principle 
perfectly consistent with optimum resource allocation, 
provided  the  method  of transfer  does  not  affect  the 
economic optimum conditions. 
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It  may  be  difficult  to  make  transfers  which  are 
economically  neutral.  But  every  reasonable  effort 
should  be  made  to  minimize  economic  distortions. 
This  means  that  any  measures  taken  should  be  as 
direct  as  possible.  To  clarify  the  point  we  may 
quote  an  example  in  connection  with  the  objectives 
of regional development.  To promote the economic 
development  of  a  region,  adequate  infrastructure 
must  first  be  provided.  The building  of this  infra-
structure may well  be justified for reasons of regional 
policy  even  if  not  on  strictly  economic  grounds. 
This  point  was  explicitly  made  in  the  preceding 
chapter.  But  it  is  generally  more  difficult  to  see 
why special measures should also be taken as regards 
transport  services.  If  adequate  infrastructure  is 
already available,  it would be preferable to stimulate 
the  economic  development  of  the  region  concerned 
by directly subsidizing the establishment of industries 
rather than  by  subsidizing  transport or imposing on 
it  "public service obligations" - all  measures which 
(')  See  Section  25.4. 
(')  For the  motivation  of  this  approach  see  Chapter  20  (in 
particular Sec.  20.0). are  likely  to  lead  to  unnecessary  distortions  in  the 
transport  sector.  Similar  considerations  apply  to 
the  use  of transport  tariffs  as  an  instrument of  agri-
cultural  policy  or  of  any  other  policy  designed  to 
protect  certain  industries,  such  as  coalmining,  or 
certain  classes  of  people. 
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The  same  conclusion  holds  good  for  an  incomes 
policy  in  the  transport  sector  itself.  If the  incomes 
of  certain  categories  of  carriers,  as  derived  from  an 
optimum  allocation  of  resources,  are  considered 
unfair,  the  desired  adjustments  should  not  be  made 
by  restrictive  and/or  protective  measures  which  are 
likely to  hinder optimum utilization of existing capa-
cities  and  impair  economic  progress  and,  conse-
quently,  the  general  standard  of  living.  Such 
adjustments  should  be  made  as  far  as  possible  by 
means of direct subsidies, which would avoid creating 
undesirable  economic  stimuli (1 ). 
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These considerations lead to doubts as  to the wisdom, 
purely  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  efficacy  of 
intervention  technique,  of  applying  criteria  other 
than  those  of  optimum  resource  allocation  to  the 
operation  of  transport  services.  Of  course,  final 
judgment  should  be  reserved,  since  it  largely  de-
pends  on  the  practical  possibility  of  attainning  the 
other  objectives  by  measures  which  are  neutral  in 
their effect on transport.  But it would indeed seem 
that the above considerations make it possible to  lay 
the  chief  accent on the purely economic  aspects. 
25.03  - Optimum  allocation  of resources 
in  transport  services 
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We  have  already  shown ('!)  that  an  optimum  alloca-
tion.  of  resources  postulates  certain  criteria  for 
investments  and  others for  current operations,  all  of 
which  can  be  formul?.ted  as  the  condition  that  the 
difference  between  total  benefits  and  cost  must  be 
maximum  at  final  prices  considered  as  fixed.  In 
the  sectors  with  a  competitive  system  where  there 
are  no  important  economies  of  scale  in  production, 
application of these criteria to transport services does 
not  involve  any  deficit.  Hence  the  problems  con-
nected  with  the  deficit,  which  were  examined  in 
detail  apropos  of  infrastructure,  no  longer  arise. 
Nor  is  it  necessary  to  take  account  of  surpluses 
otherwise than as  regards their marginal values equal 
to  the  prices  when  decisions  are  to  be  taken  on 
investments  in  road  vehicles,  rolling  stock  and 
barges.  An estimate of the actual discounted future 
revenue,  to  be  compared  with  the  cost  of  this  type 
of  investment,  provides  the  correct  investment  cri-
terion  here. 
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The  difference  between  the  benefits  and  the  costs 
is  at  a  maximum  if  two  distinct  conditions  are 
fulfilled.  One  is  that  the  total  cost  must  be  mini-
mized,  the  oth{~r  that  output  must  be  e:qual  to 
demand  at a  price equal to the  sum of  the marginal 
cost of production in the strict sense of this term and 
all  the  rents  accruing to  the  existing durabk factors 
when  these  are  fully  utilized e).  In  the  case  of 
production  which  employs  only  divisible  assets  such 
as  rolling  stock,  these  two  components  of  the  opti-
mum price  are usually lumped together as  "marginal 
cost".  This  terminology  is  somewhat  unfortunate 
and  gives  rise  to  abundant  confusion  and  errors 
because  it  suggests  that the optimum price is  a  cost 
which  can  be  determined,  independently  of  the 
market  situation,  by  pure  cost  calculations.  Such 
a  conclusion  would  be  quite  incorrect,  because  the 
rent  element,  a  component  of  the  optimum  price 
which,  at  any  given  moment  reflects  the  optimum 
use  of  the  durable  factors,  is  a  scarcity  price  and 
consequently  depends  on  the  degree  of  utilization, 
i.e.  the intensity of demand.  The other component 
is  the  cost  of use,  which  is  in  fact  a  marginal  cost. 
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Another  consideration  of  the  same  order  concerns 
the  conventional  preoccupation  with  the  optimum 
price almost to the exclusion of a condition which is 
equally  important in  theory  and  more  important  in 
practice,  i.e.,  the  condition  of cost  minimization (4). 
Consequently,  the  economic  merits  of  a  transport 
system must in general be judged primarily from the 
stand point of cost minimization in the second place 
from  that of investment criteria,  and only in the last 
instance from that of the optimum pricing rules. 
(') See  Section  25.4. 
(")  See  Section  22.11. 
(")  The  rent  element  in  the  price  of  transport  services  is 
entirely analogous to what we  called the "congestion charge" 
in  the  case  of  infrastructure.  It is  nil  when  the  existing 
factors  are not fully  utilized and otherwise just high enough 
to restrict  demand 'to the  available  capacity.  The situation 
is  therefore  logically  the same, but it  is  somewhat different 
in  degree.  In the  case  of mobile  means  of transport there 
is  a  much  closer  link  between  the  rent  received  and  the 
initial  investment  c;ost:  if  for  any  length  of  time  (i.e.  a 
period sufficient to cover  both peaks  and troughs)  the  rents 
do  not  meet  the  investment  costs,  new  means  of transport 
will  not  be  obtained.  This  is  the  justification  for  the 
common  practice  of referring to  marginal  cost  in  the strict 
sense  plus  these  rents  as  the  "marginal  cost"  of  providing 
transport  services. 
(')  See  Part  I.  Even in  theory,  cost  minimization  logically 
takes  priority.  Application  of  the  marginal  rules  for 
optimum prices hardly makes economic sense if the function 
to which the rules  are  applied is  not the one that is  relevant 
from  the  angle  of  optimum  resource  allocation,  i.e.  the 
minimum  cost  function.  On  the  other  hand,  cost  minimi-
zation  is  economically  rational  even  if  pricing  rules  are 
applied  which  are  incorrect  from  the  point  of  view  of 
optimum  resource  allocation. 25.04  - The  assumptions 
concerning  infrastructure 
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Before  we  can  discuss  the  problems  connected  with 
the  system  for  transport  services  one  final  point 
must  be  dealt  with.  This  concerns  the  general 
assumption which must be made as  regards operation 
of  infrastructure.  There  is  obviously  a  close 
connection between  policy for  transport services  and 
policy  for  infrastructure.  If,  for  example,  carriers 
in  competing  modes  of  transport  are  charged  on  a 
different basis for  the use  of their infrastructure, this 
might  provide  an  economic  justification  for  cor-
recting  the  resulting  distortions  by  appropriate 
measures  in  the  pricing  of transport services.  This 
interdependence of the systems for infrastructure and 
for  services may complicate the analysis considerably, 
since,  as  we  have  shown  in  the  previous  chapter, 
many  solutions  are  possible  and  acceptable  in  the 
matter  of  infrastructure.  However,  it  is  neither 
practicable  nor  necessary  to  consider,  for  every 
possible  system  of  tariffs  for  transport services,  the 
implications of all  possible policies for infrastructure. 
In order to evaluate the various policies for transport 
services it is  sufficient first to consider the case where 
the  system  for  infrastructure  does  not  falsify  condi-
tions  of  competition  between  the  various  modes  of 
inland  transport  by  distorting  optimum  resource 
allocation,  and  secondly  to  give  some  indication  of 
the  problems  which  arise  with  systems  that do  not 
satisfy  this  condition. 
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Failing  evidence  to  the  contrary  we  shall  always 
start  from  the  assumption  that problems  concerning 
infrastructure  have  already  been  resolved  in  such  a 
way that there is  no  distortion of optimum allocation 
of resources  in  transport services.  This  will  enable 
us  to  judge  the  policy  for  transport  services  on  its 
own  merits.  We  shall  examine  in  a  separate  sub-
section (1)  the  problems  which  would  arise  if  a 
charging system  for  the use of infrastructure did  not 
fulfil  this  condition. 
25.1  -SOME GENERAL  COMMENTS 
ON COMPETITION AND CENTRALIZATION 
IN  INLAND  TRANSPORT 
25.10  - Competition 
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Complete freedom  of competition in inland transport 
would  imply:  freedom  for  all  carriers  to  fix  their 
prices  as  they  think  fit;  no  restrictions  on capacity; 
and  freedom  of  access  to  inland  waterway  and road 
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transport (free  access to  the railways  sector being, of 
course,  without  practical  significance  in  view  of  the 
concession  system  to  which  railways  are  subject). 
This  option  is  not entirely  equivalent to  a  decentra-
lized  regime,  since  the  economic  structure  of  the 
national  railway  companies  necessitates  operating 
them  as  a  single  administrative  unit,  which  can 
practise  internal  economic  and  technical  decentrali-
zation only to  a  limited extent.  In the other modes 
of inland transport,  decentralization  and competition 
are  technically  possible,  and  are  actually  the  rule  in 
certain  markets.  However,  their  working  is  often 
inhibited  by  restrictive  government measures  and by 
private  monopolistic  concentrations,  so  that  even  in 
the  "competitive  sectors"  there  is  at  present  only 
limited  decentralization.  The  option  of  completely 
free  competition  implies  that  these  restrictions  are 
eliminated. 
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Whatever its  basic  merits or drawbacks,  competition 
will  fail  to  ensure  optimum  resource  allocation  if 
competitive relations  are falsified  by  artificial dispar-
ities  in  production  costs  or  by  other  influences 
distorting  prices.  The  most  important  potential 
sources  of  distortion  in  inland  transport  are  the 
unequal incidence of the charging systems for the use 
of infrastructure  and the  existence  of different fiscal 
and social systems (2). 
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In strict theory,  competition can potentially produce 
optimum resource  allocation  on the three  conditions 
that  charges  for  the use  of  infrastructure  and  other 
important  cost  components  are  determined  on  the 
same  basic  principles;  that  there  are  no  increasing 
returns; and that all  the other prices in the economy 
are optimum.  As regards this last point, the present 
report,  when  discussing the problems of the  relative 
optimum (3),  considers  only  cases  where  prices 
outside  the  inland  transport  sector  have  a  direct 
impact  on  competition  in  this  sector,  in  particular 
prices  of  services  produced  by  modes  of  transport 
which  are  not part of the sector in the strict sense, 
such  as  oil  pipelines,  coastal  shipping,  etc.  The 
relations  between  these  modes  of transport  and  the 
inland sector will  be considered briefly  below (4). 
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Apart from  the  complications  just  mentioned,  com-
petition  will  in  practice  assure  optimum  resource 
allocation  if  all  operators  follow  the  rules  of  the 
free  market  economy,  i.e.  if  they  endeavour  to 
maximize  their  net  income,  treating  market  prices 
(')  See  Subsection  25.30. 
(")  See  Subsections  25.30  and  25.31. 
(')  See  Section  22.4. 
e) See  Subsection  25.32. as  given.  This  condition is  achieved  if  the share of 
each  operator  in  the  total  market  for  a  specific 
service  is  sufficiently  small,  or if  actual  or potential 
competition obliges the operator to behave as  though 
his  share  were  small.  Under  these  circumstances 
there  are  powerful  arguments  in  favour  of  compe-
tition,  which  ensures  decentralization  of  decisions 
without the cost and imperfections of control.  There 
are  no  institutional  limitations  to  the  application  of 
economic  criteria  which  are  complicated  or  whose 
functioning  is  difficult  to  verify  objectively;  equality 
of  treatment  is  ensured  because  free  access  to  the 
industry  is  guaranteed;  and,  last  but  not  least,  the 
pressure  of  competition  itself  provides  a  powerful 
incentive to  cost minimization.  As we  have already 
shown (1),  this  last point is  of particular importance. 
The  fact  therefore  that  the  pressure  of  competition 
is  one  of the  most  powerful  and  effective  means  of 
reducing production costs to  the lowest possible level 
is  a considerable advantage of the competitive system. 
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Are  the  conditions  just  mentioned  fulfilled  in  the 
various  modes  of  inland  transport  or,  if  they  are 
not, could they be  fulfilled  by an appropriate change 
in  the  institutional  framework?  Effective  competi-
tion  in  conformity  with  the  general  principles  of 
optimum  resource  allocation  is  technically  possible 
in  road  and  inland  waterway  transport,  since  eco-
nomies  of scale  are not so  considerable that concen-
tration  of  each  of  these  modes  into  a  single 
production  unit  would  be  advantageous.  On  the 
other  hand,  practical  reasons  preclude  decentrali-
zation of the management of railways, which therefore 
enjoy  a  "natural  monopoly"  in  their  own  field. 
Although  the  absence of internal competition on the 
railways  may  be largely offset by actual or potential 
competition  from  the  other modes  of internal trans-
port,  the  railways  undoubtedly  occupy  a  dominant 
position  - albeit  a  limited  one  - for  certain 
services  and  in  certain  regions.  The  problems  of 
the  abuse of such dominant positions by the railways 
will  be  examined below (2). 
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It is  often  maintained  that  truly  free  competition in 
road haulage and inland waterways would have many 
undesirable consequences, usually described as arising 
from  "ruinous"  or  "excessive"  competition.  How-
ever,  it  would  seem  preferable to  avoid  these vague, 
ill-defined  and  emotionally  charged  terms,  which, 
moreover, are particularly ambiguous since they bring 
into  play  two  very  different  ideas  regarding  the 
effects  of competition,  on  the optimum allocation of 
resources  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  distribution 
of incomes  on  the  other.  We  shall  therefore  avoid 
the  expressions  "ruinous  competition"  and  "exces-
sive competition", and use "uneconomic competition" 
to  designate  any  form  of  competition  producing 
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results  incompatible  with  optimum  resource  alloca-
tion.  The  social  aspects  of  the  question  will  be 
examined  separately (3). 
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The  causes  of  uneconomic  competition  may  be 
classed  under three  heads.  One relates  to  the ope-
ration  of  competition  in  road  haulage  and  inland 
waterway  transport.  It  is  said  that  here  there 
is  a  tendency  to  overinvestment  which  is  eco-
nomically undesirable and leads, moreover, to socially 
unacceptable  consequences.  This  question  will  be 
taken up below (4).  The second case of uneconomic 
competition is  said  to derive from  the unequal com-
petitive  relations  between the railways  and the other 
modes  of inland  transport.  For certain services  the 
railways  are,  in  fact,  in  a  position  to  practise  a 
policy  of  dumping  by  "internal  subsidy"  (charging 
low  prices  for  competing  services  and offsetting  the 
loss  by  higher  prices  for  those  where  they  hold  a 
dominant  position).  This  problem  is  related  on 
the  one  hand  to  the  question  of  the  actual  extent 
of  the  railways'  monopoly  position (5)  and  on  the 
other to infrastructure policy, for it is often consider-
ed  that  internal  subsidization  is  mainly  intended  to 
meet  infrastructure  charges (6).  The  third  case  of 
uneconomic competition is  in a way the opposite of 
the previous one.  It concerns the situation in which 
railways,  under  competition  from  road  transport  in 
particular, suffer, on some or all lines, from  a cumu-
lative  loss  of traffic  that may be designated  "t'raffic 
leakage".  The  initial  loss  of  traffic  is  said  to 
increase  cost  per  unit  of  service  produced;  prices 
must  therefore be  raised,  provoking a further fall  in 
traffic,  and so  on.  This problem will  be considered 
below (1). 
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One final  point  is  worth  emphasizing.  Competitive 
prices  may  vary  quite  markedly  with  the  trend  in 
transport demand and variations in supply (8), for the 
twofold  reason that the elasticity of total  demand in 
relation to  prices is  relatively low  and transport ser-
vices cannot be stored.  These fluctuations are often 
considered  a  disadvantage  of  competitive  pricing in 
transport,  with  the  implication  that  a  price  stabili-
zation  policy would be expedient.  The stabilization 
option has already been examined at some length in 
the  case  of infrastructure,  and  we  have  shown  that 
in  general  price  stabilization  is  uneconomic.  Most 
(')  See  Subsection  25.03. 
(")  See  Subsection  25.33. 
(')  See  Section  25.4. 
(')  See  Subsection  25.21. 
(")  See  Subsection  25.33. 
(
6
)  See  Subsection  25.30. 
(1)  See  Subsection  25.34. 
(")  For instance  in  winter. of the points raised  in  connection with infrastructure 
apply  equally  to  transport  services.  Reference 
should  therefore  be  made  to  those  arguments (1)  for 
a  general  appraisal  of  the  view  that full  price  flexi-
bility  as  implied by the system of competition would 
be  a disadvantage.  It stands to  reason that fluctua-
tions  in  transport  prices can sometimes  be  disadvan-
tageous  for  users,  but the  latter could  do  something 
to  mitigate  the  harmful  consequences  of  such  fluc-
tuations  by  concluding  long-term  contracts. 
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Two  specific  arguments  have  been  advanced  in 
favour  of price  stabilization  in  the  field  of transport 
services.  First,  it  is  said  that  fully  flexible  prices 
may  lead  carriers  to  take  faulty  investment  or 
disinvestment  decisions.  This  aspect  will  be  exam-
ined  when  we  discuss  the  subject  of  investment 
decisions e).  The  second  argument  is  one  of 
equity.  Even  if  investment  decisions  were correctly 
taken,  cyclical  variations  in  demand  or  a  structural 
decline  in  particular  subsectors  of  inland  transport 
could  bring prices down  to  an  abnormally low level, 
and  this  situation would  last  all  the longer the more 
durable  the  equipment.  The  combination  of  a 
fairly  high  income  elasticity  and  a  low  price 
elasticity  in  demand  for  transport  services  would 
lead  to  a  serious  drop  in  the  income  of  carriers, 
which  could  be  considered  unfair.  This  question 
will  be  dealt  with  below  in  connection  with  the 
problems  of  recession  and  adaptation  to  structural 
change (3). 
25.11  - Centralization 
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From  a  general  point  of view  the  idea  of  a  centra-
lized  organization of inland transport services,  which 
would  be  practically equivalent to  a public transport 
monopoly,  is  very  attractive.  The structure of such 
a  system  has  none  of  the  shortcomings  which  may 
occur  in  a  competitive  system  and  on  which  a  few 
remarks were made in  the previous section.  Central-
ization  implies  a  unity  of  conception  which  essen-
tially  rules  out  any  distortions  due  to  unequal 
starting-conditions  or  unequal  market  power.  In-
vestments  can  be  co-ordinated  in  the  light  of  fore-
casts of the future.  Finally, links between prices and 
incomes  are severed,  so  that considerations of equity 
need  no  longer  interfere  with  economic  efficiency. 
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However,  closer  examination  reveals  that  centrali-
zation  resembles  the  competitive  system  in  more 
than  one  respect  We  have  already  pointed out (
4
) 
that  the  two  regimes  imply  certain  rules  to  guide 
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those  responsible  for  taking  the decisions,  and  that 
both types of rules have their limitations.  The rules 
of  the  game  as  implied  by  the  competitive  system 
can effectively serve to bring about optimum resource 
allocation  wherever  competition  is  possible  and 
efficient,  but  they  do  not  lend  themselves  to  the 
pursuit  of  social  objectives (5).  The  administrative 
rules  inherent in  a  regime  of centralized control can 
perhaps not be limited to considerations of efficiency, 
but  they  are  probably  limited  both  as  to  flexibility 
and  the  degree  of  complexity  they  can  assume 
without  infringing  the  basic  principle  we  have 
already enunciated so  often,  i.e.  that such rules  must 
be simple, clear, non-arbitrary and allow of objective 
verification  in  practice (6).  Moreover,  it  can hardly 
be doubted that competition  is  both an  efficient and 
a  real  incentive  to  cost  minimization,  and  it  is 
difficult  to  conceive  of  comparable  incentives  in  a 
regime  of centralized  decisions. 
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It follows from this that the competitive regime would 
in  general be  more  appropriate if optimum resource 
allocation  were  the  chief  objective  but that  a  cen-
tralized  regime  may  be  considered  preferable  when 
other  objectives  are  predominant.  The  structure 
of  the  actual  systems  - which  will  be  studied  in 
Part Ill - must  be  determined  largely  in  the light 
of  the  importance  attached  to  optimum  resource 
allocation  in  comparison  with  other  objectives  and 
of  the  specific  shortcomings  of  each  system  in 
achieving  the  objectives  it  is  supposed  to  achieve. 
The  optimum  resource  allocation  aspect  has  been 
considered  the  most  important  in  drawing  up  this 
report,  but  the  choice  of  the  ultimate  criteria  is 
outside  its  domain.  Consideration  of  optimum 
resource allocation will form the basis of the following 
two  sections,  which  will  deal  with  a  number  of 
problems  raised  by  the  application  of  the  compe-
titive  and  of  the  centralized  regimes  with  respect 
both  to  investment  in  transport  capacity  and  to the 
pricing of transport services. 
(')  See  Section  24.3. 
(")  See  Subsection  25.21. 
(")  See  Section  2 5  .4. 
(')  See  Subsection  25.01. 
(')  Even  through  optimum  resource  allocation,  by  condi-
tioning  the  general  efficiency  of  the  economic  system, 
conditions  the  actual  possibilities  of  any  social  policy. 
(
6
)  In  this  respect  too  there  is  a  certain  similarity  between 
the  two  regimes.  In  the  case  of  competition  we  have 
mentioned  that  the  railways  could  abuse  their  dominant 
positions  on  some  markets.  A  centralized  regime  raises 
similar  problems,  although  at  a  different  level.  Like 
market  power,  administrative  authority  can  be  abused,  and 
in  a  much  more  dangerous  way.  This  is  a  drawback 
inherent  in  the  centralized  regime,  and  strong  safeguards 
must  be  provided  against  it.  The  prime  need  is  that  the 
rules  applied  should  satisfy  the  basic  principle  mentioned. 25.2  - INVESTMENT  IN  TRANSPORT 
CAPACITY 
25.20  - Preliminary  considerations 
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As  in  the  case  of infrastructure, it is  logical  to  start 
with  the  investment  decisions.  The  optimum  price 
of  transport  services  depends  not only  on the  costs 
which  can  be  directly  imputed  to  the  services 
supplied,  but  also  on  the  marginal  rent  earned  by 
the  durable  factors  (road  vehicles,  railway  rolling 
stock  and  vessels).  Like  the  congestion  charges  in 
the  case  of  infrastructure,  the  rent  component  of 
the optimum price of transport services is  a function 
of  the  existing  capacity  of  durable  factors  and  of 
the  intensity  of  transport  demand  at  the  time  con-
sidered.  It is therefore logical to begin by examining 
the  determination  of  the  existing  capacity  and  the 
related question of investment. 
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We  shall  first  discuss  some  points  regarding  invest-
ment  decisions  in  the  modes  of  transport  with  a 
competitive system - road haulage and inland water-
ways.  Our  analysis  will  start  by  assuming  free 
competition  in  them  and  it  will  thus  be possible  to 
examine  the  problems  that  are  said  to  arise  in  the 
absence  of  any  central  control  either  over  capacity 
or over access to these modes.  In the second place we 
will  deal  with  some  aspects  of  central  control  over 
investment  and  access  to  the  market. 
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It should be remembered that throughout this section 
the term "investment" means investment in means of 
transport  (road  vehicles,  railway  rolling  stock, 
vessels) (1).  As  we  shall  deal  only  with  transport 
services,  infrastructure  capacity  will  be  considered 
as  given. 
25.21  - Investment  decisions  in  the  modes 
of transport  with  a  competitive  system 
696 
According  to  the  theory  of  optimum  resource  allo-
cation,  investment  should  be  undertaken  if  the  sum 
of  the  discounted  future  benefits  expected  from  a 
durable  asset  is  at least equal to the investment cost 
plus  the  discounted  future  costs  of  operation  and 
upkeep,  the  difference  being  maximum.  Since  in 
practice  we  can  consider  vehicles  and  vessels  as 
fully  divisible factors, the marginal benefits are equal 
to  the  prices.  Under  conditions  of  effective  com-
petition  investment  will  continue  up  to  the  point 
when the revenue expected and the costs are approx-
imately  equal,  market  prices  being  considered  as 
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given.  It  follows  from  this  that  the  investment 
decisions will satisfy the criteria of optimum resource 
allocation  provided  carriers  do  not  systematically 
overestimate or underestimate future demand. 
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However,  it  is  sometimes  claimed  that  in  inland 
waterway  and  road  transport,  competition  in  fact 
operates  in  such  a  way  as  to  cause  a  systematic 
tendency  towards  overinvestment  and corresponding 
excessively  low  prices.  Discussion  of this  question 
will  be the main object of the present  subs(~ction. 
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Before  we  go  into  the  various  arguments  advanced 
in  support  of  this  overinvestment  thesis,  a  few 
general  comments  may  not  be  out  of  place.  The 
risk  of overinvestment  is  a  source  of frequent  criti-
cism  of  the  competitive  system,  but doubts  may be 
expressed  as  to  its  real  importance.  It is  largely 
a  bad  memory  from  periods  of  depression,  when 
inadequate demand created the impression of exces-
sive  supply.  This wrong impression has  crystallized 
into  an  overinvestment  thesis  whirh  has  little  basis 
in  fact  except  for  the  incidental  errors  which  are 
unavoidable  in  any  dynamic  economy  and  except 
also,  of  course,  for  overinvestment  resulting  from 
protective  measures.  Moreover,  the  overinvestment 
argument  is  often  advanced  by  people  who  have  a 
vested  interest  in  restricting  access  to  the  market 
in  which  they offer their services,  and  who  are only 
too  ready  to  suggest  the  existence  of  a  structural 
tendency  towards  overinvestment  and  overcapacity 
and  a  resulting  waste  of  available  resources.  Their 
competitors  sometimes  adopt  the  same  point  of 
view.  In actual fact,  some overcapacity is  a normal 
and  necessary  concomitant  of  a  dynamic  and  ex-
panding economy,  and as  such it  is  certainly not an 
aspect  of  the  competitive  system  which  should  be 
corrected  a  priori  by  restrictive  measures. 
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In the specific case of transport services, three major 
arguments  - not  counting  the  numerous  variants 
which add nothing essential to the general picture -
have  been  adduced  to  support the  thesis  that  over-
investment  is  in  fact  very  widespread  in  the modes 
of transport with a competitive system. 
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The  first  argument  is  as  follows:  in  an  expanding 
economy,  demand  for  transport  does  not  grow  in 
continuous fashion but irregularly around an  ascend-
ing  curve.  When  demand  is  expanding  rapidly, 
carriers  will  all  tend  to  invest  in  additional 
capacity,  expecting  that  the  current  conditions  will 
(')  This,  of  course,  excludes  infrastructure  investments, 
which  have  already  been  studied  separately  (see  Sec.  24.1). continue to prevail in the future, or at least not taking 
sufficient  account  of  the  fact  that  their  competitors 
are  also  stepping  up  capacity.  Since  there  is  a 
time-lag  between  the  moment  at  which  investments 
in capacity are decided  on and that at which  supply 
actually  increases,  the  mistake  is  not  corrected  in 
time  by  the  rules  of  a  free  market economy.  Thus 
errors  pile  up,  and substantial overcapacity  appears. 
The result  is  abnormally low  prices  and low  degrees 
of  utilization  of  capacity,  until  natural  deterioration 
of capacity and long-term expansion of demand pro-
vide  a  tardy  corrective,  which  in  turn  will  soon  be 
cancelled  out by  a  fresh  upsurge of overinvestment. 
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The second  argument is  based on the claim that the 
modes  of  transport  with  a  competitive  system  show 
a  permanent  and  systematic  trend  towards  over-
investment  because  small  carriers  are  often  content 
with  an  income  considered  to  be  abnormally  low. 
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The  third  argument  is  more  complex.  Professional 
carriers  are  said  to be  obliged  to  have  high  reserve 
capacity  available  in  order  to  handle  peak  traffic, 
since  transport  services  cannot  be  supplied  from 
stocks.  By  this  reasoning,  the  reserve  capacity 
would  not  bring  in  sufficient  revenue  to  cover  its 
total  cost,  and  would  also  exert  a  downward  pres-
sure on prices at all times except during peak periods. 
In support of this  argument it is  often  asserted that 
the  problem  of  reserve  capacity  is  rendered  even 
more  acute  by  the  existence  of  transport  on  own 
account which  is  said to  cover only the base load of 
each  firm's  transport requirements,  leaving the peak 
to  the  professional carriers.  The problem of return 
loads  is  a  variant  of  this  argument.  Some  people 
claim  that carriers engaged in transport from  A to B 
tend  to  accept  return  loads  at  marginal  cost  from 
B  to· A,  and  that  this  spoils  the  market  for  those 
carriers  for  whom  transport  from  B  to  A  is  their 
main  source  of  revenue.  Since  the  carriers  are 
spoiling each other's markets, transport prices would 
be  too  low  to  cover costs.  This  is  not usually con-
sidered  to  constitute  a  case  of  overinvestment. 
However,  from  the  economic  point of view  it must 
be regarded  as  such,  for if  the  sum of the transport 
prices  charged  in  the  two  directions  A  to  B  and  B 
to  A  is  inadequate  to  cover  normal  operating  costs 
there  is  actually  overinvestment. 
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All  these arguments lead to the conclusion that there 
is  a  structural  tendency  towards  overinvestment  in 
road  and  inland  waterway  transport.  If no  restric-
tion  were  imposed  on  these  two  modes  the  result 
would  be  a  waste  of  available  economic  resources 
and  inadequate average income for the carriers con-
cerned.  The question is  obviously important enough 
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to  be  examined  in  some  detail.  Each of  the  three 
arguments which  we  have just presented is  therefore 
discussed  separately  in  the  following  pages. 
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The  first  argument,  regarding  the  overinvestment 
cycle, is valid only in those sectors where the time-lag 
between  the  moment  at  which  the  incentive  to 
investment arises  and that at  which capacity actually 
expands is  relatively great,  and where the equipment 
concerned has  a  very long life.  This  is  the  case  in 
particular with  inland  waterway transport.  In road 
transport,  on  the  other  hand,  the  time  needed  to 
expand capacity  and  the  span of life  of  the  vehicles 
are  relatively  short.  Obvious  cases  of  overinvest-
ment do  indeed  present  themselves  in  inland  water-
ways,  where  fluctuations  of  activity  seem  to  have 
given  rise  to  relatively  marked  investment  cycles. 
We  shall  devote  attention  later (1)  to  the  problems 
raised  by  these  fluctuations  - which  occur  when 
there is  a speed-up or slowdown of economic growth 
as  well  as  in  times  of inflation  or recession. 
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However,  the  most  frequently  cited  examples  of 
excess  capacity  relate  to  the  depression  of  the 
thirties.  This  was  a  situation which  should  not be 
considered  relevant  to  the  definition  of  a  transport 
policy in  a period of full  employment - or practic-
ally  full  employment  - as  is  the  case  in  the 
Community  today.  Moreover,  all  the  Member 
States, individually as  well  as  by common agreement 
under the Rome Treaty, have unequivocally declared 
full  employment  to  be  one  of  the  major  aims  of 
their  economic  policy  and  are  endeavouring  to  act 
accordingly.  This  does  not,  of  course,  imply  that 
recessions  or cyclical  fluctuations  are  ruled  out,  or 
that no  account should be taken of their consequen-
ces  for  transport  policy.  On  the  contrary,  as  we 
shall  point out (1),  a  timely  analysis  of those  prob-
lems  is  extremely  important.  But the fact  remains 
that  such  questions  have  no  relevance  to  situations 
of steady economic  expansion  and  full  employment. 
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With  full  employment  it  may  be  asked  whether 
the  danger  of  an  overinvestment  cycle  really  is  a 
serious  problem,  which  could  not  be  solved  by  im-
proving the flow  of information to  carriers, particul-
arly  as  regards  the  trend  of  demand  and  current 
investment  programmes (2).  Of  course,  many 
countries  apply restrictive measures ro  prevent over-
(') See  Section  25.4. 
(")  In  Chapter  33,  which  deals  with  institutional  aspects, 
we  shall examine the problems involved in making adequate 
projections  of  the  trend  of  demand  and  costs  and  in  the 
distribution  of  information  to  carriers. investment,  particularly  in  road  transport;  but  it  is 
significant that these measures all date from the great 
pre-war depression and that they are often applied in 
a way which makes one think that the aim is more to 
protect  the  railways  than  prevent  overinvestment  in 
the  modes  of transport  under a competitive system. 
It  is  understandable  that  such  a  restrictive  policy 
should  generally  be  supported  by  the  carriers  con-
cerned,  for it  protects them  against potential compe-
tition. 
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It is  more  evident  still  that  the  second  factor  which 
is  said to cause overinvestment in the modes of trans-
port with a competitive system, i.e.  that small carriers 
may  be content with  an  abnormally low income and 
thus would spoil the market, can normally only stem 
from a situation of general recession.  It  is hard to see 
why,  with  full  employment,  anybody  should be pre-
vented  from  choosing  a  particular  occupation  to 
practise which  he  is  prepared to renounce the higher 
income  he  might  have  earned  in  another  job (1). 
Admittedly,  certain  guarantees  may  be  considered 
essential  to  ensure  that  the  prospective  carrier is  in 
a  position,  both  technically  and  financially,  to 
discharge  his  professional  obligations.  There  may 
be  good  reasons  for  demanding  that  he  shall  have 
some  knowledge  of the  costs  of operating  a  vehicle 
or  boat,  in  order  to  preclude  errors  of  judgment. 
But apart from  this,  still  assuming that the  situation 
is  one of full  employment, there does not seem to be 
any  valid  economic  reason  for  protecting  existing 
firms  against  competition  from  those  prepared  to 
supply the services in  question at a lower price, even 
if  it  is  beyond  doubt that the  small  and large firms, 
and  also  the  firms  whose  various  activities  qualify 
them  for  inclusion  in  both  these categories,  may  all 
invest  on  the  basis  of  different  criteria (2). 
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The  third  case  of uneconomic  competition,  which  is 
claimed to be linked with  a certain type of overcapa-
city,  would  arise  from  the  existence  of  reserve 
capacity  and  the  problem  of  return  loads.  It  is 
quite  clear  that  since  transport  services  cannot  be 
stored,  and  mobile  means  of transport  must  return 
to  its  point of departure before it can be  used  again 
in  a  given  direction,  excess  capacity  can  exist  at 
certain  times  and  on  certain  routes.  But  it  is  not 
at  all  clear why  peak traffic,  whether predictable or 
not,  and  unequal  traffic  flows,  should  cause  any 
particular  problems  in  a  free  market.  To  be  sure, 
optimum transport prices will be different at different 
times  and  for  different  directions.  Such  differences 
are  implicit  in  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources. 
But they could only create real problems for carriers 
if  the  carriers  tended  to  extrapolate  peak  period 
prices  and  to  base  investment  decisions  on  the 
erroneous  assumption  that  these  peak  prices  will 
persist.  Such  an  investment  pattern  would  lead  to 
genuine  overcapacity;  but  ill-advised  behaviour  of 
this  sort is  hardly likely among carriers in a compe-
titive  market,  who  are  constantly  confronted  with 
the  facts  of  peak  periods  and  unequal  traffic  flows 
- facts  which  are  known  to  everybody,  even  the 
outsider. 
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Carriers  will  tend  to  keep  capacity  at  suc:h  a  level 
that discounted future revenue from any new capacity 
will  be at  least  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  investment 
costs  and  the  discounted  costs  of  operation  and 
maintenance.  This  naturally  presupposes  that  the 
carriers  are  adequately  informed  concerning  the 
trend  of demand  and its  fluctuations  in time (3).  If 
the  flexibility  of  transport  prices  is  not  limited  in 
any  way,  future  revenue  will  fluctuate  from  one 
period to  another (even  if regulations  are  introduced 
to  limit  price  fluctuations,  because  utilization  of 
capacity  will  vary  in  any  case).  However,  this  in 
no  way  affects  a  correct  implementation  of  the  in-
vestment  criteria  in  keeping  with  optimum  resource 
allocation. 
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Nor  does  transport  on  own  account  present  diffi-
culties in  this  respect.  In fact,  although such  trans-
port  can  safely  leave  peak  period  traffic  to  profes-
sional  carriers,  the  latter  would  normally  only  be 
prepared to  go  on  supplying these services  at  prices 
covering  the  cost  of  the  additional  c:apacilty  requir-
ed (4). 
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A  further  problem  is  conceivable  in  that  demand, 
particularly  outside  peak  periods  and  on secondary 
routes,  may  be  distributed  unequally  among  the 
various  carriers.  Such  distribution  could  lead  to 
inefficient  situations  in  which  new  investment would 
be made  by  one  group  of carriers  while  others  still 
had  excess  ca]pacity.  Inequities  could  also  result 
(')  Naturally,  certain  regulations  concerning  safety  (such  as 
limitations  of  working  hours)  must  be  imposed  on  all 
workers,  both  sdf-employed  and  wage-earners,  but  this 
does  not contradict  the  argument above.  Furthermore, the 
general  labour  n~gulations  must  be  applied  in  the  same 
way  to  all  wage:-earners,  whether  employed  in  small  or 
large  transport  enterprises.  This  aspect  will  be  examined 
in  Subsection  25.31. 
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(') The  social  problems  which  could  result  from  this  are 
similar  to  those  arising  when  there  are  structural  changes. 
A  fall  in  incomes  in  the  sectors  which  are  subject  to  such 
changes  may lead  to serious injustice  particularly when,  for 
some reason or other, the workers affected are insufficiently 
mobile.  Appropriate  measures  must  certainly  b<~  taken  to 
remedy  social  inequities.  But  they  should  do  as  little  as 
possible  to  distort  the  conditions  implied  by  optimum 
resource  allocation  (see  Section  25.4). 
(")  See  Subsection  33.20. 
(')  See  Subsection  25.32. from  this.  A  situation  of  the  kind  could  arise  no-
tably in  connection with  return freight in road trans-
port,  where  insufficient  market  transparency  can 
lead  to  empty  return  trips  in  both directions.  This 
is  an  obvious  case  of inefficiency  which  should  be 
remedied.  The  solution  cannot  consist  in  fixing 
prices  arbitrarily,  because  such  a  procedure  would 
still  further  obscure  the  real  situation.  It appears 
that  the  problem  can  be  solved  either by improving 
market  transparency,  for  example  by  appropriately 
organizing  freighting  or  through  specialized  inter-
mediaries,  or  by  certain  centralized  procedures  in 
the  markets  concerned. 
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Like  that  of  traffic  peaks,  the  problem  of  return 
freight  can  therefore  be  eliminated  as  a  true  cause 
of overinvestment  and  excessively  low  prices,  unless 
carriers  are  extremely  misinformed. 
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There  are  two  possibilities:  either  the  main  traffic 
flow  will  be  in  only  one  of  the  two  directions,  or 
the  two  flows  will  be  approximately  equal.  In  the 
first  case  the  market  prices  for  transport  in  the 
principal  direction  A - B  will  tend  to  find  a  level 
sufficient  to  cover the total  cost  of the outward and 
return  journeys  together,  except  as  regards  the 
marginal  cost in  the opposite direction B - A,  where 
they  will  tend  towards  the  level  of  marginal  cost. 
In other words  the "costs" of the means of transport 
will  be  entirely  borne  by  the  traffic  in  the principal 
direction (1 ),  and  this  is in  exact conformity with the 
principles  of  optimum  resource  allocation.  If the 
two  traffic  flows  are  approximately  equal,  the 
"costs"  of  the  means  of  transport  will  tend  to  be 
shared  about  equally  between  the  two  types  of 
services.  It  is  not  clear  why  the  play  of  the  free 
market  economy  should  lead  to  mutual  disturbance 
of  markets  unless  overcapacity  already  exists  for 
other  reasons  or  lack  of  information  prevents  the 
free  market  economy  from  functioning  properly. 
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Although  there  is  no  question  of  adopting  a  final 
position  on  the  facts  themselves  (which  in  any  case 
call  for  more  detailed  study),  this  analysis  would 
seem  to  justify  the  following  tentative  conclusions. 
We  have  examined the various  arguments invoked to 
support  the  fairly  widespread  thesis  that  modes  of 
transport with  a competitive system show a structural 
trend  towards  overinvestment.  The  analysis  sug-
gests  that  this  traditional  thesis  may  be  unsound 
when  applied  to  a  situation  of full  employment  and 
steady  economic  growth  and  when  no  restrictive 
measures such as  minimum prices exist.  The impli-
cation is that, under such conditions, a non-restrictive 
policy on transport capacity, combined with adequate 
information for carriers,  does  not run counter to  an 
optimum allocation of resources (2). 
25.22  - Some  aspects  of centralized  control 
over  investment  in  means  of transport 
and over access  to  the market 
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The  investment  rules  which  derive  from  the  criteria 
of  optimum  resource  allocation  could  in  principle 
be  applied  without  difficulty  by  a  central  authority. 
This  authority  could  lay  down  the optimum  invest-
ment  pattern on the  basis  of  projections of demand 
and costs in the light of the estimated growth of the 
entire  economy,  expected  shifts  in  the  composition 
of the  national  product,  probable  technical  progress 
and,  in  particular,  developments  expected  in  the 
sectors closely linked with inland transport (3). 
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Naturally,  the  provtston  of  suitable  information  is 
especially important in  those sectors of the economy 
where  the  durable factors  have  a  long economic life 
and  where  demand  is  subject  to  relatively  strong 
fluctuations.  This  applies  to  inland  transport  ser-
vices,  and  particularly  to  investment  in  means  of 
transport  for  inland  waterways  and  railways. 
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In  certain  respects  a  central  authority  has  easier 
access  to  essential  information.  We  shall  see  be-
low (4)  how far such  information could  be  dissemin-
ated  among  decentralized  investors  so  as  to  assure 
them  the same advantages on this  head  as  a  central 
authority.  We  shall show  that it  is  in fact possible 
to  work  out appropriate procedures for ensuring the 
dissemination of this  information in  an  easily  acces-
sible form, and to encourage investors to take account 
of it.  In any case decentralized investors are gener-
ally  better able  to  judge  the  most  probable  trend  in 
the  particular division  of the  market  they serve,  the 
less  this  trend depends on public decisions.  Conse-
quently,  any central control of investments must rely 
on  a  flow  of  information  in  the  reverse  direction 
to  the  decisions,  i.e.  from  those  who  supply  the 
(')  MOTe  precisely :  the  rents  accruing  to  these  fixed 
factors  and corresponding only to direction A - B,  calculated 
for the whole economic life of the means of transport, will 
be  sufficient  to cover their investment  cost. 
f) It should  be  noted that a  non-restrictive  policy does  not 
necessarily  imply  the  absence  of  all  control  on  access  to 
the  industry  or  on  transport  capacity.  A  non-restrictive 
policy  is  compatible  with  the  imposition  of personal  condi-
tions  on  the  prospective  carrier  as  regards  his  ability  to 
meet  the  obligations  of his  occupation,  both  technical  and 
financial. 
(")  See  Subsection  25.32. 
(')  See  Chapter 33. transport  services  to  the  central  authority  making 
the  investment  decisions (1). 
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Central  control  of  investment  in  transport  capacity 
generally takes  the  form  of licensing systems.  Such 
systems  are effective instruments in  preventing over-
investment,  but  they  are  clearly  onesided.  In  so 
far as  their aim  is essentially to limit investment, they 
can  hardly  serve  to  induce  additional  investment. 
This is  one reason why  a licensing system may intro-
duce  a  certain  bias  towards  unjustified  restriction. 
In  addition  there  are  institutional,  sociological  and 
economic  forces  which  may  also  exert  pressure  to-
wards  an  excessively  restrictive  application  of  the 
investment  criteria.  A  large  section  of  public  opi-
nion  will  naturally  tend  to  judge  the  policy  of  the 
licensing authorities primarily by its success or failure 
in  preventing  overcapacity  from  developing.  This 
introduces  a  bias  into  the  system  which  is  further 
aggravated by the fact  that all  carriers  are  interested 
in  restricting  the  admission  of  new  firms  and  in 
limiting  expansion  of  the  capacity  of  those  already 
in  the  market. 
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Under  these  circumstances  there  is  a  very  real  risk 
that  centralized  control  of  investment  in  means  of 
transport  might:  tend  to  be  too  restrictive 
compared  with  the  optimum.  This  seems  to 
be  confirmed  by  the  facts  in  various  countries 
which  apply  a  licensing  system  for  road  haul-
age.  Licences  are  bought  and  sold  at  a  high 
price (2),  which  represents  the  difference  between 
the  discounted  value  of all  expected future  revenues 
on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other the  sum  of the 
investment  cost  and  the  discounted  future  costs  of 
operation  and  maintenance  plus  a  remuneration  for 
the  entrepreneur  which  the  buyer  of  the  licence 
apparently  considers  satisfactory.  In  fact,  accord-
ing  to  the  theory  of  optimum  resource  allocation, 
capacity  should  be  expanded  until  these  two  terms 
are equal.  The difference  between  them is  an indi-
cation of underinvestment in  means of transport. 
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Some  people  might  maintain  that  firms'  extrapola-
tions  overestimate  the real  value  of future  revenues, 
so  that the price paid for  the  licences  is  no  measure 
of  the  underinvestment.  But  the  contrary  could 
also  be  claimed,  i.e.  that  the  licences  are  issued 
at  prices  below  those  which  would  prevail  in  a free 
market,  since,  in  most  countries,  it  is  officially  for-
bidden  to  sell  or hire  licences.  However  this  may 
be,  and  admitting  that  the price of  the licence  is  at 
best  only  an  approximate  yardstick  o£  underinvest-
ment,  it  can  hardly be  gainsaid  that the high  values 
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of  the  licences  are  obvious  proof  that  the  quota 
systems,  as  at  present  applied  in  certain  countries, 
tend  to  be over-restrictive. 
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In  conclusion,  it  should  be  noted  that  a  licensing 
system will  always  contain arbitrary elements.  Such 
a  system  limits  new  investments  on  the  basis  of 
general  considerations  which  might  well  be  put  in 
the form  of objective  and  verifiable  rules.  But the 
total  volume  of additional  capacity  authorized  must 
be  allocated  among  applicants  whose  total  claims 
are,  by  definition,  greater  than  can  be  covered  by 
the  number  of  licences  to  be  issued.  The  criteri2. 
for  the  issue  of  licences  can  hardly  avoid  raising 
genuine  problems  of  equity.  The  licences  are 
issued  gratis,  whereas  they  constitute  for  their 
holders a source of income,  which  is  sometimes very 
substantial, as their value shows.  It is  not necessary 
to  go  into  the  risks  and  considerable  drawbacks  of 
such  a  situation. 
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Of course,  it should be stressed  once  more  that the 
above  remarks  are  not  to  be  interpreted  as  a  final 
judgment  on  centralized  control  of  investment  in 
'transport  capacity  as  such.  They  are  intended 
merely to set out certain aspects of this system which 
are  of some  relevance  to  the  analysis  of the various 
policy alternatives made in Part Ill. 
25.3  - PRICING POLICY FOR 
TRANSPORT SERVICES 
25.30  - Distortions caused  by  different 
systems  for  infrastructure 
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In general,  no  system  of rates  for  transport  services 
will  produce  results  conforming  to  the  economic 
optimum if  charges  for  the  use  of infrastructure  are 
determined  on  different  bases  for  the  competing 
modes  of  internal  transport.  From  a  general  eco-
nomic  point  of  view,  the  obvious  remedy  lies  in  a 
system of charging for the use of infrastructure based 
on  concordant  principles  for  the  three  modes  of 
inland  transport.  On this  head  reference  should  be 
made  to  the  preceding  chapter,  and to  Part Ill, in 
(') It should  be  remembered  that  this  means  investment  in 
vehicles,  railway  rolling  stock  and vessels. 
(') It is  often  claimed  that  the  value  of the  licences  is  n<?t 
purely a  scarcity price but includes goodwill elements.  Th1s 
argument  can  obviously  apply  only  when,  as  actually 
happens,  the  licences  are  sold  independently  of  any  al;mn-
donment of client,ele  or transfer of the prooerty of the f1rm. which  various  policies  relating  to  infrastructure  will 
be  discussed (1). 
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The  chief  practical  difficulty  is  the  existence  of 
institutional  differences  between  the  railways,  which 
manage their own infrastructure, and the other modes 
of transport, whose  infrastructure is  provided by the 
public  authorities (2).  If  this  institutional  pattern 
were  retained,  there  would  be  two  possible  sources 
of  distortions.  First,  differences  in  the  system  of 
infrastructure  management  applied  in  each  of  the 
competing  modes  of transport may  cause  disparities 
between  the  modes  of  transport.  Secondly,  the 
different  modes  of  transport  may  apply  different 
systems  for  the  apportionment of total infrastructure 
charges  in  time  and  between  the  various  categories 
of  users (3). 
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The first  source  of  distortions  raises  no  great  eco-
nomic  problem.  The  authorities  responsible  for 
infrastructure  will  have  to  ensure  that  the  systems 
applied  have  equivalent  effects  in  each  of the  three 
modes  of  transport.  This  may,  of  course,  be  dif· 
ficult  to  achieve  in  practice,  but  it  is  in  any  case 
better to  eliminate  directly  this  source of distortions 
of  competition  than to  impose  restrictions  on trans-
port rates.  If they  are  to  provide  a  solution,  such 
restrictions  (for  instance,  fixed  tariffs  or  minimum 
rates)  would  have  to  take  into  account  charges  for 
the  use  of  infrastructure,  which  would  therefore 
have to  be  determined first  anyway.  This being so, 
there does not seem to be any valid economic reason 
for  using  this  cumbersome  method,  which  hardly 
makes  it  possible  to avoir  other distortions,  in  pre-
ference  to  the  economically  correct  one  of  harmo-
nizing  systems  of  charges  for  the  use  of  infrastruc-
ture (4). 
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The fact  that the railways  enjoy  greater freedom  to 
apportion  their  total  infrastructure  burden  than  the 
modes  of  transport with  a  competitive  system  raises 
more  difficult  problems.  Obviously  these  problems 
present themselves  only  when  the  rule  of budgetary 
equilibrium  is  imposed  on  infrastructure.  Under 
this  rule,  the  modes  of transport with  a  competitive 
system,  in  particular road  haulage,  are  subject  to a 
charging system which  necessarily has  a simpler,  i.e. 
more  highly  equalized  structure,  than  a  charging 
system resulting from the method of apportioning the 
total  burden  which  can  be applied  by  the  railways. 
This  difference  between  railways  and  roads  could 
be reduced to  some extent by introducing a charging 
system  for  the  roads  based on an  appropriate com-
bination of fixed  charges  (licence  fees)  and  taxes  on 
fuels,  with  limited  regional  inequality  of charges (5). 
It would  further  be  possible  to  differentiate  charges 
103 
for  the  various  categories  of road users.  However, 
two  major  difficulties  would  remain.  First,  possi-
bilities of  regional  inequality of charges would,  after 
all,  be  more  limited  for  roads  than  for  railways. 
Secondly,  price differentiation  between  categories  of 
users  as  practised  by  the  railways  is  impossible  for 
the  other two modes  of transport· because of "inter-
nal"  competition  in  them. 
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On balance,  these  differences  in  the practical possi-
bilities of apportioning total infrastructure charges to 
the  best advantage  give  railways  a  competitive edge 
which  could  lead  to  uneconomic  competition  in  the 
sense  described  above (6).  But  the  extent  of  the 
resulting distortions  may  be limited for  two  reasons. 
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First,  if  the  railways  are  obliged  to  balance  their 
budgets  and  therefore  encouraged  to  maximize  their 
revenues,  it  is  not worth their while  to  offer perma-
nent  services  over  a  sizeable  part of their  network 
at  such prices that total discounted revenue over the 
whole  economic  life  of the  infrastructure  concerned 
is  below  the  sum  of the  investment  and  discounted 
operating costs which can be imputed to it (1).  Nor 
does  a  temporary  policy  of  dumping  on  particular 
markets appear to be economically advantageous for 
the  railways,  for  it  is  hardly  possible  to  destroy 
competition  permanently  since  access  to  the  market 
is  easy  enough,  both in  inland  waterways  and  road 
haulage. 
729 
Secondly,  the  railways'  chances  of  engaging  in  un-
economic  competition  would  be  limited  if,  on  the 
one hand, the abuse of dominant positions was  made 
impossible by  competition  and,  on the  other,  maxi-
mum  tariffs  were  imposed  wherever  necessary (8). 
There  would  then  be  no source  of  surplus  income 
which could be used for  "internal subsidies", i.e.  for 
a  dumping  policy. 
(')  See  Chapter  31. 
(")  But  see  Section  24.1,  where  we  have  shown  that a  co-
ordination  of  infrastructure  investments  is  in  any  case 
necessary  between  all  modes  of  inland  transport. 
(")  See  Subsections  24.42  to  24.46. 
(')  Of  course  this  means,  not  that  minimum  tariffs  must 
be rejected as  such,  but simply that in general they are not 
an  effective  means  of  equalizing  such  external  conditions 
of competition as charges for the use of infrastructure.  The 
minimum  tariffs  for  transport  services  will  be  examined 
in  detail  in Part Ill (see  Chapter  32). 
(")  See  Subsection  24.45. 
(
6
)  See  Subsection  25.10. 
(1)  If  at  any  given  time,  present  and  fture  discounted 
revenues  do not cover all present and future  costs,  it might 
be  preferable from the angle of optimum resource allocation 
to  close  down  this  part  of  the  network  as  soon  as  large 
replacements  are  called  for. 
(
8
)  See  Subsection  25.33. 730 
It would  therefore seem  that  a policy of charges  for 
the  use  of  infrastructure  which  left  roads  and 
waterways  all  possible  freedom  to  differentiate  the 
prices (1), combined with the imposition of budgetary 
equilibrium  on  the  railways  (as  on  the  other modes 
of  transport)  and  with  effective  action  against  the 
abuse  of  dominant  positions,  could  be  sufficient  to 
eliminate  a  great  part of  the  distortions  which  may 
result  from  the  unequal  opportunities  available  to 
the  three  modes  of  transport  in  apportioning  their 
total  infrastructure  burden.  Nevertheless,  some 
cases  of  distortion  might  remain.  The  implications 
of  this  for  policy  will  be  examined  in  Part Ill. 
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Finally,  there  is  an  undoubted  inequality  between 
the railways  and the other modes  of inland transport 
as  regards  the  influence  they  can  exert  on  the pro-
vision  of  their  own  infrastructures.  The  railways 
have  much  more  control over their infrastructure -
an  essential  factor  of  production  - than  the other 
modes  of  inland transport have.  This  is  an  institu-
tional  problem,  to  be  considered  in  the  context  of 
investment  in  infrastructure (2).  From  this  angle 
it  would  be preferable  to  adopt  solutions  for  infra-
structure  which  tended  to  free  investments  in  it 
from  external  influences  - in  particular  from  re-
strictions  which  might  result  from  national  budget 
policy  - while  at  the  same  time  associating  all 
interested  parties in  the  decision-making. 
25.31  - Other  causes  of distortion 
of the  external  condition  of competition 
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Besides  charges  for  the  use  of  infrastructure,  there 
are  obviously  many  other factors  which  may distort 
competition  between  the  three  modes  of  inland 
transport,  i.e.  hinder  the  optimum  allocation  of 
resources.  In  the  context  of  this  report,  it  is 
impossible  to  analyse  all  the  actual  and  potential 
causes  of  distortion.  Moreover,  such  an  analysis 
would  not  have  much  bearing  on  the  problems  of 
transport  policy  considered  from  the  angle  of  opti-
mum  resource  allocation.  We  have  shown  repeat-
edly that direct measures are in  general preferable to 
indirect  ones.  This  holds  especially  for  distortions 
stemming  from  external  factors,  which  as  far  as 
possible should be  eliminated rather than neutralized 
by  corrective  measures  restricting  competition.  A 
particular instance  is  government  intervention in  the 
interest  of  regional  policy.  Such  measures  should 
as  far  as  possible  be  neutral  with  respect  to  compe-
tition  between the various  modes of inland transport. 
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As  further  examples  of  such  distortions  we  may 
mention  the  effects  of  unequal  taxation,  different 
social  security  systems,  public  service  obligations 
imposed  on  the  railways,  etc.  The  remedy  is 
obvious.  The  causes  of distortions  must  be  elimi-
nated;  it  is  not  sufficient'  merely  to  combat  their 
effects. 
734 
More  complex  are  the  problems  which  can  arise 
through  legislation  which  is  not  discriminatory  in 
itself  but has  a  different  incidence  on  the  different 
competing  modes  of  transport.  This  may  be  the 
case  with  regulations  on working  conditions,  which 
are more difficult  to enforce in the case of the small 
firms  found  in  road  and  inland  waterway  transport 
than  in  the  case  of  the  railways.  The  proper  so-
lution  consists  in  more  effective  direct  control  of 
working  conditions,  not  in  indirect  measures  and 
new restrictions on traffic. 
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Strictly  speaking,  these  problems  of  applying  and 
supervising  regulations  do  not  come  within  the 
province of the present report; but this does not mean 
they  are  unimportant.  On  the  contrary,  many 
systems  may  be  perfectly  illusory  if  they  cannot  be 
effectively  enforced.  Moreover,  if  enforcement  is 
discriminatory  and  thus  distorts  the  conditions  of 
competition,  regulations  and  control  measures  can 
do  more  harm  than  good.  These  facts  once  again 
support the view  which  we  have already emphasized 
in  connection  with  infrastructure  but  which  applies 
just  as  much  to  transport  services,  i.e.  that  any 
regulations  imposed by the  public  authorities  should 
be  simple  and  clear,  their  implementation  should 
allow  of  objective  control  and  their  enforcement 
should  involve  neither  prohibitive  cost  nor  discri-
mination. 
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25.32  - Competition  by transport  on  own 
account and by other modes of transport (") 
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The  modes  of  inland  transport,  as  defined  for  the 
purposes  of  this  report (4),  carry only  a  part of the 
total  volume  of  goods  transported  within  the  Com-
munity.  The  rest  is  conveyed  by  oil  pipelines,  by 
coastal  shipping.,  and  by  air.  Moreover,  within  the 
(')  As  we  have  se(:n,  these  possibilities  are  .in  any case  very 
limited. 
(")  See  Sections  24.1  and  33.1. 
(")  By  "other  modes  of  transport"  are  meant  all  those 
modes  which  are  conventionally  considered  as  outside  the 
inland  transport  sector  comprising  rail,  road  and  inland 
waterways.  Transport  on  own  account  certainly  comes 
within  the  inland  transport  sector  thus  defined.  However, 
the  problem  of pricing  for services  does  not  arise  for  this 
category.  On the  other hand, all other aspects of transport 
policy  concern  it  just  as  much  as  they  do  the  rest  of 
inland  transport. 
(')  See  general  Introduction. inland  transport  sector  itself,  relations  between 
professional  carriers  and  carriers  on  own  account 
present  special  problems. 
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It follows  from  this  that  no  inland  transport  policy 
can  neglect  the  competitive  relationships  between 
inland  transport and  the other modes  any  more than 
it  can  neglect  relations  between  professional  carriers 
and  transport  on  own  account.  Any  measure 
dealing  with  professional  inland  transport must take 
account of the  situation  in the competing modes,  or 
be  complemented  by  regulations  in  them  if  such 
action  is  necessary to  prevent distortions.  But since 
this  problem  arises especially in relation to  transport 
on  own  account,  the remarks below will  be confined 
to  that field. 
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To begin with,  the economic importance of transpof!: 
on own  account cannot be evaluated simply by com-
paring  its  cost  with  that  of  professional  transport, 
because  it  provides  for  the  firm  concerned  some 
indirect  advantages  over  professional  transport. 
Direct  control over a  certain transport capacity may 
have  special  advantages,  such  as  security of supply, 
better adaptation to  special requirements,  etc.  Fur-
thermore,  the  fact  that  transport  on  own  account 
creates  a direct link between producer and customer 
may  lead  to  economies if  the  transport function  can 
be  combined with  others such  as  advertising,  admin-
istrative  tasks,  etc.  It is  clear  that only  producing 
firms  themselves  are  in  a  position  to  judge  where 
and  when  own-account  transport  is  preferable  to 
professional  transport.  This  would  seem  to  imply 
that  the  choice  should  be  regulated  by  the  price 
system.  The  relation  between  the  price  of  profes-
sional  transport  and  the  cost  of  transport  on  own 
account  should  be  such  as  to  prevent  distortion  of 
the  optimum  allocation  of  resources. 
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This  last  condition  signifies  in  any  case  that  own-
account  transport  should  be  subject  to  the  same or 
equivalent  charges  for  the  use  of infrastructure,  and 
to  the  same taxes  and social charges,  as  professional 
transport.  But  it  is  often  argued  that  additional 
charges  or restrictions  should  be  imposed  on  it,  so 
as  to  equalize  conditions  of  competition.  Those 
who  call  for  a  more  restrictive  policy  towards  such 
transport  apparently  take  their  stand  on  three  main 
arguments. 
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Firstly, producing firms  are thought to be inclined to 
underestimate  the  cost  of  own-account  transport. 
Secondly,  it  is  claimed  that  firms  which  engage  in 
such  transport  are  in  unfair  competition  with  pro-
fessional  carriers  because  they  use  their  own  res-
sources  to  carry  only  the  low-cost  normal  traffic 
while  leaving  the  high-cost  peak  flows  to  the  pro-
fessionals.  Thirdly,  if  own-account  firms  were  to 
be  authorized  to  transport  fur  other  parties,  they 
could  handle return loads  and work for  such  parties 
outside their own peak periods at marginal cost, thus 
competing  unfairly  with  the  professionals  in  another 
way. 
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The  first  argument  seems  very  debatable.  Even  if 
the  facts  were  true - and  this  is  not  at  all  certain 
- they would  at most argue  for improving the flow 
of information to firms  transporting on own account. 
But  they  are  not  a  sufficient  reason  for  restricting 
such  transport.  The  degree  of  misjudgment  could 
vary  greatly  between  one  firm  and  another,  so  that 
any  uniform  "correction"  might  well  create  new 
distortions. 
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The  second  argument  seems  equally  doubtful.  If 
prices  in  the  professional  sector  are  not  subject  to 
restrictions,  they  will  be  sufficiently  high  at  peak 
periods  to  cover  the  total  cost  of  peak  capacity. 
Users will  thus be encouraged to  make the necessary 
choice between having their own peak capacity avail-
able and paying high prices at peak periods for using 
the peak capacity of the professionals. 
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The  third  argument  for  imposing  restrictions  on 
own-account  transport  concerns  the  opportunity the 
firms  may  have of taking return loads  and generally 
supplying  transport  services  for  other  parties.  In 
many  countries  such  practices  are  forbidden,  but  it 
is  hard to  see  what valid economic  arguments  could 
be advanced to justify the underutilization of capacity 
and waste of economic resources resulting from these 
restrictions,  except  of  course  where  participation  in 
the  market (I)  is  only  casual. 
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The  argument  that  such  prohibition  is  justified  be-
cause  "own-account  transport  should  meet  its  re-
quirements  without  recourse  to  the  professional 
market"  is  no  more  than  a dogmatic  statement. 
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It would  seem  possible  to  conclude  from  the  above 
that  when  the  freedom  of  professional  carriers  in 
the  matter of  prices  is  unrestricted  there is  no  valid 
economic  reason  to  impose  limits  on  own-account 
transport  or  to  forbid  firms  to  transport  for  other 
parties with the equipment they use on own account. 
The same  conclusion  holds  for  vehicles  and  vessels 
hired  for  limited  periods  for  own-account  transport. 
(')  The  point  concerning  casual  participation  in  the  market 
also  applies  to  professional transport (see  Subsection  32.51). 746 
Of course the conclusion might be different if certain 
restrictions  were  imposed  on  professional  transport. 
To  ensure  equality  of  the  conditions  of  competition 
from  the  economic  angle  it  might  then  be  necessary 
to  impose  similar  restrictions  on  own-account  trans-
port,  including  its  return  loads.  But  this  does  not 
affect  the  above  arguments;  it merely  raises  a  point 
which  is  not examined here, i.e.  whether professional 
transport  should  be  subjected to  quantitative  restric-
tions  or  to  price  restrictions (1). 
25.33  - Abuse of dominant  positions 
by  the  railways 
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All  the  six  Community  countries  apply  in  one form 
or another fixed  or maximum  rates  for  goods  trans-
port  by  rail.  These  rates  were  originally  designed 
to  prevent the  railways  from  taking improper advan-
tage  of  the  dominant  positions  which  they  had  on 
almost  all  markets  where  there  was  no  real  compe-
tition  from  inland  waterway  transport.  However, 
the  situation  has  changed  considerably following  the 
rapid  development  of  road  haulage.  Since  the 
railways  have  come  to  be squeezed between  compe-
tition  from  inland  waterways  in  transport  of  heavy 
goods,  wherever suitable canals exist,  and the  practi-
cally  omnipresent  competition  of  road  transport for 
other  traffic,  many  countries  have  modified  their 
transport  policy.  The  aim  is  no  longer  so  much  to 
limit the monopoly of the railways as  to protect them 
against  competition,  in  particular from  the  roads. 
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However,  the  previous  tariff  systems  have  remained 
in  force.  But it might be asked whether their general 
maintenance is  economically justified, in  view  of the 
present  situation  on  the  transport  market.  For the 
railways  no  longer occupy  a monopoly position with 
regard  to  all  their  transport  activities.  This  trend 
has  been  reflected  in  the  structure  of  rail  prices: 
under the pressure of road competition, the value of 
the  goods  transported  has  become  considerably  less 
important  as  a  basis  for  fixing  rates.  The  process 
by  which  the  roads  skim  off  the  freight  that  was 
formerly  the  most  profitable  for  the  railways,  thus 
obliging  them  to  reduce  their  rates  for  it,  is  often 
quoted  in  this  connection  as  an  instance  of  uneco-
nomic  competition. 
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But  such  an  op1mon  is  obviously  incompatible  with 
the argument - often propounded at the same time, 
and  with  justification - that the abuse  of dominant 
positions  should  be  prevented.  The  skimming-off 
of  high-priced  traffic  - the  prices  for  which  were 
only possible because of the dominant position of the 
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railways  - is  an  automatic corrective whose  opera-
tion  there  is  no  reason to  prevent and whkh on  the 
contrary  should  be  encouraged (2). 
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However,  it  is  indisputable  that  more  or  less  im-
portant pockets of monopoly power still exist,  where 
abuse  may  and  in  fact  does  occur.  This  is  short-
coming of the system of free pricing, and it could be 
remedied  by  imposing  maximum  rates (3)  ( 4).  It 
should,  however,  again  be  emphasized  that the  rail-
ways'  monopoly  has  shrunk  considerably  because 
of  the  growth  of road  transport.  The facts  under-
lying  transport  policy  have  changed.  Just  as  a 
policy for a time of depression is  not necessarily the 
most  suitable  for  a  period  of  expansion,  a  policy 
devised  to  curb a monopoly is  no longer appropriate 
when  the  monopoly,  which  had  been  extensive  in 
the  past,  has  very  largely  given  way  to  intense 
competition. 
25.34  - "Traffic  leakage" 
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"Traffic  leakage:"  may  result  not  only  from  skim-
ming  but  also  in  the  following  situation.  Let  us 
suppose that a given  railway  line  initially suffers  no 
competition  from  the  roads,  or is  shielded  up  to  a 
point  against  such  competition  by  quantitative 
restrictions  or  minimum  prices  for  road  haulage. 
Let  us  also  suppose that the railways  are  obliged to 
achieve  budgetary equilibrium and that, in the initial 
situation,  the  revenue  of  the  line  concerned  covers 
"total costs"(5).  If a competing road is  subsequently 
built,  or if  the  hauliers  are  freed  from  price and/or 
capacity restrictions, some traffic will  desert the rail-
ways  for  the road.  Should the  railway line be in  a 
situation  of increasing returns,  this  "traffic  leakage" 
will  entail  highler costs per unit of rail  service.  To 
achieve  budgetary  equilibrium  the  line  would  have 
(')  For  the  question  of  quantitative  restrictions,  see  Sub-
section  32.51,  and  for  prices  of transport  see  Chapter  32. 
(') It should be recalled here that skimming-off also  reduces 
the  railways'  opportunities  of practising  dumping  in  regard 
to  the  other  categories  of  traffic.  In  certain  cases  skim-
ming  could  give  rise  to  social  problems,  if  the  services 
favoured  by  internal  subsidies  should  enjoy  what  are 
essentially  support  tariffs. 
(")  See  Chapter  32. 
(')  These  points  refer  to  skimming  which  corresponds  to 
ad  valorem  tariff-fixing.  On  the other hand,  the  skimming 
resulting  from  the  regional  equalization  of  charges  which 
might  be  imposed  on  the  railways  can  have  uneconomic 
effects. 
(
6
)  In  the  sense  that  the  sum  of  the  discounted  revenue 
during  the  economic  life  of  the  infrastructure  is  expected 
to be  sufficient  to cover the sum of the original investment 
in  the  infrastructure,  the  costs  of  its  operation  and  main-
tenance,  and  the  costs  of transport  services  over the  same 
period. to  charge  higher  prices,  thus  causing  a  further  loss 
of  traffic.  The  railway  line  may  therefore  find 
itself  progressively  forced  into  a  situation  where 
"total  costs"  could  no  longer  be  covered  and  the 
only  choice  remaining  would  be  between  a  perma-
nent  deficit  and  closure  of  the  line (1). 
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There  is  little  doubt  that  the  railways  are  generally 
in  a  situation of  increasing  returns  in  the  sense  that 
the  average  cost  per ton-kilometre (2)  falls  as  traffic 
increases.  This  is  certainly  the  case  with  infra-
structure.  Whatever  the  system  of  budgetary  equi-
librium  adopted,  infrastructure  charges  per  unit  of 
transport service  will  fall  with  the increase in traffic. 
But  for  the  railways  there  may  also  be  increasing 
returns  in  the  operation  of  transport  services.  Va-
rious  cost  factors  increase  less  than  proportionally 
with  traffic  and can remain constant up  to  a certain 
limit (3),  so  that  the  revenue  from  prices  equal  to 
the  marginal costs  may  not be  sufficient  to  cover  all 
expenses. 
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How  are  we  to  judge  traffic  leakage,  and  what  are 
its  consequences?  Before  we  answer  these  ques-
tions,  two  concepts  must  be  defined:  the  rule  of 
budgetary  equilibrium  as  applied  to  a  given  railway 
line,  and  the  corresponding  "total  cost".  In  the 
previous  chapter (4)  we  showed  that  imposition  of 
the  rule  on  each  distinct  part  of  a  network  made 
little  economic  sense,  particularly since the  revenues 
from  those  different parts are  highly  interdependent. 
In  addition,  only  a  portion  of  the  total  financial 
burden of the railways can be directly imputed to the 
individual  parts  of  the  network.  We  therefore 
concluded  that  if  budgetary  equilibrium  should  be 
imposed  at  all,  it  would  have  to  be  imposed  on  a 
broad  scale,  i.e.,  on  relatively  large  components  of 
the  network.  This  need  is  particularly  obvious  in 
the  system  of  budgetary  equilibrium  without  possi-
bility  of  borrowing (5),  under  which  infrastructure 
users are  charged each year with the current expend-
iture  on  investment,  replacements,  upkeep  and 
operations. 
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It follows  from  the  above that the question of traffic 
leakage  is  in  fact  more  complicated than it seems  at 
first  sight,  because  the  case  of  a  given  railway  line 
cannot be considered in isolation but must be related 
to  the  overall  situation  in  the  network  to  which  it 
belongs. 
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Let us therefore suppose that the railways  are subject 
to the rule of budgetary equilibrium in a general form 
and  are  free  to  fix  their  rates  as  they  please.  On 
this  assumption,  an  increase in road competition will 
probably  have  the  following  consequences  for  the 
line concerned: 
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i)  If returns  are  increasing,  the  railways  can  en-
deavour to  maximize their net income either by clos· 
ing  the  line  (alternative  1  a)  or  by  fixing  rates 
which enable them to  meet the increased competition 
(alternative  1  b). 
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ii)  In  either  case,  the  new  situation  is  likely  to 
threaten  the  railways'  ability  to  satisfy  the  rule  of 
budgetary  equilibrium  for  the  network  as  a  whole. 
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The choice between  1 a) and  1 b) will  only seriously 
arise  in the  case  of  branch lines,  because  the  inter-
dependence  of  revenues  from  the  various  parts  of 
a  network  obviously  rules  out  the  closing  of  main 
lines  unless  a whole  subnetwork is  to  be abandoned. 
No  valid  economic  reason  exists  for  excluding  pos-
sibility  1 a) for a branch line,  on the assumption that 
the line  would  be closed only if the revenue imputa-
ble  to  its  operation was  not  even  adequate  to  cover 
direct operating costs, including operating costs inde-
pendent  of  traffic,  or - in  the  event  of  important 
replacements being needed - if the future discount-
ed  revenue was  not expected to  cover the  operating 
costs  plus  the  new  investment  costs.  Preservation 
of such an economically unviable branch line,  either 
by directly obliging  the  railway to  keep  it  in  service 
or  by  ensuring  its  viability  through  restrictions  on 
road transport, is  tantamount to  sacrificing technical 
progress to the supposed advantages of stability and 
protection  of  vested  interests (6).  If  alternative 
means  of  transport  are  available  at  less  cost  - as 
is  the  case  in  the  situation  envisaged  - such  pro-
tection  would  seem  to  be  economically  unjusti-
fied (1).  Various  problems  of  adaptation  could 
(')  The  same  problem  can  arise  in  the  case  of  a  canal 
subjected  to  increased  competition,  for  example  from  the 
railways  or  an  oil  pipeline.  This  case  is  usually  not 
considered  because  at present canals  are  not  subject  to the 
rule  of  budgetary  equilibrium.  Moreover,  the  individual 
carriers are  not in  a  situation of increasing returns,  because 
the  tariffs  for  the  use  of infrastructure  are  fixed  according 
to  a  procedure  which  does  not  have  the  effect  of bringing 
down  charges  per unit of service  as  traffic increases.  This 
is  a  case  of "institutional  convexity"  (see  Part 1). 
(")  Including  the  financial  charges. 
C)  This  applies  for  instance  to  labour  costs  for  operating 
stations,  administrative  services,  etc. 
(')  See  particularly  Section  24  and  Subsection  24.45. 
(
5
)  See  Section  31.4. 
(
6
)  Of course,  closing  a  line  can  also  pose  serious  problems 
of equity. 
C)  The verdict could only be  otherwise if the  railways were 
in  a  situation  not  only  of  increasing  average  returns  but 
also  of increasing  marginal  returns.  In  such  circumstances 
and  in  certain  cases  there  could  be  a  situation  of unstable 
equilibrium,  and  traffic  leakage  could  impair  optimum 
resource  allocation.  However,  as  we  have  already 
indicated, such situations appear to  be relatively exceptional 
(see  Sec.  11.4). arise,  however,  and  they  might  be  very  grave  from 
both  the  economic  and  social  angles.  These  prob-
lems  and  their  implications  for  policy  will  be  exam-
ined later in  connection with  adaptation to  structural 
change (1). 
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Besides  these  problems  of adaptation,  a genuine dif-
ficulty arises if  minimum tariffs preclude the railways 
from  adopting  solution  1 (b),  i.e.  fixing  competitive 
rates.  In  this  case  there  will  be a  real traffic leak-
age,  which  would  run  counter to  optimum  resource 
allocation.  If the  economically rational  solution -
abolition of the restrictions on the railways - is ruled 
out  for  some  reason,  there  may  be  good  grounds 
for  imposing  equivalent  restrictions  on  road  trans-
port,  in  order  to  prevent  the  uneconomic  competi-
tion  which  would  result  from  the  combination  of 
restrictions  for  the  railways  and  complete  freedom 
for  the  roads. 
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The situation  envisaged  under ii) can  arise  in  actual 
fact,  but  in  itself  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
question  of  traffic  leakage,  and  it  would  hardly  be 
reasonable  to  try  to  remedy  it  by  such  ad  hoc 
measures  as  the  protection  of  certain  railway  lines 
whenever  stronger  competition  threatens  to  change 
the present distribution of traffic to  the disadvantage 
of  the  railways.  Such  a  solution  would  hinder  the 
adaptation of the transport system  to changes in  the 
structure  of  demand  or  costs  and,  particularly,  to 
technical  progress. 
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If  we  discard  the  unrealistic  hypothesis  of  total 
closure  of  entire  subnetworks,  there  are  only  two 
solutiQns  which  are  not  incompatible  with  optimum 
resource  allocation.  The first  is  to  cover the entire 
deficit of the railways by subsidies - in other words 
to  disregard  the  rule  of  budgetary  equilibrium;  but 
this  has  a  number  of  serious  drawbacks  which  we 
have  already  examined (2).  In  principle,  subsidies 
ought to  do no  more than remedy the consequences 
of traffic  leakage.  To calculate them would  require 
an  estimate  of  the  income which  traffic  on  the  line 
in  question  would  have  yielded  if  there had been no 
leakage.  Hence,  in  practice  it  would  be  very  diffi-
cult  to  establish  objective  criteria  for  granting  sub-
sidies  and  yet  avoid  losing  the  institutional 
advantages  of the  rule  of budgetary equilibrium. 
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The  second  solution  is  to  apply  a  particular variant 
of  the  budgetary  equilibrium  system  which  excludes 
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borrowing (3).  This  implies  that  the  railways' total 
expenditure on expansion, replacements, maintenance 
and  operati0n  of  infrastructure  shall  be  financed 
from  their  current  revenue.  It  rules  out  all  possi-
bility  of  deferring  the  financial  burdens  of  current 
investment  through  loan  issues,  and  it  also  leaves 
the  financial  burdens  of  past  investment  out  of 
account.  Since,  in  the  matter  of  traffic  leakage 
examined  here,  we  are  considering  specific  infra-
structures  whose  financial  burdens  would  be  nil 
under  the  system  of  budgetary  equilibrium  without 
borrowing,  budgetary  equilibrium  would  not  con-
stitute  an  effective  constraint  except  perhaps  as 
regards  the  operating  costs  of  infrastructure  inde-
pendent  of traffic.  Consequently,  in  so far  as  any 
deficit  corresponding to these operating costs can be 
covered by a certain increase in prices in other parts 
of  the  network,  the  railways  will  be able  to  charge 
prices  equal  to  the  economic  charges  and  to  face 
up  to  competition.  Any  traffic  leakage  occurring 
under these conditions can therefore not be regarded 
as  contrary in  itself to  optimum resource allocation; 
but  the  increase  in  prices  in  another  part  of  the 
network  entailed  by this  price  policy  may  well  run 
counter  to  such  optimum  allocation. 
763 
In the  case  considered,  only  the marginal  costs  can 
be  charged  and  not  the  financial  burdens  and  the 
operating costs  independent of traffic,  and therefore 
a  loss  of  financial  capital  ensues  for  the  railways 
( 4)  ( 5).  Hence,  failing  any  compensations.  in  the 
rest  of the network,  either this  loss  will  be  accepted 
and  the  principle  of  budgetary  equilibrium  in  its 
widest  sense  abandoned,  or  budgetary  equilibrium 
will  be enforced.  In the latter case, either subsidies 
must  be  provided  or traffic  leakage  (which  would, 
however,  be  consonant  with  optimum  resource 
allocation)  must  be  prevented  by  arbitrary  restric-
tions  of road  traffic. 
25.35  - Some  aspects  of tariff  systems 
fixed  or  approved  by  the  public  authorities 
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Can  the  optimum  prices  of  transport  services  cor-
responding  to  optimum  resource  allocation  be  de-
(')  See  Subsection  25 .41. 
(')  See  Section  23.3. 
(")  See  Section  31 A. 
(')  For the question of capital losses,  see  Sedion 31.2. 
(')  Once  the  system  of  budgetary  equilibrium  without  bor-
rowing  has  been  introduced,  such  a  loss  does  not  occur  if 
the  line  is  shut  down.  In  this  system,  by  definition  there 
are  no  longer  any  financial  charges:  operating  costs  inde-
pendent of traffic  are  eliminated  by the  closing  of the  line. termined  by  a  centralized  procedure?  This  is 
perfectly  conceivable  in  theory;  but  its  practical 
implementation  depends  on  various  conditions  such 
as  the  actual  possibilities  of  minimizing  costs  in  a 
centralized  system  and  of  keeping  prices  flexible 
both  in  time  and  for  the  different  types  of services, 
etc.  Furthermore,  it  is  difficult  if  not  impossible 
for  a  central  authority  to  calculate  such  prices. 
765 
We  have  shown  that  cost  mmrmrzation  should  be 
considered an essential condition of optimum resource 
allocation (1),  and  that  competition  is  an  effective 
means  to  this  end (2).  As  system  of tariffs (3)  fixed 
or approved by the authorities has certain drawbacks 
from  this  point of view  in  that it  is  likely  to  reduce 
the  pressure  of  competition. 
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Furthermore,  a  centralized  system  is  necessarily  less 
flexible,  particularly as  to changes in optimum prices 
which  are  not  fully  predictable.  Tariffs  fixed  or 
approved  by  the  authorities  can,  of  course,  always 
be  changed;  but  this  calls  for  administrative  pro-
cedure  whose  effect  is  to  hold  up  adaptation  to 
special  or  new  conditions.  It can  rule  out  certain 
short-term  changes  and  obstruct  the  adoption  of 
special  rates  for  certain  types  of  services.  Tariffs 
fixed  or  approved  by  the  authorities  can  certainly 
be  highly  differentiated.  But  the  more  complex 
the  tariff  structure  is,  the  more  rigid  it  tends  to  be, 
since a change in one rate will often require complete 
revision  of  the  whole  tariff,  both  on  economic 
grounds (possibilities of substitution) and for political 
reasons  (opposition  of  vested  interests  to  partial 
changes). 
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Consequently,  the  question  at  the  head of  this  sub-
section  can  only  be  answered  affirmatively  and 
unreservedly  if  the  optimum  prices  are  not  subject 
to  wide  and unpredictable variation.  It is  often said 
that  this  condition  is  in  fact  fulfilled.  For  those 
who  hold this  opinion, transport rates corresponding 
to  the  optimum  prices  of economic  theory could be 
esiablished  on  the  objective  basis  of  costs,  the only 
rule  to  be  imposed  on  the  decentralized  operators 
being  that  of  maximizing  production  (maximum  use 
of existing capacity).  The application of such a rule 
can  in  fact  be  fairly  easily  supervised,  but  the 
optimum  price  hypothesis  on  which  it  is  based  is 
based  is  incorrect.  As  we  have  shown,  the  prices 
corresponding to optimum resource allocation consist 
of two  parts:  the  marginal cost of production on the 
one  hand,  and  the  marginal  rents  arising  from  the 
durable factors  of production, in particular means of 
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transport,  on the  other.  The marginal cost may  be 
roughly  constant  in  time  and  equal  for  important 
groups  of  services,  and  may  consequently  be  de-
termined  accurately  enough  by  a  centralized  proce-
dure.  But this  conclusion  does  not  apply  to  rents, 
which  are  scarcity  prices  for  fixed  factors  and 
therefore depend entirely on the intensity of demand. 
Since  demand  for  transport services  is  characterized 
by fairly  strong fluctuations in time which  cannot be 
exactly foreseen,  and  since  transport services  cannot 
be  stored,  the rents  included  in  the optimum prices, 
and  hence  the  prices  themselves,  tend  to  vary 
strongly. 
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Tariffs  fixed  or  approved  by  the  public  authorities 
cannot  take  full  account  of  these  variations,  which 
are  not  predictable  enough  to  be  incorporated  in 
tariff  schedules,  and  cannot  be  adapted  rapidly 
enough  to  follow  changes  in  demand.  The  conse-
quent  lack  of  flexibility  is  a  hindrance  to  optimum 
resource  allocation.  If their  level  corresponds  to 
the  average  of  the  optimum  prices,  the  tariffs  will 
be  sometimes  too  low  and  sometimes  too  high  in 
relation  to  the economic optimum (4). 
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If the  tariffs  are  too  low,  the  available  transport 
capacity  will  be  insufficient  to  meet  total  demand. 
Capacity  will  then  have  to  be  either  rationed  or 
expanded,  even  if  expansion  is  not  economically 
justified,  as  will  be  the  case  especially  if  the  initial 
capacity  was  optimum.  As  regards  rationing,  since 
this  cannot be done by  prices,  other means,  such  as 
the establishment of waiting lists,  which do not make 
economic  sense,  must  be  resorted  to.  Moreover, 
the fact that price increases are impossible or limited 
will  unduly  discourage  investment  in  reserve  capa-
city  (assuming  investment  decisions  are  left  to  the 
(')  See  Subsection  25.03. 
0  See  Subsection  25.10. 
(')  In the following  pages  the  term "tariffs"  will  be  used  to 
designate  transport prices  fixed  directly  or approved  by  the 
public authorities.  These can be  either fixed  tariffs, leaving 
no  margin  of freedom  for  the  carrier, or bracket rates,  i.e. 
minimum  and  maximum  rates.  Transport  prices  fixed  by 
the  carrier and not subject  to approval  by  public authorities 
are  regarded here as  forming  a  "price schedule".  They can 
be  either  guide  prices,  if  the  price  actually  paid  is  settled 
between the  carrier and the customer, or fixed  prices,  if the 
price  actually paid  is  the  same  as  that of the  schedule. 
(')  In  principle,  some  of  these  difficulties  are  inherent  in 
every  system  of  prices  fixed  in  advance  as  opposed  to 
prices  fixed  by individual  contract,  but they  are  less  severe 
in  the  case  of price  schedules fixed  by  the  enterprises  than 
in  that of tariffs fixed  or approved by the public authorities. carriers),  and  will  thus  contribute  to  an  aggravation 
of traffic  peaks (I) e). 
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If  official  tariffs  are  too  high  in  relation  to  the 
optimum  price,  existing  capacity will  be  underutiliz-
ed,  and  this  will  lead  to  manifest waste  of economic 
resources.  Such  will  be  the  case  if  tariffs  exceed 
marginal  cost  at  times  when  capacity  is  not  fully 
used.  This distortion could be prevented by limiting 
investment  in  transport  equipment  so  as  to  reduce 
the  risk  of  unforeseeable  underutilization  to  a  mi-
nimum.  However,  the  strongly  restrictive  policy 
this  would  entail is  not only undesirable in  itself but 
would  also  aggravate  difficulties  where  tariffs  are 
too  low.  Here  it  should  be  noted  that  if,  with  a 
system  of  tariffs  fixed  or  approved  by  the  public 
authorities,  responsibility  for  decisions  to  invest  in 
means  of  transport  is  left  to  the  carriers,  restrictive 
measures  may  be  necessary  in  any  case.  For pro-
tection  against  unforeseen  price  reductions  can  in-
crease  the  private  profits  but  not  the  general  eco-
nomic profits from  investment in  P1eans  of transport. 
Furthermore,  such  measures  might  have  the  effect 
of diverting uneconomic professional haulage towards 
own-account  transport;  this  diversion  would  then 
have to be  prevented by  restricting the latter form  of 
transport. 
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These drawbacks of  tariffs  fixed  or approved by the 
public  authorities  could  be  reduced  by  detailed  dif-
ferentiation  to  take  maximum  account  of all  factors 
determining  the  optimum  prices.  Even  those 
variations  in  supply  and  demand  stemming  from 
circumstances (3)  whose  time  of  occurrence  is  un-
predictable  could  be  allowed  for  in  such  tariffs, 
provided  such  circumstances  can  be  defined  clearly 
and  objectively.  However,  the  complexity  and 
jynamic  nature  of  transport,  and  the  impossibility 
:Jf  storing transport services,  would  still  leave out of 
account  a  very  large  number  of  individual  cases 
which  could  neither  be  catered  for  in  the  tariffs 
nor dealt with  by  modifying the rates, because of the 
delays  inevitable  in  all  administrative  procedure. 
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Finally,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  these  draw-
backs  of tariffs  fixed  or approved by the  authorities 
need  not  be  considered  as  decisive  if  the  tariffs  are 
expected  to  conform  to  objectives  which  are  other 
than  those  of  optimum  resource  allocation  and  in-
compatible with  such optimum allocation.  This fact 
must  be taken into  account in  analysing the various 
possible  intermediate  systems. 
25.36  - The  option  of stabilization 
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It is  often  said  that  a  system  of  fixed  tariffs (4)  or 
bracket  rates  has  a  stabilizing  function.  As  a 
statement  of  fact  this  is  quite  correct;  but  the  im-
plicit  judgment  involved  - that  stabilization  is 
desirable  in  itself  - should  be  scrutinized  a  little 
more  closely.  'There  is  no  doubt  that  in.,  for  in-
st~nce,  a  general  system  of bracket rates,  transport 
pnces  fluctuate  less  often  and  less  violently  than 
under a  system  of free pricing.  The time  necessary 
to  change  the price limits  depends  of course  on the 
procedures  followed,  but  certain  time-lags  are  ine-
vitable  in  any  case,  because  the  rates  must  be 
approved  by  the  public  authorities.  These  time-
lags  rule out  any  immediate  adaptation  of the  rates 
to  new  conditions  - at least  in  so  far  as  the  new 
prices would have to be outside previously authorized 
limits - and can thus prevent short-term fluctuations 
of  prices  outside  the  bracket.  These  fluctuations 
might,  however,,  be  desirable.  In  a  system  of 
bracket  rates,  the  range  of  fluctuations  possible 
without revising rates is  obviously determined by the 
width of the margin between the minimum and max-
imum  limits  of  the  brackets.  If stabilization  is  to 
be effective the bracket must be fixed  in  such a way 
that  it  really  prevents  certain  rises  or falls  in  price 
which would occur if there were no price limits. 
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It may be asked whether such stabilization, obtained 
by  limiting  price  rises  and  falls  and  by  a  deferred 
adaptation  of  the  bracket  rates,  can  be  considered 
(')  This may not occur if the carriers are paid black market 
prices.  However  regrettable  and  undesirable  such  a  state 
of  affairs  may  be  from  the  ethical  and  institutional  points 
of  view,  it  could  be  considered  an  economically  valid 
corrective  to too rigid  a  tariff were it  not  for the fact  that 
it  distorts  the  conditions  of  competition  at  the  expense  of 
the  railways,  which  are open to more effective  control  than 
the  other types  of transport. 
(")  If,  however,  investment  is  centrally  controlled  and 
capacity is  expanded so  that all  predictable  demand  and  all 
unpredictable  peak  traffic  can  be  handled  because  there  is 
sufficient  reserve  capacity  to  reduce  the  risk  of  congestion 
to a  reasonable  level,  a  distortion might occur in  conditions 
of  competition  between  professional  transport  and  own-
account transport.  In fact,  under these  conditions,  it  might 
be  in  the  interest  of  transport  users  to  effect  their  basic 
transport  with  their  own  resources  and  unload  their  traffic 
peaks  on  to  professional  transport.  Under  a  centrally 
controlled  tariff system,  restrictions  would  then  have  to  be 
imposed  on  own-account  transport.  This  may  eliminate 
distortions  in  conditions  of  competition,  but  it  does  not 
resolve  the fundamental  dilemma, i.e.  either to put up with 
temporary  congestions  or  to  create  reserve  capacity  which 
is  economically excessive. 
(')  Such  as  a  fall  in  the  level  of  rivers,  especially  severe 
winters,  etc. 
(')  In  the  following  pages  the expression  "fixed  tar.iffs"  will 
be  used  to  denote  tariffs  which  are either fixed  directly  by 
the  competent  authorities  or determined  under  a  procedure 
implying  their  approval  and  leaving  no margin  of freedom 
for  carriers.  Obviously  they  are  "fixed"  not  in  the  sense 
that  they  cannot  be  changed  but  that  changes  must  be 
approved;  this  implies  an  administrative  procedure  which 
may  take  some  time,  certainly  longer  than  the  time 
required  for  decisions  by  a  private  firm. an  economic  advantage.  We  have  shown (1)  that 
the  advantages  of  price stabilization  are  very  debat-
able.  If we  disregard  cyclical  fluctuations,  which 
give  rise  to  very  important  special  problems  and 
must  be  examined  separately (2),  stabilization  can 
never continue for more than a relatively short period: 
in  the  long  run  adaptation to the  economic  trend  is 
both  desirable  from  the economic point of view  and 
inevitable  in  practice.  This  is  why,  in  terms  of 
optimum  resource  allocation,  price  stabilization  is 
not  relevant  to  long-term  decisions  such  as  those 
made  by  transport  users  concerning  the  siting  of 
enterprises. 
775 
Short-term  price  stabilization  as  such  - i.e.  disre-
garding  the  consequences  of  stabilization  of  prices 
at  a  level  different  from  the  average  which  would 
have  prevailed  under  a  free  pricing  system  - is 
often  considered  an  advantage  by  carriers  and/or 
transport  users. 
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The fixing  of  a  maximum  limit  would  appear to be 
chiefly  to  the  advantage  of users;  but the  merits  of 
the  case  are  far  from  clear.  With  a  free  pricing 
system,  users  have  some  possibility  of  ensuring 
against  the  risk  of  price  movements  by  concluding 
contracts  for  a  certain  period  of  time.  This  pro-
cedure  not  only  guarantees  users  a  specific  price 
but  also  has  the  advantage,  considered  essential  by 
some of them, of making the required capacity avail-
able  at  this  price.  However,  as  we  have  already 
pointed  out (3),  in  a  system  of  stabilized  prices  any 
increase  in  demand  beyond  the  available  capacity 
makes it necessary to  ration demand by means other 
than  prices  (waiting  lists,  etc.).  The user  then  has 
no  w~y of  expressing  the  relative  urgency  of  his 
demand  for  transport  and  of  satisfying  at least  that 
part of it for which he is  prepared to pay a relatively 
high  price,  i.e.  the  part  whose  economic  value  is 
high (4). 
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Maintenance  of  too  high  a  tariff  on  the  pretext  of 
stabilizing  prices  is  tantamount  to  a  monopolistic 
policy which  favours  carriers in  the modes of trans-
port with a competitive system if elasticity of demand 
in  relation  to  prices  is  less  than  unity.  But  from 
this  point  of  view  the  aim  would  be  not  so  much 
price  stabilization  for  its  own  sake  as  a  certain 
distribution of incomes.  Such a policy has economic 
drawbacks.  It jeopardizes  the  optimum  utilization 
of capacity and it  can weaken the incentive to mini-
mize  costs  by  reducing  the pressure of  competition. 
Both  these  consequences  are  in  conflict  with  the 
optimum  allocation  of  resources ("). 
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The bad effect on optimum resource allocation can be 
all  the  more  considerable  the  higher  the  elasticity 
of  demand.  It must  be  stressed,  however,  that  in 
practice  the  a  priori  evaluation  of  demand  elasticity 
is  very  hazardous (H).  If  it  is  desired  to  attain 
income distribution objectives by  means of minimum 
tariffs  and  at  the  same  time  reduce  to  a  minimum 
the disadvantages which such tariffs involve from  the 
angle  of optimum resource  allocation,  it  would  seem 
advisable  to  impose  them  only  as  correctives  after 
making  sure  that  the  resulting  higher  prices  have 
no  ill effects  on  the  volume  of traffic. 
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Apart from  the drawbacks just mentioned, the fixing 
of  minimum  prices  can lead  to  a  certain  restrictive 
control  of  transport  capacity,  with  all  the  disad-
vantages  this  involves (1). 
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It follows  from  the above that the various arguments 
advanced in favour of stabilizing transport prices are 
open  to  serious  doubt  from  an  economic  point  of 
view.  Provided that competition, where it can exist 
at  all,  is  not  prevented  from  functioning,  any  rigid 
attitude  to  prices  would  seem  to  run  counter  to 
optimum  resource  allocation.  Competitive  prices 
reflect  the  economic  conditions  of cost  and  demand 
as  expressed in  the  marginal cost  and  marginal rent 
of the durable equipment.  They thus help to ensure 
the  completest  possible  utilization of  capacity  and  a 
rational  distribution  of  available  capacity  when  the 
durable  equipment  is  fully  utilized. 
25.37  - The option of market transparency 
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There is  no doubt that sufficient transparency of the 
market  is  a  necessary  condition  for  rational  and 
efficient  operation  of  the  price  system.  But  fixed 
tariffs  or  bracket  rates  are  not  the  only  means  of 
(
1
)  See  Subsection  25.35. 
(")  See  Section  25.4. 
(")  See  Subsection  25.35. 
(')  Of  course,  rationing  by  price  raises  the  problem  of 
whether  the  given  distribution of income  can  be  considered 
equitable - a  general problem outside  the  province  of this 
report. 
(
5
)  See  Subsection  25.35. 
(")  It  certainly  differs  greatly  according  to  the  general 
economic  situation. 
C)  See  Subsections  25.21  and  25.22  for  an  examination  of 
the problems of the systems of control of transport capacity 
and access  to the market and their drawbacks (in  particular 
reduction  of  the  incentive  to  minimize  costs,  the  risk  of 
excessive  restrictions,  and the  unfair nature of quotas). achieving  this  transparency.  Good  market  transpa-
rency  can  undoubtedly  be  assured  by  the  existence 
of tariffs  known  in  advance,  published in some form 
or other, and binding ou the carriers concerned until 
such  time  as  they  are  modified.  But  the  result  is 
a  certain  rigidity  in  the  rates,  which,  as  we  have 
already pointed out, can involve economic disadvant-
ages.  However,  rates  which  are  fixed  by  the  car-
riers  themselves  without  having  to  be  approved  by 
the  authorities  are  less  rigid  than  rates  fixed  by  a 
procedure  involving  their  approval  or  even  impo-
sition  by  these  authorities (1). 
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A  system  of  tariffs  or  price  schedules  is  certainly 
necessary  for  some  categories  of  goods  transport, 
in  particular  small  consignments,  and  for  passenger 
transport.  If  the  tariffs  or  schedules  for  such 
transport were  not published in  advance,  the market 
would  not  be  transparent enough,  for  the individual 
user  generally  cannot  obtain  the  information  he 
requires  except  at  a cost  too  high  in  relation  to the 
price  of  the  transport. 
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However,  this  argument  may  not  hold  for  large 
tonnages  or transport  operations  which  take  a  long 
time.  Beyond  a certain limit,  transport services can 
be  economically  large  enough  to  justify  special 
conditions.  A system of tariffs or schedules, wheth-
er  fixed  or  allowing  a  certain  latitude,  could  there-
fore  conflict  to  some  extent  with  the  desired 
flexibility  of  transport  prices,  as  regards  both 
variations  in  time  and  adaptation  to  the  special 
conditions of the contract envisaged.  In such cases, 
market transparency does  not  necessarily require the 
tariffs  or schedules  to  be published in  advance;  it is 
sufficient  that there should be  a procedure by which 
the  user  can  obtain  rapidly  and  at  reasonable  cost 
the  ~ecessary information  on  the  conditions  under 
which  the  various  alternative  modes  of  transport 
can  meet  his  requirements.  Furthermore, the terms 
of  such  contracts  would  have  to  be  published  post 
facto  in  an  appropriate form. 
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Users  can  be  supplied  with  adequate information in 
various,  widely  differing  ways.  Freight  exchanges 
for  the  modes  of  transport  with  a  competitive 
system e)  are  one  instance.  The  procedures  need 
not be  the  same  for  all  modes.  For example,  they 
can  include  the  publication  of  tariffs  or schedules, 
especially  in  the  case  of  small  consignments,  as 
mentioned  above. 
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But although the existence of public tariffs or private 
price schedules is very helpful to market transparency, 
when  all  is  said  and  done  a  system  of  tariffs  or 
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schedules, whether fixed or involving a limited margin 
of freedom,  is  not  essential  to  transparency  at  least 
when  it  can  be  assured  by  other means (3). 
25.4  - SPECIFIC  PROBLEMS OF CYCLICAL 
FLUCTUATIONS AND ADAPTATION 
TO  STRUCTURAL  CHANGE 
25.40  - Cyclical  fluctuations 
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On several occasions already we have referred readers 
to  the  present  section  for  a  study  of  the  problems 
of  cyclical  fluctuations.  These  can  take  the  form 
of  more  or less  temporary  recessions,  of  relatively 
long  depressions,  or  of  accelerations  or  slowdowns 
in the rate of ec:onomic  growth. 
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Up to  the  present our analysis  has  presupposed full 
employment  and  steady  economic  growth,  because 
this  can  be  considered  a  desirable  situation  of 
economic  "normality".  It is  in  fact  the  declared 
aim  of  the  economic  policy  of  all  the  Community 
States,  and  so  far  has  been  more  or  less  attained. 
But  this  does  not  mean  that  the  possibility  of  a 
recession  or of  a  slowdown  in  growth  is  necessarily 
to  be  ruled  out.  In  fact,  fairly  recent  experience 
shows  that  the  growth  rate  of  the  national  product 
can  suffer  appreciable  fluctuations,  even  in  excep-
tionally  favourable  conditions.  The  consequences 
of  a  general  recession  or  a  marked  slowdown  of 
growth  for  inland  transport  should  therefore  be 
thoroughly  analysed  in  the  near future,  with  a  view 
to  defining  the  best  policy  for  such  circumstances. 
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It is  manifestly impossible to undertake such a study 
in the context of this report, for it would require both 
(')  Although  "fixed"  in  the  sense  defined  above,  rates  may 
still  be  widely  differentiated,  for  example  as  to  the  times 
at  which  the  service  is  supplied.  For  passenger  transport, 
uniform  tariffs  are  both  useless  and  clearly  incompatible 
with  optimum resource  allocation, owing to the existence of 
very  marked  peak  periods.  The  varying  intensity  of 
demand, coupled with the employment of durable equipment 
and  the  impossibility  of  storing  transport  services,  implies 
that  optimum  prices,  in  particular  the  element  of rent  for 
the  use  of  durable  equipment,  will  be  relatively  high 
during  peak  periods  and  relatively  low  or  even  nil  when 
demand  is  weaker (see  Subsection  25.03).  At present there 
are  many  tariffs  whose  structure  is  exactly  the  opposite, 
since  reductions  are  granted  for  travel  at  the  hourly  and 
seasonal  peak  periods. 
(")  See  Chapter  33. 
(")  Independently  of  the  question  of  market  transparency, 
the  means  used  must  make  it  possible  for  the  authorities 
to  see  whether  abuse  of dominant  positions  or uneconomic 
competition  is  ocwring.  This  aspect  will  be  considered 
in  Part  Ill  (see  Subsection  33.21). detailed  research  into  the  types  of economic fluctua-
tions  and  their  effects  on  the  various  sectors  of the 
transport market and a comprehensive analysis of the 
pros and cons  of the different  measures which  could 
be  taken.  The  following  comments  are  therefore 
intended  only  to  pinpoint  a  few  important  aspects. 
They  do  not  pretend to  do  more  than open the way 
to  a  subsequent  full  analysis,  which  we  consider  an 
extremely  important  task  for  the  future. 
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A first.  fundamental observation concerns the nature 
of  economic  fluctuations.  A  general  recession 
results  from  insufficient  overall  demand.  It  can 
therefore  only  be  remedied  by  action  to  influence 
the  level  of  overall  expenditure.  Obviously,  meas-
ures  taken  in  individual  economic  sectors  such  as 
inland  transport  are  not  capable  of  eliminating  the 
general  causes  of  the  recession.  They  can  do  no 
more  than  act  on  the  consequences  it  produces  in 
these sectors.  The primary aim of anticyclical policy 
must be to regulate overall expenditure. 
790 
The  second  aspect  to  be  considered  is  whether  the 
criteria  of  optimum  resource  allocation,  which  we 
have  examined  under the  twofold  hypothesis  of full 
employment  and  steady  economic  growth,  apply  in 
a  situation  where  these  conditions  are  not  fulfilled. 
It appears that in  fact  they  do  apply,  without major 
modification.  Neither  the  general  lines  of  an  opti-
mum  transport  policy  nor  its  manifestations  are 
changed  if  the  optimum  resource  allocation  criteria 
are  applied  in  situations  of  recession  or  slower 
growth.  A fall  in demand from the level expected at 
the  time  when  the  investment  decisions  were  made 
causes  reduced  utilization  of  available  capacity  and 
therefore  a  fall  in  optimum  prices  which  can  have 
the  effect  of  eliminating  all  rents  arising  from  the 
existing  equipment.  The  result  will  be  a  decline  in 
carriers'  incomes  which  may  well  be  considered 
unacceptable  from  the  social  angle.  On the  strictly 
economic  plane,  however,  the  falls  in  prices perform 
a  useful  function,  by  generally  preventing  even 
greater  underutilization  of  existing  capacity. 
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It  is  often  said  in  opposition  to  this  that  overall 
transport  demand  is  relatively  inelastic,  so  that  the 
imposition  of  lower  limits  to  prevent or restrict falls 
in  prices  would  have  but little  effect  on  the  utiliza-
tion  of  capacity,  although  it  would  work  against  an 
excessively  serious  drop in  incomes.  This argument 
may  be  relevant  to  some  extent  (thorough  research 
into  the  elasticity  of overall  demand for  transport in 
relation  to  prices  in  a  situation  of  recession  would 
be  needed  to  check  the  point);  but it  does  not  alter 
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the  fact  that,  as  demand  is  generally  not  entirely 
inelastic,  minimum  prices  might  have  no  other 
effect  than  to  reduce  utilization  of  capacity  even 
further.  Hence  their  effectiveness  as  a  means  of 
supporting  carriers'  incomes  would  be  to  some 
extent  diminished,  and  waste of economic  resources 
would occur. 
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In  the  third  place,  attention  must  be  paid  to  the 
social  consequences  of  an  absolute  or  relative  fall 
in  demand.  The  fall  in  incomes  caused  by  a 
recession  can  be  considered  particularly  undesirable 
in the modes of transport with a competitive system, 
where  small  firms  with  an inadequate financial  basis 
are  predominant.  Furthermore,  the  more  durable 
the  equipment,  the  more  serious  the  consequences 
are  likely  to  be.  This  is  particularly the case  with 
inland waterway transport, since it is the rents arising 
from  durable  equipment  which  are  affected  by  the 
fall  in  prices.  Owners  of such  equipment lose  part 
or  even  all  of the income  they  expected  to  receive 
as  rents, while they may still be liable for interest and 
amortization  on  the  debt  contracted  when  they  ac-
quired their equipment.  In the case of a recession it 
is  naturally  not  possible  to  interpret the  bankruptcy 
of an  enterprise  as  proof that it  was inefficient. 
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In  a  situation  of  recession  the  strictly  economic 
aspects  of transport  policy  should  therefore be sup-
plemented  by  measures  to  mitigate  its  social  effects 
if  these  are  undesirable.  The  only  economic 
problem  which  arises  here  concerns  the  form  these 
measures  should  assume,  and  more  particularly  the 
question  whether  or  not  they  should  and  could  be 
taken in  such  a way  as  to  respect optimum resource 
allocation.  This point can only be fully  analysed in 
the context of a comprehensive study of the problems 
of cyclical fluctuations and their impact on transport. 
But  in  general  a  policy  of  direct  subsidies  might 
be  preferable  to  fixing  minimum  prices.  Direct 
subsidies  have  the  double  advantage  of  directly 
supporting  overall  demand  (and  consequently  of 
directly  combating  the  recession)  and  of  not  im-
peding  better  utilization  of  capacity (
1
). 
(')  The  granting  of  subsidies  may,  however,  reduce  the 
autonomy  of decisions  in  a  decentralized  economy.  More-
over,  it  may  be  fraught  with  institutional  difficulties  in 
practice.  Determination  of  the  amount  of  these  subsidies, 
and  in  particular  the  criteria  to  be  applied,  pose  delicate 
problems.  Political  considerations  may result  in  preference 
being  given  to  the  protection  of  incomes  by  minimum 
prices.  But besides  the  drawbacks to this  already mention-
ed,  there  is  a  risk  of the  minimum  price  being  maintained 
after  the  recession  has  ended,  through  pressure  from  the 
carriers.  It  is  clear  that  the  whole  question  needs  to  be 
studied  in  the  light  of  all  the  economic,  practical  and 
institutional  aspects. 794 
One  last  point  concerns  the  influence  of  cyclical 
fluctuations  on  investment  in  transport  capacity, 
particularly  in  inland  waterway  transport (1).  It is 
quite conceivable that fluctuations of economic activ.: 
ity or even of growth rate can lead to overinvestment 
during  a  phase  of  rapid  expansion.  Where  this 
cannot  be  prevented  by  keeping  carriers  better 
informed (2),  other  measures  may  have  to  be  con-
sidered.  Here again  we  are obliged  to  confine our-
selves  to  recommending  a  special  study  of  the 
problems posed by cyclical fluctuations as  they affect 
the  transport  sector. 
25.41  - Adaptation  to  structural  change 
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Structural changes can be due to a shift in the compo-
sition  of  demand  for  transport,  or  to  technical 
progress, or to institutional changes.  As in the case 
of  recession,  the  causes  of  structural  change  lie 
outside  transport  policy.  To ensure  optimum  allo-
cation  of  resources,  transport  policy  cannot  and 
should  not  obstruct  technical  progress  and  modifi-
cations  in  the  structure of demand.  Whatever their 
cause,  these  structural  changes  may  result  in  social 
problems very  similar in appearance to those caused 
by  a  general  recession. 
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However, there are at least two important differences. 
The  first  is  that  structural  change,  unlike  recession, 
is  inevitable  in  a  dynamic  economy.  Expansion 
involves  risks,  and  the  entrepreneur  must  norma1ly 
take  the  good  with  the  bad  if  a  price-based  and 
decentralized  economy  is  to  continue  to  function 
efficiently.  A  decline  in  income  due  to  structural 
change  therefore  has  not  the  same  economic  and 
social  significance as  a decline due to recession. 
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Secondly,  whereas  during  a  recession  there  are  no 
alternative  opportunities  for  victims  of  unemploy-
ment  or  a  fall  in  income,  such  opportunities  do 
exist  in  the case  of structural  changes.  This  factor 
is  of  fundamental  importance  from  both  the  social 
and  economic  angles.  On  the  social  plane  the 
intervention  of  the  public  authorities  in  one  form 
or  another  is  reaJly  justified  only  if  the  workers 
suffering  from  the  structural  trend  have  difficulty 
in  finding  other  employment  rapidly,  because  they 
lack  natural mobility  or because  the cost of readap-
tation  is  too  heavy,  etc.  Economica1ly,  it is  clear 
that the aid  granted should be such as  not to reduce 
but  strengthen  incentives  to  look  for  another  job. 
For. optimum  resource  a1location,  which  may  be 
considered of only  secondary importance in  a reces-
sion,  when  the  first  priority  is  the  fu11  exploitation 
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of  available  but  unused  resources,  retains  an  its 
economic importance in the case of structural change. 
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It therefore  follows  that,  on  both  social  and  eco-
nomic  grounds,  whatever measures  are taken  should 
aim  primarily at facilitating  and speeding-up adapta-
tion  to  the  new  conditions.  Aids  for  retraining, 
grants  on  change  of  employment,  compensation  for 
reduced  capacity,  and  like  measures,  answer  the 
purpose.  Furthermore,  those who  are insufficiently 
mobile  to  take  advantage  even  of  these  measures 
may  perhaps  be  given  direct  aJlowances  to  cushion 
at least  partiaJly the effects  of a faH  in  income. 
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However,  such  aids  should  not  obstruct  the  general 
process  of  adaptation.  For instance,  it  would  not 
appear desirable to subsidize a declining sector or to 
try  to  maintain  incomes  earned  in  such  a  sector. 
For the  same  reason,  minimum  prices  do not seem 
to  be  a  suitable  method  of assistance.  Like  subsi-
dies,  minimum  prices  tend to slow  down  adaptation 
to  structural  change  by  protecting  incomes  in  a 
declining  sector.  Preference  should  be  given  to  a 
policy which does not oppose the faH  in remuneration 
from  factors of production utilized so  as  to stimulate 
the process of adaptation, while correcting the social 
consequences,  when  necessary,  by  measures  of  the 
type  we  have  indicated. 
25.5  - SUMMARY 
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The  analysis  made  in  this  Chapter  permits  only 
provisional  conclusions  coupled  with  reservations. 
The  final  choice  of  the  best  system  for  transport 
services depends on two  sets of considerations which 
are  outside the  sphere  of economic  reasoning in  the 
strict  sense.  One  relates  to the basic objectives to 
be  pursued,  and  it  is  clear  that  the  decision  here 
can  only  be  a  political  one.  The  other  concerns 
the  correct  evaluation  of  certain  facts  which  we 
have  shown  to  be  important  elements  in  the  choice 
between the different options.  A few  remarks  must 
be  made  on  these  two  points. 
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Our analysis  is  founded  on  the  criteria of optimum 
resource  allocation.  If we  accept  efficiency  as  the 
chief aim  of policy in  the field  of transport  ser~i.ces, 
and  if  it  is  further  agreed  that under the  conditions 
we  have  described  a  decentralized  system  based  on 
(')  See  Subsection  25.21. 
(")  See  Chapter 32. competition  is  best calculated to  achieve this  aim (1), 
it  would  seem that the optimum system for transport 
services  should  be  based  on  free  competition,  wher-
ever  this  is  possible  in  practice.  If other  criteria 
are  accepted(!!),  the  conclusions  might  well  be dif-
ferent.  These  objectives,  where  their  achievement 
can  conflict  with  optimum  resource  allocation, 
generally  presuppose  deliberate  intervention  by  the 
f'Ublic  authorities.  The  more  numerous  such  inter-
ventions  are,  the less  suitable the competitive system 
will  be,  and  the  more open  it  will  be  to criticism. 
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However,  we  have  shown  in  the introduction to this 
Chapter (3)  that these other general  policy objectives 
can probably be  achieved in  many cases in  a decen-
tralized  economy  without  distorting  optimum  re-
source  allocation.  In this  respect  transport services 
are  very  different  from  infrastructure,  where  the 
other  general  policy  aims  play  a  more  direct  role, 
particularly  in  investment  decisions. 
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In  a  situation  where  the  level  or  the  rate  of 
expansion  of  general  economic  activity  is  falling, 
a  number  of  specific  problems  arise  which  may 
re~uire  special  measures,  notably  to  combat  the 
harmful  social  consequences.  These  problems have 
not  been  examined  exhaustively  in  this  report,  for 
they  obviously  call  for  a  special  study.  Hence  our 
conclusions  are  valid  only  for  a  situation  of  full 
employment  and  relatively  steady  economic  growth. 
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Realization  of  these  two  conditions  is  one  of  the 
Community's  general  objectives;  and  if  they  are 
fulfilled  (as  has usually been the case since the war), 
the competitive system can be efficient from the angle 
of  economic  criteria (4),  provided  it  can  function 
without  public  or  private  restrictions,  and  subject 
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to  one  important  reservation  and  two  possible 
exceptions. 
805 
The reservation  is  that neither the system of charges 
for the use of infrastructure nor other external factors 
shall  distort  the  conditions  of competition (5).  This 
is  an  important  reservation,  but  we  have  shown 
that it can be satisfied, and that the problems involved 
must  be  solved  in  any  case,  whatever  system  is 
applied  to  transport  services. 
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The  two  exceptions  concern  those  cases  where  free 
competition  can  have  results  incompatible  with 
optimum  resource  allocation.  This  occurs  when 
there is  either abuse of dominant positions or uneco-
nomic  competition,  itself  due  to  inadequate  infor-
mation (0)  or to a differentiation of charges for infra-
structure  or operation  by  "internal  subsidizing",  as 
can happen with  the  railways. 
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The  importance  of  these  situations  clearly  depends 
on  the  facts  of the  individual case.  After a general 
examination of the data we have been able to obtain, 
we  feel  that the  two  dangers  of abuse  of dominant 
positions  and  uneconomic  competition  arise  less 
frequently  than  is  often  claimed.  We  shall  come 
back to this  point in  Part Ill. 
(') This  provisional  conclusion  of  our  analysis  is  based 
notably  on  the  fact  that  competition  is  a  strong  incentive 
to  the  minimization  of  costs  (see  Subsec.  25.10). 
(")  Such  as  the  objectives  of  regional  policy  or  income 
distribution (see  Ch.  21). 
(")  See  Subsection  25.02. 
(•)  According  to  the  indications  we  gave  in  Part  I,  and 
subject  to  those  in Chapter 21. 
(")  See  Subsections  25.30  and  25.32. 
(")  In particular,  inadequate  information  to  carriers  in  the 
competitive modes  of transport  (overinvestment,  problem  of 
return  loads,  etc.). PART Ill 
ANALYSIS  OF VARIOUS  SYSTEMS 
CHAPTER  30 
INTRODUCTION 
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In the first two chapters of this Part we shall examine 
a  certain  number  of  systems,  first  for  infrastructure 
and  then  for  transport  services.  In  view  of  what 
has been said in  Parts I  and 11  about the differences 
in  the  economic  and  institutional  structure  of these 
two  stages in the production of transport services, no 
further  justification  is  required  for  the  separate 
treatment  of  actual  policies  in  them. 
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The  third  chapter  will  deal  with  some  institutional 
aspects  of  the  various  systems,  and  the  last  with 
the  steps  we  suggest  for  solving  the  problems  of 
implementing  a  common  transport  policy. 
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Where  transport  services  are  concerned,  our  study 
has  been  limited  to  the  transport  of  goods.  This 
does not mean that we  think the problems of passen-
ger transport unimportant, but simply that it was not 
possible  to  study  them  in  the  time  allotted (1). 
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Most of the options suggested for goods transport are 
alsQ  applicable to  passenger transport.  But in prac-
tice,  where  passenger  transport  is  concerned  there 
are  undoubtedly  many  tariffs  that  are  fixed  by  the 
State and are certainly not consistent with an optimum 
allocation  of  resources.  Where  such  tariffs  an: 
held  to  be  too  socially  important  for  correction,  it 
is  clearly  necessary  to  estimate  the  loss  of  business 
suffered  by  common  carriers (2).  If  the  aim  is 
to  achieve  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources,  the: 
best  solution,  in  theory,  would  be  for  the  State  to 
compensate  carriers  for  their  loss  of  business. 
30.0  - INFRASTRUCTURE 
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In seeking  a  policy  on charges  for  the  use  of infra-· 
structure, we  found  that two main solutions emerged 
from  our  study  in  Part  11.  One  consists  in  not 
charging  the  users  more  than  the  economic  charges 
or in  adopting a  system  of charges that are  the best 
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possible  practical  approximation  to  the  economic 
charges.  We  have  called  this  the  practic:al  system 
of economic charges (3).  The other solution consists 
in imposing, in addition, the requirement of budgetary 
equilibrium;  the  various  ways  in  which  thils  require-
ment  could  be  applied  have  not  yet  been  worked 
out precisely. 
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In Chapter 31  we  shall make a detailed study of the 
first  solution (4),  and  of  two  versions  of the second 
depending  on  whether  borrowing  is  allowed  or 
not (5). 
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Besides  these  two  main  solutions  we  shall  also 
consider  two  other  systems,  the  system  of  develop-
ment  cost (6)  and  the  system  of  calculated  total 
cost (7).  The  development  cost  system  is  based 
on  charges  that  remain  constant  over  a  period  of 
time,  whereas  the  calculated  total  cost  system  is 
primarily  an  attempt  to  equalize  the  conditions  of 
competition fm the different  modes  of transport. 
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The  choice  bt:tween  these  systems  will  largely  be 
a  political  one.  On  purely  economic  grounds,  the 
practical system of economic charges would obviously 
be the  best,  since  it  is  derived directly from  the cri-
teria  of  optimum  resource  allocation.  There  are 
three  possible  drawbacks  to  this  system,  which  we 
have analysed  in  Part 11 (8).  Firstly, it  may not be 
compatible with  equity.  Secondly,  when  investment 
in  infrastructure  is  dependent  on  public  funds  and 
therefore on political decisions, such investments may 
be inadequate owing to the limitations of the national 
budget,  or misdirected  owing  to  the  action  of  pres-
(')  When  our  terms  of  reference  were  ·~xplained,  all  the 
emphasis  was  laid  on  the  transport  of  goods. 
(")  These  problems  are  similar  to  those  to  be  considered 
in  Chapters  32  and  33  in  connection  with  priC4~  limits. 
(")  See  Section  24.2. 
(') See  Section  31.0. 
(")  See  Sections  31.3  and  31.4. 
(")  See  Section  31.1. 
() See  Section  31.2. 
(')  See  particularly  Section  23.3. sure  groups.  Thirdly,  if  the  deficit  is  financed  by 
subsidies,  there will  be  a danger,  where  the  railways 
are  concerned,  that  the  true  infrastructure  deficit 
may  be  confused  with  a  deficit  due  to  inefficient 
management,  and  there  may  therefore be  less  incen-
tive  to  minimize  costs.  These  are  mainly  sociolo-
gical  and  institutional  considerations,  which  cannot 
be analysed in economic terms alone.  Consequently, 
all  the  other  systems  we  shall  discuss,  which  in  va-
rying  degrees  attempt  to  meet  the  objections  to  the 
practical  system  of  economic  charges (1),  are  based 
on these extra-economic considerations and are there-
fore  to  some  extent  a  matter of political  choice,  on 
which  it  is  not  for  us  to  express  an  opinion. 
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This  does  not,  however,  mean  that  economic consi-
derations  cannot enter into  our study  of  the various 
systems.  But  these  considerations  are  not  decisive, 
since  political,  sociological  and  institutional  aspects 
must  be  taken  into  account  at  the  same time.  The 
only  really  positive  requirement  that  follows  from 
economic  analysis  alone  is  that  the charges  for  the 
use  of  infrastructure  should  not  be  lower  than  the 
practical  economic  charges. 
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For  any  components  additional  to  the  economic 
charges,  we  shall  show  that economic  sophistication 
serves  little  purpose;  since  the  political  and  socio-
logical  objectives  pursued  when  the  condition  of 
budgetary  equilibrium  is  imposed  are  of  a  very 
general  nature,  costs  do not need  to  be  apportioned 
or calculated in great detail.  In these circumstances, 
the  only  reasonable  thing  to  do  is  to  define  rules 
that  are  clear,  simple  and  not  arbitrary,  and  whose 
implementation  allows  of  objective  control. 
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In this connection it should be emphasized that even 
a  rough  policy  - provided  it  was  consistent  -
would be a great improvement on the present situation 
in  most  countries.  Very  few  serious  attempts  have 
actually  been  made  to  determine  the  marginal  use 
costs of infrastructure or to charge them to the users. 
Even less  has been done to  adjust the charges to the 
degree  of  congestion.  The  present  situation  is 
equally  chaotic  as  regards  the  nature of  the revenue 
obtained from  the users and the relationship between 
this  revenue  and  expenditure  on  infrastructure. 
Road vehicles are subject to several kinds of taxation, 
but  there  is  usually  no  direct  connection  between 
expenditure  on  roads  and  the  revenue  from  these 
taxes.  Although in  most countries the total revenue 
obtained  in  this  way  seems  greater than the costs of 
road  infrastructures  (however  these  costs  are  deter-
mined),  it  is  difficult  and  dangerous  to  express  a 
definite  opinion  as  long  as  this  revenue  is  fiscal  in 
character.  As  for  the  railways,  although  they  are 
technically  responsible  for  their  own  infrastructure 
costs,  they  are  subsidized  by  the  State  in  most 
countries e).  And inland  shipping contributes little 
to  pay the cost of waterways. 
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Without wishing  to  express  an opinion a priori as  to 
which  is  the  best  system  of  charges  for  the  use  of 
infrastructure,  we  can  at  least  say  that  whatever 
system  is  adopted  should  be  coherent.  In  most 
countries,  however,  it  seems  clear  that  the  present 
situation  is  not  based  on  any  coherent  set  of  prin-
ciples,  but is  more  the product of history  and often 
also  of  political  pressures,  chance  expedients,  and 
concepts  that  are out  of date,  erroneous,  or appro-
priate to  situations  that  no  longer exist.  Transport 
policy,  especially  as  regards  infrastructure,  must  get 
free of these shackles, in order to play its proper part 
in  economic progress and European integration. 
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30.1  - TRANSPORT SERVICES 
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In Part II we  arrived at the conclusion - tentatively 
and  with  certain  reservations  - that  a  competitive 
system,  if  it  were  allowed  to  function  without  any 
restrictions  of  a  public  or private  nature,  and  if  it 
proved  able  to  function  in  an  economic  manner, 
would  generally  produce  results  in  keeping  with  the 
criteria of optimum resource allocation (3).  For the 
various  assumptions  on  which  this  conclusion  de-
pends,  particularly  the  assumptions  of  full  employ-
ment  and  reasonably  steady  economic  growth,  we 
may refer to the Chapter on the options for transport 
services (4).  We  must,  however,  again  consider  in 
detail the exceptions to  this  proposition, which  arise 
when  there  is  abuse  of  dominant  positions  and  un-
economic  competition. 
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In these two  cases,  competition may produce results 
that  conflict  with  the  optimum  allocation  of  res-
sources. 
(1)  Of course,  in  so far as  these  systems  are not  completely 
free  from these  objections,  more or less  the same criticisms 
can be made of them as of the practical system of economic 
charges.  This  applies,  for  example  to  the  system  of 
development  costs,  which  also  generally  results  in  a  deficit 
when it is  put into practice. 
(")  The subsidies  are  not  always  subsidies  in  the  true  sense 
of the  word,  but may  consist,  either wholly  or in  part,  of 
compensation  paid  for  costs  arising  from  public-service  or 
other obligations. 
e)  We  would  repeat  that,  generally  speaking,  we  are  not 
considering  here  the  other  objectives  of  economic  policy 
that  were  discussed  in  Chapter  21,  since  they  would  be 
incompatible  with  an  optimum  allocation  of resources. 
(')  See  Chapter 25. 822 
As  we  have  already  said,  the  significance  of  these 
exceptions  depends  on  facts  and  on  the  way  in 
which  these  facts  are assessed and interpreted.  The 
information  available  to  us  is  not  sufficient  to  war-
rant  a definite  opinion  as  to the  actual frequency  of 
cases  of  abuse  of  dominant  positions  and  of  uneco-
nomic  competition.  However,  after  a  careful  study 
of  the  available  data  and  of  a  number  of  general 
considerations (1),  we  have  formed  the  impression 
that,  at  the  present  time,  the  number  of  cases  is 
smaller  than  is  often  thought. 
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In the first  place,  abuse of dominant positions is  not 
a general occurrence on the transport market, because 
the  railways  now  face  strong  competition  from  the 
roads  and  also  because, in the other modes of trans-
port,  internal competition - when  effective  - acts 
as  a  check  on  any  monopolistic  tendencies. 
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Secondly,  uneconomic  competition,  which  would 
show itself in the prevalence of excessively low prices 
over  a long  period,  is  associated with  internal subsi-
dizing  practised  by  the  railways;  a  presumed  struc-
tural  tendency  to  overinvestment  by  the competitive 
modes  of transport,  and a situation of cyclical insta-
bility  and  structural  change.  We  have  shown  that 
the  practice  of  internal  subsidizing  on  the  railways 
can  be  largely  prevented by  imposing the  constraint 
of budgetary equilibrium  and by imposing maximum 
tariffs  wherever  abuse  of  dominant  positions 
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occurs (2).  We  also  pointed out in  Part 11  that the 
"overinvestment thesis" must be treated with  consid-
erable  caution,  at  least  in  the  absence  of restrictive 
measures  and  as  long  as  carriers  are  adequately 
informed.  For  this  reason,  in  view  of  the  general 
disadvantages  of  licensing  systems,  we  expressed 
serious  doubts of the  advisability of systems  to con-
trol and restrict capacity (3).  The omission from our 
report  of  any  attempt  to  define  an  appropriate 
transport policy  for  a situation of recession is  delib-
erate:  we  have  shown  that,  although  various  social 
measures  might  be  desirable  if  structural  changes 
occurred,  particularly  in  order  to  facilitate  con-
version,  any  specific  and  lasting  support  of  the 
incomes  of  carriers  (e.g.  in  the  fonn  of  minimum 
prices)  would  only  hamper  their  adaptation  to  new 
economic  conditions (4). 
825 
In any case, as we stated in the General Introduction, 
the policy of transport tariffs suggested in this report, 
which  will  be dealt  with  in  detail  in  Chapter 32,  is 
essentially  pragmatic  in  character;  it  makes  no  par-
ticular  assumptions  as  to  the  actual  frequency  of 
cases  of  abuse  of  dominant positions  and  of uneco-
nomic competition, and is  completely independent of 
them. 
(')  Which  will  be  dealt with in  greater detail in Chapter 32. 
(")  See Subsection  25.30. 
(")  See  Subsection  25.22. 
(')  See  Section  25.4. CHAPTER  31 
VARIOUS SYSTEMS  FOR  INFRASTRUCTURE 
31.0- THE  PRACTICAL  SYSTEM 
OF  ECONOMIC  CHARGES 
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The  essential  elements  of  this  system  have  already 
been  discussed  in  Part  II (1).  It will  therefore  be 
sufficient  here  to  mention  a  few  practical problems. 
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For optimum infrastructure utilization, the charges to 
be  paid by  the users  must - as  we  have shown -
be  made up of  a  cost charge equal to  the marginal 
use  cost  and  a  congestion  charge  which,  when  the 
infrastructure  is  economically  fully  utilized,  is  high 
enough  to  limit  demand  to  the  capacity  available. 
We  also  saw  that,  for  the  roads,  the  cost  charges 
can  be  levied  reasonably  approximately  by  combin-
ing  fuel  taxes  with  taxes on vehicles,  and that there 
is  no  particular  problem  of application  in  the  case 
of waterways and railways.  The cost charges should 
- and  could  - be  differentiated  according  to the 
deterioration  of  infrastructure  attributable  to  the 
various  categories  of  traffic.  As  these  charges 
probably do not vary perceptibly in time or space, a 
differentiation  according  to  these  two  factors  would 
not  appear to  be essential.  On the other hand, the 
congestion  charges,  reflecting  as  they  do  the degree 
of  economic  utilization,  show  very  wide  variations 
both  over  a  period  of  time  and  between  one  part 
of  a  network  and another (2).  It is  clearly  imprac-
ticable  to  differentiate  prices  on  this  basis,  at least 
for  the  roads.  Any  system  applied  will  therefore 
have  to  confine  itself  to  imposing  specific  charges 
for  economic  congestion  in  those  areas  and  at 
those  times  when  the  risk  of  congestion  is  greatest. 
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How  close  can one  get  in  practice to the  ideal  pat-
tern  of  economic  charges?  The  answer  to  this 
question,  which  will  largely  depend  on  the  cost . of 
collection,  raises  technical  problems  that  are outside 
the  scope  of this  report.  Nevertheless,  much.  more 
can surely be done in this direction than has hitherto 
been  done  in  most  countries  and  if  the  system  of 
charges  for  the use  of infrastructure were de_veloped 
along the  broad lines  set out above (3), considerable 
progress  would  have  been  made  towards  the intro-
duction  of  a  more  rational  system. 
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Such policy,  the aim  of which  is  to  ensure an opti-
mum  utilization  of  infrastructures,  should  prevent 
any. distortion  of  the  distribution  of  traffic  bet.ween 
competing  modes  of  inland transport.  For this,.  of 
course,  the  same  criteria  and  the  same  practical 
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approximations  would  have  to  be  applied  to  the 
infrastructure  of  each  of  the  three  modes.  Thus, 
the  general  principles  on which  the  classification  of 
roads (  4)  should  be based  would  also  have  to  apply 
to  the  other  modes  of  transport.  Subject  to  a  few 
obvious adjustments, the points we made with regard 
to regional non-equalization of charges when budget-
ary  equilibrium  is  imposed  may  equally  well  be 
made  here ("). 
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As· we  stressed  in  the Introduction  to this  Part,  the 
arguments  in  favour  of  the  practical  system  of 
economic charges derive from economic criteria, and 
more especially from  the objective of optimum utili-
zation  of  infrastructure,  both  within  each  mode  of 
transport  and  where  the  distribution  of  traffic  be-
tween competing modes is  concerned.  On the other 
hand,  the  disadvantages  of  the  system,  which  we 
studied  in  detail  in  Part  11 (6),  are  based  on  con-
siderations that lie for the most part outside the scope 
of  purely  economic  reasoning.  Consequently,  t~e 
final  choice  is  clearly political in character.  It will 
depend in the first  place on the  ~mportance attach~d 
to  achieving  an optimum  allocation  of resources,  m 
particular by creating such con?itio.ns  as  will  ensure 
efficient operation.  Secondly,  It  will  depend on the 
weight  that  is  given  to  non-economic  aspects,  and 
on the  degree  to  which  the  alternative  sy.stems  are 
free from  the disadvantages of the economic charges 
system.  Lastly,  it  will  also.  dep~~d  on  how .far 
objectives  other  than  economic  efficiency  - ob~ec­
t'ives  of equity in particular - are accepted as  a1ms 
for  transport  policy. 
31.1  - THE DEVELOPMENT COST SYSTEM 
31.10  - General 
831 
The development cost system springs from ess.entially 
the  same  considerations  as  those  from  whtch  the 
(')  See  particularly Section  24.2. 
(")  Varying,  for  example,  with  the  peak  traffic  hours  or 
seasons.  (See  Part  I,  in  which  we  showed  that  the  con-
gestion  charge  could  not  be  interpreted  as  a  cost). 
(")  See  Section  24.2. 
(')  We  have  classified  roads  into  at  least  three  main  cate-
gories of network:  main, urban and suburban, and local. 
(")  See Subsection  24.45. 
(")  See  Section  23.3. system  of  economic  tolls  is  derived,  namely  the 
criteria  of  optimum  resource  allocation,  and  partic-
ularly  their  marginalist  aspect.  By  and  large,  the 
development  cost  theory  seeks  to  determine  the 
charges  for  the  use  of  infrastructure  from  the  mar-
ginal  cost  of  providing  it.  But  - and  this  is  a 
vital  point  - the  theory  also  imposes  a  certain 
restraint on  these charges,  in  that it requires them to 
remain  constant  over  a  period  of  time,  and  this  is 
generally  incompatible  with  an  optimum  allocation 
of resources (1). 
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According  to  the  development  cost  theory,  charges 
for  the  use  of infrastructure  should  be  equal  to  the 
cost  of  progression  when  traffic  is  increasing  and 
the  existing  capacity  will  have  to  be  expanded  in 
the  foreseeable  future;  they  should  be equal  to  the 
cost of regression when  traffic is  decreasing so  much 
that  the  existing  infrastructure  will  not  be  replaced 
at  the  end  of  its  economic  life.  The cost  of  pro-
gression  is  defined  as  the quotient of the total  (  dis-
counted)  cost  of an  addition  to the capacity  of  the 
infrastructure  (i.e.  the  sum  of  the  investment  cost 
and  the  discounted  value  of  future  operating costs; 
less  the  discounted  value  of  the  investment  at  the 
end  of  its  economic  life)  divided  by  the  discounted 
sum  of  all  future  services  to  be  performed  by  the 
additional  capacity,  assessed  as  physical  quantities. 
The  cost  of regression  is  defined  as  the  quotient  of 
the  market value  at the  moment  of calculation  of a 
particular  element  of  the  infrastructure,  plus  the 
discounted  value  of  present  and  future  operating 
costs,  divided  by  the  discounted  sum  of  all  future 
services to be provided by the infrastructure, assessed 
as  physical  quantities (2). 
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The  development  cost  system  occurs  in  a  number 
of different versions.  In particular, the denominator 
may  be  defined  not  as  the  discounted  future  traffic 
flow,  but as  the total discounted capacity created by 
the  marginal  expansion  of the  infrastructure.  Both 
versions  imply  fixing  conversion  factors  for  the 
various  categories  of  traffic  that  will  use  the  infra-
structure in  question  (such  categories  being  assessed 
as  physical  quantities),  so  as  to  reduce  them  to  a 
common  denominator.  The  problems  involved 
will  be  discussed  below (3). 
834 
Another version  consists in  allowing varying degrees 
of regional equalization of charges.  The reasons for 
equalization,  and  the  problems  it  raises,  which  are 
similar  to  those  mentioned  in  connection  with  the 
system  of economic  charges,  will  also  be  considered 
in ·the  following  subsections. 
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Neither  the  cost  of  progression  nor  th~:  cost  of 
regression  is  r1eally  a  cost  at  all  in  the  economic 
sense of the term, since they do not denote the value 
of the  factors  sacrificed in producing the services  of 
which  the  cost  is  to  be  determined.  The  cost  of 
utilizing  the  infrastructure  does  not  equal  the  cost 
of  progression  nor  the  cost  of  regression  but  the 
marginal  use  c:ost.  This  does  not  mean  that  the 
development  cost  theory is  not worth  serious  exam-
ination.  The name is  certainly a misnomer, but the 
concept  nevertheless  suggests  at  first  sight'  a  prom-
ising  convention  by  which  a  system  of  charges  for 
the  use  of infrastructure might  be worked  out. 
31.11  - Advantages  and  disadvantages 
836 
The  development  cost  system,  at  least  in  some  of 
its  versions,  may be  seen  as  an  attempt to  reconcile 
the  criteria  of optimum  resource  allocation  (and  in 
particular  the  marginal  conditions)  with  the  desire 
to  achieve  some  stabilization  of charges  for  the use 
of  infrastructure  and  to make  it  easier  to  calculate 
them in  practic~:.  In some versions it also  serves to 
bring about a certain uniformity of charges in space. 
Since  the  basic  idea  of development  cost  iis  similar 
to  that of economic charges,  it  is  worth  considering 
how far the development cost system is free from the 
various objections  that have  been made to  the latter 
system (4)•,  and  what  specific  advantages  and 
disadvantages  it  has  in  comparison  with  economic 
charges. 
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Where  this  system  would  lead  to  a  deficit,  the 
problems we have shown to be inherent in the system 
of  economic  charges  would  also  arise  -· though 
perhaps  not  to  the  same  extent.  From  certain 
points  of  view,  this  possible  difference  gives  the 
system  of development cost  a  relative  advantage (5). 
(')  See  Part I. 
(")  The market value  will  often  be  very  low,  either because 
the  element  in  question  cannot  be  put  to  any  other  use 
(e.g.  a  tunnel),  or  because  the  cost  of  converting  it  for 
other uses  is  high  (e.g.  a  canal or the roadbed of a  railway 
line  in  open  country). 
(")  See  Subsection  31.12. 
(')  See  Section  23.3. 
(
5
)  This  fact  is  important when  equity  is  considerc::d,  or the 
social  and  political pressures  that may lead  to selious mis-
direction  of investments  in  infrastructure.  But  it  does  not 
apply  to  the  third.  aspect  of  the  deficit,  namely  the  risk 
that the efficiency of the railways might decline if subsidies 
were  granted,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  distinguishing  be-
tween  rail  transport  operations  and  infrastructure.  Thi!i 
problem  persits  as  long  as  there  is  a  deficit  - large  or 
small  - covered  by  public funds. 838 
Compared  with  the  system  of  calculated  total  cost 
that  we  shall  consider  later,  it  has  another,  very 
important  advantage,  in  that  it  seeks  to  take  into 
account  the  present  and  future  consequences  of 
current  decisions  to  expand  the  infrastructure  or 
close  down  certain  parts  of  it;  also,  it  avoids  any 
consideration of past expenses,  which  are completely 
irrelevant  to  economic  decisions  that  have  to  be 
taken  in  the  present. 
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Compared with  the  system  of economic charges,  the 
development  cost  system  may  have  the  relative 
advantage  of  reducing  the  deficit,  but  at  the  same 
time  it  has  the  relative  disadvantage  of  causing  a 
certain  distortion  of  the  optimum  allocation  of 
resources.  This  is  a  drawback  which  it  shares  in 
varying  degrees  with  all  the  other  systems  we  shall 
consider.  In so  far as  this distortion occurs because 
the  average  charges  are  higher  than  the  economic 
charges, it is the price that must be paid for  reducing 
the  deficit  and  solving  the  problems  connected  with 
it. 
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But  development  cost  has  another drawback,  which 
is  not  necessarily  connected  with  reduction  of  the 
deficit.  In  Part I  we  showed  that  the development 
cost  is  only  strictly  equal  to  the  economic  charges 
when  the  economy  is  static  and there are  no  indivi-
sibilities.  The  development  cost  is  a  cost  that -
if  we  disregard  any  changes  in  prices  and  techno-
logy  - remains  constant  over  a  period  of time,  as 
long  as  the  capacity  of  the  existing  infrastructure  is 
not changed.  Since the economic charges, and espe-
cially  their  rent  component,  vary  with  the  intensity 
of  demand,  the  "constant"  charges  based  on  the 
development  cost  are  only  equal  to  the  economic 
charges  if  demand  does  not  fluctuate.  In fact,  the 
charges based on the development cost  are therefore 
at  best  no  more  than  an  approximation  to  the 
economic  charges  in  a  very  special  and  unrealistic 
case. 
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Stabilization  of  charges  over  a  period  of  time  is 
often held to be an advantage - sometimes even the 
principal  advantage  - of  the  development  cost 
system.  But  the  argument  that  any  stabilization  of 
charges  would  be  an  economic  advantage  is  doubt-
ful (1).  For long-lived  indivisible  assets,  which  will 
be underemployed for  a long  time,  such stabilization 
would certainly be harmful rather than good, from an 
economic  point  of  view.  Moreover,  in  the  face  of 
economic  congestion,  stabilization  of  charges  at  an 
average  - and  therefore inadequate - level  would 
mean  that  an  efficient  instrument  for  rationing  de-
mand had  been  abandoned in  favour  of the  method 
of  the  queue.  For  this  reason,  the  element  of 
stabilization  implicit  in  the  option  of  development 
cost  is  a  doubtful  advantage,  to  say  the  least. 
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But this criticism may be somewhat unrealistic, since 
perfect differentiation of the charges for each element 
of  infrastructure  is  physically  impossible.  Consid-
erable  equalization  is  inevitable,  which  means  that 
in  practice  the  charges  cannot be perfectly  adapted 
to  the  actual  degree  of  utilization  of  each  of these 
elements.  In  other  words,  since  the  charges  must 
be  equalized  in  practice,  a  considerable  degree  of 
"stabilization"  is  inevitable. 
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This  is  just  as  true  for  development  cost  as  for 
economic  charges.  In  practice,  the  development 
cost  system  can  only  be  applied  to  large  divisions 
of infrastructure, such as the three categories of roads 
that  we  have  mentioned (2). 
31.12  - Practical  application 
844 
When  one realizes  the practical limitations that mil-
itate against adoption of specific charges for  the use 
of  particular  infrastructure  elements,  the  develop-
ment  cost  system  appears  in  a  different  light. 
845 
It  obviously  cannot  claim  to  be  as  precise  as  the 
theory  would  sometimes  suggest.  The  question  is, 
then,  how  to  put  into  practice  a  concept  which 
involves  very  extensively  individualized  calculations. 
How,  for  example,  should  the  development  cost  be 
calculated  for  very  large  units  which  include  roads 
with  very  different  technical  characteristics  and  very 
different  traffic  prospects? 
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Another problem, as we have seen (3), arises because 
the  various categories of traffic,  assessed  as  physical 
quantities, have to be reduced to a common denomi-
nator by means  of conversion factors.  It is  not,  of 
course,  impossible  to  find  reasonable  conventions 
for  calculating  such  factors (4),  but  they  remain 
intrinsically conventional  and do  not follow  automa-
tically  from  the  development  cost  theory  itself. 
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It seems  abundantly  clear  that  application  of  the 
development  cost  system  would  give  rise  to  many 
arbitrary  decisions.  It should  be  remembered  here 
(')  See  Section  24.3. 
(")  Main networks,  urban  and  suburban networks,  and local 
networks.  This  classification  is  not  necessarily  exhaustive. 
(")  See  Subsection  31.10. 
(')  See  Subsection  24.46. that  some  of the  major  requirements  of any  rule  in 
this  field  are that it  should  be  relatively  simple,  not 
arbitrary, and such that its working can be objectively 
checked in  practice.  These conditions would not be 
fulfilled  by  the  development  cost  system  as 
implemented; 
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The  objections  we  have  stated  cannot  be  met  by 
applying  the  development  cost  system.  If  such 
disadvantages  are to be avoided,  other systems  must 
be  considered, such as that of budgetary equilibrium 
without  the possibility of borrowing (1). 
31.2 - THE SYSTEM OF CALCULATED 
TOTAL  COST 
31.20  - General 
849 
Like  the  development cost system  and the budgetary 
equilibrium  system,  the  system  of  calculated  total 
cost takes many different forms.  Obviously we shall 
have  to  confine  our study  to  the  broad  outlines  of 
this  system  and its  main  variants, without going into 
details. 
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The general idea underlying all versions of the system 
of  calculated  total  cost  is  as  follows.  The  system 
is  designed  to  provide  a  basis  for  determining  the 
charges to be paid by the users of infrastructure, and 
does  this  by  formulating  rules  for  calculating  the 
"total cost" of infrastructure (i.e. the sum that should 
be  paid  each  year  by  the  users).  Its  main  task  is 
to  determine  this  "total  cost"  in  such  a  way  as  to 
avoid any distortion of the conditions of competition 
between  the  various  modes  of  transport.  The 
system is  also  based to some extent on the idea of a 
balanced budget, since the charges to be paid by the 
users  are  so  calculated  as  to  cover  all  the  costs 
connected  with  infrastructure  - the  costs  of  in-
vestment  as  well  as  of operation  and  maintenance. 
Where  investment  is  concerned,  these costs  are not, 
however,  the nominal value of the investment but its 
replacement value,  i.e.  the price  that would  have to 
be  paid  to  construct  an  identical  or equivalent  in-
stallation  at  the  present  time (2).  The  system  of 
calculated  total  cost  allows  for  price  changes, 
technical  developments  and,  in  one of  its  versions, 
fluctuations  of  demand (3).  The  sum  to  be  paid 
each  year by the users of infrastructure on the basis 
of  the  capital  invested  must  continually  be  worked 
out  afresh  from  the  present  replacement  value  of 
the  infrastructure;  for  this  purpose  conventional 
schedules  of  amortization  and  interest  are  used  to 
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determine the yearly capital burden of infrastructure. 
In at least one version of the system these schedules 
are based on the  expected length of the installation's 
economic  life,  and  are  adjusted  when  the  latter 
changes. 
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Whatever the version considered, the idea underlying 
the system  of  calculated total cost is  entirely sound. 
This system is intended to avert the distortions of the 
conditions  of  competition  that  might  occur  if  the 
rule of budgetary equilibrium were applied (4).  The 
nature of such  distortions  can be seen  quilt~ clearly 
by  comparing  two  similar  and  competing  units  of 
infrastructure, such as two harbours built at different 
'times.  If  the  rule  of  budgetary  equilibrium  is 
imposed  on each of them  separately, the older har-
bour will be in a more favourable competitive position 
simply  because  its  original  cost  of construction  has 
been wiped out by inflation, whereas the other, more 
recently  constructed  harbour  is  burdened  with  a 
much higher debt although its installations are essen-
tially  the  same.  Such  a  situation  is  unacceptable, 
both  from  the  strictly  economic  point  of view  and 
from  the point of view  of equity. 
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This  example  shows  very  clearly  that  the  system 
of  budgetary  equilibrium  may  lead  to  very  senous 
difficulties  when  it is  applied to  one particular item 
of  infrastructure  or to  small  aggregates (5).  If,  for 
some  reason,  the  system cannot be applied  to suffi-
ciently  large  units,  it  would  be logical  to adopt one 
of  the  following  lines  of  approach;  either  to  reject 
budgetary equilibrium and accept the practical system 
of  economic  charges,  or  to  correct  the  system  of 
(') See  Section  31.4. 
(")  In  one  version  of the  system,  no  account  is  taken  of 
technical  developments  unless  a  particular  technique  is  no 
longer  employed  at  all.  In  this  version,  the  replacement 
value  is  essentially  the  present-day  cost  of constructing  an 
installation  identical  with  the  one  in  question. 
(') It follows  that the  system  of calculated  total  c:ost  need 
not necessarily satisfy the condition of budgetary equilibrium 
as  usually  understood.  Recently,  however,  it  would  seem 
to  have  satisfied  this  condition  completely,  owing  to  infla-
tion.  Since  in  numerous  cases  the  nominal  value  of  the 
sums  that  were  invested  in  the  past 'has  been  reduced  to 
zero  by  inflation,  charges  based  on  the  replacement  value 
would  generally  be  higher  than  charges  calculated  from 
the historic cost, except where there has been great technical 
progress. 
(')  We  would  stress.  that the  practical  system  of c:conomic 
charges  (see  Section  31.0)  makes  it  possible  to  avoid  such 
distortions  completely.  But  this  system  does  not  satisfy 
the  condition  of budgetary equilibrium,  whereas  the  system 
of calculated total cost does at any rate when given a special 
form. 
(")  This  will  be  dealt  with  in  the  section  on  the  system  of 
budgetary  equilibrium,  especially  with  regard  to  the  version 
of  it  without  the  possibility  of  borrowing,  in  which  the 
problem is  particularly acute (see  Subsec.  31.40). budgetary  equilibrium  in  such  a  way  as  to  bring  it 
closer to  the  system of calculated total cost. 
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This  conclusion  does  not  necessarily  apply  to  large 
aggregates.  If  charges  are  equalized  over  wide 
areas,  the  problems  connected  with  budgetary 
equilibrium  are  reduced  to  the  possibility  of 
distortion between one mode of transport as  a whole 
and  another.  Such  distortions,  if  they  occur  at  all, 
are  certainly far  less  serious than those we have just 
illustrated  by  our  example  of  the  two  harbours (1). 
Moreover,  although  the  method  of  calculated  total 
cost  may  have  certain  theoretical  advantages  over 
that  of  budgetary  equilibrium  where  smallscale 
aggregates  are  concerned,  the  choice  is  much  less 
easy where  the aggregates are large,  In this context 
it  is  worth  repeating that,  if  the  system  of economic 
charges  is  rejected,  a  substantial  degree  of  regional 
equalization  of charges  for  the  use  of infrastructure 
is  in  any  case  desirable  for  many  other  reasons (2). 
The  choice  between  the  system  of  calculated  total 
cost  and  that of budgetary equilibrium  thus  remains 
open,  at  least  as  long  as  we  have  not  considered 
the  other  aspects  of these  systems. 
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On this  general level,  one final  point must be  made. 
Neither the "total cost" derived from the replacement 
value,  nor any  other measure of the  "total cost"  of 
existing  infrastructure,  can  claim  to  be an  interpre-
tation  of  budgetary  equilibrium  consistent  with  an 
optimum  allocation  of resources,  nor to  be the only 
possible basis for  a system of charges consistent with 
an  optimum allocation of resources.  This is  clearly 
demonstrated by economic  theory.  The only meas-
ure  of  cost  that  should  be  considered  when  an 
optimum  system  of  tariffs  is  to  be  worked  out  is 
the cost charge, which is  combined with a congestion 
charge designed to  ration the available capacity when 
the  latter  is  fully  utilized.  As  we  have  seen  in 
Part·  11 (3),  there  may  be  several  reasons  for  also 
imposing  the  constraint  of  budgetary  equilibrium, 
but  none  of  them  clearly  suggests  the  adoption  of 
one  particular  interpretation  of  the  "total  cost"  of 
infrastructure.  The  constraint  of  budgetary  equil-
ibrium  is  mainly  justified  by  the  fact  that  its  aim 
is  to  eliminate the  various  disadvantages  inherent in 
the  deficit;  more  particularly,  it  aims  at  ensuring 
efficient  operation  of infrastructure within  the exist-
ing  institutional  and  social  context.  Its  application 
cannot  and  should  not  be  other  than  very  general 
(i.e.  accompanied  by  a  high  degree  of equalization); 
obviously  this  necessarily  excludes  any  economic 
perfectionism. 
31.21  - Practical  application 
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If the system of calculated total cost is  to be applied, 
the  sum  to  be  paid  each  year  by  the  users  of infra-
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structure  (the  "total  cost")  must  be  determined  by 
means  of i)  a  conventional  measure  of  the  present 
value  of  the  existing  infrastructure  and  ii)  conven-
tional  schedules  of amortization and interest applied 
to  that  measure  of  value.  Both  these  elements 
require closer analysis before the pros and cons of the 
system  can  be  assessed (4). 
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There are several alternative definitions and practical 
interpretations  of  the  concept  of  present  value.  It 
could  be  defined,  for  example,  as  the  discounted 
value of the congestion charges relating to  the infra-
structure  in  question.  This  would  certainly  be  a 
very  convenient definition from  the point of view  of 
economic  theory,  but  it  provides  no  answer  to the 
problems  that  the  system  of  calculated  total  cost  is 
intented to solve, because it assumes that the problem 
of  optimum  charging  has  been  solved  already, 
whereas  solution  of  this  problem  is  in  fact  the 
object  of  the  exercise.  It  would  be  quite  useless 
to  calculate  the  present  value  in  this  way,  for  that 
would  mean  estimating  future  charges  in  order  to 
determine  a  present  value  that  would  then  be  used 
to determine those  same charges.  This is  obviously 
a  vicious  circle. 
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The  present  value  is  generally  interpreted  as  the 
current  replacement  value  of  the  infrastructure  in 
question.  At  first  sight,  this  is  an  attractive  idea. 
The charges  to  be  paid by  the  users  are  calculated 
from  what  the  infrastructure would  cost  if  identical 
or  equivalent  installations  were  to  be  constructed 
now,  for a given  scheme of amortization.  The con-
ditions  of  competition  would  thus  be  equalized  on 
the basis of current replacement value (5). 
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Another line of reasoning is  often advanced in favour 
of  this  interpretation  of  the  present  value  of  infra-
structure.  It  is  said  that  the  replacement  value 
represents  the  economic value  of the factors  of  pro-
duction  tied  up  in  the  infrastructure,  and  that  the 
interest and amortization to be borne by  the present 
(')  The  overall  distortion  may  be  relatively  slight,  even 
if the  distortion  on one particular route is  very  marked. 
(")  See  Section  23.3  and  Subsection  24.45. 
(")  See  particularly  Section  23.3. 
(')  With regard to apportionment of the total cost among. the 
various functions of the infrastructure and among the vanous 
categories  of traffic,  the  problems  are  essentially  t~':  s~me 
as  those connected with the system of budgetary eqmlibnum 
(see  Subsecs  24.43  and  24.46). 
(")  According  to  one  version  of  the  system  of  calculated 
total  cost,  the  present  value  of  an  infrastructure  should 
be  calculated  differently  if  it  is  not  going  to  be  replaced 
at  the  end  of  its  economic  life.  We  shall  consider  this 
case  later. users  should  be calculated on that basil>,  so  that the 
charges  would  cover the  cost of keeping the  factors 
of  production  in  their  present  emplovment.  This 
~rgument is  illogical; it  would  imply valuation of the 
~nf~astructure  at  its  opportunity  cost  (i.e.  its  value 
m tts  best  alternative employment)  rather than at its 
replacement  value.  The  opportunity  cost  of  infra-
structure  is  usually  rather  low,  since  it  cannot  be 
used  for  other  purposes  without  high  expenditure 
on  c?nversion (1).  Consequently,  the  opportunity 
cost  ts  almost  always  far  below  the  replacement 
value;  hence  this  reasoning  would  lead  to  an  inter-
pretation  of  the  present  value  very  different  from 
the replacement value,  and in certain cases this could 
cause  serious  distortion. 
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The  advocates  of the  system  of total cost  calculated 
from  an  assessment  of  infrastructure  at its  replace-
ment  value  usually  modify  this  principle  when  the 
infrastructure is  not to  be  replaced  at  the  end of its 
economic  life.  The value is  then interpreted as  the 
recoverable  value  of the infrastructure at the  end of 
tha~  life.  In  itself,  this  modification  may  seem 
emmently  reasonable,  since  it avoids  further  under-
utilization  of  an  infrastructure  that  is  already  so 
underutilized that it is  not going to be replaced when 
th~t would normally become necessary.  Three other 
pomts should,  however,  be noted.  Firstly, the same 
argument  holds  good,  by  and  large,  for  an  infra-
structure  t?~t  is  expected  to  be  replaced  but  may 
be underutihzed for a great part of its  economic life. 
This  is  particularly  relevant  if  the  infrastructure  is 
very  durable,  for  it  may then  be  underutilized for  a 
long  period.  Secondly,  such  a  correction  of  the 
replacement  cost  appreciably  reduces  whatever 
in~titutional  ad~antages  there  may  be  in  applying 
thts  concept  stnctly, because  it  makes the system  of 
charges  dependent on decisions  of an  incidental  and 
discretionary nature.  Thirdly,  this  correction is  less 
important  if  there  is  great  regional  equalization  of 
charges,  and  if  the  charges  are  not  related  to  the 
separate  parts  of  infrastructure  but  to  the  right  to 
use the infrastructure over a large area. 
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One  other  version  of  present  value  that  should  be 
mentioned  here  results  from  correcting  the  historic 
cost  by  applying  certain  objective  price  indices,  by 
a  method  of  standard  costing,  to  the  various  com-
ponents  of  the  cost  of  building  the  infrastructure. 
This method can take many forms, depending on the 
extent  to  which  the bullding costs  are broken down. 
Once agreement has been reached on certain conven-
tional  rules,  the  method  has  the  merit  of  being 
~ompletely unambiguous;  but  there  is  a  danger  that 
tt  may  lead to  an  ever greater degree  of differentia-
tion  of  the  components  that  go  to  make  up  these 
costs,  and  this  would  automatically  tend  to  cancel 
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out  the advantages.  In addition,  it  might  result  in 
unnecessarily  high  charges,  since  technical  advances 
could  not  at  first  be  fully  taken  into  account. 
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The sched.ules  of amortization and interest rnay  also 
vary  considerably,  as  regards  both  the  duration  of 
amortization  and its pattern during that period.  As 
regards  the  duration,  the schedules  could  be based 
on the expected t:conomic life of the infrastructure  or 
they  could  prescribe  shorter  standard  periods.  'As 
regards  the  pattern,  the  annual  burden  of  amorti-
zation  a~d interest  may  be constant,  degressive  or 
progressive.  However,  as  we have shown in  Part I, 
any  rul.e  of  this  kind  for  amortization  is  purely 
conventiOnal as  far as  economic theory is  concerned. 
The  optimum  amortization  cannot  be  determined 
a priori; it can only be determined by considering the 
charges  consistent  with  an  optimum  allocation  of 
resources. 
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The  interest  rates  would  have  to  be  co-ordinated 
between all infrastructures, for otherwise there would 
be a distortion of the conditions of competition such 
as  the  system  of  calculated  total  cost  is  expressly 
designed  to  avoid.  These rates  would  also  have to 
be  continually  adjusted. 
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Special  problems  arise  in  determining  the  value  of 
land  occupied  by  infrastructure.  Since  such  land 
has  no  replacement  value,  its  value  is  usually 
determined from  that of the  land  adjoining it.  The 
corresponding  annual  charges  on  the  users  can  be 
calculated from  such estimates according to the rates 
?f interest chosen.  These charges may be  v1~ry high 
m areas where land values have risen greatly, partic-
ularly in towns.  This must be regarde~ as  a logical 
and inevitable consequence of the system of calculat-
ed total cost.  Nevertheless it is  sometimes suggested 
that  the  fraction  of  this  value  due  to  the  presence 
of  the  infrastructure  should  be  deducted  from  the 
value  (thus  defined)  of  such  land.  The  underlying 
idea  is  not  unreasonable.  In  general  t1~rms  it 
amounts to saying that the total benefits arising from 
the  infrastructure  could  be  taken  as  the  sum  of  all 
the  rents  that would  disappear  if  the  infrastructure 
did  not  exist.  Some  of these  rents  are  not  subject 
to  any tax.  This  is  the case,  for  example,  with the 
potential income  derived  by the owners of adjoining 
lands  from  the  value  added  to  their  land  by  the 
presence of the infrastructure.  These "external ben-
efits"  could  be taken  into  account  by  regarding the 
value  of  the  land  occupied  by  the  infrastructure  as 
(')  But  see  what is  said at the end of the pn:sent subsection 
about land  values  in  towns. the  value  of the  adjoining  land  less  the value  added 
to  it  by  the  infrastructure. 
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There are,  however,  at  least  three objections to such 
a  solution.  Firstly,  it  raises  problems  of  valuation 
that  are  practically insoluble,  and it  therefore makes 
the  method  of  calculated  total  cost  conditional  on 
a great many discretionary estimates.  Secondly, the 
'_'correction"  envisaged  is  not  really  logical,  because 
Jt  only takes one type of rent into account and disre-
~ards the  many  others  that  can  be  created  by  the 
mfrastructure  and  are  not  subject  to  a  tax  either, 
such  as  the  rents  of  consumers  and  producers. 
Thirdly,  it is  doubtful  whether  this  correction  is  an 
improvement  from  an  economic  point  of  view, 
because  it  is  precisely  in  areas  where  the  price  of 
land is  high, such as towns, that economic congestion, 
and  therefore  the  economic  charges,  tend  to  be 
greatest.  If the  users  were  made  to  pay  the  high 
charges  that would  result  if  the system  of calculated 
total cost were adopted without correction, congestion 
might  be reduced  in  the  cities  and  an  economically 
desirable  improvement  in  their  infrastructure  might 
be  promoted. 
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In  any  case,  there  are  a  great  number  of  possible 
solutions  here,  each  of  which  is  based  on  sound 
arguments.  But  it  must  be  realized  that  they  are 
all  basically  conventional. 
31.22  - Advantages  and  disadvantages 
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It  is  difficult  to  pass  a  general  judgment  on  the 
system  of calculated  total cost  because  there  are  so 
many  different  versions  of it.  The main differences 
between them concern the way in which the value of 
infrastructure  is  assessed,  particularly  as  regards 
land  and  installations  that  are  not  intended  to  be 
replaced,  and  the  length  of  the  period  and  the 
pattern  of  amortization. 
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All  these  solutions  are  conventional,  and  can  there-
fore  only be judged from  an  economic standpoint by 
COQ)paring  their  actual  effects  on  the  optimum 
allocation  of  resources.  Such  a  comparison  would 
be  beyond  the  scope  of this  report,  in  view  of  the 
extensive research required.  One general point may, 
however, be made.  The system of economic charges 
makes  it  possible  to  avoid  the arbitrariness,  and  the 
distortion  of  optimum  resource  allocation,  that  are 
inherent - though not always to the same extent -
in  all  the different versions of the system of calculat-
ed  total  cost.  This  system  must  therefore  stand  or 
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fall  b~ the  advantages it  has to  offer compared with 
the.  disadvantages  of  the  economic  charges,  all  of 
which  are connected with the deficit (1). 
868 
This  brings  us  to  a  comparison  of  the  system  of 
calc.u.lat~d  total  cost  with  the  systems  of  budgetary 
eqm.hbnum  that  we  shall  discuss  in  the  following 
sections.  The former may be regarded as presenting 
certain  economic  advantages  over  the  latter,  in  so 
far  as  it  avoids  the  distortion  of  the  conditions  of 
competition  resulting  from  the  unequal  effects  of 
inflation  on  the  three  modes  of  transport.  These 
advantages  are  especially  important  when  the  two 
systems  are  applied  on  a  small  scale  (i.e.  to  indivi-
dual  elements  of infrastructure  or to  small  aggrega-
tes), but they carry much less weight when a comdd-
erable  degree  of  regional  equalization  of  charges 
is  applied  at  the same time.  In this  connection we 
would  point out - as  we  have  already done several 
times (2)  - that,  even  if  the  system  of  economic 
charges is  rejected,  broad equalization is  in  any case 
rendered necessary by the economic interdependence 
of  the  separate  parts  of  a  network.  Consequently, 
the  apparent  advantages  of  the  system  of 
calculated  total  cost  over  the  system  of  budgetary 
equilibrium  are  much  reduced  - if  not  eliminated 
- by extensive  equalization of charges. 
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How  does  the  policy  under  review  stand  up  to the 
other  criteria?  If it  is  judged  by  the  criterion  that 
any  charging  policy  must  be  simple,  not  arbitrary, 
and  allow  of  objective  supervision,  the  method  of 
calculated total cost gets  a  fairly  low  rating,  at least 
in its  usual versions  (according to which the charges 
should  be  determined  from  the  replacement  value 
of the infrastructure).  The calculations involved are 
not  simple,  even  when  the  system  is  already  in 
operation,  and they  necessitate  a  great many discre-
tionary  decisions.  Replacement  value  is  not  an 
observable or easily  verifiable  fact,  especially  in  the 
case  of  such  unique  installations  as  some  of  the 
elements  of  infrastructure (a).  It  is  essentially  a 
more  or less  subjective  estimate.  As  was  shown  in 
the  preceding  subsection,  these  disadvantages  are 
even greater in the version in  which the replacement 
value  is  corrected  so  that  it  becomes  equivalent  to 
the  recoverable  cost  of  an  infrastructure  whenever 
the  infrastructure  is  not  to  be  replaced  at  the  end 
of its economic life.  Moreover, this correction loses 
(')  See  Section  23.3. 
(")  See  particularly  Section  23.3  and  Subsection  24.45. 
(")  Of course, this does not mean that there are no objective 
points  of  reference  for  evaluating  certain  infrastructure 
elements.  These exist,  for example, for the permanent way 
of  the  railways  (rails,  sleepers,  ballast,  etc.). much  of  its  significance  if  the  idea  of  equalizing 
charges  throughout  large  areas  is  accepted. 
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It  is  doubtful  whether  these  drawbacks  can  be 
reduced  if  the  replacement  value  is  determined  not 
directly  but  from  the  historic  cost,  certain  price 
indices  being  applied  to  the  various  elements  of this 
cost  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  practical  assessment  of 
the  replacement  value.  Compared with  the  method 
of  assessing  the  replacement  value  directly,  this  has 
the  disadvantage of incorporating irrelevant elements 
of  historic  cost  (e.g.  insufficient  productivity  in 
building  infrastructure)  into  present  charging 
systems.  Also,  it  is  difficult  to  make  allowance  for 
technical  progress  when  establishing  the  indices. 
New  distortions  might  occur  if  no  solution  is  found 
to  this  problem.  Finally,  it  is  hard  to  see  how 
agreement could be reached on any of the numerous 
opportunities  for  putting  this  method  into  practice. 
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All  the  versions  of  the  system  of  calculated  total 
cost  have  essentially  the  same  problems  of  transi-
tion.  The  system  implies  regular  correction  of  the 
valuation  of the  infrastructure  in  order to  allow  for 
changes  in  replacement  values.  This  is  a  difficult 
task;  it  may  be  subject  to  many  uncertainties  and 
hence  to  many  arbitrary  estimates.  But  it  is  not 
absolutely  impossible. 
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Furthermore,  when  a  system  of  charges  based  on 
calculated  total  cost  is  to  be  introduced,  the  whole 
of  the  existing  infrastructure  will  first  have  to  be 
valued.  The  great  amount  of  work  required  to 
determine  the  replacement  value  would  almost 
certainly  not  be  justified  by  the  results;  and  the 
usefulness  of  such  valuations  would  be  doubtful, 
sinee  at  best  they  would  only  be  rough  estimates 
based  largely  on  individual  judgments  and  arbitrary 
conventions. 
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The  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  all  this  can  be 
summarized briefly.  The method of calculated total 
cost appears at first sight to offer certain unquestion-
able  economic  advantages.  It will  generally  satisfy 
the  condition  of  budgetary equilibrium,  while  at  the 
same  time  avoiding  distortions  of the  conditions  of 
competition  by  the  various  effects  of  inflation. 
For these  reasons  the  system  has  a  certain  appeal. 
But  these  advantages  are  coupled  with  serious 
disadvantages.  This  system  - whatever  form  it 
takes  - is  bound  to  involve  arbitrary  conventions 
that  do  not  make  economic  sense (1).  It  requires 
many  complicated  calculations  which  can  only  be 
approximate.  Lastly,  and  most  important,  it  does 
not  really  avoid  creating  economic  distortions,  since 
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it  will  always  depart  from  the  economic  charges, 
which remain the optimum charges for the utilization 
of  infrastructure. 
31.3  - THE SYSTEM OF BUDGETARY 
EQUILIBRIUM WITH THE POSSIBILITY 
OF  BORROWING 
31.30  - Budgetary  equilibrium:  general 
874 
The  general  principles  underlying  the  system  of 
budgetary  equilibrium  have  been  studied  at  some 
length  in  Part  II (2).  We  saw  that  the main  argu-
ment  in  its  favour  is  that  it  avoids  the  problems 
associated  with  the  deficit.  Budgetary  equilibrium 
requires that no  subsidies for transport infrastructure 
shall  be  granted  from  public  funds (8).  This  rule 
constitutes  a  certain  institutional  barrier against  the 
social  and  political  pressures  that  may  be  exerted 
to  influence  investments  in  infrastructure  when  the 
latter are largely  financed  from  the national budget; 
it  may  thus  help  to  prevent  misdirected  invest-
ments (4).  Lastly,  it  may  well  promote  economic 
efficiency,  particularly  on  the  railways,  because  it 
makes  it  impossible  for  deficits  to  be  covered  by 
subsidies (5). 
875 
In  Chapter  21  we  examined  several  arguments  for 
and  against  enforcement  of  budgetary  equilibrium. 
Since  most  of these  arguments  are  not  strictly  eco-
nomic,  we  did  not  express  a  definite  opinon either 
way.  We did, however, arrive at the conclusion that, 
if budgetary equilibrium were  adopted,  certain parts 
of  infrastructure,  such  as  local  networks  and  all 
infrastructures  in  underdeveloped  areas,  would  have 
to  be exempted anyway (6), and that in other cases it 
would  not  be  feasible  without extensive equalization 
of  charges.  Moreover,  its  introduction  might  have 
to  be  gradual. 
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We  pointed out that the system of budgetary equilib-
rium  can  take  many  different  forms (1).  In  the 
last  analysis,  the  various  versions  have  only  one 
element  in  common:  they  all  exclude  subsidies from 
(')  See  Part I. 
(")  See  Section  24.4. 
(')  See  Subsection  23.31. 
(')  See  Subsection  23.32. 
(")  See  Subsection  23.33. 
(')  See  Subsection  24.45. 
(')  See  Subsection  24.40. public  funds (1).  Each  version  is  defined  by  its 
rules  for  arriving  at  "total cost",  i.e.  the  sum  to  be 
paid each year by the users of infrastructure, and for 
apportioning  this  "total  cost"  among  the  different 
categories  of  users.  The  latter  problem,  which  is 
common  to  all  variants of the budgetary equilibrium 
system,  has  already  been  discussed  at  some  length 
in  Part  11  (2).  In  this  Chapter  we  can  therefore 
confine  ourselves  to  the  question  of  how  the  "total 
cost"  should  be  defined. 
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There  is,  however,  one  aspect  of  the  distribution  of 
the  "total  cost"  of  infrastructure  to  which  we  must 
now  return,  because  it  is  particularly  important  for 
the  interpretation  of  budgetary  equilibrium.  This 
concerns the extent to  which  the charges for  the use 
of  infrastructure  should  be  equalized.  Our general 
analysis  of  the  budgetary  equilibrium  system  in 
Part  11  led  us  to  the  conclusion  that,  if  the  rule  is 
imposed  at  all,  it  should  be imposed on  each  mode 
of  transport  separately.  This  conclusion  will  be 
taken  for  granted  in  what  follows.  With  regard  to 
regional  equalization  of  charges,  we  saw (3)  that 
wide-scale  equalization  is  generally  quite compatible 
with  the  objectives  for  which the  rule  of  budgetary 
equilibrium  is  imposed,  and  is  at  the  same  time 
desirable  in  itself  because  it  can  avert  the  harmful 
effects  of  applying  the  rule  too  rigorously.  Nev-
ertheless,  with  regard  to  the  roads,  we  suggested 
that  infrastructure  should  be  divided  into  at  least 
three  parts,  and  the  rule  applied  to  each  of  them 
separately:  main  networks,  urban  and  suburban 
networks,  and local networks.  We also  showed that 
local  networks,  and  all  infrastructures  in  underde-
veloped  areas,  should  be  exempted  from  the  rule, 
since  other  considerations  which  may  be  more 
important than optimum resource allocation can play 
a part in such  cases. 
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Before  we  examine  the  various  possible  interpre-
tations  of  budgetary  equilibrium,  two  general  points 
may  be  made. 
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In  the  first  place,  as  we  have  already  pointed  out 
several  times,  any  system  of  charges  that  is  to  be 
consistent  with  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources 
must  be  based  on the  economic  charges.  The rule 
of budgetary equilibrium  is  an  additional constraint; 
it may well conflict with the requirements of optimum 
resource  allocation,  but  does  not  invalidate  these 
requirements  as  a  basis  for  all  charging  systems. 
From  this  point  of  view,  the  remarks  made  at the 
beginning  of  this  Chapter (4)  apply  implicitly  to  all 
the  systems  of  budgetary  equilibrium  that  we  shall 
examine. 
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Secondly,  we  would  point  out  that  in  some  cases 
the  only  practicable  version  of the  budgetary  equil-
ibrium system is  that which  allows  for the possibility 
of  borrowing (5). 
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The sum to  be  charged to the users of infrastructure 
in  any  particular year is  defined by  two elements (in 
addition to the obvious determinant, viz.  the expenses 
connected  with  the  infrastructure):  i)  the  extent  to 
which loans may be contracted to finance expenditure 
on  infrastructure;  and  - if  borrowing  is  permitted 
at  all  - ii)  the  period  and pattern of  amortization 
of such loans.  The system of budgetary equilibrium 
that we  shall  deal with  in the next section is  defined 
as  one in  which  no  borrowing  is  permitted on prin-
ciple.  This  is  a  simple  rule  which  admits  of  no 
variations in interpretation of the "total cost".  There 
is  another system  which  does  permit borrowing; but 
the  freedom  to contract loans  may be restricted in  a 
number  of  ways  that give  rise  to  as  many  different 
versions  of  that  system. 
31.31  - The  system  of budgetary  equilibrium 
with the possibility  of borrowing: 
different  versions 
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In  its  most  general  form,  the  system  of  budgetary 
equilibrium with the possibility of borrowing requires 
that  all  expenditure  connected  with  infrastructure 
should  be  financed  either  directly  from  current 
revenue (i.e.  charges paid by the users) or else from 
loans, the interest and amortization of the latter being 
also  financed  from  revenue (6).  The  sum  to  be 
covered by charges on users  each year is  then  quite 
simply equal to the accountable expenditure, i.e.  the 
interest and amortization on the debt incurred in  the 
(')  For  the  formal  definition  of  budgetary  equilibrium  see 
Subsection  24.40. 
(")  See  Subsections  24.42  to  24.46. 
(")  See  Subsection  24.45. 
(')  See  Section  31.0. 
(")  See  Subsection  31.41. 
(")  In  other  words  the  system  with  the  possibility  of  bor-
rowing  simply  requires  that  the  total  discounted  expen-
diture  should  be  covered  by  the  total  discounted  revenue 
obtained  from  charges  on  the  users,  not  counting  any 
subsidies  from  public  funds.  This  definition  agrees  with 
that  given  in  Subsection  24.40,  except  as  regards  the  con-
stant,  i.e.  the  initial  debt  which  may  have  to  be  imposed 
on  infrastructure  when  the  system  is  first  introduced.  If 
this  constant  is  taken  as  being  equal to the  discounted  net 
revenue  when the charges  actually collected are at all times 
equal  to  the  economic  charges,  the  system  of  budgetary 
equilibrium  becomes  identical  with  the  practical  system  of 
economic charges. past  plus  that  expenditure  incurred  in  the  current 
year  which  is  not  financed  by  borrowing.  This 
system  has  two  great  advantages over the  system  of 
calculated total cost, for it is  flexible  and there is  no 
need  to  determine a conventional formula of amorti-
zation. 
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Of course,  in  this  form,  the  balanced  budget  rule  is 
not  very  strict;  it  is  in  fact  always  possible  to 
transfer  the  burden  of  expenditure  to  the  future 
u~ers by  contracting  loans,  particularly  if  the  loans 
are  contracted by the State or by a semi-public body 
which  can  theoretically  borrow  unlimited  amounts 
because  there  is  no  risk  of  the  debtor's  defaulting. 
Consequently,  in  its  most  general  form,  the  system 
of budgetary equilibrium with  the possibility of bor-
rowing  is  not  very  clearly  defined,  nor  is  it certain 
whether this system effectively answers the objections 
that  can  be  made  to  any  policy  involving  a  deficit. 
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These  difficulties  are  somewhat  reduced  in  those 
versions  of  the system  that impose some  limitations 
on borrowing.  One  solution  would  be to  authorize 
borrowing  only  when  it  is  intended  to  finance 
investments,  or,  in  other  w·ords,  not  to  authorize 
loans  to  cover  running expenses.  Also,  these loans 
could  be  limited  to  the  expected  economic  life  of 
the  investment  or  to  even  shorter  periods.  It  is 
obvious  that the  more  such  restrictions  are  imposed, 
the closer the system will be to the system of budget-
ary  equilibrium  without  the possibility of borrowing. 
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The  drawback  of  all  such  restncttons,  however,  is 
that  they  require  a  fairly  extensive  control  over 
borrowing operations (1 ).  This may to  some extent 
reduce  the  principal  advantage  which  the  system  of 
budgetary  equilibrium  with  the  possibility  of  bor-
rowing  has  over the  system  of calculated  total  cost, 
namely,  that  it  is  simple  to  put  into  practice  and 
institutionally  transparent.  Without  a  full  exami-
nation  of the  facts  and  of  the  practical  possibilities 
of  direct  control  over  borrowing  operations,  it  is 
difficult  to  say  how  formidable  this  drawback  really 
is.  It  seems,  however,  that  a  control  procedure 
could be devised  that would be relatively simple  and 
clear,  not  very  difficult  to  apply,  and  not  largely 
a matter of subjective evaluation. 
31.32  - Practical  application 
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Provided it is  possible to  exert a simple and effective 
control over loan operations, the system of budgetary 
equilibrium with  the possibility of borrowing is  quite 
clear  and  simple.  All  it  means  is  that no  subsidies 
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are granted for infrastructure.  Investments could be 
financed  by borrowing, but interest and amortization 
would  have  to  be paid out  of revenue  from  use of 
the infrastructure:.  No detailed rules need be worked 
out  here,  since  this  criterion  is  quite  unambiguous 
and  its  application  could be  easily checked in prac-
tice.  The system  requires  no  detailed  control  and 
no  complicated  institutional  arrangements.  In 
particular,  in  the  case  of the  railways,  there  is  no 
need  to  separate the administration of infrastructure 
from  that  of  transport  services.  The  system  of 
budgetary  equilibrium  frees  investments  in  infra-
structure  from  constraints  imposed  by  the  national 
budget,  and  effectively  prevents  investments  from 
being  misdirected,  because  there  is  a  clear  and 
obvious alarm-signal in the event of mismanagement. 
There  might  be  a  risk  of underinvestment  if  those 
responsible  for  infrastructure  tended  to  be  over-
cautious  and  wished  to  "play safe"  when  investing. 
An  appropriate institutional  procedure would  there-
fore  have  to  be  adopted  in  order  to minimize  this 
risk.  We  have  emphasized  already (2)  that it is  in 
any  case  vital  that  investments  in  infrastructure 
should  be  co-ordinated. 
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Application  of  the  rule  of  budgetary  equilibrium 
with the possibility of borrowing raises certain  prob~ 
!ems  when  serious  misinvestments  have  been  made. 
For  example,  if  a  certain  infrastructure  had  been 
constructed  as  a  result  of  such  an  error,  it  would 
be  economically  very  harmful  to  prevent  the  opti-
mum  utilization  of that  infrastructure by  attempting 
to  meet the full  burden of interest  and amortization 
out  of  revenue.  It would  obviously  be  preferable 
not  to  make  matters  worse  by  penalizing  current 
utilization  of  the  infrastructure  in  an  uneconomic 
manner.  In principle,  this  difficulty  could  be over-
come  by  granting  subsidies  in  such  cases,  and  ob-
viously  the procedure by which  such  subsidies  were 
given  would  hav(~ to  include firm  safeguards  against 
abuse.  But even  if  such  safeguards  were  provided, 
this  procedure  would  make  the  charging  system 
dependent  on  incidental  decisions,  and  would  thus 
open  the  door  to  all  those  pressures  that  the  con-
straint  of  budgetary  equilibrium  is  expressly  design-
ed  to  combat.  Probably  the  best  solution  would 
therefore  be  not  to  allow  any  exceptions  to  the 
(')  In  the  case of the  railways it might also  be  necessary, if 
such  restrictions  were  imposed,  to  make  a  distinction 
between  infrastructure  and  transport  services  - at  least 
for  accounting  purposes.  As  we  have  seen,  various 
problems  arise  if  we  try  to  make  such  a  distinction  (see 
Subsection  23.33).  However,  there  does  not  really  seem 
to  be  any  need  for  it  as  long  as  borrowing  operations 
themselves  are  subjc~cted to some  form  of direct  control  as 
part  of  a general  plan  to  co-ordinate  investments  in  infra-
structure,  which  we  recommend elsewhere. 
(")  See  Section  24.1. g~neral rule  of  budgetary  equilibrium  but  to  apply 
wide  geographical  equalization  of  charges (1),  in 
order to  mitigate  any  undesirable  consequences  that 
it  might  have  in  practice  when  errors  have  been 
made  with  investments in  the past. 
888 
As  to  the charges  to  be  paid  by  the  users  of infra-
structure,  suitable  procedures  would  have  to  be 
worked  out  for  each  mode  of  transport.  In order 
to  avmd  distortions  in  the  distribution  of  traffic 
~mong competing  modes  of  transport,  the  conven-
tions  adopted for apportioning the "total cost" would 
have  to  be  reasonably  uniform.  This  applies,  in 
particular,  to  the  degree  of  geographical  inequality 
of  charges,  as  also  to  conventions  for  apportioning 
the  costs  that  cannot  be  directly  imputed  to  the 
individual  categories  of  traffic. 
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As  we  have seen,  the main problems connected with 
inequality of charges  arise in road and inland water-
way  transport.  For  the  roads,  the  most  sensible 
system  might  be  an  appropriate combination of fuel 
taxes  and  taxes  on  vehicles,  designed  to  cover,  in 
addition to the cost charge and the congestion charge 
in  cases  of  economic  congestion,  all  expenditure 
needed  to  achieve  budgetary  equilibrium  with  the 
possibility  of  borrowing.  These  taxes  could  be 
differentiated  for  the  various  categories  of  infra-
structure,  such  as  the  three  types  of  road  network 
we  have  already  mentioned.  Similar  principles 
should  be  applied  to  the  charges  for  the  use  of 
infrastructure  in  the  case  of  railways  and  inland 
shipping.  In  the  case  of  inland  shipping,  special 
problems  may  arise  with  regard  to  the geographical 
extent  of equalization (2).  The question  of regional 
equalization  is  especially  important for  the railways, 
where the charges ior use of infrastructure are incor-
porated in  the charges for  transport services.  It will 
therefore  be  discussed  in  the  chapter  dealing  with 
tariffs  for  transport services (3). 
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Apportionment  of  the  non-directly-imputable  costs 
among  the  various  categories  of  traffic  presents 
similar  problems.  In  this  case  too,  the  general 
principles  applied  to  competing  modes  of  transport 
should  be  equivalent  in  their  effects.  As  we  have 
already seen (4),  the apportionment of non-imputable 
costs  is  essentially  arbitrary.  One  solution  might 
be  to  adopt  two-part  charges,  one  component  of 
which  would  be  the marginal use  cost and the other 
the  result  of distributing  the  deficit  in  proportion to 
the  utilization of capacity. 
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31.33  - Advantages  and  disadvantages 
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The  most  serious  disadvantage  of  the  system  of 
?ud&etary eguilibrium with  the possibility of borrow-
mg  IS  that  It  does  not  take  account  of  changes  in 
the "cost" of infrastructures due to technical progress 
a?d  price  changes.  This  is,  however,  only  a  real 
disavdantage  if  "cost"  in  this  context  is  implicitly 
equated  with  "replacement  cost".  But  from  the 
point of view  of an  optimum allocation of resources 
there is  no reason why the rule of budgetary equilib-
rium  should  be  applied  to  replacement  cost  rather 
than to  historic cost.  As  we  have  already seen,  the 
only  component  that  can  really  be regarded  as  the 
cost  of using  an  asset  during  a  particular  period  is 
its  marginal  use  cost.  This  is  probably  very  low 
for  many infrastructures.  All other concepts of cost 
are  merely  conventions  for  the  formulation  of rules 
designed  to  overcome  the  various  drawbacks  -
mainly institutional - of a system in which the infra-
structure deficit is  borne by the national budget.  In 
other  words,  the  different  concepts  of  "total  cost" 
can  only  be  judged  by  the  effectiveness  with  which 
they  fulfil  this  function  and  avoid  distortions  in  the 
distribution  of  traffic  among  competing  modes  of 
transport. 
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Changes  in  the  value  of  money  are not reflected  in 
the  original  money cost of infrastructure in  nominal 
value,  on which  the system  of budgetary equilibrium 
with  the  possibility  of  borrowing  is  based.  When 
prices  are  rising,  the  original  cost  will  tend  to  be 
lower  than  the  replacement  cost.  Assuming  that 
the  authorities  responsible  for  investments  in  infra-
structure  in  the  three  modes  of  transport  do  not 
speculate on the future rate of inflation when making 
their  investment  decisions,  such  decisions  would  be 
based on the  actual cost of the  infrastructure  at the 
moment of  construction,  and the  charges  to  be  paid 
by the users would be calculated from  that cost.  In 
that  case,  the  optimum  utilization  of  the  existing 
infrastructure  would  either  not  be  impaired  or else 
would  be  impaired less  than it  would  have been but 
for  inflation.  This  advantage  of inflation  has often 
been  pointed out,  but  it  depends  on the  assumption 
that  investment  decisions  are  not  modified  by 
inflation- which is  doubtful to say the least; in  any 
case,  even  if  the  advantage  does  really  exist,  it  is 
unimportant compared with the well-known disadvan-
tages  of  systematic  inflation. 
(')  Which  is  desirable  in  any  system  of budgetary  equilib-
rium. 
(")  See  Subsection  24.45. 
(")  See  Chapter  32. 
<')  See  Subsection  24.46. 893 
The  only  valid  reason  for  correcting  the  original 
investment  cost  to  allow  for  price  changes  (i.e.  to 
apply  a  version  of  the  system  of  calculated  total 
cost) (1)  is  that,  if  such  corrections  are  not  made, 
the  system  may  lead  to  discrimination  between  the 
competing  modes  of  transport.  Such  "discrimina-
tion"  cannot,  however,  be  regarded  a  priori  as  eco-
nomically  harmful  unless  it  is  agreed  that  charges 
should  normally  be  calculated  from  replacement 
cost;  but that is  to beg  the question.  It is  none the 
less clear that the effects of inflation on the competing 
modes of transport are "blind" in  the highest degree, 
and may distort the conditions of competition, as was 
shown  by  the  example  of  the  two  harbours  given 
above (2).  There  is  therefore  good  reason  to  eli-
minate  their  influence  on  the  conditions  of  compe-
tition as  much  as  possible, in one way or another (3). 
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In the  absence  of  full  information  on  the extent  to 
which  the  various  modes  of  transport actually  cover 
their infrastructure  costs,  it is  difficult  to  assess  the 
effects  of introducing  the system  of budgetary equil-
ibrium  with  the  possibility  of  borrowing.  If this 
system  is  adopted,  the  newer  the  installations  are, 
the  greater  will  be  the  infrastructure  charges.  In 
general,  they  would  therefore  probably  be  relatively 
higher  for  the  roads - a mode  of transport that is 
expanding  rapidly  and  continuously -· than for  the 
railways  and  inland  waterways,  as  the  networks  of 
the  latter  do  not  vary  very  much  and  their  past 
charges  have,  moreover,  been  largely  wiped  out, 
either by  inflation  or by  the  amortization  of  loans. 
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Nevertheless,  in  many cases the sums  actually levied 
from  all  road  users  are  probably  no  less  than  the 
total  sums  that  would  result  from  the  system  of 
budgetary  equilibrium  with  the  possibility  of  bor-
rowing.  The  roads  would  then  benefit  more  than 
they  do  at  present,  for  the  new  system,  like  the 
others  examined  in  this  report,  would  mean  defisca-
lization  of the  taxes  on  vehicles  and motor fuels (4). 
31.34  - Problems  of transition 
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The problems connected with inflation that we exam-
ined  in  the  preceding  sub-section  are  inherent  in 
the  system  of  budgetary  equilibrium  with  the  possi-
bility  of  borrowing.  They  arise  whenever  that 
system  is  applied  in  a  dynamic  economy,  in  which 
price  and  technology  change  during  the  economic 
life  of  the infrastructure, which  is  usually  very  long. 
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More  serious  disadvantages  become  apparent  when 
we consider the difficulties of changing over from the 
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current policy o:f  charges for the use of infrastructure 
to  a system  of budgetary equilibrium  with  the possi-
bility  of  borrowing.  This  problem  may  seem  less 
important  than  the  one  discussed  in  the  previous 
subsection,  because it  arises only once and its effects 
gradually disappear.  Such a view,  however, serious-
ly  underestimates  the  significance  of  the  issue.  As 
the  economic  life  of  the  infrastructure  of  transport 
is  very  long,  the charges  to  be  levied on account of 
the  infrastructure  already  in  existence  when  the 
system  is  introduced  will  largely  determine  the 
charges  to be  paid  by  the  users  for  a  long  time  to 
come. 
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The  problems  of  the  change-over  arise  from  the 
fact  that,  in  the  past,  existing  infrastructure  was 
financed  to a great extent from  public funds.  If the 
system  of  budgetary equilibrium  with  the  possibility 
of  borrowing  is  to  be  introduced,  it  would  seem 
necessary first  to  fix  the "initial debt" of each mode 
of  transport.  This  would  be  technically  very  dif-
ficult,  and would,  moreover, involve  a great number 
of  essentially  arbitrary  decisions.  Even  if  the  ori-
ginal investment expenditure for  each separate infra-
structure  item  could  be  traced  - which  is  quite 
impossible  in  many  cases  - there  would  be  no 
simple,  indisputable rule for  determining  the part of 
the  hypothetical  original  loan  that  would  have  to 
be  assumed  to  be still outstanding. 
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In  fact,  however,  this  "fictitious"  procedure  would 
be  thoroughly  irrational.  Generally  speaking,  past 
expenditure  is  entirely  irrelevant  to  present  deci-
sions (5).  From  this  point  of  view  there  is  no 
difference  between  a  canal  dug  in  the  nineteenth 
century,  which  may  be  regarded  as  a  gift  from  our 
ancestors,  and  a  river  which  is  a  gift  from  nature. 
The reasons for  adopting the rule of budgetary equi-
librium  (in  any  form)  are  mainly  institutional (6). 
(
1
)  There  is  a  certain  similarity  between  the  system  of 
calculated  total  cost  and  the  version  of  the  system  of 
budgetary equilibrium  that allows  for revision  of the initial 
constant (see  Subsection  24.40). 
(")  See  Subsection  31.20. 
(")  For  instance,  by  the  system  of  calculated  total  cost; 
the  system  of budgetary  equilibrium  without  the  possibility 
of  borrowing;  the  practical  system  of  economic:  charges; 
or the  system  of budgetary equilibrium  with  the  possibility 
of  borrowing  combined  with  considerable  equalization  of 
charges. 
(')  See  Subsection  31.42. 
(5)  Except,  of  course,  in  so  far  as  a  knowledge  of  past 
expenditure  makes  it  easier  to  arrive  at estimates  of  what 
will  happen  in  future. 
(
6
)  The  fact  that  in  the  past  certain  expenses  have  been 
incurred  by  private  bodies  or  public  authorities  does  not 
justify,  either in  the  present or in the  future,  the  adoption 
of  specific  financial  measures  to  protect  the  fixed  assets 
thus  created.  The  one  valid  criterion,  even  during  the 
transitional  period,  is  that "only the future  counts"  both as 
regards  the  investments  to  be  made  at  or  after  a  certain 
moment and as  regards the existing  fixed  assets. 900 
Consequently,  the  only  real  "problem  of  transition" 
is  to  prevent  too  abrupt  a  break  between  the  past 
and  the  system  to  be  introduced.  This  may  neces-
sitate  certain special  provisions,  but it cannot justify 
any  recalculation  of  past expenditure and  the impo-
sition  of  a  hypothetical  debt  on  account  of  that 
expenditure.  Such  an  initial  debt  would  be econo-
mically  meaningless,  because  it  would  bear  almost 
no  relation  to  the  present  situation;  inflation,  tech-
nical  progress  and  changed  conditions  of  demand 
have  altered  the  situation  that  was  originally  fore-
seen.  That  would  therefore  be  an  unreasonable 
way  of  going  about  things,  even  if  it  were regarded 
merely  as  a  transitional  measure.  In  addition,  the 
fixing  of an  initial  debt would be very arbitrary,  and 
would  undoubtedly  give  rise  to  endless  problems 
and  to  ever  more  complicated  formulae,  involving 
a great  amount of work which  might conceivably be 
of  some  historical  interest  but would  be  completely 
worthless  from  an  economic  point  of  view.  The 
disadvantages  of the  system  of  calculated  total  cost 
would  in  fact  be  repeated  here. 
31.4- THE SYSTEM OF BUDGETARY 
EQUILIBRIUM  WITHOUT  THE  POSSIBILITY 
OF BORROWING 
31.40 - General 
901 
Of  all  the  general  approaches  under  review,  the 
version  of  the  system  of  budgetary  equilibrium  that 
we  shall  examine  in  this  section  is  the  simplest, 
clearest  and  most objective,  and  the one that leaves 
least  place  for  subjective  decisions.  It  consists 
simply .in  charging  the  users  each  year  with  all  the 
expenses  of  operation,  maintenance,  renewal  or 
expansion  incurred  during  that year.  If the  system 
is  adopted,  all  subsidies  will  have  to  be  eliminated 
and all debts at the moment of its  introduction taken 
over  by  the  State (1). 
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There  is  therefore  a direct link between  investments 
and  charging  policy,  whereby  the  effects  of  invest-
ment  policy  immediately  become  apparent  to  all 
concerned.  Since the institutional advantages of this 
system  are  obvious,  the main question  is  whether it 
conflicts  with  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources 
and,  if so,  to  what extent. 
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One  point is  clear:  the system  of  budgetary equilib-
rium  without  the possibility  of borrowing cannot be 
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put  into  effect  unless  there  is  wide  geographical 
equalization  of  charges.  If it  were  applied  on  too 
small  a  scale,  the  users  might  have  to  pay  prohibi-
tively large sums in years when investment takes place 
since  investments  in  infrastructure  are  to  some 
extent indivisible (2).  In the marginal case, it would 
even  be impossible  to  recover  these  costs.  Equali-
zation  over  wide  areas  is  therefore  necessary  and 
desirable from  this point of view; but difficulties may 
occur,  particularly  with  regard  to  the  conditions  of 
competition. 
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The  degree  of  equalization  may,  however,  be  ina-
dequate  when  indivisible  investment  projects  are  so 
large,  compared  with  the  size  of  the  area  within 
which  charges  are  to  be  equalized,  that the charges 
would  have  to  be  increased  considerably  during  the 
period  of  construction.  This  would  clearly  be  the 
case  during  the  initial  stages  of  construction  of  an 
entirely  new  infrastructure  network,  or  when  an 
existing  network  was  being  enlarged  so  much  and 
so  rapidly  that  this  practically  amounted  to  con-
struction  of  a  new  network.  Consequently,  the 
system  of  budgetary  equilibrium  without  the  possi-
bility  of  borrowing  would  certainly  not  be  appro-
priate for  large (3)  underdeveloped  areas.  For such 
areas,  the  best  solution  would  be  to  discard  the 
budgetary  equilibrium  system  altogether  and  adopt 
the  practical  system  of  economic  charges (4).  The 
indirect effects  of the infrastructure may be  so  great 
in  this  case  that  it  will  be  - and  must  be  -
constructed,  even  though  it is  likely  to  be  underuti-
lized  for  a  long  time  because the  initial  traffic  will 
be very light compared with the indivisible minimum 
size  of  the  network.  It would  then  be  absolutely 
uneconomic  to  hamper  utilization  of the  infrastruc-
ture,  and thereby retard the economic growth of the 
(') It  is  debatable  whether  this  system  should  be  applied 
to railway rolling stock.  If it is  not, accounting difficulties 
might  arise,  but  these  do  not  seem  insurmountable.  If, 
however,  the system  were applied to all  activities  connected 
with  the  railways,  but  only  to  the  infrastructure  of  the 
roads  and  inland  waterways,  problems  concerning  condi-
tions  of  competition  and  equity  might .  arise.  It might  be 
thought  that  the  railways  would  inevitably  be  favoured  by 
a  system  that  freed  them  from  all  financial  burdens 
connected  with  existing  means  of  transport  whilst  the 
other  modes  of  inland  transport  had  to  bear  them;  this 
would  not  in  fact  be  the  case,  however,  because  the  rail-
ways  would  be  at  a  disadvantage  compared  with  the  other 
modes  in  that  they  would  no  longer be  able  to finance  an 
increase  in  their  rolling  stock  by  borrowing.  In  any  case, 
the  probable  distortion  would  only  concern  the  burden  of 
interest relating to means  of transport;  and for a  particular 
enterprise  this distortion  would be  nil  anyway if the  means 
of  transport  were  expanding  at  a  rate  equal  to  the  rate 
of interest. 
0  See  Section  23.2. 
(')  That is  to say,  large in  relation to the area within which 
charges  are  equalized. 
(')  See  Section  31.0. underdeveloped  areas,  by  imposmg  budgetary  equi-
librium  in  any  form  whatever. 
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On the other hand, when infrastructure has developed 
beyond  the  indivisible  minimum  - as  everywhere 
in  the  Community  with  the  probable  exception  of 
southern Italy - the infrastructure can generally be 
expanded  more  gradually  and  at  a  pace  more  in 
keeping  with  the  rate  at which  traffic  is  increasing. 
It  is  then,  in  principle,  no  longer  impossible  to 
apply  the  system  of  budgetary  equilibrium  without 
the possibility of borrowing.  Certain difficulties may 
none  the  less  arise  in  some  cases,  particularly  in 
inland  shipping  where  some  individual  investments 
may  be  very  large  compared  with  the  size  of  the 
area over which  charges would  normally be equaliz-
ed.  Of  course,  the  problem  could  be  solved  by 
extending  the  area,  but  this  might  then  have  to 
become  so  large  that the connection between  finan-
cial  results  and  administration  would  become  even 
more  tenuous.  This  question  will  be  dealt  with  in 
greater  detail  in  the  following  subsection. 
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Another  question  to  be  considered  concerns  the 
influence  of  the  system  of  budgetary  equilibrium 
without  the possibility  of borrowing  on competitive 
relations  between  the  modes  of  transport.  This 
system  clearly  favours  modes  of transport  that  are 
not  expanding,  or are expanding only slowly,  while 
it  imposes  reatively  heavy  burdens  on  modes  that 
are expanding very  rapidly.  The charges under the 
system  of budgetary  equilibrium  without  the possi-
bility of borrowing are in fact just the same as those 
that would be imposed under the system of budgetary 
equilibrium with that possibility, or under the system 
of  calculated  total  cost,  when  the  total  investment 
expenditure  is  equal  to  the  total  burden of interest 
an<~  amortization  derived  from  these  other  sys-
tems (1).  This  means  that  the  system  of budgetary 
equilibrium without the possibility of borrowing leads 
to  higher or lower charges according to whether the 
growth  rate  is  higher  or  lower  than  the  rate  of 
interest.  The  implications  of  this  relation  will  be 
discussed later in  this  report (2). 
31.41  - Practical  application 
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Adoption  of  the  system  of  budgetary  equilibrium 
without  the  possibility  of borrowing would  seem  to 
present  few  practical  problems  other  than  those 
inherent  in  all  versions  of  the  system,  such  as  the 
apportionment  of  infrastructure  costs  among  the 
various categories of users  and the degree of geogra-
phical  equalization  of  charges (3).  The  total  sum 
to  be  charged  to  the  users  each  year  is  arrived  at 
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categorically  by  considering  only  the  total  expendi-
ture  on  infrastructure.  There  is  no  need  to  fix  a 
schedule of amortization and interest, nor to estimate 
the  value  of the  existing  infrastructure.  There  are 
no  problems  of  transition  of the  kind  we  examined 
in  connection  with  the system  of budgetary equilib-
rium  with  the  possibility  of  borrowing  and  the 
system of calculated total cost, since consideration of 
past  expenditure  and  the  difficulties  to  which  that 
gives  rise  are eliminated. 
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One problem, however, remains.  This always crops 
up in connection with the system of budgetary equi-
librium, but it is particularly important in the version 
that excludes the possibility of borrowing:  the prob-
lem  of the extent of geographical equalization.  We 
have  already  seen (4)  that,  to  determine  the precise 
areas  within  which  charges  should  be  equalized,  a 
number of factors should be taken into account, viz.: 
certain  fundamental  characteristics  of  infrastructu-
re (5); the degree of interdependence of the different 
networks,  which  is  shown  in  the  relation  between, 
on  the  one  hand,  the  density  of  traffic  travelling 
between  the  network  in question  and the  other net-
works  and,  on the other hand, the dcmsity  of traffic 
within  the  network;  and  the  competitive  situation. 
Although  these  criteria  cannot  be  directly  applied, 
it  would  not  seem  impossible  to  deduce operational 
rules from  them.  If the areas within which charges 
are to be equalized are determined in  this way,  they 
will  usually  be large  enough  to  allow  the  system  of 
budgetary  equilibrium  without  the  possibility  of 
borrowing to function  satisfactorily. 
909 
There  may,  however,  be  investment  projects  that 
are  so  large  (i.e.  so indivisible)  compared  with  the 
area  within  which  charges  are  equalized  that  they 
could not be financed out of current r,evenue without 
a  quite  unacceptable  increase  in  the  charges  to be 
paid by the user:s. Inland waterways have almady been 
mentioned  as  the  mode  of transport in  which  such 
cases are most likely to occur; the canalization of the 
Moselle  could  be  taken  as  an  example.  Electrifi-
cation of the railways is  another case of a large and 
indivisible  investment  where  difficulties  might  arise 
if  the  system  of  budgetary  equilibrium  without  the 
possibility  of borrowing were  applied unmodified. 
(')  See  Sections  31.2  and  31.3. 
(")  See  Subsection  31.42. 
(")  See  Subsections  24.42 - 24.46. 
(")  See  Subsection  24.45. 
(")  Which  require  a  distinction  at  least  between  main  net-
works,  (i.e.  roads of national or regional importance), urban 
and  suburban  networks,  and  local  networks. 910 
There  are  two  possible  solutions.  One  would  be 
to  extend the area within which charges  are equaliz-
ed.  This,  however,  has  serious  disadvantages,  both 
institutional  (for the  reasons  already giwn) and eco-
nomic.  The  cost  characteristics  of  infrastructure 
may differ substantially from one network to another, 
so  that  to  equalize  charges  over  a  wider  area than 
necessary  would  hinder  the  optimum  allocation  of 
resources e)  and  serve  no  useful  purpose. 
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The second possibility would be  to  provide a special 
system for large-scale indivisible investment projects. 
As  we  have  already  shown,  there  will  in  any  case 
have to  be some central co-ordination of investments 
in  infrastructure (2).  It  goes  without  saying  that 
special  attention  must  be given  to  large-scale  indi-
visible  projects.  Such  projects  may  have  important 
indirect effects,  both in  the short term,  because they 
absorb  a substantial share of the  national equipment 
budget,  and  in  the  long  term,  because  they  may 
appreciably  influence  the  competitive  situation  and 
the  siting  of  economic  activity.  They  stand,  as  it 
were,  midway  between  a  situation in  which  an enti-
rely new  network is  being built up - in which case 
budgetary equilibrium must be ignored altogether -
and a situation in which the infrastructure is  expand-
ing normally and the system of budgetary equilibrium 
without the possibility of borrowing can therefore be 
applied  without  difficulty.  A  special  system  under 
which  no  charges  would  be  made  for  use  of  the 
infrastructure  in  question  would  have  institutional 
disadvantages  that  we  have  already  examined  at 
length (3);  for  one  thing,  since  the  infrastructure 
would  be  financed  from  public  funds,  investment 
decisions  might  be  influenced  by  pressure  groups. 
Again,  such  an  exception  might  distort  the  condi-
tions  of  competition.  For  these  reasons,  another 
system  might  well  be  envisaged  for  large-scale  indi-
visible  projects,  i.e.  the  system  of  budgetary  equi-
librium  with  the  possibility  of  borrowing (4). 
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If this  were applied, such projects would be financed 
by  loans,  so  that the users  of today would  not have 
to  bear the full  cost of investment,  and the users in 
future  years  would  be  charged  with  the  financial 
service on the debt incurred, as  well  as  with  all cur-
rent  expenditure  for  operation,  maintenance  and 
renewal.  One element of the system with the possi-
bility of borrowing would thus be incorporated in the 
system  without  that  possibility.  Of course,  such  a 
solution  would  not  be entirely  free  of  the  inherent 
drawbacks of the system with  the possibility of bor-
rowing;  for  example,  there  would  still  be  a  risk  of 
some  distortion  of competition,  due  to  the  different 
effects  that  inflation  and  technical  advances  would 
have on the different modes of transport.  But these 
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drawbacks  would  be much  less  important,  since the 
service on the debt incurred for large scale indivisible 
projects  will  generally  be  only  a  fraction  of  total 
expenditure  for  infrastructure.  Moreover,  if  the 
situation  were  deemed  to  be  that  of  an  underdeve-
loped  area,  the  rule of budgetary equilibrium  would 
have  to  be  deliberately  abandoned. 
913 
There  is  another,  much  less  fundamental  modifica-
tion that could reasonably be made when the system 
without the possibility of borrowing is  applied.  The 
authorities responsible for infrastructure would  have 
to  have  the  right  to  contract  short-term  loans  in 
order to lessen the fluctuations in their actual annual 
expenditure.  No special provisions would be needed 
here,  other than  a  general limitation  of the  amount 
of such loans and of the period for which they could 
be contracted; longer term loans  would only be au-
thorized  as  part  of  the  special  procedure  we  have 
suggested  for  large-scale  indivisible  projects.  This 
whole  system  would  be similar  to  that  applied  in 
several  countries  to the financial  operations of local 
authorities  (municipalities,  etc.). 
31.42  - Advantages  and  disadvantages 
914 
The  system  of  budgetary  equilibrium  without  the 
possibility of borrowing stands or falls  primarily by 
its  effectiveness  in promoting an optimum allocation 
of  resources.  It  has  undoubted  institutional  and 
practical advantages;  for example,  it does  not entail 
recalculation  of  past  expenditure,  or assessment  of 
the value of the existing infrastructure.  It also  has 
the  advantage of flexibility,  since  special  provisions 
(such  as  those  proposed  above  for  large-scale  indi-
visible  projects)  can  be  made  without  undermining 
the  whole  system. 
915 
In  its  economic  effects,  the  system  of  budgetary 
equilibrium  without  the  possibility  of  borrowing  is 
in  certain  cases  similar  to  the  development  cost 
system,  but it  avoids  the  chief  disadvantages  of the 
latter (5)  - particularly  as  regards  the  calculation 
of costs - while  at the same time  sharing many of 
its  economic  advantages.  The  most  important  of 
(')  For the  importance  of  the  ensuing  distortion,  see  Sub-
section  24.47. 
(")  See  Section  24.1. 
(') See  Section  23.3. 
(') As  a  general  solution,  this  system  has  been  examined 
in Section  31.3.  It is  only studied here  as  an exception  to 
the  standard  system  of  budgetary  equilibrium  without  the 
possibility  of  contracting  loans. 
(')  See  Subsection  3  1.1 I. these  advantages  is  that  the  charges  to  be paid  by 
users  when  a  network is  underutilized  are  very  low; 
the  infrastructure  will  then  not  expand  at  all,  and 
the  only  expenses  will  be  those  of  operation  and 
maintenance.  This  is  not  a  drawback,  as  is  some-
times  thought,  nor  does  it  lead  to  a  distortion  of 
the  optimum  division  of  traffic;  on  the  contrary,  it 
is  a definite economic  advantage. 
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On  the  other  hand,  the  need  to  impose  relatively 
high  charges  on  those  modes  of transport  that  are 
rapidly expanding poses a serious economic problem. 
As was mentioned at the beginning of this section (1), 
adoption  of  the  system  of  budgetary  equilibrium 
without the possibility of borrowing instead of some 
other  version  of the  system  would  penalize  rapidly 
expanding modes of transport if their rate of invest-
ment were  higher than the  rate of interest. 
917 
This  objection  is  certainly valid  in  principle,  but its 
practical importance must not be overestimated, since 
the  modes  of  transport  which  are  expanding  most 
rapidly  are usually those that can most easily  afford 
such  charges.  Moreover,  it  loses  much  of its  force 
in  the present situation.  The same arguments could 
in  fact  be put forward  here  as  were used  to  defend 
the  system  of budgetary  equilibrium  with  the possi-
bility  of borrowing  against  the  charge  that it would 
discriminate  against  the  sectors  where  the  infra-
structure  is  on  the  average  newest  and  whose  debt 
has  therefore  been  least  depreciated  by  inflation. 
In  both  cases,  it  is  the  roads  thas  would  be most 
severely  penalized.  But  the  roads  are  also  major 
beneficiaries of any system of budgetary equilibrium, 
since  such  a  system  (like  other  systems  in  present 
circumstances) leads to defiscalization of the charges 
imposed  on  road  users  and  reduces  dependence  on 
the  national  budget  where  investments  in  infra-
structure  are  concerned (2).  Also,  the  practical 
system of economic charges which is the basis of any 
rational  charging  system  would  in  any  case  result 
in  high  charges  on  road  transport  whenever  road 
infrastructure  is  inadequate.  These  effects  of  the 
system  of  budgetary  equilibrium  without  the  possi-
bility  of borrowing  need  not be regarded  as  econo-
mically harmful for the roads,  at least not in present 
circumstances. 
31.5- SUMMARY 
918 
It is  not  the  purpose  of this  report to  propose de-
tailed  solutions  or to  express  a  definite  opinion  in 
favour  of  one  system  or  another.  Our analysis  is 
confined  in  principle to  considerations  based on the 
criteria  necessary  to  ensure  an  optimum  allocation 
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of  resources,  and  we  have  repeatedly  shown  that 
in  most  cases  the  choice  to  be made  between  the 
solutions  we  have  discussed  cannot  depend  upon 
such  economic  considerations  alone.  The  final 
choice  between  the  different  systems  has  been 
deliberately  left  open.  These  are:  the  practical 
system  of  economic  charges,  the  de:velopment  cost 
system, the various versions of the system of calculat-
ed  total cost,  and the different systems  of budgetary 
equilibrium.  Arguments  have  been  advanced  for 
and  against each of these,  but in the last resort the 
choice  can only be a political one since,  in  addition 
to  economic factors,  institutional considerations play 
a very important, if not a decisive,  role in  determin-
ing  this  choice. 
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Nevertheless,  from  the preceding  analysis  a  number 
of  conclusions  appear  to  emerge  with  sufficient 
force  for  us  to offer  them  as  suggestions  that may 
be of help in deciding on the policy to be pursued. 
920 
1.  In so  far as the aim is  to ensure that transport 
functions  efficiently,  the theory of optimum resource 
allocation  is  a  very  useful,  indeed  an  indispensable, 
guide  when  a  reasoned  opinion  has  to  be  given 
on the merits  of the various  possible systems  which 
will  affect  both  decisions  regarding  investment  in 
infrastructure  and  the  most  efficient  utilization  of 
that  infrastructure. 
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2.  Decisions regarding investment in infrastructure, 
particularly where large indivisible projects  are  con-
cerned, should be co-ordinated centrally for all modes 
of  transport,  such  centralization  being  carried  out 
at  regional,  national  or Community level,  as  neces-
sary. 
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3.  As  regards  the  utilization  of  infrastructure, 
none of the possible systems is  perfect, and none can 
be  put  into  practice  without  some  modification. 
They must all be supplemented by special provisions 
designed to allow exceptions to be made, in order to 
avoid  the undesirable effects  that might follow  if the 
system were  applied too  strictly. 
923 
4.  The  systems  whereby  the  charges  to  be  paid 
by  the  users  are  derived  from  calculation  of infra-
structure costs -- i.e.  the systems of calculated total 
cost  and  development  cost  - have  particularly 
serious disadvantages. 
(')  See  Subsection  31.40. 
(")  See  Subsection  31.33. 924 
5.  The  usefulness  of  the  system  of  budgetary 
equilibrium with  the  possibility of borrowing is  more 
apparent than  real.  Moreover,  for  each element of 
infrastructure  it  entails  the  use of an  initial constant 
which  is  bound  to  be  arbitrary  and  can  therefore 
virtually deprive this system of its constraining effect. 
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6.  The  real  choice  with  regard  to  the  policy  for 
infrastructure  may  lie  between  the  practical  system 
of economic charges  and  an  appropriate form  of the 
budgetary  equilibrium  system. 
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We  must  again  emphasize  that  neither  of  these 
systems  can  be  adopted  without  modification.  In 
practice  it  is  only  possible  to  apply the  first  system 
approximately,  and  the  second  has  to  be  qualified 
by  exceptions  of  varying  importance. 
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7.  Neither system fully  satisfies the two conditions 
of  economic  efficiency,  a)  that  there  should  be  an 
adequate  incentive  to  minimize  operating costs,  and 
b)  that  the  best  possible  use  should  be  made  of 
the  existing  infrastructures. 
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The  budgetary  equilibrium  system  satisfies  the first 
condition,  but  is  sometimes  in  conflict  with  the sec-
ond.  The  system  of  economic  charges  satisfies 
the  second  condition,  but does  not  fully  satisfy  the 
first. 
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8.  The  budgetary  equilibrium  system  satisfies  the 
condition that all the users of an infrastructure should 
bear the  cost of that infrastructure.  But this  condi-
tion  can  only  be  fulfilled  if  charges  are  equalized 
over large areas; otherwise, extensive distortion might 
occur  which  would  seriously  impair  economic  effi-
ciency. 
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9.  As  regards  road  and  inland  waterway  trans-
port,  these  two  systems  would  seem  on  the  whole, 
when  accompanied by some co-ordination of invest-
ment decisions,  to  be  most  in keeping with the gen-
eral  principle  that  the  rules  adopted  must  be 
simple,  clear  and  not  arbitrary,  and their implemen-
tation  should  allow  of  objective  control. 
931 
In  the  case  of  the  railways,  this  principle  can  only 
be  observed  if  the  system  of  budgetary  equilibrium 
is  adopted. 
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10.  Economically,  these  two  systems  have  the  ad-
vantage of looking forward to the future and not back 
to  the  past.  They  do  not  require  recalculation  of 
past expenditure or assessment of the value of invest-
ments already made - calculations of very doubtful 
worth. 
933 
11.  If the deficit  accompanying an  optimum allo-
cation of resources is  very large, the practical system 
of economic charges  would  seem  preferable.  If the 
deficit  is  relatively  small,  the  advantages  of  the 
system  of  budgetary  equilibrium  appear  decisive. 
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12.  The  rule  of  budgetary  equilibrium  must  not 
under  any  circumstances  be  imposed  on  large 
underdeveloped  areas.  Special  precautions  should 
be  taken  with  regard  to  those  areas,  in  order  to 
prevent thoroughly unjustified investments from being 
made. 
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13.  If  the rule of budgetary equilibrium is applied, 
the charges for  use of infrastructure should be equa-
lized  over  comparatively  large  subdivisions  of  the 
network  within  each  mode  of  transport.  In fixing 
the extent of these  subdivisions,  account should also 
be taken of their competitive position. 
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14.  When  two  modes  of transport  are  expanding 
at very different rates and at least one of them has a 
relatively  large  deficit  following  from  an  optimum 
allocation  of  resources,  a  serious  distortion  of  the 
conditions  of competition might  result  if the rule of 
budgetary  equilibrium  without  the  possibility  of 
borrowing  were  applied  to  those  two  modes  of 
transport;  this  might  also  produce  a  situation  that 
would  seriously  conflict  with  an  optimum  allocation 
of  resources. 
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Therefore,  where the  various  versions of the budget-
ary  equilibrium  system  are  concerned,  a  certain 
preference  may  be  given  to  a  mixed  policy  based 
primarily  on  the  version  without  the  possibility  of 
borrowing  but  modified,  for  large-scale  indivisible 
projects, in  a way that makes it more like the version 
with  the  possibility of borrowing. 
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15.  In  practice,  in  all  cases  where  the  existing 
infrastructures have largely been financially amortized 
and  where  management  costs  independent of traffic 
are  relatively  low,  there is  a  high  degree  of compa-
tibility  between  the  practical  system  of  economic 
charges  and a  system  of budgetary equilibrium  that 
allows  borrowing. 939 
At  present  the  modes  of  transport  that  are  rapidly 
expanding are also those where the economic charges 
would  be  very  high  owing  to  current  congestion;  in 
these  circumstances  there  is  also  a  large  measure 
of compatibility between the requirements of optimum 
resource  allocation  and  a  policy  of budgetary  equi-
librium  without  borrowing. 
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16.  The  best  solution  will  probably  depend  on 
the features of the individual case; it does not appear 
advisable  to  invoke  the  principle  of  equality  of 
treatment  to  justify  adoption of the  same  system  in 
all  cases,  however  different  conditions  may  be. 
941 
The best policy cannot be achieved by systematically 
applying  one  and  the  same  system  everywhere:  if 
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the  system  adopted is  to  work,  it will  necessarily be 
complex  and  make  special  provisions  for  special 
cases.  Even if  the aim here is  simply the optimum 
allocation  of resources,  in  practice there is  not,  and 
cannot be,  any one formula that can be regarded as 
universally  valid. 
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We  believe  that the various points mentioned in this 
general  summary  are  important,  but  that  none  of 
them is  sufficient in itself to decide the issue.  Insti-
tutional  considerations  and  the  different  objectives 
pursued are equally important, and hence no definite 
answer  can  be found  by  economic  analysis  alone. 
The final  choice must therefore  be a  political  one; 
those  who  have  to  make it  must  neither  disregard 
the  economic  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the 
various  solutions,  nor confine  their  attention  solely 
to  economic  aspects. CHAPTER  32 
VARIOUS SYSTEMS  FOR  TRANSPORT SERVICES 
32.0  - GENERAL 
943 
The purpose of this  chapter is  to analyse the system 
of  transport  services  and  in  particular  the  determi-
nation  of  their  prices.  The  starting  point  is  the 
endeavour  to  achieve  optimum  resource  allocation. 
Following  on  the  preceding  analyses  it is  assumed, 
as  a general principle, that pricing must be less  than 
free  whenever  there  is  a  possibility  of abuse  of do-
minant  positions  or  of  uneconomic  competition. 
Where  these  dangers  do  not  exist  free  pricing  is 
considered  preferable. 
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The existence of real dangers of uneconomic compe-
tition or of abuse of dominant positions is  a question 
of fact,  not  theory.  We  consider that the extent of 
these  dangers  cannot  be  gauged  at  present for  lack 
of  the  indispensable  empirical  data.  This  is  partly 
because the present regulations are very strict on the 
whole,  and  stem  at  least  to  some  extent  from  cir-
cumstances  - the  world  depression  of  the  thirties 
or the  Second  World  War - which  were  very  dif-
ferent  from  those  of  today. 
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This  chapter therefore  suggests  a  pragmatic  method 
under which  coherent transport policy  arrangements 
could  be  gradually  introduced  by  following  the 
lessons  of  experience  rather  than  by  defining  the 
policy  a  priori. 
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First of  all,  in  every case  where  abuse of dominant 
positions  or uneconomic  competition  can  at present 
be  noted,  the  conclusion  from  the  general  principle 
we  have stated would be that the existing restrictions 
on  freedom  of prices  are  inadequate or that,  where 
prices  are  free,  restrictions  should  be  introduced. 
In  these  cases  appropriate  restrictions  would  have 
to  be applied by  establishing minimum  rates  if  there 
is uneconomic competition or maximum rates if there 
is  abuse  of dominant positions. 
947 
Conversely,  in  all  those  cases  where,  as  things  now 
stand,  no  situation  of this  kind  can  be  seen,  appli-
cation  of  the  general  principle  would  result  in  a 
progressive  reduction  in  the  restrictions.  It follows 
from  this  that,  where  there  is  free  pricing,  it would 
be  maintained;  where  a  bracket  rate  system  is  in 
operation,  the brackets  would  be gradually widened; 
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and where fixed  tariffs  exist,  they would be replaced 
by  bracket  rates. 
948 
Such  liberalization  could  be  carried  out either  in  a 
way  appropriate  to  each  specific  case or uniformly. 
The  main  thing  is  that it  should  be  done  gradually 
and  carefully. 
949 
Three  situations  can  occur.  In  the  first  place,  the 
prices actually noted may tend to maintain themselves 
in  the neighbourhood of the lower limits  of the rate 
brackets.  This  may  indicate  a  situation  of  uneco-
nomic  competition,  in  which  the  competent  control 
authorities  may  act'  ex  officio,  or  be  requested  to 
act  by  any  interested  party,  to  stop  the lowering  of 
the  lower  limits  of  the  brackets  or  to  raise  these 
limits. 
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In the  second place, the prices charged may tend to 
rise  continuously,  and  this  can  be interpreted  as  a 
sign  that  dominant  positions  are  being  abused. 
Here  again,  the  competent  control  authorities  can 
intervene  either ex  officio or on request. 
951 
In the  third  place,  after  a  certain  period  of  adjust-
ment  prices  may tend  to  find  a  stable  average  level 
without the occurence of uneconomic competition or 
abuse  of  dominant  positions.  In  this  case  there 
is obviously no reason to maintain any restrictions (1). 
952 
Such  in  brief  outline  is  the procedure  suggested  for 
the  prices  of  transport  services. 
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It would  apply  mutatis mutandis  to  quantitative  re-
strictions (2). 
(')  Of course  the  price trend must be  interpreted with  great 
caution  in  all  cases  in  which,  in  the  initial  situation,  the 
tariffs  diverge  notably  from  the  prices  corresponding  to 
optimum resource  allocation.  This is  the case  in  particular 
when tariffs are maintained at a  specially low level through 
Government  intervention,  or  when  they  are  very  high 
because  of  particularly  marked  quantitative  restrictions. 
(")  In fact,  the  above  analysis  leads  to  the  conclusion  that 
although control of access  is  considered  useful  to guarantee 
certain  minimum  professional  qualifications  of  carriers  or 
to avoid unwelcome market disturbances, such control should 
not  be  so  restrictive  as  to  cause  the  value  of  licences  to 
diverge  appreciably  from  nil. 954 
The  diversity  of  the  initial  situations  governing 
transport price formation is  only one element requir-
ing  change  to  be  gradual.  Three  other  ele-
ments  also  demand such  an  approach.  First, as  we 
have  pointed  out on  several  occasions,  the  informa-
tion  at  present available on the actual situation does 
not  yield  any  exact  picture  of  the  real  dangers  of 
abuse  of dominant positions or of uneconomic  com-
petition.  Such information can only be accumulated 
by  observation  as  and  when  the  policy  suggested  is 
applied.  Secondly,  the  national  markets  show 
external  distortions  of  the  conditions  of competition 
(different  fiscal  or  social  systems,  etc.).  Finally, 
such  external  distortions  also  exist  at  Community 
level.  At  both  national  and  Community  level  they 
can  only  be  eliminated gradually. 
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We will give several reasons to  support the suggestion 
that  a pragmatic  and  gradual  approach  is  preferable 
to  any  other. 
956 
It  will  first  be shown  that, although it  is  possible to 
formulate  coherent  criteria  for  the  fixing  of  mini-
mum  or maximum rates,  these criteria are extremely 
complex  and  cannot  exclude  a  residual  element  of 
subjective  appraisal.  This  being  so,  although  these 
criteria can be operational for an authority which has 
to  settle  a  certain  number  of  concrete  cases,  the 
a  priori fixing  of  minimum  and  maximum  rates  for 
all  categories  of  transport  services  would  present 
insurmountable difficulties for the controlling author-
ities. 
957 
We  will  also  show  that  fixing  two  simultaneous 
limits  within  a  permanent  and  general  bracket  rate 
system  would  be inconsistent and could be economi-
cally  harmful  because  the  situations  which  call  for 
a  minimum  and  maximum  rate  respectively  are 
mutually  exclusive. 
958 
Finally, we will show that a pragmatic solution would 
have  several very  appreciable  advantages.  It would 
enable the common policy to  get  off to  a good start 
without  transgressing  the  limits  of  caution  and 
without waiting for introduction of a coherent system 
of  charges  for  the  use  of  infrastructure  or complete 
harmonization of  external conditions of competition. 
This would avoid extensive preliminary administrative 
work  of little  real  significance (1). 
959 
We  shall  see  that if  the  aim  is  effectively  to  oppose 
uneconomic  competition  and  abuse of dominant po-
sitions,  the  public  authorities  must  be  able  to  judge 
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the rates and prices charged in the light of operational 
and  objective  criteria.  It  will  be  shown  that' 
establishment of such criteria for all transport services 
on  the  basis  of  data  on  transport  costs  and  the 
structure of demand presents considerable difficulties, 
and  that  it is  almost  impossible  to  fix  appropriate 
tariff limits by  this  method. 
960 
We  shall  see  that  every  feasible  method  necessarily 
implies  an  element of appraisal,  but that this can be 
based on  various objective factors  such  as  the prices 
actually charged, the degree of utilization of the infra-
structure,  etc.  In  the  case  of  the  railways  there 
would  seem  to  be  a  greater  risk  of  improper 
advantage being taken of dominant positions than in 
the  modes  of  transport  with  a  competitive  system, 
because  of  the  elements  of monopoly  power  which 
may  still  exist,  and  a  greater  risk  of  uneconomic 
competition  owing  to  the  possibility  of  practising 
"internal  subsidizing".  We  shall  therefore  suggest 
that  a  comparison  also  be  made  between  the  tariff 
considered  and  the  rates  actually  charged  elsewhere 
by  the  railways  for  similar  transport,  when  services 
exist  which  are  at  least  approximately  comparable. 
961 
The  remainder  of  the  chapter  will  contain  some 
remarks  on  unjustified  tariff  differentiations  and 
relations  between  the  tariff system  and certain other 
elements  of transport policy.' 
962 
Finally,  we  would  recall  that  our whole  analysis  is 
subject  to  two  general limitations. 
963 
First,  we  consider  in  the  main  only the objective of 
optimum  resource  allocation.  Where  other objec-
tives  are imposed  on transport policy (2), and where 
these  cannot  be  achieved  except  by  means  which 
are  distinctly  incompatible  with  optimum  resource 
allocation,  certain  conclusions  of our analysis  might 
call  for  slight  amendment.  We  have,  however, 
shown  that  some  of  the  most  important  of  these 
objectives  are  consonant  with  optimum  resource 
allocation and are in  fact implicit in  it. 
964 
In  the  second  place,  our conclusions  are  only  fully 
valid  if  there  is  full  employment  and  fairly  steady 
economic growth.  Although these two preconditions 
are  fulfilled  at  present  in  the  Community,  they  do 
restrict  the  scope  of  our  analysis.  Only  a  special 
study  of  the  consequences  for  transport  policy  of 
(')  As  regards the  difficulties  of control which  are inevitable 
in  any  system,  see  Subsection  33.21. 
(")  See  Chapter 21. recession or slower expansion will show whether this 
restriction  is  serious. 
32.1  - THE  CRITERIA  FOR  DETERMINING 
UPPER  AND LOWER LIMITS 
965 
The criteria  for  determining  upper and  lower  limits 
raise  many  problems.  Ultimately,  this  is  because 
neither  uneconomic  competition  nor  the  abuse  of 
dominant positions can be defined unambiguously in 
economic  terms,  and  it is  thus impossible to  fix  the 
limits  in  practice without  bringing  in  an  element of 
appraisal. 
966 
It is  often said that objective limits deduced from  the 
criteria of optimum resource allocation can be estab-
lished  simply  by  considering  costs.  As  we  have 
shown (1 ),  this  view  is  incorrect,  since  the  optimum 
prices consist of the marginal cost and a rent compo-
nent which  reflects  the  scarcity value of the durable 
equipment.  Even if the marginal cost is independent 
of demand - and this is  not necessarily the case -
the  rent component is  entirely determined by it,  and 
consequently  cannot  be  incorporated  into  a  rate 
system  except where the variations can be estimated 
correctly  in  advance  in  each particular case (2). 
967 
From the  angle of optimum resource allocation there 
is  only  one  cost  which  could  possibly  serve  as  a 
yardstick  in  determining  a  rate  limit:  the  marginal 
cost.  If the marginal  cost  of  a  transport operation 
is  reckoned as being approximately constant, without, 
of  course,  necessarily  being  uniform  for  all  cate-
gories  of  transport,  it  could  at  a  pinch  supply  a 
criterion for determining a minimum rate.  Thus the 
marginal  cost  might  well  be an  important  and  eco-
nomically  valid instrument in  this  respect.  But the 
marginal cost in  itself is  not the  only  element to be 
considered  when  defining  a  practical lower limit  for 
transport rates.  In any case no transport firm would 
willingly  work below  marginal cost except in certain 
special  situations (3). 
968 
As regards  the upper limit,  no specific  and  intrinsic 
criterion  can  be  derived  from  the  consideration  of 
costs  once  the  objective  is  to  ensure optimum  allo-
cation  of  resources. 
969 
The  fact  that  optimum  rates  cannot  be established 
purely from  cost considerations  does  not,  of course, 
mean  that  it  is  theoretically  impossible  to  calculate 
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such rates.  In fact it is conceivable that an optimum 
rate system could be established for the whole inland 
transport sector.  To this  end, the public  authorities 
would  have  to  possess  all  the  essential  information 
concerning  costs  and  the  future  pattern  of demand 
for  all  categories  of  transport,  and  also  know 
how  investment  in  transport  capacity  reacts  to 
variations  in  carriers'  incomes.  In  practice,  the 
authorities  obviously  cannot  establish  a  system  of 
transport  rates  on  such  a  basis,  irrespective  of 
whether it  has to  be  imposed on  carriers or used as 
a  yardstick  in  judging  the  rates  submitted  for  their 
approval.  The necessary data are not available, and 
even  if  they  were  the  practical  calculations  would 
be  extremely  difficult,  if  not  impossible. 
970 
Assuming the calculations were possible, this method 
would  tend  to  lead  to  very  rigid  tariffs  because  of 
the difficulties in  establishing, and hence in changing, 
the  tariffs. 
(')  See  Subsection  25.35. 
e)  An inexact  presentation of the  theory  of prices  in much 
economic  literature  has  led  many  people  to  interpret  opti-
mum  prices  as  costs,  and  thus  to  think  that  they  can  be 
determined  by  calculation  on  the  basis  of  costs  alone.  In 
reality  the  concept  of normal  cost,  when  one  goes  into  it, 
appears to have concrete significance only in connection with 
the prices noted on a  market characterized by active  compe-
tition  with  full  employment  and  relatively  steady  growth. 
Whereas  the  concept  of  calculated  "normal  costs"  raises 
insoluble problems, this  connection makes it  possible to find 
criteria  which  satisfy  the  concerns  underlying  the  doctrine 
of  "normal  costs"  while  avoiding  the  impasse  to  which 
it  leads.  It is  this  approach  which  the  present  report  has 
adopted  by  taking  as  basis  not  a  concept of "normal cost" 
which  cannot  be  defined  in  terms  beyond  dispute  but  the 
concept  of  optimum  price  corresponding  to  an  optimum 
allocation of resources, and by looking for the criteria which 
can  be  used  to  determine  it. 
(")  Apart from the case  of public service  obligations  impos-
ed  on  transport  enterprises,  particularly  railways,  rates  can 
be  temporarily  fixed  below  the  marginal  costs  in  various 
exceptional  cases,  for instance,  when  demand has weakened 
so  much  that  capacity  is  no  longer  fully  used  even  at  a 
price  equal  to  marginal  cost.  It  may  be  rational,  and 
moreover  quite  in  conformity  with  optimum  resource  allo-
cation,  temporarily  to  apply  a  rate  below  marginal  cost  if 
demand  is  expected  to  increase  again  in  the  near  future 
and if it  is  more  profitable to continue  to work at a  level 
relatively  close  to  full  capacity  than  to  reduce  activity 
substantially  or  even  stop  it.  A  further  case  of  operation 
at a  rate below marginal cost  could occur when a  transport 
enterprise  and  an  enterprise  of  another  type  are  under  the 
same  management,  for  instance  in  the  event  of  vertical 
integration, and when the transport enterprise is  temporarily 
subsidized by the other to the point that transport rates  are 
fixed  below  marginal  cost.  Finally,  the  railways  could 
conceivably  practise  a  temporary  policy  of  dumping  prices 
lower  than  the  marginal  cost  with  the  aim  of  eliminating 
competitors.  However,  we  have  noted  in  Subsection  25.30 
that  such  a  policy  would  be  relatively  ineffective  in  most 
situations  if  access  to  the  market  were  free.  Hence,  the 
real  risk  of the  railways  practising  a  dumping  policy  does 
not seem to be  very great. 971 
The  calculations  would  also  involve  a great  number 
of estimates  and  judgments for  which  the  authorities 
would be largely obliged to rely on the parties directly 
interested.  Control,  which  is  an  essential  element 
of  the  system,  might  therefore  well  be  ineffective. 
Moreover,  the  method would not give  any indication 
as  to  optimum  price  limits,  except  that  they  would 
have  to  be  fixed  with  great caution. 
972 
Finally  - and  this  is  an  even  more  fundamental 
defect ____,  the method cannot supply criteria by which 
to  judge whether a given  minimum or maximum rate 
actually  prevents  uneconomic  competition  or  the 
abuse  of  dominant  positions. 
973 
It follows  that  a  system  of  calculated  rates  would 
furnish  neither  a  practical  basis  for  fixing  transport 
prices  nor criteria by  which  to  measure  the  serious-
ness  of  uneconomic  competition  or  the  abuse  of 
dominant positions.  This conclusion holds  not only 
for  rates  conceived  as  an  approximation of the opti-
mum  prices,  whose  a  priori  determination,  as  we 
have  seen,  presents  almost  insurmountable  diffi-
culties,  but  also  for  rates  based  on  a  calculation 
of  "average  costs".  For,  no  matter  how  "average 
cost"  is  defined  for  transport  services,  the  main 
requirement for its  determination is  a purely conven-
tional  "imputation"  of  the  costs  which  cannot  be 
apportioned  directly (1). 
974 
The inherent difficulties in calculating minimum and/ 
or maximum  rates  or fixed  tariffs  on  the  basis  of 
economically objective criteria do not, however, imply 
that the imposition  of price  limits  is  necessarily  and 
in  all  cases  an  ineffective  method  of  combating 
uneconomic  competition  and  the  abuse  of dominant 
positions.  But  the  fact  that  there  is  no  objective 
rule  for  calculating  prices  from  the  economic  angle 
means  that  the  criteria  for  determining  their  limits 
will  always  be  to  some extent  a question of opinion 
based  on  a  number  of  different  factors,  which  we 
will  examine  later,  and  on  the  practical  experience 
acquired  as  and  when  the  tariff  is  applied.  This 
is  why  we  attach  great  importance  to  the  empirical 
procedure  we  propose,  which  makes  it  possible  to 
obtain  the  necessary  information  and  at  the  same 
time  ensures,  by  simple  and  practical  means,  the 
transition  from  the  present  situation  to  the  system 
most  appropriate  to  each  case. 
975 
The fact  that,  up  to  a  point,  the  criteria  for  deter-
mining  the  price  limits  are  a  matter  of  personal 
judgment  is  unsatisfactory.  For it  means  that  the 
limits,  far  from  being exclusively based on objective 
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and  verifiable  criteria,  are  ultimately  partl'y  depen-
dent  on  a  more or less  broad  appraisal.  However 
discouraging  this  conclusion  undoubtedly  is,  there 
seems to  be no choice but to accept it, since in theory 
and in practice it is  generally impossible to establish, 
a priori and on the basis of objective data, complete 
economic  criteria  for  the  calculation  of price limits 
which  could  provide  an  effective  barrier  against 
uneconomic competition  and the abuse of dominant 
positions and at the same time avoid any considerable 
distortions  of optimum resource  allocation. 
976 
Two further problems remain to be examined.  One 
is  the definition  of an appropriate institutional  pro-
cedure  for  applying  the  system,  allowing  for  the 
fact  that  the  more  or  less  wide  latitude  left  for 
subjective  appraisal  calls  for  special  procedural 
guarantees (2).  The other concerns the factms which 
should be taken into account in determining whether, 
and  if  so  at what level,  price limits  should be  fixed 
in  a  given  case. 
977 
It is  clear that marginal cost is  an importan( element 
in determining an appropriate minimum rate in situa-
tions  where  uneconomic  competition  is  suspected. 
In the  case of the  railways  a further indication may 
be  obtained  by  comparing  the  particular  price 
presumed  to  be  "excessively  low"  with  the  prices 
of  comparable  services  provided  elsewhere  by  the 
railways.  The same procedure can be followed  for 
rail  tariffs  which  are  considered  to  be too high  and 
as  possibly  reflecting  abuse  of a  dominant  position. 
978 
The  difficulties  involved  in  defining  "comparable 
services"  are  well  known.  They  arise  from  differ-
ences not only in the categories of goods transported 
and  in  the  features  of  costs  in  the  various  parts of 
the  network  but  also  in  the  periods  at  which  the 
transport  operation  is  carried  out,  the  season,  the  • 
direction,  the  degree  of utilization  of  infrastructure, 
etc.  In  particular,  the  optimum  prices  for  the 
utilization  of  infrastructure,  which  are  incorporated 
into  the  prices  of  transport,  are  entirely  different 
according  to  whether  the infrastructure  is  or is  not 
fully  utilized,  since the congestion charge component 
can be  nil  or high,  depending on the case.  Conse-
quently, any comparison between the price of a given 
transport  service  and  the  prices  charged  lfor  other 
services  considered  comparable  must  take  account 
of  the  conditions  of  utilization  of  infrastructure  in 
the  relevant  part  of  the  network  at  the  time  when 
the service concf:rned is  supplied.  Another difficulty 
(')  See  Part  I. 
(")  See  Subsection  33.21. is  that  such  comparable  services  may  not  always 
exist. 
979 
However,  although  absolutely  comparable  services 
rarely  exist,  it  would  nevertheless  seem  that  with 
railways a transport service can be defined as the sum 
of  components  such  as  the  hauling  of  the  trucks, 
stopping,  shunting,  administrative  operations,  etc., 
and that there  is  nothing to  prevent effective compa-
rison  of  these  components.  From  this  it  follows 
that,  although  it  is  difficult  to  find  comparable 
services  for  a  given  transport  operation,  the  opera-
tion can be broken down into basic components, each 
of  which  can be compared.  A  similar  analysis  can 
also  be  envisaged for inland waterways  and roads. 
980 
Of  course,  this  procedure  can  furnish  useful 
information  on  one  element  only  (i.e.  order  of 
magnitude  of  the  average  cost)  among  all  those 
which  must  be taken  into  account in  comparing the 
prices  of  the  various  transport  services  that  are 
assumed  to  be  comparable.  In particular,  the  rent 
element,  whose  importance  we  have  emphasized  on 
several  occasions,  cannot  be  evaluated  by  this  pro-
cedure since it depends  essentially on  demand.  But 
certain comparisons may  also  be  practicable for  this 
aspect  of  the  prices  of services  to  be  compared,  by 
reference  to  those  charged  in  situations  where  the 
degree of utilization of capacity of both infrastructure 
and means of transport is  comparable (1). 
981 
The problems of the comparative method are serious, 
but they do  not imply that it must be rejected.  The 
method does  not claim  to offer  a complete criterion, 
any  more  than  the  one  based  on  consideration  of 
the  marginal  cost.  But it should  be  borne  is  mind 
when  judging  whether price limits  must be imposed 
and,  if  so,  at  what  level  they  should  be fixed.  It 
has  the  advantage  of  being  relatively  easy  to  apply 
objectively  and  to  check  on  in  practice.  Provided 
the  prices  actually  charged  for  each  category  of 
transport  are  published  in  an  appropriate  form,  the 
initiative  in  making  complaints  to  the  competent 
authorities  against  a  tariff  or prices  charged  by  the 
railways could largely be left to the parties concerned, 
i.e.  users  and  their  competitors  and  the  competing 
modes  of  inland  transport (2). 
982 
In the modes with a competitive system, the question 
generally  arises  in  a  different  way,  and  the  danger 
alleged  is  that  the  general  price  level  would  be  too 
low because of a presumed trend towards overinvest-
ment.  We  have  already  studied  this  argument (3) 
and  shown  that such  a  trend appears improbable in 
a  situation  of  full  employment  and  relatively  steady 
141 
economic  growth,  provided  carriers  are  well  enough 
informed (4).  In reality the application of minimum 
rates in  the sectors with a competitive system is often 
advocated  not  for  the  reasons  analysed  in  this 
Chapter,  but  as  a  form  of  incomes  policy (5). 
Without  there  being  any  question  of  judging  the 
merits of such a policy, it is clear that minimum rates, 
unless  accompanied  by  a  limitation  of  investments 
in  transport  capacity  and  of  access  to  the  market, 
would  be  absolutely  ineffective,  since  in  themselves 
they could only be  an incitement to  new  investments 
and consequently would aggravate rather than correct 
the causes of price levels considered to be too low. 
983 
In any case,  it  is  also  clear that in  the context of an 
incomes  policy  the  appropriate  criterion  for  deter-
mining  minimum  rates  must  necessarily  be  deduced 
from a concept of a "reasonable income" for carriers. 
984 
From  this  angle  the  problems  which  arise  for  the 
sectors with  a competitive system  are obvious.  The 
rates  would  have  to  be  based  on  calculated  scales 
whose  determination presents difficulties.  (Some  of 
these  difficulties,  of  a  general  nature,  have  already 
been  examined  above.)  But  the  rates  would  also 
require  a  definition  of  "reasonable  income"  which 
would  necessarily  represent  a  compromise  between 
equity and efficiency.  Since in this case tariff limits 
are not motivated by strictly economic considerations, 
the  criteria  of  optimum  resource  allocation  cannot 
furnish  a complete basis for fixing  them  and  do not 
in  themselves  give  any  special  guidance,  except 
(')  In  particular,  on  the  route  considered  and  at  a  compar-
able  time. 
(")  The  same  type  of  comparison  could  obviously  be  used 
to limit the differentiation of tariffs according to the  nature 
of  the  goods  transported  (ad  valorem),  a  differentiation 
which  could be  considered as  constituting uneconomic com-
petition  or the  abuse  of a  dominant  position  for  the  same 
reasons  as  territorial  differentiation  of  tariffs.  However, 
provided  it  remains  moderate,  some  differentiation  of this 
type  can  be,  and probably  is,  necessary  to enable  the  rail-
ways  to meet  the  budgetary equilibrium  requirement.  This 
problem  is  examined  in  Section  32.4. 
(")  See  Subsection  25.21. 
(')  See  Chapter  33. 
(")  Another  argument  sometimes  advanced  in  favour  of 
minimum  rates  in  the  sectors  with  a  competitive  system 
is  that  such  rates  can  protect  small  carriers  against  the 
competition of the large haulage firms.  However, it may be 
asked  whether  such  protection  is  necessary,  since  we  hear 
even  more often  the  reverse  argument  that  the  large  enter-
prises  need  to  be  protected  against  the  small  hauliers,  who 
are  said  not  to  respect  social  legislation  and  who,  being 
self-employed,  are  not  subject  to  this  legislatioJ:?- anyw~y. 
Moreover  it is  not clearly proved that the large firms  enJOY 
cost  adv~tages which  would  enable  them  to eliminate  the 
little  men.  If this  were  the case,  however,  protection  does 
not appear intrinsically desirable, as it amounts to preservi~g 
a  certain  market  structure  at the  expense  of the  economiC 
advantages inherent in some  degree  of concentration. perhaps to show the need to adopt the least restrictive 
price  limits  possible  and  a general tariff level  which 
weakens the stimulus to efficiency as little as possible. 
32.2  - THE  SYSTEM  OF  PERMANENT 
AND  GENERAL  BRACKET RATES 
985 
At first  sight  it may seem  natural to impose perma-
nent bracket rates on all  transport services,  in  order 
to  protect  the  transport  market  against  the  two 
dangers  of abuse  of  dominant  positions  and  uneco-
nomic  competition.  However,  closer  examination 
shows  that  such  a  solution  would  have little  justifi-
cation and would also be very hard to implement (1). 
986 
To  substantiate  this  a  few  remarks  may  be  made 
regarding the consequences of two  factors concerned 
in  distortion  of  the  conditions  of competition  when 
there are no price limits. 
987 
First,  uneconomic  competition (2)  can occur in rela-
tions  between  different  modes  of  inland  transport. 
If we disregard external distortions of the conditions 
of  competition (3),  which  should  be  eliminated  by 
direct measures, such uneconomic competition seems 
to  stem  primarily from  the  railways'  opportunity of 
practising  "internal  subsidizing",  i.e.  differentiating 
tariffs  either between  different  parts of the  network 
or between different categories of traffic, which leads 
to  dumping  prices  for  services  exposed  to  strong 
competition  from  another  mode  of  transport (4). 
Without  going  into  the  complicated  problems  of 
defining  such  a  differentiation or of determining the 
real  content of the  expression  "dumping price"  and 
appraising  its  economic  consequences,  we  may  say 
that. two  remedies  are  possible.  One is  to  impose 
minimum  rates  wherever  the  railways  can  practise 
uneconomic  competition.  Another  may  be  to 
impose  on  the  railways,  as  on the infrastructure of 
the  other modes  of transport,  the rule  of budgetary 
equilibrium  and, in addition,  maximum rates for the 
services  for  which  they  are  in  a  position  to  charge 
relatively  high  prices (5).  These  categories  of 
services will largely coincide with, or at least include, 
those in which  there is  abuse  of dominant positions 
or risk of such abuse. 
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In the  second place,  as  regards uneconomic compe-
tition  also  occurring  within  the  modes  of transport 
with  a  competitive  system,  we  have  already (6) 
expressed doubt as  to the real extent of such compe-
tition  and  as  to  the  power  of  minimum  rates  to 
correct  any  distortions  it  causes (1).  However, 
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wathever  the  validity  of  our  judgment  may  be  as 
regards  the  facts,  and  whatever  the  merits  of  the 
policies  proposed to combat such  uneconomic  com-
petition,  it  is  dear that  the  situation  would  hardly 
justify  the  general  imposition of maximum  rates  in 
the modes of transport with a competitive system (8). 
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Improper  exploitation  of  dominant  positions  is 
generally possible only by the railways, though it may 
occur in  the  modes  of transport  with  an  actual  or 
potential competitive system  when competition there 
is  restricted by private agreements or by regulations. 
Such  action  by  the railways  might  be  prevented  by 
imposing  appropriate  maximum  rates  for  categories 
of  services  in  which  they enjoy  a  clearly  dominant 
position.  But however  we  judge the  real  1~xtent of 
such  situations (9),  their  existence  does  not  justify 
the permanent imposition  of maximum  rates on the 
other modes of inland transport or for those services 
where  the  railways,  far  from  making  improper  use 
of  a  dominant  position,  charge  competitive  prices 
which  are  described  as  "excessively  low". 
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These remarks seem to lead to the following  conclu-
sions.  Even if the risks of uneconomic competition 
and  abuse  of  dominant  positions  were  very  wide-
(') It will  be  shown  that,  although  bracket  rates  have  no 
permanent  economic  justification,  there  are  nevertheless 
excellent  reasons  for  maintaining  them  where  they  exist  or 
introducing  them  where  fixed  tariffs  are  at  present  applied, 
during  the  initial phase  of a common  transport policy, when 
we  are  generally  in  the  dark  as  to  where  the  dangers  of 
uneconomic  competition  or abuse  of dominant  positions  are 
to  be  found. 
(')  See  Sections  25.2  and  25.3. 
(")  See  Subsection  25.31. 
(')  See  Subsection  25.30.  See  also  Subsection  25.34,  where 
we  concluded  that,  with  non-increasing  marginal  returns  in 
the  supply  of  services,  "traffic  leakage"  does  not  call  for 
special  measures  provided  the  rule  of budgetary  equilibrium 
without  possibility  of  borrowing  (assuming  it  is  necessary) 
can  be  applied  by  the  railways  and  is  applied  with  sufficient 
equalization  of  charges. 
(')  See Subsection 2.5.30, in  which we saw that such measures 
could  largely  eliminate  the  problems  of uneconomic  compe-
tition  where  these  arise  from  the  possibility  open  to  the 
railways  of  practising  "internal  subsidizing".  It  should, 
however,  be  noted  that  this  method  is  only  really  effective 
when  the  rule  of  budgetary  equilibrium  without  possibility 
of  borrowing  is  applied,  since  the  rule  with  possibility  of 
borrowing  could  conceivably  be  used  by  the  railways,  at 
least  to  some  extent,  to  procure  the  funds  necessary  for 
"dumping  prices'. 
(
6
)  See  especially  Subsection  25.21. 
(') It should  be  remembered  that  the  analysis  was  carried 
out  under  the  two  premises  of  full  employment  and  relati-
vely  steady  economic  growth. 
(
8
)  It should  be  remembered  that  the  reasoning  here  applies 
only  to  a permanent system  of bracket  rates  (see  footnote (') 
above). 
(")  See  Subsection  25.33. spread,  they  could  not  be  invoked  to  justify  the 
permanent  application  to  all  transport services  of a 
tariff including both a minimum and maximum limit. 
At  most,  they  might  justify  the  imposition  on  the 
competitive  modes  of a  general  system  of  minimum 
rates,  and,  on  the  railways,  of .  maximum  rates  for 
some  categories  of  transport  and,  where  necessary, 
minimum  rates  for  others (1).  For the  reasons  set 
out above, the simultaneous imposition of a minimum 
and  maximum  rate  for  the  same  type  of  service  is 
not  justified.  There  cannot  be,  at  the  same  time 
and for the same type of service, uneconomic compe-
tition  which  would  take  the  form  of  "excessively 
low"  prices,  and abuse of dominant positions, which 
would  involve  "too  high"  prices,  since  these  two 
situations  are mutually exclusive ( 2). 
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Admittedly, it could be  argued that although, strictly 
speaking, a minimum  and a maximum rate are never 
required  at  the  same  time  for  the  same  type  of 
service,  they  could  nevertheless  be  required  shortly 
after  each  other. 
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It is  quite  conceivable  that  the  structural  situation 
in  a  particular  part  of  the  transport  market  may 
suddenly  be  transformed,  with  a  transition  from  a 
state  of  affairs  in  which  the  railways  are  charging 
"excessively  low"  prices  to  one  in  which  they  enjoy 
a  dominant  position (3).  In such  a  case  a  bracket 
rate  system  could  prevent the  railways  from  impro-
perly  exploiting their newly-acquired  dominant posi-
tion  during  the  time  needed  to  carry  through  the 
administrative procedure for substituting a maximum 
rate  for  the  initial  minimum  rate.  Whatever  the 
real importance of such situations and the probability 
of  whether  the  railways  would  in  fact  immediately 
misuse their newly-acquired dominant position know-
ing that this would almost certainly provoke counter-
measures  by the authorities,  it would  seem  that this 
eventuality  cannot  be  a  valid  argument  for  perma-
nently  imposing  a  bracket  rate  system  on  a  whole 
category of transport services. 
993 
A  further  argument often  advanced in  favour  of the 
general  introduction  of  bracket  rates  is  that  of 
equality of treatment.  It is  held  that when  a mode 
of  transport  is  subject  to  such  rates,  the  equality 
of  treatment  principle  requires  that  price  limits 
should  also  be  imposed  on  the  other  competing 
modes of transport.  But this argument is  manifestly 
illogical.  If minimum or maximum rates are applied 
for  the  precise  purpose  of  preventing  uneconomic 
competition or the  abuse of dominant positions,  and 
if they  are in fact imposed in specific cases in which 
these risks  occur, there is  no economically justifiable 
reason  to  introduce  similar  limitations  for  other 
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categories  of  services  or  other  modes  of  transport 
where  the  risks  do  not  exist' (4). 
994 
Simultaneous  and  permanent  imposition  of  a  maxi-
mum  and  minimum  price on  one  and the same type 
of  service  is  not  only  economically  unjustified;  it is 
also  likely  to  have  drawbacks  which  are  all  the 
more  serious  the  narrower the  bracket. 
995 
This last statement is  based on three sets of reasons. 
996 
In  the  first  place,  a  system  of universal  price  limits 
does  not  imply  that  a  specific  bracket  rate  system 
can  be  established  for  every  individual  transport 
service.  Such  a  procudure  would  moreover  be 
impossible  in  strict logic,  since  a transport service  is 
defined inter alia by the time at which it is  produced. 
Hence  some grouping of services  is  necessary in  any 
case.  Consequently,  the  bracket  would  have  to  be 
wide  enough  to  allow  of  all  the  price  variations 
implied  by  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources  for 
all  services  in  the  same  category. 
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Secondly, we have already shown (5)  that fixed tariffs, 
i.e.  by  our  definition  tariffs  imposed  or  approved 
by the public authorities and not allowing any margin 
of  freedom  to  the  carrier,  are  often  in  danger  of 
being  too  low  or  too  high  in  comparison  with  the 
prices which  would correspond to optimum resource 
allocation.  The  reason  is  to  be  found  first  in  the 
risk  of  error  implicit  in  determination  of  the  level 
(') The expression  "where necessary"  refers to the  fact  that 
the  combination  of  the  budgetary  equilibrium  rule  with 
maximum rates for the services for which the railways hold 
a  dominant  position  may  possibly  suffice  to  prevent  "in-
ternal  subsidizing"  and  consequently  uneconomic  competi-
tion. 
(")  We  recall  once  again  that  the  whole  analysis  presented 
here  is  subject to the two  general  premises  of full  employ-
ment  and  relatively  steady  economic  growth. 
(')  For instance,  let  us consider a  route  between  two points 
A  and  B  on  which  the  railways  apply  a  reduced  tariff  to 
compete  with  inland  waterways  on  a  route  C - B.  It  is 
assumed  there  is  no  waterway  for  route  A - B.  If,  for 
some  reason,  traffic  from  C  towards  B  ceases  (shutdown 
of  a  colliery,  discontinuance  of  an  import  flow,  etc.),  the 
railways acquire a  dominant position on route A-B.  Similar 
reversals  of  situation  could  occur  when  special  weather 
conditions cause, for example, a  very sharp fall  in  the level 
of  navigable  rivers,  and  consequently  the  more  or  less 
complete elimination of these  routes for a  time.  In such a 
case  the  railway  might find  itself  in  a  very  strong position 
which it could be  tempted to exploit. 
(') If a  minimum or maximum price  is  imposed  as  a  result 
of an error on the part of the competent authorities, it would 
obviously  be  better to correct this error rather than extend 
it  to  the  competing  modes  of  transport  for  the  sake  of 
equality of treatment. 
(")  See  Subsection  25.35. of  the  tariffs,  and  secondly  in  the  fact  that  market 
conditions,  in  particular  intensity  of  demand,  can 
change  fairly  rapidly,  whereas  in  practice  fixed 
tariffs  cannot be  adapted  at  short notice.  We  have 
shown  that  this  danger  is  particularly  serious  for 
transport  services,  since  these  cannot be  stored.  In 
such  cases  the optimum prices,  and in  particular the 
rent component, i.e.  the rent arising from  the durable 
equipment, largely depend on the intensity of demand, 
the  variation  in  which  is  only  partially  predictable. 
These drawbacks of fixed  tariffs also exist for bracket 
rates,  although  they  decrease  with  increasing  width 
of  the  bracket.  Bracket  rates  with  only  narrow 
limits  and  small  possibilities  of  making  exceptions 
carry  a  high  risk  of  serious  distortion  of  optimum 
resource  allocation,  particularly  in  view  of  the 
difficulty  of  establishing  objective  criteria  for  the 
a  priori  determination  of price limits. 
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In the  third place, any rate system  subject to  official 
approval  naturally  tends  to  be  rigid,  since  the  pro-
cedure of approval always  takes some time. 
999 
A  permanent  and  general  system  of bracket rates  is 
therefore not to be recommended from  the economic 
angle.  As  just  shown,  it  would  be  unjustified  and 
harmful  to  an  optimum  allocation  of resources. 
1000 
The  criteria for  judging  situations of abuse of domi-
nant  positions  and  uneconomic  competition  are  so 
complex  that  such  a  system  would  be fraught  with 
practically insuperable difficulties if it were proposed 
to  fix  the  lower  and  upper  limits  at  all  exactly. 
1001 
Hence, if reasons unconnected with optimum resource 
allocation  nevertheless  led  to  such  a  system  being 
applied,  the  range  of  the  brackets  should  be  wide, 
in  order  to  minimize  the  economic  drawbacks  -
which  are  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  the  general 
procedure  for  approval  of  the  tariffs  cannot  fail  to 
be  rather  inexact. 
1002 
This  conclusion  is  closely  related  to  another,  which 
may  moreover  be  derived  from  it:  that the  brackets 
should  be  indicative  rather than  absolute.  In other 
words  the  authorities  would  have  to  allow  prices 
outside  the  limits  when  special  circumstances  justi-
fied  it.  We  have not specially examined the criteria 
for  defining  such  circumstances,  but  permission  to 
charge  such  prices  would  appear  to  be  a  logical 
concomitant'  of  the  system  provided  it  did  not  give 
rise  to  uneconomic  competition  or  the  abuse  of 
dominant  positions. 
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Of course,  the above remarks in no  way answer the 
question of how to  determine the range between the 
lower  and  upper limits  of the brackets.  Since only 
one limit can be deduced from the criteria, the other 
is  essentially  arbitrary.  Hence,  the system  which is 
simplest,  and  therefore  most  appropriate  in  the 
absence  of  other  considerations,  might  be to  fix  a 
uniform  percentage for  the range  of the bracket for 
all  categories  of  transport.  However,  such  a  pro-
cedure  could  fit  the  case  only  if  the  range  were 
wide.  If it is  relatively narrow, other aspects might 
have to be taken into account, such as  the variability 
of demand  for  the  transport  services  coming  under 
the tariff in question,  the degree of differentiation of 
the tariffs which could be applied within the category 
of services considered, the probability of error implied 
by  determination  of  price limits,  etc.  As  it  is  not 
the aim of this report to  supply detailed solutions for 
practical problems,  we  shall  do  no  more than men-
tion these aspects,  and not attempt a complete anal-
ysis  of  the questions  of  applying  tariffs  in  practice. 
1004 
But the general conclusion is  certainly that a system 
of specific  maximum  and  minimum  rates  would  be 
more  suitable than a general system  of bracket rates 
for  categories  of services  in which  improper exploi-
tation  of  dominant  positions  is  probable  or where 
there  is  risk  of uneconomic  competition.  The  pro-
cedure we  propose in  the following  section is  calcu-
lated  to  permit  gradual  pinpointing  of  these  cate-
gories. 
1005 
In fact,  wherever there is  no abuse of dominant posi-
tions  or uneconomic  competition  at the outset,  this 
procedure will generally consist in substituting bracket 
rates  for  fixed  tariffs  where  there  are  fixed  tariffs, 
and  in  gradually widening the  range of the brackets 
where  there  are  bracket  rates,  until  such  time  as 
cases  of  uneconomic  competition or abuse  of domi-
nant  positions  present  themselves.  The  advantages 
of the procedure are that it  does  not require a priori 
definition  of  the  limits  of  the  brackets  and  that  it 
constitutes  an  empirical  method  for  identifying  all 
those  cases  where  there is  a  real danger of abuse of 
dominant  positions  or  of  uneconomic  competition. 
1006 
All  in  all,  the  solution  suggested  appears  to  be  the 
least  unsatisfactory.  Although  it  presents  obvious 
difficulties  of  application,  these  are  at  least  equally 
acute in all  the other systems  proposed or envisaged. 
On  the  other  hand it completely  lacks  some  major 
drawbacks of th1~ other systems. 32.3  - ADVANTAGES 
OF  A  PRAGMATIC SOLUTION 
1007 
We  have  shown  above  that  the  judicious  fixing  of 
maximum  and  minimum  prices  in  a  permanent  and 
general  bracket  rate  system  would  encounter  almost 
insurmountable  difficulties.  Errors  would  necessa-
rily  be  numerous  and  economically  harmful. 
1008 
On the other hand,  almost  all  Community states  are 
at  present  applying  systems  of  fixed  tariffs,  or 
bracket rates with relatively narrow range, for certain 
modes  of  inland  transport,  as  well  as  licensing 
systems which  are often very restrictive in the modes 
with  a  competitive  system,  particularly  road  trans-
port.  The  result  is  that  it  is  impossible  to  know 
a  priori  which  categories  of  services  are  su\ceptible 
to  uneconomic  competition  or  abuse  of  dominant 
positions  and  which  categories  are  free  from  such 
risk. 
1009 
This  being  so,  if  the  aim  is  to  apply  the  general 
principles  suggested  by  this  report  - i.e.  that' 
restrictions  must  be  imposed  on  freedom  of  prices 
whenever there is  a possibility of  abuse of dominant 
positions or uneconomic competition, but that other-
wise  freedom  is  preferable  - an  empirical  and 
gradual method would appear to be the only r;;ltional 
one. 
1010 
Procedure could be  as  follows.  Where neither abuse 
of  dominant  positions  nor  uneconomic  competition 
is  observable  at  present,  and  where  fixed  tariffs  or 
bracket  rates  with  a  narrow  range  are  in  operation, 
whether  in  railway,  road  or inland  waterway  trans-
port, restrictions can be  reduced by a percentage not 
exceeding  a  specific  maximum,  on  the basis  of  the 
current  tariffs (1).  In  other  words,  wherever  fixed 
tariffs  are  in  operation  they  would  be  replaced  by 
bracket  rates,  and  wherever  bracket  rates  are  in 
operation  they  would  be  maintained.  The  range 
of the  brackets  would  be gradually widened. 
1011 
We  can  envisage  imposing  the  obligation  to  widen 
the  brackets  gradually  and  regularly  to  the  same 
extent  in  both  directions,  except  where  this  would 
clearly  have  major  drawbacks.  The  argument  in 
favour  of  a  strict  obligation  in  this  respect  at 
Community level  is  that the decision as  to  the degree 
of flexibility  to be introduced into rigid tariff systems 
cannot  be left  to  the  discretion  of those  concerned, 
or  even  of  the  national  authorities,  for  this  might 
result  in  the  process lasting  too  long.  Moreover,  it 
is  reasonable  to  try  to  stimulate  adaptation  by  the 
certainty  that  particular  time-limits  are  absolute. 
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It  may  be  advisable  here  to. follow  the  solution 
adopted by the Rome Treaty as  regards the lowering 
of  customs  tariffs  and  abolition  of  quotas. 
1013 
It goes  without  saying,  however,  that application of 
such  a  procedure  would  in  any  case  have  to  be 
pragmatic,  i.e.  adaptable  to  circumstances.  In  the 
first  place,  the  process  of  widening  the  brackets 
would  be  stopped  or  even  reversed  whenever  the 
authorities  noted  that  greater  freedom  had  led  to 
improper  exploitation  of  dominant  positions  or 
uneconomic competition,  and  the fixing  of an upper 
or  lower  limit  would  be  justified.  In  the  second 
place,  in  the  absence  of  uneconomic  competition or 
abuse  of  dominant  positions,  controlled  facilities 
should  be  available  for  waiving  the  obligation  to 
widen  the brackets in the event of serious disturban-
ces  causied  by  difficult  problems  of  adaptation. 
But  the  freedom  granted  should  be  progressively 
eliminated once it  became possible to  suppress these 
disturbances. 
1014 
Furthermore, the possibility of widening the brackets 
more  rapidly  than  was  initially  planned  should  be 
left  open.  This  could  be  particularly  important  if 
one  mode  of transport found  itself in  direct  compe-
tition  with  another  not  subject  to  price  limits. 
1015 
From  the  above  it  follows  that  the  bracket  rate 
system  is  an  indispensable  instrument  in  ensuring 
the  necessary  transitions,  since  any  lessening  of 
restrictions  presupposes  that  bracket  rates  are  sub-
stituted for  fixed  tariffs  or the range of the brackets 
is  widened  where  such  rates  exist  at  the  outset (
2
). 
On  the  other  hand,  as  soon  as  abuse  of  dominant 
positions  or uneconomic  competition  appears,  mini-
mum  or  maximum  rates  are  introduced. 
1016 
The  advantages  of the  pragmatic  solution  suggested 
here  appear  decisive. 
1017 
As  we  have  just  indicated,  it  combines  efficiency 
with flexibility, and minimizes the risks of distrubance 
due to  over-rapid  action  which  would  not  allow  the 
time  necessary  for  adaptation. 
(')  More  severe  restrictions  would  have  to  be  introduced  at 
the beginning only  if abuse  of dominant positions  or unec': 
nomic  competition  were  present  from  the  ou!set.  Thts 
aspect  will  be  considered  at  the  end  of the  sectiOn. 
(")  Naturally,  this  recommendation  does  not  ap~IY. to  those 
sectors  which  are  at  present  free  from  restncttons  and 
where  neither  the  abuse  of  dominant  positions  nor  uneco-
nomic  competition  is  observed.  Here  the  existing  freedom 
should  be  maintained. 1018 
Moreover,  the  solution  makes  it  possible  to  follow 
the  lessons  of  experience,  rather  than  the  highly 
uncertain  results  of  extremely  complex  calculations, 
without  detriment  to  the  correctness  of  the  final 
result'. 
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This  solution  also  makes  it  possible  to  begin  imple-
menting  the  common  policy  before  full  introduction 
of  a  coherent  system  of  charges  for  the  use  of 
infrastructure  or  full  harmonization  of  the  external 
conditions  of  competition. 
1020 
The  fact  that  this  harmonization  will  occur  only 
gradually  in  no  way  implies  that  nothing  must  be 
done  to  lessen  restrictions  until  it  is  completed.  In 
actual  fact,  the  existing  restrictions  are  only  partly 
justified  by  inequality of external conditions of com-
petition  between  the  different  modes  of  transport 
or  between  the  different  countries  as  regards  the 
same  mode  of transport.  Where  there is  no  appre-
ciable distortion of the external conditions of compe-
tition there  is  obviously no  reason to  slow  down  the 
reduction of existing restrictions.  If, on the contrary, 
restrictions  are  justified by  inequality in the external 
conditions, it would appear desirable from a practical 
point of view  that the  two  processes  of  abolition  of 
restrictions  and  harmonization  should  go  on  simul-
taneously,  for  they  can  mutually enforce each other. 
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The  abolition  of  quantitative  restrictions  on  access 
to the  market could operate in  the same progressive 
and pragmatic way  as  the  reduction of tariff restric-
tions (1). 
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Thus,  the process of transition could be arranged so 
as  to. preclude  any  serious  disturbance.  The  pro-
gressive  abolition  of  restrictions,  accompanied  by 
parallel  harmonization  of  external  conditions  of 
competition  and  the gradual  introduction  of  a  com-
mon system for infrastructure, would make it possible 
to  observe  the general  or particular  effects  of  each 
step  in  the  process  and  to  use  the  information 
garnered in  preparing for the following step.  As we 
have  already indicated,  the process  could  be  slowed 
down,  stopped  or  even  reversed  when  experience 
showed that to continue abolishing restrictions would 
lead  to  the  improper  exploitation  of  dominant 
positions  and  uneconomic  competition.  Conversely, 
in  all  cases  where  such  situations  did  not  appear, 
the  process  could  be speeded  up. 
1023 
In a general way,  with experience making it possible 
to  accumulate  a  large  number  of  factual  data,  the 
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firm  lines  of  a  transport  system  would  gradually 
emerge. 
1024 
In certain cases, whose number and importance need 
not  be  estimated from  the  outset,  dangers  of uneco-
nomic  competition  or  abuse  of  dominant  positions 
would  become  evident.  The  bracket  rate  system 
would  then  be replaced by  a  minimum or maximum 
price. 
1025 
In  the  other cases  the  limits  of the  brackets  would 
gradually become nominal.  The brac:ket rate system 
would  then  cease  to  exist. 
1026 
There  is  nothing  to  imply  that  this  process  should 
go  on  at  exactly  the  same  pace  in  all  transport 
services.  In  certain  cases  practical  experience  may 
rapidly  prove  conclusive  in  one  way  or the  other, 
while  in  others it  will  have  to continue for  a  longer 
time. 
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But whatever technical and economic difficulties have 
to  be foreseen  in  implementing the policy suggested 
by  this  report,  it  does  not  seem  that,  with  the 
procedures  suggested,  recognition  of cases  of  abuse 
of  dominant  positions  and  uneconomic  competition 
should  take more  than  about  ten  years.  From  the 
same  technical  and  economic  angles,  adequate  har-
monization of the external conditions of competition 
would  seem  to  be  possible  within  about  the  same 
time limit. 
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Having  said  this,  there  is  no  question  of  claiming 
that implementation of the policy suggested here will 
not  give  rise  1'o  difficulties.  Quite  the  contrary. 
But no effective policy can be free of such difficulties. 
1029 
They  cannot  possibly  be dealt  with  exhaustively  in 
this  report.  We  will  therefore  confine  ourselves  to 
a  few  remarks. 
1030 
In  addition  to  the  difficulties  of  introducing  the 
institutional  procedures  which  will  be  €:xamined 
later (2),  mention  should  be  made  of  the  pace  at 
(')  Although,  for  road  haulage  and/or  inland  waterways, 
control  of  transport  capacity  is  considered  expedient  to 
ensure that carriers have a  certain minimum of professional 
qualifications  or to  avoid  undesirable  market  disturbances, 
such  control  should  not  be  economically  restrictive.  In 
other  words,  the  market  value  of  the  licences  should  be 
close  to  nil. 
~  See  Subsection  33.21. which  the  brackets  are  widened  in  the  initial phase. 
This  can  hardly  be  decided  categorically;  it is  more 
a  problem  of  appraisal,  and  calls  for  an  empirical 
judgment. 
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It can nevertheless  be  affirmed that,  at the outset,  a 
widening of the  rate brackets by about two  per cent 
per annum in  both directions is  feasible and prudent, 
it  being understood  that this  pace would  need to  be 
adjusted in the light of experience and of the parallel 
advance  made in  harmonizing external conditions  of 
competition. 
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Another  problem  concerns  the  fate  of  the  modes 
of  transport  at  present  free  of  any  notable  restric-
tion.  In all  cases  the  proper solution can be found 
only  by  thorough  study  of  the  existing  situation. 
Three  cases  may  present  themselves.  First,  if 
restrictions  are  not  justified  by  a  real  risk  of  abuse 
of dominant positions or uneconomic competition, it 
would  be  inconsistent,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
optimum  resource  allocation,  to  introduce  such 
restrictions.  Secondly,  when  there  is  no  such  risk, 
and  when  one of two  competing modes of transport 
is  subject  to  restrictions  while  the  other  is  exempt 
from  them,  the  most  sensible  solution  would  be  to 
speed  up  the  easing  of  the  restrictions.  Thirdly, 
when the abuse of dominant positions or uneconomic 
competition  is  possible  in  one  mode  of  transport 
because  restrictions  are  imposed  on  another  mode, 
the solution would again be to ease these restrictions. 
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There  will,  of  course,  be  serious  initial  difficulties 
in  working  out  the  provisions  for  fixing  maximum 
or minimum  prices  where  there  is  improper exploi-
tation  of  dominant  positions  or uneconomic  compe-
tition.  But the only  reasonable approach here is  to 
propose  a  method based on practical and consistent 
principles.  These  have  been  set  out  above  and 
there  is  no  need  to  revert  to  them  here.  Never-
theless,  these  principles  will  never furnish  automatic 
solutions  for  concrete  cases,  and  we  would  repeat 
once again that any decision would inevitably involve 
a  more  or  less  substantial  element  of  subjective 
appraisal.  This  is  the  root  of  the  difficulties  of 
any  tariff  policy  for  the control  authorities.  How-
ever,  it  would  be  as  unscientific  to  declare  them 
insoluble  without  examining  them  as  to  deny  their 
existence. 
32.4  - PRICE DIFFERENTIATION 
1034 
So  far  we  have  considered  the problems  of  uneco-
nomic  competition  and  abuse  of  dominant  position 
in  their  most  general form,  together with  the possi-
bilities of remedying them.  However, our suggested 
solutions may not be sufficient in themselves to meet 
a  group  of  special  cases  likely  to  require  further 
measures.  These special cases  stem from  the possi-
bility  open  to  the  railways  of  systematically  differ-
entiating  their  prices. 
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In  principle,  price  differentiation  can  be  defined  as 
charging different prices for identical services.  This 
may be extended to  cover similar services, but to do 
so  naturally  entails  many difficulties. 
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Such  price  differentiation  can  take  three  different 
forms.  The first is a differentiation in prices charged 
in  different  parts  of  the  network.  This  type  of 
differentiation,  the  extent of which  depends  on how 
far the railways are in competition with other modes 
of transport on the various parts of the rail network, 
has  already  been  considered  in  studying  minimum 
and  maximum  rates.  The  second  type  consists  in 
charging  different  prices  for  different  categories  of 
goods  transported  (ad  valorem  rates).  We  have 
already noted that this type has become considerably 
less  important  following  the  rapid  development  of 
competing  modes  of  transport,  in  particular  road 
haulage.  The  limited  opportunities  still  open  to 
the  railways  in  this  respect  can  probably  not  be 
further reduced by public measures without endanger-
ing their ability to meet the requirement of budgetary 
equilibrium,  should  this  be  imposed  on  them. 
147 
1037 
The  third  type  of  price  differentiation  consists  in 
application  by  a  carrier  of  transport  rates  which 
differ for different consignors, in respect of the same 
goods  carried  under  the  same  circumstances.  This 
type of differentiation - which, like the ad valorem 
rates, may give rise to problems of equity - can be 
justified to some extent by the fact that the railways 
are  in  a  situation  of  increasing  returns  and  may 
therefore not be able to achieve budgetary equilibrium 
without  such  differentiation.  However,  there  are 
several  factors  which  seem  to  indicate  that  special 
guarantees  against  abuse  may  be  necessary.  The 
chief  one  is  that  the  centralized  administration  of 
the railways  is  inevitably exposed  to pressures, both 
public  and  private  (except  where  the  railways  are 
managed in a purely commercial spirit); and this can 
give  rise  to  a  certain  favouritism  which  has  no 
economic  justification.  Such  favouritism  may  man-
ifest  itself  at  both  national  and  Community  level. 
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This  latter possibility  is  abviously  of special  impor-
tance  to  a  Community  transport  policy.  It consti-
tutes  a  very  real  danger,  since  most  railway  corn-panies  have  been  traditionally  considered  as  instru-
ments of national economic policy, all too frequently 
with  the  result  that  their  tariffs  have  been  openly 
or secretly  manipulated  for  national  economic  ends. 
A  tendency  to  favour  home  industries  can  persist 
even  when  there  is  no  direct  intervention  by  the 
national  authorities.  Such  discrimination  clearly 
conflicts  with  the  objectives  of  the  Rome  Treaty, 
whether  it  directly  favours  home  industries  or takes 
the  form  of other types  of price differentiation  intli-
rectly affecting the conditions of compc~tition between 
the  various  Community states. 
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Abuses  of  this  kind  would  be  contrary both to opti-
mum  resource  allocation  and  Community  interests. 
To  prevent  them,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  suppress 
discrimination  which  consists  in  the  application  by 
a carrier,  in  respect  of the  same goods  conveyed  in 
the  same  circumstances,  of  transport  rates  and 
conditions which  differ on the ground of the country 
of origin  or destination,  or to  limit  imposition  by  a 
Member  State  of  prices  and  conditions  involving 
elements of support or protection for  one or several 
enterprises or particular industries.  A more general 
procedure  would  be  necessary,  precisely  because 
discrimination  can  take  place  without  intervention 
by  the  national  authorities,  and  because  the  effect 
on conditions of competition between the Community 
States can be entirely indirect (1).  The same conclu-
sion  must  be  drawn  as  regards  unjustified  price 
differentiations  which  might  be  applied  at  purely 
national  level. 
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Consequently,  there should be  a procedure to  enable 
any  interests  which  may  be  injured  to  present  their 
defence.  The  institutional  aspects  of  this  question 
will  be  examined  briefly  below (2).  No  illusions 
should  be  entertained  regarding  the  difficulties  of 
proof  inevitable  in  such  a  matter.  As  in  the  case 
of  abuse  of  dominant  positions  and  uneconomic 
competition,  no  control  will  be  effective  unless  it 
leaves  the  authorities  entrusted  with  it  a  certain 
freedom  of discretionary judgment. 
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It is  important  to  emphasize  again  that  one  of the 
elements  which  must  be  taken  into  consideration 
is  the  degree  of  utilization  of  the  durable  factors 
in  both  infrastructure  and  transport  services.  Con-
sequently, the procedure to prevent unjustified discri-
minations  in  no  way  implies  that  prices  should  be 
equal for  all  services which  are comparable on a cost 
basis.  Hence,  when  comparing  different  services 
whose  prices  are  supposed  to  be  discriminatory, 
account  must  be  taken  of these other elements,  and 
in  particular of the  demand  situation. 
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Whatever  the  procedure  adopted,  it  should  in  any 
case  be  supplemented  by  publication  in  a  suitable 
form  of the prices charged,  so  as  to  enable users to 
know  whether  they  are  right  or  not  in  thinking 
themselves  victims  of  unjustified  discrimination. 
Such publication could take several forms, but should 
at least include post facto notification of the average 
prices  actually  charged (3). 
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When the railways have a published tariff (i.e.  a rate 
schedule which,  although not itself subject to official 
approval,  conforms  to  the  minimum  or  maximum 
rates,  if  any,  approved  by  the  public  authorities), 
such  a  tariff  should as  a  general  rule  be  applicable 
without  discrimination  to  any user for  any  compar-
able  transport  service.  This  tariff  would  relate 
only to normal cases,  and it goes  without saying that 
the carrier would be free in principle to  grant special 
conditions for special cases provided such conditions 
were  published  later  in  an  appropriate  form  and 
provided  the  possibility  of making  special  arrange-
ments  within  the price limits  to  meet  the  conditions 
of competition never led to  systematic discriimination 
at national or Community level. 
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If the railways  have  no  systems  of published tariffs, 
adequate procedures would have to be worked out to 
prevent  systematic  discrimination  in  the  sense  indi-
cated  above.  These  procedures  would  imply  post 
facto  publication  of  the  transport  prices  actually 
charged  in  a  form  giving  users  enough  information 
to  enable  them  to  decide  whether  they  had  a  case 
for  complaining  of  systematic  discrimination.  The 
competent  authorities  should  also  have  the  right 
to  know the prices  actually charged,  to enable them 
to  examine  properly  all  complaints  concerning 
unjustified  discrimination,  particularly  when  applied 
against'  users  of  another  nationality. 
32.5- RELATIONS BETWEEN  THE 
PRICE SYSTEM AND CERTAIN OTHER 
ASPECTS OF  TRANSPORT POLICY 
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We  have  drawn  attention  several  times  to  two  addi-
tional  points.  The  first  concerns  the  link  between 
(')  The  concept  of discrimination  involves  very  many diffi-
culties,  whose  examination  is  outside  the:  scope:  of  this 
report. 
(")  See  Chapter  33. 
(')  These averages  concern groups of services of sufficiently 
small extent for the information not to be devoid of practical 
significance.  It  would  also  be  desirable  to  publish  the 
highest  and  lowes1t  prices  actually  charged. the  fixing  of  prices  for  transport  services  and  the 
system of charges for the use of infrastructure.  The 
second  concerns  relations  between  tariff  policy  and 
~he other  method  of  market  regulation,  which  is  to 
Impose  quantitative restrictions on transport' capacity 
and/or  access  to  the  market.  Each  of  these  two 
points  calls  for  more detailed  examination. 
32.50  - The  link  between  the  prices 
of transport  services  and  charges 
for  the  use  of infrastructure 
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The charges  paid by carriers for  using infrastructure 
are  obviously  a  component of the  price of transport 
services.  The  various  policy  options  for  infra-
structure  which  we  studied  in  the  previous  chapter 
have  varying  effects  on  the  prices  of  transport 
services,  as  regards  both  their  absolute  level  and 
the relations between the different categories.  These 
effects are visible both within each mode of transport 
and within the inland transport sector as a whole, and 
on  both  the  national  and  the  Community  plane. 
The  choice  of  the  system  of charges  for  the  use  of 
infrastructure must naturally take them  into account. 
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However,  once  this  choice  is  made,  charges  for  use 
of infrastructure no  longer pose any special problem 
in  connection  with  fixing  prices  for  services  in  the 
modes  of transport with  a  competit'ive  system:  road 
haulage  and inland waterways. 
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Things  are  different  in  the  case  of  the  railways, 
where there is  no  autonomous procedure for charging 
for  infrastructure  use.  This  is  why  any  appraisal 
of  a  railway  tariff  must  be  based  not  only  on  the 
"transport'  service"  component  but  also  on  the 
"infrastructure"  component.  Hence,  if  tariff  discri-
mination  is  defined  as  the  application  of  differing 
prices  for  comparable  services (1),  two  transport 
operations  which  are  otherwise  perfectly  identical 
could  not  be  considered  comparable  if  one  were 
carried  out  in  a  slack  period  and  the  other  in  a 
period  of  full  economic  utilization  of  the  infra-
structure,  since  the  optimum  prices  for  use  of  the 
latter,  and  particularly  the  congestion  charge,  are 
different  in  the  two  cases. 
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The  considerations  on  the  pncmg  of transport  ser-
vices  in  this  chapter  presuppose  that  two  problems 
have  been  solved. 
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On  the  one  hand,  it  is  understood  that  a  specific 
system  has  been  adopted for  infrastructure - in the 
cas~  of  roa~s  and  inland  waterways  a  perfectly 
defmed chargmg system,  and for  railways  a  general 
r_ule.'  for  instance  a  variant  of  the  budgetary  equi-
hbnum system.  Hence, only in the case of the rail-
ways  is  there  any  reason  to  fear  that  charges  for 
the  use  of infrastructure may raise  special problems 
in  pricing  transport  services. 
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On the  other  hand,  the  system  for  infrastructure  is 
assumed to  be neutral with respect to the conditions 
implied  by  an  optimum  allocation  of resources.  In 
other  words,  it  must  not  give  rise  to  a  distortion 
of the conditions of competition (2). 
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32.51  - Tariff  policy  and 
quantitative  restrictions 
1052 
We  have  already  seen (3)  that  there  is  a  close 
connection  between  the  two  methods  of  regulating 
the  market,  viz.  tariff  policy  and  the  control  of 
transport  capacities  and/or  access  to  the  market. 
Obviously,  this  question concerns only the modes of 
transport  with  a  competitive  system,  since  for  the 
railways  limitation  of  access  to  the  market  by  a 
concession system  necessarily follows  from  their very 
nature. 
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In Part II (4)  we came to the conclusion that there is 
little likelihood  of overinvestment  in  transport capa-
city  constituting  a  serious  problem  in  a  situation of 
full  employment  and  steady  economic  growth. 
Quantitative restrictions on investments and/or access 
to  the  market  would  therefore  not  be  necessary  in 
such  situations.  A  permanent  system  of  licences 
could  nevertheless  play  a  useful  part  in  preventing 
the disturbances which might be provoked by carriers 
occasionally  entering  the  market  for  transport  ser-
vices for short periods without restriction of medium-
and  long-term  investment  and  access (5).  This 
objective  could  be  attained  if  the  licensing  system 
were  applied  in  such  a  way  that the  value at  which 
licences  could  be  freely  negotiated  was  practically 
nil.  Furthermore,  it  may  be  desirable  for  access 
to  the market to be subject to the condition that the 
prospective carrier is  able  to meet the technical  and 
financial  obligations  of  his  profession. 
(')  As we have already indicated (see  Sec.  32.1),  the concept 
of comparable  services  raises  very  many difficulties. 
(")  It goes  without  saying that  all  the  other distortions,  for 
instance  those  due  to  unequal  fiscal  and  social  systems, 
are  also  eliminated. 
(')  See  especially  Subsection  25.22. 
(')  See  Subsection  25.21. 
(")  See,  for  instance,  the special case  mentioned in foot-
DOte (2)  page 101. 1054 
A  po~i~y of  this  type  for  the  control  of  transport 
capacities  and  access  to  the  market fits  in  well  with 
the  general  policy  concept  we  suggest.  Minimum 
rates  may  not  be  sufficient  to  prevent  uneconomic 
competition  which  results  from  a  trend  to  overin-
vestment, and may even be of only secondary impor-
tance here.  Under this hypothesis their introduction 
u~accomp~nied by  any  other  action  might  further 
stimulate  mvestments  and  reduce  the:  utilization  of 
existing  capacities. 
32.6  - SUMMARY 
1055 
The  above  considerations  are  based  on  a  general 
principle.  The  final  objective  is  that  minimum  or 
maximum price limitations calculated to prevent any 
uneconomic  competition  or  abuse  of  dominant 
positions should be established where such situations 
are  met with  or are possible.  Otherwise, prices are 
to  remain  free. 
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In  order  to  gradually  achieve  this  situation,  an 
approach  is  suggested  which  is  based  in  the  main 
on  lessons  drawn  from  observation. 
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Whenever no  abuse of dominant positions or uneco-
nomic competition is  found,  existing restrictions shall 
be relaxed  to  some  extent,  on the  grounds  that the 
restrictions  have  proved  to  be  too  strict.  Hence, 
whenever the risk of abuse of dominant positions or 
uneconomic  competition  is  nil  or  negligible,  prices 
gradually  become  free. 
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On the  other hand,  as  soon  as  uneconomic  compe-
tition  or abuses  of  dominant  positions  are  seen  to 
exist,  minimum  or  maximum  rates  are  introduced. 
The method  suggested  for  fixing  these  is  based  (a) 
on  a  price  threshold  beyond  which  complaints  of 
uneconomic  competition or abuse of dominant posi-
tions  will  arise,  (b)  on  comparisons,  and  (c)  on  an 
overall  appraisal  of  the  circumstances  in  the  light 
of the general criteria set out in this  report. 
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The  first  element  is  purely  empirical  and  is  essen-
tially  based  on  the  possibility  open  to  every  inte-
rested  party  either  to  lodge  complaints  with  the 
competent  authorities  or  to  initiate  action  in  the 
courts. 
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The  second  element  is  based  on  the  prices  charged 
and  the  costs  shown  by  industrial  accounting,  and 
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on  the  degree  of  utilization  of  infrastructures  and 
means  of  transport  in  relation  to  demand.  The 
breakdown  of  transport  services  into  their  basic 
components may supply useful information on costs, 
particularly  as  regards  the  railways.  Fmthermore, 
observation  of  the  prices  charged  is  an  additional 
~actor to ?e considered in making at least an approx-
Imate  estimate  of the  order of magnitude  of those 
costs which  can be looked upon as  "normal".  The 
degree  of utilization  of infrastructures  and means of 
transport  is  a  factor  whose  importance  has  been 
empha.sized  in  this  report in connection with  judging 
the existence of uneconomic competition or abuse of 
dominant positions.  In the main it can be ascertain-
ed  from  objective factors. 
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The  third  element  consists  in  a  general  appraisal of 
all  the  circumstances  of  each  specific  case  in  the 
light  not  only  of the  first  two  elements  but  also  of 
any  other relevant  factor,  such  as  harmonization  of 
conditions  of  competition,  the  system  of  charges 
for the use of infrastructure, quantitative restrictions, 
the general economic  situation, etc.  The difficulties 
of making such an appraisal are obvious, but they are 
unavoidable  and  occur  in  all  systems  in  one  form 
or another. 
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In  the  context  of  our  suggestions,  a  system  of 
bracket  rates  would  seem  to  be  an  indispensable 
1 instrument  for  any  policy  aimed  at  easing  the 
transition,  since  any  lessening  of  restrictions  pre-
supposes  the  substitution  of  brackets  for  fixed 
tariffs  or  the  widening  of the  brackets  where  such 
are  present  at  the  outset.  In  the  initial  phase the 
brackets,  where  they  exist,  would  be  progressively 
widened  at  a  rate which  could be laid  down by the 
authorities.  The  widening  process  would  naturally 
be stopped or even  reversed  whenever it resulted in 
uneconomic  competition  or  abuse  of  dominant  po-
sitions.  Furthermore,  provision  could  be  made  for 
allowing  exceptions,  in  order  to  prevent  serious 
disturbances  due  to  difficulties  of  adaptation. 
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The method  thus supplies  a  body of common  prin-
ciples for determining the factors to be considered in 
fixing minimum or maximum rates wherever such are 
necessary.  These  principles  are  not  to  b~~  applied 
dogmatically.  Their  operation  is  essentiaUy  prag-
matic  and  largely  based  on  practical  rules  which 
can  be  applied  without  undue  difficulty.  But  in 
any  case,  whenever  there  is  a  possibility  of  abuse 
of  dominant  positions  and  of  uneconomic  compe-
tition,  the  price limits  to be imposed  will  inevitably 
rest  on a compromise between the need to cope with 
these  situations  and  the  no  less  imperative need  to 
leave  some  pric:e  margin  in  order  to  facilitate  the adjustments  to  the  vanat10ns  in  market  conditions 
called  for  by  optimum  resource  allocation.  In  its 
turn,  such  a  compromise  is  bound  to  rest  largely 
on  subjective  appraisal,  and  it  is  this  which  con-
stitutes  the  intrinsic difficulty of any tariff policy for 
the  authorities. 
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Similar  suggestions  hold  good  for  quantitative  re-
strictions.  Although  supervision  may  be  deemed 
useful  to  guarantee  certain  minimum  professional 
qualifications  for  carriers,  or  to  avoid  undesirable 
disturbances of the market, it should never be unduly 
restrictive,  in  so  far  that  the  value  of  the  licences 
should  not  diverge  appreciably from  nil. 
1065 
A  gradual  approach  appears  necessary  anyway, 
because  of  the  diversity  of the  initial  situations,  the 
inadequacy  of  the  information  at  present  available 
on  the  actual  dangers  of  uneconomic  competition 
and  abuse  of  dominant  positions,  and  the  existence 
of  external  distortions  of  conditions  of  competition 
both  on  national  markets  and  at  Community  level. 
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Seen  from  the  purely  economic  angle  on  which  we 
were  consulted,  these  suggestions  are  based  on  the 
following  considerations: 
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I.  First  and  foremost,  no  policy  can  be  usefully 
applied unless its objectives have been clearly defined 
beforehand.  Our  general  point  of  view  has  been 
that  of  optimum  resource  allocation;  and  our  sug-
gestions are therefore fully  valid only if this objective 
is  actually  pursued. 
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2.  Upper  and  lower  tariff  limits  should  be fixed 
only  if,  in  the  absence  of  such  limits,  there  was 
abuse  of  dominant  positions  or uneconomic  compe-
tition. 
1069 
Abuse  of dominant positions can only occur if there 
is  no  real competition,  and uneconomic  competition 
depends  to  a  great  extent  on the general  economic 
situation.  As  regards  real  competition  between 
modes  of transport  and  the general  economic  situa-
tion,  the existing  regulations  largely owe their origin 
to situations which no longer exist.  Hence, it would 
be  as  unscientific  to  assert  presumptively  that there 
is  everywhere danger of abuse of dominant positions 
or  of  uneconomic  competition  - and  to conclude 
from  this  that  restrictive  measures  should  be intro-
duced  everywhere  - as  to  maintain  that  such 
dangers  do  not exist and conclude that all restrictive 
measures are inadvisable.  The only proper approach 
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is  to  rely on observation, imposing restrictions where 
these  dangers  are really present and abolishing them 
where  such  is  not  the  c:tse.  This  is  why  the 
approach  we  recommend  is  essentially  pragmatic. 
In  such  a  field  nothing  would  be  mode  dangerous 
than to  rely  purely  and  simply  on dogmatic  theoret-
ical  views. 
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3.  Lower  or  upper  limits  for  tariffs  cannot  be 
calculated simply on the basis of costs.  At any given 
time  and  place,  the  economically  optimum  prices 
depend  on  other conditions  - such  as  demand  -
which  are equally if not more important.  It follows 
from  this  that  none  of the  many  concepts  of costs 
discussed  can  be  considered  entirely  adequate  for 
establishment  of  a  price  policy.  All  are  based  on 
conventions  which  may  seem  to  offer  practical 
advantages  of  simplicity  but  actually  cannot  be 
justified  by  optimum  resource  allocation  theory  and 
do  not  really  correspond  with  reality.  All  rest  on 
theories  which  have  no  foundation.  This  is  ob-
viously  a  rather  depressing  conclusion,  but  nothing 
would  be  more  dangerous  than to  adopt  an  inexact 
view  of reality  simply  for  the  sake  of convenience. 
To  look  for  a  system  of cost  calculation  which  is 
entirely  suitable  and  valid  from  the economic  angle 
is  like  trying  to  square  the  circle:  it  means  looking 
for a solution which does not exist. 
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4.  Nevertheless,  it  is  possible  to  establish  a  line 
of  approach,  via  a  series  of useful  approximations, 
which could lead to effective regulations for combat-
ing  abuse  of  dominant  positions  and  uneconomic 
competition.  We have defined a whole set of criteria 
relating to demand and capacity which enable a valid 
judgment to be made in  each case.  Here again,  the 
fact  that there is  no universally  valid  and  automatic 
formula may be disappointing but is  fully  consonant 
with  the  real  state of affairs.  Only  theories  which 
flagrantly simplify matters could yield such formulae. 
In  fact,  only  by  examining  each  case,  taking  into 
account the special elements of each situation in the 
light  of the  various  criteria  we  have  suggested,  is  it 
possible  to  judge  whether  dangers  of  abuse  of  do-
'minant  positions  or  uneconomic  competition  do 
or do  not  exist.  Here we  must  abstain  from  pre-
conceived  theoretical  views  which  tend  to  reduce 
a  complex  reality  to  a  unitary  system,  and  adopt 
an approach which is certainly more difficult but also 
better suited to the real state of affairs. 
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5...  Although  it  is  impossible  to  calculate  price 
Iin\its a priori and with complete validity on the basis 
of  costs  alone,  it  is  possible  to  find  empirically 
approximate  values  for  these  limits  which  are  such 
that  in  all  cases  that  matter  their  imposition  can prevent  any  abuse  of  dominant  positions  and  any 
uneconomic  competition. 
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6.  The  essential  aim  of  the  system  of  bracket 
rates  which  we  suggest  for  application  wherever 
price  restrictions  exist  at present  is  to  make  prices 
as  flexible  as  possible  while  at  the  same  time  effec-
tively  combating  abuses  of  dominant  positions  and 
uneconomic competition.  The analysis suggests that 
the  use  of  bracket  rates  is  in  fact  essential  at  the 
beginning  and  for  a  period  long  enough  to  obtain 
the  necessary  information  and  to  pass  without 
interruption  or excessive  disturbances  from  the pre-
sent to  the final  situation.  However,  it also shows 
that  in  the  meantime  the  application  of these  rates 
does  not  necessitate  previous  calculation  of  the 
lower  or upper  limits  from  costs.  All  that  has  to 
be  known  is  the  present  situation  of the  tariffs  and 
the  prices  actually  charged,  and  this  knowledge  is 
largely  available. 
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7.  Normally, bracket rates  are not necessary,  and 
where dangers of the abuse of dominant positions or 
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of uneconomic  competition  actually  exist it is  suffi-
cient to impose upper and lower limits on the prices 
charged.  Here  again,  previous  calculations  from 
costs  are not sufficient to determine these limits; but 
the  empirical  approach  we  suggest  provides  a  prac-
tical  way  of  finding  them. 
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8.  Implementation of our suggestions  will  involve 
numerous  difficulties,  but these  are in  the  nature of 
the  case,  which  cannot  be  ignored  with  impunity. 
The  verdict  on  a  policy  can  only  be  relative.  All 
have  drawbacks,  and  the one  to  be chosen  cannot 
be  an  exception,  since  the  perfect  policy  does  not 
exist'.  It must be  the one which  appears  preferable 
among  all  those  that  can  be  envisaged.  If the 
pragmatic  approach  we  propose  presents  manifest 
disadvantages  and  difficulties,  it  il;  nevertheless 
founded  on  reality  and  capable  of  leading,  by  a 
prudent  approach  and  successive  approximations, 
to a  satisfactory solution,  whereas  any other choice, 
based on preconceived views, can yield only arbitrary 
solutions  which  are still  more difficult to implement. CHAPTER  33 
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS  OF  TRANSITION: 
GENERAL  C()MMENTS 
33.0  - INTRODUCTION 
1076 
At various  points in  the  preceding chapters we  have 
mentioned  certain  institutional  aspects  of the  differ-
ent  policies  under  review;  but  we  have  not  yet 
dealt with the possible institutional arrangements that 
could give effect to these policies.  The main purpose 
of this chapter is  to comment on a number of impor-
tant  institutional  questions  that  arise  in  connection 
with  all,  or nearly  all,  of the  systems  we  have  dis-
cussed.  These  comments  will  inevitably  be  rather 
general,  because  it  is  clearly  impossible  within  the 
scope  of  this  report  to  undertake  a  detailed  exami-
nation  of  all  the practical issues  involved  in  each of 
the  systems. 
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Once  again,  a  distinction  must  be  made  between 
infrastructure  and  transport  services.  On  the  in-
stitutional  level  there  is,  as  we  have  frequently 
pointed  out,  an  essential  difference  between  these 
two  stages  in  the  production  of  transport  services. 
In all  modes  of inland transport management of the 
infrastructures  must be  centralized to  a  considerable 
degree,  but  transport  services  can  largely  be  left 
uncentralized,  at  least  in  the  modes  where  compe-
tition  operates.  This  latter point does  not  apply to 
the  railways  - at  any  rate,  not generally;  neverthe-
less,  even  where  they  are  concerned,  it  is  advisable 
to  study  the  institutional  problems  connected  with 
infrastructure  and  transport  services  separately,  be-
cause  the  problems  in  these  two  stages  of  the  pro-
duction  process  are  basically  quite  different. 
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The  institutional  aspects  are  particularly  important 
for  infrastructure,  because  large  parts  of  it  are 
managed  centrally.  In addition.  as  we have shown, 
a  rational  policy  of  investment  in  infrastructure  re-
quires  some  co-ordination  between  the  different 
modes  of  inland  transport (1).  For  these  two 
reasons,  special  institutional arrangements  are neces-
sary.  In  our  study  of  these,  we  shall  deal  first 
with  investment  decisions (2)  and  then  with  the 
system  of charges for  the  use of  infrastructure ea). 
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The  problem  of  co-ordinating  investments  in  infra-
structure  is  essentially  the  same  in  all  systems;  we 
have  shown  that  such co-ordination is  a  prerequisite 
for  any  rational  transport  policy,  no  matter  what 
system  of  charges  for  the  use  of infrastructure  may 
be  adopted. 
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The measures for implementing the system of charges 
for  the  use  of  infrastructure  obviously  depend  to 
some  extent  on  the  particular  system  chosen.  We 
shall  pay  special  attention  here  to  the  systems  of 
budgetary  equilibrium  because  they  demand  special 
institutional  arrangements  for  keeping  the  revenue 
and  expenditure  connected  with  infrastructure 
separate from  the  general  budget.  Achievement  of 
this  financial  autonomy  would  entail  such  measures 
as  defiscalization of the various taxes  and charges at 
present  levied  on  the  users  of  infrastructure,  espe-
cially  on  road-users. 
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Where  transport  services  are concerned,  the institu-
tional  questions  concern (a)  an intensification of the 
competitive  system  and  (b)  the  restrictions  to  be 
imposed  on  this  system  whenever  its  effects  are 
considered  harmful.  In dealing  with  the  pricing  of 
transport services and with investment in vehicles and 
boats  in  a  competitive  system (4),  we  repeatedly 
stressed  how  important  it  is  for  carriers  to  be 
adequately  informed.  We  also  pointed  out (5)  that 
transport  users  should  also  have  quick  and  easy 
access  to  any  information  they  may  need  on  prices 
and  other  transport  conditions.  This  problem  of 
information  and  its  institutional  aspects  will  be 
examined separately (11).  Finally, private agreements 
tending  to  restrict  the  freedom  of  carriers  can 
certainly have serious  effects  on the free  working of 
competition;  but  the  institutional  problems  they 
pose  will  not  be  considered  here,  because  they  lie 
outside  the  proper  domain  of  this  report. 
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With  regard  to  restnctlons  of  competition  imposed 
by  the  public  authorities,  two  main  policies  may be 
distinguished:  a  policy  that  restricts  capacity  and 
access to the market, and a policy that involves some 
control  over  prices.  The  first  policy  will  not  be 
dealt  with  in  this  chapter;  we  would  only  point out 
(')  See  Section  24.1. 
(")  See  Subsection  33.10. 
(")  See  Subsection  33.11. 
(<)  See  Chapters  25  and  32. 
(")  See  Subsection  25.37. 
( 6)  See  Subsection  33.20. that,  when  there  is  full  employment  and  relatively 
steady economic  growth  (which  we  have  assumed to 
be  the  case  throughout  this  report),  such  a  policy 
must  confine  itself  to  imposing  a  licensing  system 
that  will  not  be  economically  restrictive  but  will 
prevent  the  disturbances  that might  occur  if  casual 
carriers  entered  the  market  only  for  short  periods. 
We  shall,  however,  examine  the various  institutional 
aspects  of  a  policy  that  involves  some  control  over 
prices (1). 
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In  every  case,  whether  the  policy  to  be  worked out 
relates  to  investment  in  infrastructure  or  to  the 
prices  of services,  we  consider it essential that there 
should  be  some  suitable  procedure  by  which  all 
the  interested  parties  could  take part in  determining 
that  policy. 
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We  shall conclude this  chapter with  some comments 
on the problems connected with the change-over from 
one  system  to  another. 
33.1  -INFRASTRUCTURE 
33.10  - Co-ordination  of investment 
in  infrastructure 
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It follows  from  all  we  have  said  that  co-ordination 
of  investment  in  infrastructure  is  a  technical  and 
economic  necessity.  Such  co-ordination  need  not 
mean  that  all  investment  decisions  or the  manage-
ment of infrastructure must be completely centralized. 
The ultimate responsibility can be left with the local, 
regional, national or Community authorities, depend-
ing  on  the  primary  function  of  the  infrastructure 
concerned.  However,  the  fact  that  the  different 
parts  of  a  single  network  are  interdependent  at 
every  level  means that investment decisions  must be 
co-ordinated  on  a  sufficiently  broad scale  and  with 
sufficient authority to ensure an integrated pattern of 
investment  for  the  entire  network.  Also,  the  level 
at which such co-ordination takes place must depend 
upon  the  extent  to  which  the  charges  for  the  use 
of infrastructure  are equal. 
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Two  questions connected with co-ordination must be 
examined more closely.  The first  concerns the part 
that  the  users  of  infrastructure  should  play  when 
decisions  are  to  be  taken  with  regard  to  new 
investments.  The  second  concerns  the  institutional 
arrangements for  the co-ordination of investments in 
infrastructure  for  each  entire  made  of  inland  trans-
1 
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port.  The  importance  of  these  two  questions  is 
obvious. 
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Investments  in  infrastructure must largely  be geared 
to  the  expected  volume  of  traffic.  The investment 
plans both of the  direct users  of infrastructure (who 
include,  in  the  competitive  sectors  of inland  trans-
port, professional carriers, firms  transporting for own 
account,  and  private  infrastructure  users),  and  of 
the  indirect  beneficiaries  (i.e.  industries  using  pro-
fessional  transport  or  whose  activities  are  closely 
linked  with  infrastructure  capacity),  are  clearly  an 
important source of information on future  needs for 
infrastructure.  Consequently,  for  rational  planning 
of  infrastructure  it  would  seem  very  useful,  if  not 
essential,  to  establish  a  procedure  for  investment 
decisions  regarding  infrastructure in  which  both  the 
carriers  and  the  other  direct  and  indirect  users  of 
transport  can  play  an  active  part,  together  with  all 
other interested  parties,  such  as  producers of trans-
port  equipment.  Such  a  procedure  would  also  be 
justified  for  reasons  of  equity  in  cases  where infra-
structure  is  financed  by  charges  on the users,  as  in 
the systems of budgetary equilibrium and, in practice, 
also  the  system  of  calculated  total  cost. 
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There  are  various  reasons  why  it  is  necessary  for 
investments  in  infrastructure to  be  co-ordinated  be-
tween the different modes of inland transport (2).  In 
the  first  place,  completion  of  a  particular  infra-
structure project  will  reduce the  total benefits  to be 
expected  from  a  competing  project  (by  another 
mode  of transport,  for  example),  and may therefore 
prevent the latter project'  from  being  undertaken  at 
all - when  account is  taken of the criteria of opti-
mum resource allocation - even though comparison 
of  the  two  projects  might  have  shown  that  the 
second  would  have been preferable.  Secondly,  dif-
ferent  modes  of transport may be complementary to 
some extent, or may require common installations. 
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These  two  considerations  are  in  themselv,es  suffi-
cient to show the need for co-ordinating investments 
in infrastructure between the modes  of inland trans-
port.  This  applies  to  local  and  urban  networks, 
but it is  particularly urgent in  the case of the main 
road  and  railway  networks  and the principal inland 
waterways.  M~>st  countries  of  the  Community, 
however,  lack  an  adequate  procedure  for  achieving 
a  permanent  and  effective  co-ordination  of  invest-
ment  in  transport  infrastructure. 
(')  See  Subsection  33.21. 
(")  For a full discussion of this question, see Section 24.1. 1090 
Many  different  institutional  arrangements  are  pos-
sible,  but  they  must  all  contain  the  following 
elements.  In  the  first  place,  whenever  any  major 
project  for  expanding,  renewing,  modernizing  or 
scrapping infrastructure is  contemplated, there should 
be  consultations  between  the  various  authorities 
directly  responsible  for  taking  the  decisions.  Such 
consultations,  in  which  carriers  and  the other direct 
and  indirect  users  of  the  infrastructure  should  be 
able  to  participate  in  one  way  or another,  could be 
based  on  quantitative  proposals  containing  date  or 
estimates  for  all  the  various  factors  that  must  be 
considered  before  the  investment  decisions  can  be 
taken (1). 
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Secondly,  the  investment plan (which,  if  it covered a 
period of years,  would  have to  be  revised  annually) 
could  be  submitted to  the competent central author-
ities,  either  at  national  or  Community  level  for 
approval, or arbitration in a case of conflict.  Before 
approving an investment plan, these authorities might 
consult  an  independent  body  in  order to  obtain  an 
impartial  opinion  on  the  economic  merits  of  the 
proposals. 
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Finally, once the investment plan had been  adopted, 
the  authorities  directly  responsible  for  infrastructure 
in  each mode of transport could be left to effect the 
investments  and  manage the infrastructure according 
to  the  specific  requirements  of  the  various  sectors, 
provided they complied with the general trend of the 
investment  plan.  If the  infrastructure were  subject 
to  the  constraint  of  budgetary  equilibrium  without 
the  possibility  of  borrowing,  a  greater  degree  of 
freedom  could  be  left  to  these  authorities (
2
),  espe-
cially  to  the  railways,  than  would  be  possible  under 
any of the other systems of charges for the use of in-
frastructure  that we  have studied. 
33.11  - THE INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS CONNECTED  WITH 
THE  VARIOUS  SYSTEMS  OF CHARGES 
FOR  THE  USE  OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
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The  appropriate  arrangements  for  putting  a  partic-
ular  system  of charges  into  effect  obviously  depend 
to a great extent on the nature and function  of that 
system.  A  primary  distinction  must be  made  here 
between  the  systems  that are based explicitly on the 
concept of budgetary equilibrium  and  those that are 
not.  We  will  first  consider  the  systems  that  are 
not  based  on  this  concept,  i.e.  the  practical  system 
of economic  tolls,  the development cost system,  and 
the system  of calculated  total  cost (3). 
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The  disadvantages  of  these  systems (4)  could  be 
somewhat  mitigated  by  suitable  institutional  arran-
gements,  such  as  those  envisaged  in  the  preceding 
subsection  for  investments  in  infrastructure.  In 
addition,  independent  bodies  could  be  set  up  to 
advise  the public  authorities,  put forward  proposals, 
or even  take  decisions  as  to  the  total volume of the 
charges and their apportionment among the different 
categories  of  users.  This  procedure  raises  a  num-
ber of problems which  cannot be dealt with  fully  in 
this  report.  We  would  emphasize,  however,  that 
the  systems  of calculated total cost and development 
cost  necessitate  many  detailed  calculations  which 
greatly  depend  on  subjective  judgments.  This  also 
applies  to  the practical system  of economic  charges, 
though  not to the  same extent.  This  being  so,  the 
procedures  and  institutional  arrangements  for  these 
different  systems  will  have to include  effective  safe-
guards against the influence of pressure groups.  The 
working  rules  would  therefore have  to  be  as  simple 
and clear as  possible, so that all the interested parties 
would be able to  see  whether or not they were being 
complied  with. 
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As regards the railways,  any system of charges likely 
to  lead to  a deficit would in principle make it neces-
sary  for  the  financial  matters  connected  with  infra-
structure and transport services to be kept complete-
ly  separate,  so  as  to  prevent  any  deficit  that  might 
be occasioned by inefficient management from  being 
confused  with  the  infrastructure  deficit  and  conse-
quently  also  financed  from  public  funds.  For  the 
same  reason,  investments  in  infrastructure  would 
have  to  be  subject  to  strict  central  control.  The 
difficulties  of  separating infrastructure  and transport 
services  in  the  case  of  the  railways  have  already 
been  mentioned (5). 
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The systems based on budgetary equilibrium have the 
advantage  of  avoiding  some  of  these  institutional 
difficulties.  If the  constraint  of  budgetary  equilib-
rium  were  imposed  on  the  roads  and  inland  water-
ways,  separate  funds  would  have  to  be  set  up  for 
each  of  these  modes  of  transport,  and  these  might 
perhaps be  subdivided,  especially  in  the case of the 
roads,  according  to  the  various  categories  of  infra-
(') Of  course,  the  contents  of  the  proposals  and  their 
justification  will  be  affected  by the  constraints  imposed  on 
the  infrastructure,  such  as  the  requirement  of  budgetary 
equilibrium. 
(")  Provided the area over which charges were equali7..ed  was 
not  too  large.  See  Subsection  24.45. 
(') At  least  one  version  of the  system  of  calculated  total 
cost does  in fact ensure budgetary equilibrium. 
(')  See  Section  23.3. 
(")  See  Subsection  23.33. structure  we  have  distinguished (1).  The charges on 
the  users  would  be  defiscalized  and  paid  into  the 
various  funds,  which  would  be  responsible  for  all 
financial  transactions  connected  with  infrastructure. 
The  total  amount  of  such  charges  would  be  de-
termined  according  to  the  rules  implicit  in  whatever 
version  of  budgetary  equilibrium  had  been  adopted. 
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In  practice,  however,  these  rules  are only of limited 
application in those versions of the system of budget-
ary  equilibrium  with  the  possibility  of  borrowing 
which  impose  no  limit  on  the  ability  to  contract 
loans.  The absence of such limits  would  mean that 
the  actual  level  of charges  to  be paid  by  the  users 
of  infrastructure  during  the  year  would  be  largely 
determined by discretionary judgments.  This would 
raise  problems  similar  to  those  already  mentioned 
in  connection  with  the  systems  that  do  not  impose 
the  constraint  of  budgetary  equilibrium.  Only  if 
the  ability  to  contract  loans  is  limited  - and  a 
fortiori  if  it  is  practically  excluded,  as  in  the  system 
without  the  possibility  of  borrowing  - does  the 
constraint of budgetary  equilibrium  become a  useful 
guide,  free  from  arbitrary elements, for  working out 
a system of charges.  This leaves only the problems 
connected  with  apportioning  the  total  charges  for 
infrastructure among the  various  categories of users. 
We  have  noted  that  this  distribution  is  largely  con-
ventional  but  that  certain  reasonable  rules  could 
be  worked  out  wich  could  be  laid  down  once  and 
for all  - taking into  account the objectives pursued 
and  the  differences  in  the  total  amount  of  the 
charges - and then applied for a relatively long time 
without  requiring  revision (2). 
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In  the  case  of  the  railways,  implementation  of  the 
system  of budgetary equilibrium  raises  no  particular 
institutional  problems.  If there  were  no  deficit  to 
be  financed  from  public  funds,  and  if  the  ability  to 
contract  loans  were ·limited (11),  no  special  arrange-
ments  would  be required.  There would then be no 
need to  keep  financial  matters connected with  infra-
structure  separate  from  those  connected  with  trans-
port services,  nor  to  create  a  special  procedure  for 
fixing  the charges for the use of infrastructure, since 
the  sums  in  question  would  be  included in the rates 
charged  by  the  railways.  Of  course,  the  railways' 
freedom  to  apportion  the  total  charges  connected 
with  infrastructure among the different categories of 
users. does  in  fact  create  certain  problems (4);  but 
that ts  only one aspect  of a  more  general  problem. 
Internal  subsidizing  can  be practised  with  regard  to 
all  railway  costs,  not  just  those  of  infrastructure. 
We  have  already  discussed  how  the  distortions  that 
may  result  from  such  practices can be  combated (';). 
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33.2  - TRANSPORT SERVICES 
33.20  - The  flow  of information 
to  carriers  and  transport  u~ers 
1099 
The  transport  system  can  only  operate  efficiently 
if  every  operator  possesses  all  the  information  he 
needs  for  the  decisions  he  has  to  make.  This 
applies  as  much to transport users as  to  carriers. 
1100 
The  decisions  to  be  taken  by  carriers  are  of  two 
types.  There  are,  on the one hand,  decisions  con-
cerning  current  operations  (i.e.  output and charges) 
and,  on  the  other,  decisions  concerning  investment 
in  transport equipment.  Decisions of the first  type 
require information on the present state of costs and 
demand,  separately  in  respect  of  all  groups  of 
products that are not perfect substitutes for others at 
the production  stage.  As  transport  services  cannot 
be stored, and as services provided in different places 
are  not  always  substitutable  at  short  notice,  the 
decisions  regarding  current operations  are  numerous 
and  call  for  precise  information  that must  be avail-
able  at  the  right  time  and  place.  It follows  that 
these  decisions  demand  a  substantial  degree  of  de-
centralization.  Such  decentralization  already  exists 
in  the competitive modes of inland transport, but this 
does  not  mean  that  there  is  always  an  adequate 
flow  of  information  on  which  decisions  concerning 
current operations  can be based.  The market may 
in  fact  be insufficiently transparent for the individual 
carrier. 
(')  Viz.,  main,  urban and suburban, and local networks.  In 
Part 11  (Section  23.3  and  Subsection  24.45)  we  showed that 
local  networks  would  probably have  to  be  exempted  from 
the  requirement  of  budgetary  equilibrium.  This  would 
mean  that  the  expenditure  on  that  type  of  infrastructure 
would be  covered, at least partially, by the  national budget. 
The  same  exception  might  be  made  for  all  infrastructures 
in  underdeveloped  areas.  If  the  principle  of  budgetary 
equilibrium  were  applied  to the  various  categories  of infra-
structure  separately,  it  would  obviously  be  necessary  to 
share  out  the  total  revenue  from  fuel  taxes  and  taxes  on 
vehicles  among  these  different  categories.  This  problem 
does  not  seem  insoluble  in  practice.  Fuel  taxes  could  be 
apportioned  according  to  the  relative  amounts  of  traffic. 
The revenue  from  taxes  on vehicles  would  be  diffl~rentiated 
automatically,  since  the  system  would  involve  separate  (or 
supplementary) road licences for urban and suburban traffic 
respectively. 
(~')  See  Subsection  24.46. 
(")  For instance,  if  the  bonds  issued  by  the  railways  were 
not guaranteed by the State, thus automatically limiting the 
ability to borrow. 
(')  Connected  with  the  possibility  of internal  subsidization; 
see  Section  32.1. 
(")  See  Subsection  25.30  and Chapter  32. 1101 
We  touched  on  this  problem  when dealing with  the 
question  of  the  return  load (1).  It was  shown  that 
one  of the  most  efficient  methods of providing such 
information  might  be  to  remove  all  restrictions  on 
transport rates,  so  that  they  might  regain  their  sig-
nalling  function  and  possibly  even  induce  inter-
mediaries  to  provide  the  necessary  link  between 
supply and demand, or encourage firms to rationalize 
their activities  by technical  and commercial co-oper-
ation.  The removal of such  restrictions would have 
to  be  accompanied  by  appropriate  measures  for 
providing information,  such  as  the creation of public 
freight  exchanges. 
1102 
Other  difficulties  arise  in  the  case  of  the  railways, 
where  the  possibilities of decentralization are limited 
by  technical  factors  which  necessitate  close  co-
ordination  between  the  different  services  provided 
on  the  same  network.  In  this  case,  a  suitable 
compromise must  be  found  between  some  decentra-
lization  of  the  power  of  decision  and  the  need  for 
centralized  management  in  matters  concerning  the 
entire  network.  The  problem  of information  takes 
different  forms,  depending  on  the  nature  of  this 
compromise.  When  management  is  centralized,  it 
is  important  that information  should  be sent  by  the 
operators  to  the  central  authority  above  them,  and 
that  the  central  authority  should  issue  specific  di-
rectives  to  the  operators.  The  delays  inherent  in 
such  a procedure usually lead to  a system of "fixed" 
directives and "fixed" tariffs (i.e. directives and prices 
that are determined by the central administration and 
can  only  be  modified  with  difficulty).  As  we  have 
seen,  this  causes  a certain distortion of the optimum 
allocation of resources (2),  which is  probably to some 
extent  unavoidable  but might  possibly  be  reduced  if 
the  power  of  decision  were  suitably  decentralized. 
Such  decentralization  undoubtedly  raises  problems 
of  internal  organization  that  cannot  be  discussed 
here,  but  the  solutions  adopted  in  certain  countries 
show  that  it  is  not  impossible. 
1103 
Investment  decisions  require  information  of  a  dif-
ferent  kind,  i.e.  estimates  of  future  demand  and 
future  cost  conditions.  Obviously,  the  more  du-
rable  the  equipment  is,  and  the  more  uncertain  the 
future  development  of demand,  the  more  important 
such  information  will  be.  There  is  no  particular 
reason  for  believing  that  transport  services  as  a 
whole  are  generally  exceptional  where  durability  of 
equipment and uncertainty of the future development 
of  demand  are  concerned.  But  special  difficulties 
may arise in the case of the inland waterways, because 
the  equipment  there  is  very  highly  durable_  and 
activities  mainly  concern  the  transport  of  pnmary 
products which  are liable to considerable fluctuations 
in  price  and quantity. 
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There are  two  reasons why a centralized information 
procedure  is  an  advantage  where  investments  are 
concerned.  In  the  first  place,  many  factors  that 
determine future  conditions concern  all  carriers,  and 
can therefore be estimated better and more efficiently 
by  a  common  effort.  This  applies  particularly  to 
future development of the total demand for transport, 
and  to  its  distribution among the different classes  of 
goods  and  different  areas.  Secondly,  the  share  of 
the  market that each individual carrier can expect to 
obtain in the future will depend upon the investments 
of his competitors.  Both these considerations appear 
to  support the idea of a system under which inform-
ation  could  be  pooled  and  distributed  centrally  by 
co-operation between all  carriers and transport users, 
in a  context of long-term  economic forecasts.  Such 
systems  do  at  present  exist  in  some  countries.  A 
special  study should  be made of the specific  institu-
tional arrangements that would be suitable for inland 
transport,  and of  how  they could  be  put into  effect 
at Community level.  Such arrangements can in any 
case  only  be  really  effective  if  they  form  part of  a 
wider  system  of economic  forecasting  for  all  sectors 
of  the  economy (3). 
1105 
A  transport  system  based  on  the  freedom  of  users 
to  choose the mode of transport and the carrier they 
prefer  can  only  operate  efficiently  if  the  users  can 
obtain,  without  difficulty  or delay,  all  the  necess~ry 
information on the various ways in which their partic-
ular  needs  can  be  met.  This  applies  as  much  to 
prices as  to all other transport conditions.  For s<?me 
classes of services, particularly small-tonnage consign-
ments  and  passenger  transport,  an  adequate  trans-
parency  of  the  market  can  in  practice  only  be 
achieved if the prices are published in advance, either 
in the form of tariffs or as price schedules.  We have, 
however  shown (4)  that  this  procedure  has  the  dis-
advantage of rendering prices less  flexible:  necessary 
changes  in  them  take  too  long  to  make,  and  they 
cannot be readily adjusted to meet individual transport 
requirements.  This  disadvantage  is,  however,  less 
noticeable  in  the case  of  price  schedules,  which  are 
drawn  up by the transport firms  and do  not require 
official approval, than it is in the case of tariffs, which 
are imposed or authorized by the  competent author-
ities.  Since transport services  cannot be stored,  the 
optimum prices may often differ greatly for individual 
loads,  depending on the special  features  of the  con-
tract,  particularly the period within which it  is  to  be 
carried out.  Consequently, more flexible procedures, 
(')  See  Subsection  25.21. 
(")  See  Subsection  25.5. 
(")  Such  a  procedure  has  recently  been  instituted  by  the 
EEC Council of Ministers. 
(')  See  Subsection  25.37. to achieve adequate transparency of the market, could 
be  adopted  for  those  classes  of  service  for  which 
published price schedules are not absolutely necessary 
on practical grounds.  Without going into the specific 
institutional  and  practical arrangements in  detail,  we 
would  here only repeat the  suggestions that we  have 
already  made (1).  In  the  competitive  sectors,  price 
formation  could,  for  example,  be effected  by  means 
of  public  freight  exchanges.  The  prices  actually 
charged  would  be  published  subsequently  in  some 
appropriate  form. 
1106 
Whenever  price  limits  are  imposed,  they  would 
obviously  have to be  published in  advance. 
33.21  - Price  policy 
1107 
Suitable institutional procedures will have to be intro-
duced,  particularly at Community level,  to deal with 
most of the problems arising from  the conditions and 
the  pace of implementation of the  policy  suggested, 
and  to  assess  actual situations  and  the effects of the 
measures  taken. 
1108 
Such procedures are especially important because no 
objective general rule can be evolved for determining 
price  limits (2),  we  did  mention  several  objective 
factors that ought to be taken into account when each 
particular case is being examined, but we nevertheless 
concluded  that  a  certain  amount  of  discretionary 
judgment  will  almost  inevitably  be  involved.  It is 
therefore essential that the procedure to be followed 
in  determining  the price  limits,  and  the institutional 
arrangements  to  be  made,  should  be  taken  into 
account when  a  tariff  policy  for  inland  transport  is 
being  worked  out. 
1109 
Obviously,  the appropriate institutional structure for 
transport  services  is  susceptible  to  a  great  many 
variations (3).  The  choice  between  these  possible 
forms  must largely depend on considerations that lie 
outside the scope of this report.  Nevertheless, what-
ever variations  are  considered,  the appropriate insti-
tutional  framework  would  seem  to  be  one  that 
satisfies  the  following  general  requirements. 
Elimination  of restrictive  practices  and 
harmonization  of  the  external  conditions 
of competition 
1110 
Of  course,  when  a  system  i.s  based  on  competition, 
it  can  only  function  completely  and  properly within 
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an  appropriate  institutional  framework.  In  partic-
ular,  an  effective  policy  against  restrictive  practices 
that  distort  competition  is  an  essential  prerequisite 
for  any  regime  based  on a  free  market;  this  is  t'rue 
of transport  as  of any other sector of the economy. 
1111 
In addition, it is  essential that there should ultimately 
be no perceptible external distortion of the conditions 
of competition, caused; for example, by the existence 
of different  fiscal  and  social  systems (4). 
1112 
Finally, when there is  a danger of abuse of dominant 
positions  or of  uneconomic  competition,  investment 
in transport capacity and access  to  the market must 
not  be  restricted  to  any  great  extent,  and  all  other 
restrictive  measures  must be abolished. 
1113 
This  means  that  the  existing  conditions  of  compe-
tition  must be gradually harmonized and that licens-
ing  systems,  where  they  exist,  must  be  gradually 
relaxed. 
Flow of information to the authorities 
and interested  parties 
1114 
First of all,  the controlling authorities and interested 
parties  must  have  precise  and extensive  information 
as  to  the  rates  in  force.  When there  are  officially 
approved tariffs,.  the authorities and the public would 
get to know the rates through the process of approval 
and  publication  of  these  tariffs.  When  there  are 
price  schedules  drawn  up  by  firms,  the  authorities 
would,  and  the  public  could,  get  to  know  the  rates 
(')  See  Subsection  25.37  and  Section  32.3. 
(2)  Wo  have  seen  that  in  practice  there  is  no  method  of 
calculation by which  the  rates in  keeping  with  an optimum 
allocation  of  resources  can  be  worked  out  a  priori,  and 
that in  each  particular case  the  risk  arising  from  dominant 
positions  or  uneconomic  competition  can  only  be  assessed 
if  a  number  of  factors  are  considered  together.  These 
factors  may be  the  current  rates  or costs,  or they  may be 
directly  related  to  the  situation  of  the  market  and  the 
extent to which the infrastructures are utilized (sec:  Chapters 
12,  13  and  32). 
(")  Notably as  regards  procedure,  burden  of proof,  possible 
sanctions,  etc. 
(')  Or  due,  throughout  the  period  when  bracket  rates  are 
in  existence,  to  different  degrees  of  specification  of  rates 
(this  possible distortion would finally disappear if maximum 
or  minimum  rate!l  were  imposed  only  where  there  was  a 
real  danger  of  abuse  of  dominant  positions  or  of  uneco-
nomic  competition).  Important  though  the  conditions  of 
competition may be,  the  authors of this  report nevertheless 
feel  that implementation  of most  of their suggestions  need 
not wait  until  complete  harmonization of the  conditions  of 
competition  has  been  achieved,  but  that  the  policy  they 
propose  could  be  put  into  effect  while  these  conditions 
are in  process  of being harmonized. through  the  process  of notification  and  publication 
of these  schedules.  If there were  neither tariffs  nor 
price  schedules (1),  appropriate  statistical  returns 
would  have  to  be  published;  these  should  cover  an 
adequate number of categories of transport, and give 
not  only  the  average  of the  rates  in  force  but  also 
some  indication  of  their  range  (i.e.  their  upper and 
lower  limits). 
Effectiveness  and  ease  of control 
1115 
Secondly,  the  methods  devised  for  the  exercise  of 
control  must  be  both  effective  and  easy  to  operate. 
In  this  connection,  the question of degree  of control 
is  an  essential  factor,  for  the  reasons  stated  in  the 
preceding  chapter.  The  degree  and  precision  of 
such  control  will,  in  fact,  largely  be  in  inverse ratio 
to  each  other.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why, 
under the system  we  suggest,  maximum or minimum 
rates would not be laid down except where there was 
a real danger of uneconomic competition or abuse of 
dominant  positions. 
1116 
Whenever rates  are at present restricted in  any  way, 
a  bracket  rate  system  is  an  excellent  means  of 
ensuring  a  gradual  transition  from  a  situation  that 
is  strictly  regulated,  chaotic,  and  probably  very  far 
from  achieving  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources, 
to  one  that  is  less  strictly  regulated,  more  coherent 
and  closer  to  the  optimum.  Nevertheless,  one  of 
the main  ideas  underlying the present report is  that, 
in  spite  of  this,  a  system  of  bracket  rates  cannot 
permanently  prevent  uneconomic  competition  or 
abuse of dominant positions, in transport services  as 
a  whole,  without  seriously  compromising  optimum 
resource  allocation.  In fact,  as  the  optimum  level 
of the limits (and a fortiori the optimum rates) cannot 
be  assessed  in  advance,  any  policy  based on  a  per-
manent  and  generally  applicable  system  of  bracket 
rates would be condemned - from the point of view 
of optimum resource allocation - to operate blindly 
or, at  best, in the light of crude approximations. 
1117 
This  is  regrettable  because  in  principle  prevention 
is always better than cure.  But it would be pointless, 
and indeed very dangerous,  to  ignore the fact simply 
because  it  is  regrettable. 
1118 
Consequently,  where  the  optimum  allocation  of  re-
sources  is  concerned,  the  best  system  of  control 
would  be one based  not on  preventive measures,  as 
under  a  system  of  permanent  and  generally  applic-
able  bracket  rates,  but on  an  arrangement  whereby 
the authorities could intervene swiftly when a case of 
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abuse of dominant  positions  or of  uneconomic  com-
petition  had  been  observed.  Such  an  arrangement 
would  entail  rapid  and  effective  investigation  of the 
complaints that would inevitably be made in  such an 
event. 
1119 
Control is  relatively simple when maximum rates are 
laid  down,  because  one  of  the  two  parties  to  the 
contract may  then  have  an  interest in  respecting the 
limits fixed by the controlling authority.  But control 
certainly  becomes  much  more  difficult  when  the 
rates  laid  down  are  minimum  rates,  because  both 
parties  may  then  have  an  interest  in  ignoring  these 
limits,  at  any  rate temporarily:  the  users  would  pay 
a  lower  price,  and  the  carrier  would  improve  his 
competitive  position.  Hence,  no  system  of  control 
can  be  effective  unless  it  is  really  possible  for  any 
interested  party  to  lodge  complaints  or  institute 
proceedings with  regard to the level of certain prices 
or  specific  cases  of  alleged  discrimination.  More-
over,  unless  there  is  such  a  possibility,  the  parties 
concerned will  not be  adequately protected. 
1120 
It cannot be  denied that the system we  are proposing 
involves  a  risk  of  temporary  disturbance  of  the 
market by the possible occurrence of cases of uneco-
nomic  competition  or  abuse  of  dominant  positions. 
But  such  risks  are  much  reduced  if  the  system  is 
implemented pragmatically, gradually and cautiously, 
as  we  have suggested. 
1121 
If, instead of this,  an arrangement were adopted that 
was  essentially  preventive  in  character,  the  risk  of 
serious  and  widesread  distortions  would  be  all  the 
greater,  because  rates  would  be  controlled  more 
strictly. 
1122 
An  arrangement  enabling  any  interested  party  to 
lodge  complaints  or institute  proceedings  would  be 
very  effective  (for  it  is  much  more  likely  that  a 
large  number  of  unjustified  complaints  would  be 
brought  than  the  reverse).  It  therefore  appears 
that a form  of control based on such an arrangement 
would  be  suited  to  take  very  rapid  intervention 
action. 
1123 
All  these  arguments  obviously  point  to  the  conclu-
sion  that  the  system  we  are  suggesting  would  very 
probably have fewer  disadvantages than a system  of 
general  control - especially  because  control  would 
be  stricter  in  the  latter  case. 
(')  See  under  "Price  schedules  established  by  firms",  page 
160. Official  approval  and  post  facto  control 
1124 
The  need  for  gradual  and  cautious  implementation 
of  tariff  policy  for  transport  implies  that  methods 
of  control  should  evolve  as  time  goes  on. 
1125 
At  the  start,  as  has  been  suggested,  a  system  of 
gradually  widened  rate  brackets  would  apply  to  all 
the  categories  of  traffic  at present  subject  to  price 
regulation.  In this initial phase control would there-
fore  probably  be  in  two  stages.  First,  a  procedure 
of  official  approval  would  make  sure  the  rules  con-
cerning  the  brackets  were  properly  observed.  The 
second  stage  would  arise  only  if  a  complaint  were 
lodged  on  legal  action  taken in  respect of a  specific 
category of traffic, or if the control authority decided 
ex  officio  that  there  were  grounds  for  an  inquiry. 
In such  case  the  purpose of the control would  natu~ 
rally  be  to  verify  by  thorough  examination  whether 
there was  in  fact  a situation of uneconomic competi-
tion  or abuse of a dominant position.  If there was, 
a  maximum  or  minimum  price  would  have  to  be 
imposed. 
1126 
For categories  of traffic  in  respect of which  bracket 
rates  had  been  abolished  without  any  maximum  or 
minimum  price being imposed, only the second stage 
of control would apply.  Here, it would be sufficient 
for  the  control  authority  to  have  at its  disposal  the 
information  and  means  of  investigation  enabling  it 
to  examine  any  complaint  properly. 
1127 
Once bracket rates had ceased to exist and minimum 
and  maximum  rates  had been  imposed,  it would,  of 
course,  be  possible  to  submit  applications  for  the 
modification  of  these.  The  grounds  advanced  by 
applicants  would  be  examined  in  the:  light  of  the 
criteria we  have suggested for  determining maximum 
or minimum  prices. 
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When,  as  could  quite  well  be  justified  in  principle, 
the proposals submitted included changes in  the rate 
limits,  whether  specific  or  general,  the  purpose  of 
official  approval  would  be  to  see  whether  such 
changes  involved  systematic  bias  and  were  likely  to 
jeopardize  the  aims  of  the  system,  for  instance  by 
transferring certain goods from  one class  to  another. 
1129 
Should  there  be  a  fall  in  the  purchasing  power  of 
money, the aim of official approval could be to judge 
applications  based  on  this  ground.  Here a simpler, 
but more  drastic  and  probably more fitting,  alterna-
tive  solution would  be simply to  tie the limits  of the 
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brackets  or the  minimum  and  maximum  rates  to  a 
suitable index (1 ). 
Price  schedules  established  by  firms 
1130 
Another  institutional  question  with  important  eco-
nomic  repercussions  is  whether  or  not  transport 
enterprises  should  be  required  to  establish  price 
schedules (2).  The  advantage  of these  is  that  they 
increase market transparency and are  an obstacle to 
possible  discriminactions (3).  Their  disadvantage  is 
that  they  are  liable  to  introduce  some  rigidity  into 
the formation of prices on a market where the balance 
between  supply  and  demand  is  likely  to  fluctuate 
in the very short term because the service cannot be 
stored,  and where such fluctuations  are very difficult 
to  foresee.  It  hardly  appears  possible  to  decide 
beforehand  for  what  categories  of  transport  and 
enterprises  the  disadvantages  would  outweigh  the 
advantages  of  the  obligation  to  establish  price 
schedules.  In  the  final  analysis,  experience  is 
doubtless  the only  basis  for  decision. 
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If firms  were  not forced to establish price schedules, 
they would remain free to do as  they chose, provided 
they  observed  any  minimum  and  maximum  limits 
imposed.  They could either freely settle prices with 
their  clients (4)  or  publish  a  list  in  advance  of the 
prices  at  which  they  were  prepared  to  carry  out 
transport  operations. 
Questions of  procedure 
1132 
It  is  obviously  desirable  where  possible  to  prevent 
the  supervisory  and  legal  authorities  from  being 
inundated  with  ill-founded  complaints  and  suit's. 
To  this  end  the  costs  of inquiries  could  be charged 
to  plaintiffs in  cases where examination or judgment 
showed  their  complaints  or  suits  to  be  unjustified. 
In the  contrary case  these  expenses would  lbe  borne 
(')  Such indexing  would, of course,  apply only to the  li~its 
of the brackets and not to the rates or prices charged, whtch 
would  remain  completely  free  within  these  limits.  It  ~~;lso 
goes without saying that all the points made here (:Oncemmg 
approval  and  control are  themselves  only valid  for  the  mi-
nimum and maximum price  limits. 
(")  By this we  mean price schedule.s  not subject to  ap~roval, 
which  simply  imply  an  undertakmg  by  the  enterpnse  to 
supply  transport  services  at  specific  prices  it  has  fixed  in 
advance. 
(")  See  Section  32.4. 
(')  Obviously  this  facility  could  only  be  granted to  carriers 
subject to what has been said in Section 32.4 concerning the 
risk  of systematic  discrimination  between  different  users. by  the  operators  responsible  for  the  abuse  of 
dominant  positions  or uneconomic  competition. 
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Furthermore,  again  in  the  interest  of  rapid  and 
efficient  control,  it  would  seem  advisable  for  the 
competent  authorities  to  take  interim  conservatory 
decisions  pending  full  study  of  a  case,  when  the 
issues  involved  appear  sufficiently  important  and  a 
preliminary  examination  indicates  that  the  request 
is  based  on pertinent  arguments. 
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Finally,  the  competent  authority  should  have  the 
character of  a  tribunal,  since  it  is  essential  that all 
interested parties should have an opportunity of being 
heard. 
1135 
In fact,  the suggestions  we submit offer every  inter-
ested  party two  opportunities:  first,  complaints  may 
be  lodged  with  the  competent  authorities,  which 
would  have  to  examine  them;  and  secondly,  pro-
ceedings can be  instituted with the appropriate legal 
bodies.  In  principle  the  control  authorities  would 
be  responsible  for  imposing  minimum  or maximum 
prices  where  necessary,  while  the  legal  authorities; 
once the matter was  referred to them, would have to 
pronounce (a) on the facts and (b) on the conformity 
of such minimum or maximum prices wiih the general 
principles  of the  tariff  policy. 
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Harmonization  of  legal  systems  throughout  the 
Community  is  an  essential  condition  for  a  coherent 
common  transport  policy  and  should  therefore  be 
assured.  This  in  no  way  prevents  national  or re-
gional authorities from being competent in complaints 
concerning  disturbances  affecting  purely  national or 
regional  traffic.  But  to  eliminate  the  risk  of  con-
flicting  decisions  by  regions  or  countries,  at  least 
an  opportunity  of  appeal  to  an  appropriate  Com-
munity authority (1)  would seem to be indispensable. 
It  is  indispensable  anyway  whenever  the  interest  at 
stake  are  not  exclusively  national,  in  view,  for  in-
stance,  of the possibilities  of discrimination at Com-
munity  level (2). 
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Finally,  it  should  be  remembered  that  disputes  will 
essentially concern questions of fact,  the appraisal of 
which  inevitably  entails  some  margin  of  discretion, 
and  that  optimum  resource  allocation  is  not neces-
sarily  the  only  objective  of  transport  policy.  The 
authority  to  be  responsible for rate control in  trans-
port  services  would  have  to  be  chosen,  and  its 
composition  and  rules  of  procedure  estabilished,  in 
the  light  of  the  very  complex  character  of  the 
decisions it  would be called upon to take (3). 
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It is  not for us to make suggestions on this head, and 
we  will  confine  ourselves  to  pointing  out  that 
decisions  on  minimum  or  maximum  prices  or  un-
justified  discrimination  always  have  an economic,  a 
legal  and  a  political  aspect. 
33.3  - SOME  FURTHER  OBSERVATIONS 
ON  PROBLEMS OF  TRANSITION 
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In  view  of the  diversity  of the  transport policies  at 
present applied in  the various Community countries, 
implementation  of  any  common  policy  in  the  field 
of  inland  transport  will  give  rise  to  problems  of 
transition.  There  is  no  doubt  that  these  problems 
are  of  great  practical  importance  for  both  infra-
structure  and  transport  services,  and  must  be  taken 
into  consideration  in  every  system.  Any change of 
policy  inevitably  has  serious  repercussions  not only 
on inland  transport itself  but on  the  economy  as  a 
whole. 
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Despite  the  importance  of  this  question  we  ha·'e 
refrained  from  studying  it  in  detail  for  several 
reasons.  First,  this  part  of  our  report  deals  with 
a  certain number of possible systems,  and only with 
the  main  aspects  even  of  these.  Such  a  general 
examination  is  obviously  inadequate  for  appraising 
the problems of adaptation which implementation of 
each  system  would  involve.  It'  would  clearly  be 
impossible in  the  framework  of this  report to  make 
such  a  detailed  analysis  in  respect  of  each  of  the 
systems  examined  and  their  different  variants. 
Furthermore,  an  analysis  of  that  kind  would  have 
no  point  unless  it  was  made  from  the angle  of the 
existing  transport  situation.  It  is  impossible  to 
study problems of adaptation without taking account 
of  the  particular  initial  situation  in  which  a  given 
(')  This  suggestion  in  no  way  calls  into  question  the  final 
competence  of the  Court of Justice. 
(")  See  Section  32.4. 
Or  of  distortions  of  the  conditions  of  competition  which 
could  be  introduced  by  the  existence  of  lower  or  upper 
limits  which  are  not equivalent  throughout  all  the  national 
territories. 
(")  From  the  economic  angle  alone  the  study  of  transport 
tariffs  is  very  complex.  Transport  services  differ  widely; 
the  structure  of  costs,  particularly  in  the  railways,  is  ex-
tremely intricate; and the optimum prices for transport servi-
ces  corresponding to optimum resource  allocation vary with 
demand.  Similarly,  the  influence  of  possible  distortions 
of the conditions of competition may be  extremely difficult 
to determine.  For all  these reasons,  appraisal of the actual 
existence  of abuse  of dominant positions  or of uneconomic 
competition  or,  again,  of  situations  of  discrimination,  may 
present considerable difficulties, and the authority concerned 
would  then  require  wide  economic competence. system  would  have  to  be  introduced.  Study  of the 
specific  transition  problems  involved  in  the  various 
systems  would  demand not  only  a detailed quantita-
tive analysis of each system but also comparison with 
the  actual  position  in  the  different  Community 
countries.  A  study  of  such  magnitude  would 
obviously be  beyond the scope of this report (1). 
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For all  these  reasons  we  have confined  ourselves  to 
presenting  a few  general comments on the problems 
of the change-over.  We  supplement them here with 
some  remarks  on  the  nature  of these  problems  and 
their influence on the choice between the systems and 
on the types of measures which can facilitate adapta-
tion  to  a new  policy for inland transport. 
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It is  generally  considered  that the  problems of tran-
sition involve two distinct though closely interdepend-
ent elements:  the necessary economic adaptation and 
the  impact  on  incomes.  These  two  aspects  are 
obviously  of concern  to  transport.  Any  change  of 
system may require some adaptation of inland trans-
port itself, particulrly if such change affects the con-
ditions of competition within and between the modes 
of transport.  Moreover,  any  change  in  the  system 
of inland transport is likely to influence both national 
and  international  conditions  of competition in  other 
sectors of the economy, because it usually affects the 
relative  costs  of transport  either  of competing  pro-
ducts  or of the same  products manufactured  in  dif-
ferent  places.  In  addition  to  these  economic  re-
percussions,  and  often  because  of  them,  a  change 
in  the  transport  system  may  appreciably  affect 
distribution  of  incomes.  One  example  will  suffice 
to  illustrate  this.  If  an  end  was  made  of  the 
restrictions on road haulage capacity now applied in 
many  countries,  the  value  of licences  - sometimes 
very  high  at  present  - would  fall  to  practically 
nil. 
1143 
Because these  transition  problems are imminent and 
manifest,  they tend to  play an  important and some-
times  even  a determining role in  political discussions 
on the choice of systems.  However, from  the angle 
of optimum resource allocation it is doubtful whether 
these  problems,  though  certainly  very  important  in 
themselves,  should be a decisive factor in the choice 
of  a  transport  policy.  In  particular,  the  argument 
that  any  change  of  policy  would  entail  a  "loss  of 
capital" for  society  which  would  reduce the advant-
ages  accruing  from  the  proposed  reorganization 
appears  to  be  incorrect  if  the  reorganization  con-
fonns  with  the  criteria  of  optimum  resource  allo-
cation. 
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These criteria imply that reorganization (2)  should be 
carried  out  if -- and only if - the  sum  of all  dis-
counted  future  benefits  is  higher  than  the  sum  of 
future  costs,  including  all  readaptation  and  conver-
sion  expenditure,  the  difference  being  maximum. 
When such is  the case, the reorganization is desirable 
from  the  point  of  view  of  society  even  if  it lowers 
the  market value of some durable equipment. 
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In  actual  fact,  a  reorganization  which  is  desirable 
in  the interest of society could cause a "loss of capi-
tal" in the accounting sense.  But this is  not a valid 
economic  reason  for  preventing  such  a  reorganiza-
tion.  If,  in  order  to  avoid  this  "paper  loss",  the 
reorganization  is  not  carried  out,  the  books  will 
naturally  show  no  loss,  but the  economic  waste  to 
the  detriment  of society  will  continue. 
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Furthermore,  it  would  be  economically  harmful  to 
try to protect the value of existing durable equipment 
by imposing minimum prices.  Falling prices ensure 
that  this  equipment  is  used  for  as  long  as  it  makes 
a  positive  contribution to the economy,  and  are  an 
incentive  to  reorganization  as  soon  as  it  ceases  to 
do  so.  Sectors  affected  by  reorganization  will 
continue to  use their durable equipment for  as  long 
as  the  revenue  from  it  covers  the  direct  cost  of 
utilization,  which  includes  costs  of  operation  and 
maintenance.  In  this  case  the  "loss  of  capital" 
for  society  will  only  be a  paper one (i.e.  the  value 
of  the  durable  equipment  will  decline),  not  an 
economic one.  If,  on the other hand, revenue over 
a relatively long period is  insufficient to cover direct 
costs  of  use,  the  equipment  will  be  abandoned  or 
sold  at  a  price  corresponding  to  its  value  in  the 
best  possible  alternative  employment.  It should  be 
repeated that this  does  not mean a "loss of capital" 
for  society,  since  a  decline  in  operations  shows  -
if total demand has not decreased - that alternative 
facilities  are  apparently available to users  at a  price 
below  the cost  of operating  the  existing  equipment. 
1147 
Accordingly,  from  the  angle  of  optimum  resource 
allocation,  adaptation  to  a  change  of  system  does 
not  present  any  fundamental  economic  difficulties 
but only technical and social ones.  Such adaptation 
may elicit a new pattern of activity in several sectors 
of the economy -- a process which can be facilitated 
and  speeded  up  by  various  measures,  particularly 
(') In  addition  we  must  stress  that  the  policy  we  have  sug-
gested  as  regards  transport  services  takes  account,  in  its 
principles, of the diversity of the existing situations. 
(")  Consisting,  for  instance,  in  closing  down  a  railway  line, 
abolishing  quantitative  restrictions,  etc. in  the  field  of  information  and  vocational  retraining. 
But  the  real  problem  is  not  here;  it  is  in  the  redis-
tribution  of  incomes  resulting  from  a  change  of 
policy (1).  We  have  already  given  an  example  to 
illustrate this,  and it  would be possible to  quote many 
others. 
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Once  the  real  problems  involved  in  changing  from 
one system to  another are admitted to be linked with 
the  possible  impact  on  incomes,  the  nature  of these 
problems  and  their  practical  effects  on  the  policy 
choice  appear  in  a  new  light.  The  importance  of 
the  social  consequences  is  undeniab;  ; but from  the 
purely  economic  angle  they  are  only  an  essential 
element at a second stage in the choice of a transport 
policy.  They  then  entail  measures  to  mitigate  any 
harmful  effects  on  the  social  plane,  and  such  meas-
ures  must  as  far  as  possible  avoid  hampering  the 
process  of  adaptation (:!). 
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Only  when  measures  which  are  neutral  from  the 
angle  of optimum  resource  allocation  are impossible 
can  the  choice  of  a  transport  system  be  influenced 
by  the  problems  of  transition.  But  it  should  be 
remembered  that if  the  aim  is  a  policy  to  integrate 
European  transport  there  is  no  room  for  choosing 
between  change  and  maintenance  of  the status quo. 
In  view  of  the  differences  existing  in  this  field 
between  the  various  Community  countries,  and 
whatever  the final  policy  may  be,  certain  modifica-
tions  are  inevitable  if  it is  desired  that the organi-
zation of inland transport in the EEC shall be based 
as far as  possible on coherent economic principles (3). 
(') It  must , not  be  forgotten  that  a  gradual  and  cautious 
development' uf State  transport  policy  is  of decisive  impor-
tance in this context.  It is  in  the light of a  certain concep-
tion of transport policy that enterprises take decisions  which 
bind  them  for  a  long  time. 
(")  See  Subsection  25 .41. 
(")  We  speak of "coherent" and not of  "uniform" principles 
deliberately  here,  because  many  people  think  that  a  Com-
munity  organization  of  transport  should  always  entail  the 
application of uniform principles or even rules, whether the 
situations  concerned  are  identical  or  not.  However,  the 
only  reasonable  solution  is  to  apply  principles  and  rules 
which,  given  the  diversity· of situations,  enable  the  general 
objectives  to be  attained  in  the  most  effective  way. 
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THE APPROACH SUGGESTED 
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1.  In  this  final  chapter  we  shall  not  try  to  sum 
up  Part Ill of our report.  Such  a  summary  could 
make our suggestions sound too categorical, whereas 
we  have  emphasized  throughout  that  the  necessary 
decisions  will  in  many  cases  be  determined  largely 
by  facts  at  present insufficiently  known  and  also by 
political  considerations  which  it  is  not  for  us  to 
judge.  The sole aim of these final remarks is  there-
fore  to  point  to  a  few  general  lines  which  emerge 
from  our analysis  and  which  we  consider significant 
for  an  understanding  of  the  types  of  solution  we 
suggest. 
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Our whole  analysis  rests  on the  argument that any 
solution  must  be  practicable  and  based  not  on 
abstract  and  preconceived  ideas  but  on  the  actual 
situation of the transport market.  In this respect, as 
in  many  others,  our  analysis  is  in  close  harmony 
with  both  the  spirit  and  the  substance of the  initia-
tives  already  taken  regarding the  common transport 
policy. 
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2.  From  the  twofold  viewpoint  of  optimum  re-
source  allocation  and  practical  procedure  we  have 
come  to  the  conclusion,  in  respect  of  both  infra-
structure and transport services, that prices and price 
limits  cannot  properly  be determined  solely  on  the 
basis  of  costs.  Admittedly,  costs  are  a  necessary 
element  of  any  policy,  but  consideration  of  them 
alone  is  insufficient.  Calculation  of  prices  on  the 
basis  of  costs  means  adopting  conventions  for 
apportioning  the  costs  among  the  many  types  of 
services  supplied  by  means  of the  same  faclors  of 
production  at  different  periods and in  varying situa-
tions  of  capacity  utilization.  In  the transport field, 
where  there  is  no  possibility  of storing  production, 
demand  must  be  taken  into  consideration  for 
determining  prices  in  conformity  with  optimum 
resource  allocation.  This  applies  both  to  infra-
structure  and  to  transport  services.  It follows  that 
price  calculation  on  the  basis  of cost  alone is  faced 
with  a  fundamental  dilemma.  Either such  a  calcu-
lation must  make use of certain conventions for cost 
imputation,  in  which  case  the  demand  situation 
cannot  be  fully  allowed  for  and  there  is  a  conflict 
with  the  criteria of optimum  resource  allocation;  or 
an  endeavour  is  made  to  integrate  the  demand 
situation  into the calculations,  and  the  method  then 
becomes  practically  unworkable. 
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For  these  reasons,  and  for  others  stated  in  more 
detail  in  the  preceding chapters,  we  have  based our 
analysis  neither  on  the  calculation  of  cost  nor  on 
the  definition  of  certain  conventions  for  their 
imputation.  On the contrary, we  have tried to find 
working  procedures  which,  although  adapted  to  the 
real  situation  of  inland  transport,  are  calculated  to 
lead  to  a  situation  in  which  the  conditions  cor-
responding  to  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources 
are  realized  as  satisfactorily as  possible:. 
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3.  The implications  of this  approach  are particu-
larly evident in  the field  of infrastructure.  It is  too 
often  thought  that  the  fundamental  question  here  is 
how  to  impute  costs,  i.e.  to  determine  appropriate 
scales  by  which  the  total  cost  of  infrastructure, 
however this  may be defined,  can be apportioned in 
time  and  between  the  different  categories  of  users. 
We  consider that such a solution is  not economically 
justified.  The basic  question  is  not how  to  impute 
a  given  amount  of  costs,  irrespective  of  their 
definition,  but  to  implement  procedures  which  can 
yield  correct  decisions. 
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Two types of distinct though closely related decisions 
may be distinguished.  The first concern investments 
in  infrastructure,  and the second  its  use.  The very 
nature of infrastructure investments,  and par1ticularly 
the  close  economic  interdependence  between  the 
different  parts  of  an  infrastructure  network  and 
between  competing  networks,  raises  the  problem  of 
centralization  of  decisions.  We  have  pinpointed 
criteria  for  investment  and  proposed  procedure  for 
co-ordinating  decisions  on  the  different  modes  of 
inland  transport.  This  procedure  includes  partici-
pation,  or  at  least  consultation,  of  all  interested 
parties  in  an  appropriate  institutional  framework 
like  that envisaged  on a  more  general  plane for  the 
medium-term  economic  policy  in  the Community. 
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As  regards  charges  on  infrastructure users,  the first 
problem  is  to  fix  these  in  such  a  way  as  to  achieve 
optimum utilization of the infrastructure.  If it were 
possible  to  apply  procedures  for  infrastructure  in-
vestment  decisions  which  would  .shield  the  latter 
against  all  pressure groups,  the most suitable system 
for  fixing  prices  for  utilization  would  obviously  be 
the practical one of economic charges.  This system 
is  in  no  way  bas<ed  on  apportionment  of  thf:  "total cost"  of  infrastructure;  the  prices  comprise  simply 
the  direct  cost  caused  by  the  user  and  a  scarcity 
pnce  when  the  infrastructure  is  fully  utilized.  All 
methods  of  apportioning  "costs"  are  arbitrary,  and 
for  this  reason  they  are probably both incompatible 
with  optimum  resource  allocation  and  hardly  likely 
to  furnish  a  basis  for  agreement.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  system  of  economic  charges,  while  being 
sufficiently  practical,  conforms  as  far  as  possible 
to  the criteria of optimum  resource  allocation. 
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The  investment  decisions  may,  however,  be  subject 
to  pressures  of various  kinds,  and  these  essentially 
social  and  political  considerations  may  lead  to  the 
requirement of budgetary equilibrium  being imposed 
on infrastructure.  We are obviously not in a position 
to judge such considerations,  which depend to some 
extent on facts  insufficiently  known  and for the rest 
are  a  matter  of  political  appraisal.  However, 
generally  speaking it  seems  evident that the decision 
whether or not to  impose the  additional requirement 
of budgetary equilibrium  depends on the features  of 
each  individual  case.  As  regards  the  infrastructure 
of  underdeveloped  regions  and  local  networks,  the 
verdict  appears  to  be  clearly  against  imposition  of 
this  balanced-budget  requirement. 
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If the  requirement  is  imposed,  the  question  arises 
of how the total amount to be borne by infrastructure 
users should be defined, and how it should be broken 
down between the different categories of users.  Here 
again we have suggested a pragmatic approach.  We 
have given special attention to the variants of budget-
ary  equilibrium  which  would  provide  an  effective 
barrier against pressure groups without being unnec-
essarily  complex  and  without  unduly  jeopardizing 
optimum  resource  allocation,  i.e.  the  best  use  of 
infrastructure.  Here too  we  came to  the conclusion 
that  an  allocation  of  costs  is  useless.  Taking 
account in  particular of the fact that, in every system 
of  budgetary  equilibrium,  extensive  equalization  of 
charges is  necessary and desirable, such an allocation 
is  an  unnecessary  complication;  it is  hardly  practic-
able because  of the many calculations it entails,  and 
it  imposes  an  excessive  constraint  on infrastructure 
prices  to  the detriment  of the objectives  pursued. 
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4.  Our analysis of the pricing of transport services 
has  been  guided by  the same  considerations, i.e.  the 
need  to  define  a  workable  system  and  to  base  all 
policy  on  the  real  situation of the transport market. 
Whenever effective  and correctly functioning compe-
tition  exists,  it  is  an  incitement  to efficiency  and  a 
powerful  stimulus  to  technical  progress  and  speedy 
adaptation  to  change.  But  it  can  only  function 
properly  in  an  appropriate  institutional  framework, 
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and  this  implies  harmonization  of the  conditions  of 
competition.  Competition  must  be  supplemented 
by  social  policy  measures  and  restrained  whenever 
its free play yields  results conflicting with the criteria 
of  optimum  resource  allocation.  In  the  transport' 
services field these results may be, in particular, une-
conomic  competition  and  the  abuse  of  dominant 
positions.  Any  policy  for  inland  transport  must 
take  account  of such  situations  and  include  suitable 
measures  to  combat their undesirable effects. 
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When examining the various possible policies we  met 
with  one difficulty,  i.e.  the  facts  about  uneconomic 
competition and the abuse of dominant positions are 
not  sufficiently  known  to  justify  a  judgment  on 
whether  these  situations  are  relatively  common  or, 
on  the contrary,  exceptional.  This  is  why  we  have 
proposed  a  procedure  which  would  enable  the 
authorities  concerned  to  obtain  the necessary  infor-
mation  and,  guided  by  this,  to  set  limits  to  the 
freedom  of competitive prices  whenever uneconomic 
competition  or  abuse  of  dominant  positions  can 
actually  be  observed. 
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Such  a  procedure  is  justified  for  a  further  reason, 
i.e.  because  any  common  transport  policy  can  be 
implemented only gradually,  in view  of the  diversity 
of  the  initial  situations  as  regards  both  the  pricing 
of transport  and  the  external  conditions  of compe-
tition (1).  A  bracket  rate  system  seems  to  be  a 
suitable  instrument  for  achieving  this  gradual  evo-
lution.  Implementation  of  all  the  necessary  meas-
ures  depends  chiefly  on  the  political  will  of  the 
Member  States.  However,  from  the  technical  and 
economic points of view,  we  consider that this proc-
ess  can be achieved  within  about twelve  years. 
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Our indications  concerning the transition  period  are 
only  scanty,  and  do  not  claim  to  answer  all  the 
questions  arising  in  this  connection.  The  institu-
tional  problems,  in  particular,  have  only  been 
partially  tackled.  This  does  not  mean  that  the 
Community's  transport  policy  must  not include  the 
establishment  of  appropriate  administrative  bodies 
and  tribunals  during  the transition  period.  On the 
contrary,  it  will  be  necessary  to  obtain  numerous 
statistical  reports,  to  introduce  regulations  and 
administrative  procedures  and,  finally,  to  impose 
economic  sanctions  in  order  to  ensure  the  efficient 
and  uninterrupted execution of the transport policy. 
Whatever  that  policy  may  be,  such  arrangements 
seem necessary if it is  to conform to  the criteria and 
objectives  fixed  by  the  Community  institutions. 
(')  Tax systems, social arrangements, other systems of charg-
ing for  the  use  of infrastructure, etc. 1163 
But  our task  was  only  to  examine  the  substance  of 
the  transport  policy  as  economists,  and  we  are  not 
competent in  legal  and  institutional matters. 
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The approach we  suggest  is  extremely pragmatic and 
does  not  provide  any  general  "open  Sesame"  for 
determining  price  limits.  We  think  we  have  shown 
that  such  general  solutions  would  not  be  appro-
priate.  They  are  not  necessary  in  the  transition 
period,  since  the  procedure  of  gradually  widening 
the margin available for price formation in a compet-
itive  framework  starts  from  given  tariff  systems. 
Hence  no  criteria  for  fixing  price  limits  are  needed 
except  in  specific  cases  where  uneconomic  compe-
tition or abuse of dominant positions actually appear, 
and  here  they  are  always  needed.  Moreover,  any 
general  application  of  price  limits  to  all  transport 
services  also  conflicts  with  the  criteria  of  optimum 
resource  allocation.  Optimum  prices  for  transport 
services,  like  those  for  the  use  of  infrastructure, 
cannot  be  determined  simply  on  the  basis  of  costs, 
and  any  at'temps  to  take  account  of  all  the relevant 
demand  factors  renders  all  systems  of  calculated 
prices  or price  limits  impracticable. 
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For those  reasons,  and  allowing  for  the  fact  that  a 
certain  element  of appraisal  and  judgment  is  inevi-
table in fixing suitable price limits, we have proposed 
an  institutional  procedure to  detect  actual  situations 
of  abuse  of  dominant  positions  and  of  uneconomic 
competition  and  to  determine  and  impose  specific 
price limits in all the cases found.  According to this 
proposal,  any party which  considers itself injured by 
the  price  policy  followed  by  one  or  more  carriers 
could  ask  for  a  price  limit  to  be  imposed.  The 
applicant  would  have  to  justify  his  allegations,  and 
if his application were rejected the costs of the action 
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would  be  charged  to  him.  This  would  appear  to 
be  necessary to  prevent a flood  of such appeals.  In 
judging  each  case,  account  would  have to  be  taken 
of  a  great  number  of  factors,  in  particular  the 
marginal  cost  of the  transport  operation  considered 
and  other  cost  components,  the  demand  situation, 
utilization  of  capacity,  etc.  It  is  impossible  to 
define  generally  valid  practical rules  for  determining 
price  limits,  and  hence  the procedure  proposed  has 
the  advantage  of  enabling  the  authorities  to  base 
their  decisions  and  any  measures  they  may  take  on 
the  actual  facts  of  each  case.  The  intervention  of 
the  interested  parties  is  an  essential  element  of  the 
procedure. 
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We  believe  that  this  general  approach  can  supply 
a  serviceable  framework  for  a  system  of  pricing  in 
inland  transport  which  combines  the  advantages  of 
competition  with  the  necessary  guarantees  against 
abuse of dominant positions and uneconomic compet-
ition.  It might  be  necessary  to  supplement  it  by 
various  measures  concerning  access  to  the  market 
and transport capacity.  Since our terms of reference 
specified  that  we  were  to  concentrate  particularly 
on  tariff policy,  we  have not studied these measures 
in  detail.  We  have  nevertheless  become  convinced 
that  the  strongly  restrictive  licensing  systems  which 
various  countries  at  present  apply,  particularly  in 
road  haulage,  are difficult to  reconcile  with  the cri-
teria  of  optimum  resource  allocation.  These  re-
strictions could be reduced gradually to  the point at 
which  control  would  cease  to be  unduly  restrictive. 
This point could be recognized in particular from the 
fact  that  once  it  was  reached  the  market  value  of 
licences  would  not deviate  substantially from  nil (1). 
(')  Naturally,  this  overall  view  of the  general  lines  of Part 
Ill is  given here only for the sake of convenience.  For any 
details  of application  or interpretation,  reference  should  be 
made  to the analysis in the preceding chapters. FINAL  CONSIDERATIONS 
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This  report  presents  no  overall  conclusions  nor,  as 
conceived,  could  it  present  any.  There  are  two 
main  reasons  for  this. 
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Firstly,  it  deals  with  the  subject  chiefly  from  the 
point of view  of economic efficiency.  But,  however 
important  this  aspect  may  be,  other  objectives  can 
be  pursued  at  the  same  time.  The  attainment  of 
such  objectives  may  more  or  less  depend  on  the 
existence  of  an  efficient  economy,  but this  does  not 
alter the fact  that they cannot be considered identical 
with  concern  for  efficiency.  Hence,  since  other 
objectives  may  be  pursued,  notably  on  the  social 
and  political levels,  it was  impossible for the authors 
to conclude in favour of any specific policy. 
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Secondly,  viewing  the  matter  again  solely  from  the 
angle of economic efficiency, the report clearly shows 
that  in  practice  no  policy  could  fully  satisfy  all  the 
conditions  of  optimum  resource  allocation.  For 
example,  the  rule  of  budgetary  equilibrium  will  to 
some  extent  jeopardize optimum resource  allocation, 
since  the  prices  established  under  this  rule  are  not 
optimal.  But the  rule  appears essential if sufficient 
pressure  is  to  be exerted  in  favour  of  that minimi-
zation  of  costs  without  which  prices,  whatever  their 
level,  lack  their full  economic  significance.  This  is 
only  one  instance  among  many  which  have  been 
discussed  in  this  report. 
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On the  economic level  alone  a compromise between 
conflicting  desiderata is  therefore indicated,  and this 
can  only  result  from  an  appraisal  of  the  empirical 
data supplied  by  observation.  Moreover,  this  com-
promise  must  take  full  account  of  the  various 
objectives  pursued,  in  particular  those  of  a  social 
and political nature. 
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Although  the  report does  not  and  could  not  submit 
any  general  conclusions,  we  feel  that  it  constitutes 
a  useful  instrument  of  analysis  and  that  - again, 
solely  from  the  economic  angle  - it  gives  a certain 
number  of limited  judgments  and conclusions  which 
could  perhaps  facilitate  the  definitive  choices. 
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This  study  is  presented  and  was  planned  not  as  an 
academic  exercise  but  as  a  project  of  operational 
research  geared  to  finding  practical  applications. 
The  object  was  to  furnish,  in  the  light  of  the 
available  information  and  within  a  given  time,  an 
opinion  on  tariff  policy  in  transport.  These  condi-
tions explain the manifest limitations of the report as 
regards  the  subject dealt with,  the  context in  which 
it  is  placed,  and  the  partial  conclusions  submitted. 
They  also  justify  the ·pragmatic  approach  which  is 
one of its  essential  proposals for  the implementation 
of  any  policy.  Although  it  does  not  submit  any 
overall  conclusion  it  does  offer suggestions  for  ana-
lysing  facts  and  working  out the  requisite  policy  in 
each period from the information obtained during the 
preceding  phase. 
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Finally,  on  the  practical  level,  we  would  like  to 
emphasize  that,  in  so  far  as  a  policy  aiming  at 
efficiency  is  pursued,  it can  and  must  be  applied 
differently  in each specific  case.  For instance,  it is 
quite possible that a policy of balanced budgets may 
in  fact  be  the  most  suitable  for  one  part  of  the 
transport  economy,  while  a  policy  founded  on  the 
practical  system  of  economic  charges  could  present 
essential advantages in another case.  Nothing would 
be more erroneous than to imagine that the practical 
details  of  a  policy  ultimately  directed  towards 
optimum resource  allocation  must necessarily be the 
same in the different parts of the transport economy. Alphabetical  Index C1 
(1)  The  numbers  are  those  of  the  paragraphs  in  the  Report.  Those  in  heavy 
type  relate  to  the  paragraphs  containing  the  most  important  information  on  the 
subject  or  the  definitions  of  the  terms. 
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119,  180,  181,  184,  185,  189,  191,  239,  240,  291,  292,  293-
295,  297,  300,  303,  305,  357,  416,  476,  477,  488,  508,  518, 
552,  597 - 599,  605- 608,  609,  623,  625,  640,  641'  658,  661' 
677,  702,  713,  742,  751'  753,  832,  850,  854,  855,  876,  877, 
881'  888,  891'  912,  1154,  1156 
COSTING 
standard 
860 
COURT  OF  JUSTICE 
1136 
CRITERION(-IA) 
- for  current  operations 
476-479 
- in  transport  policy 
410,  668,  670-675 
175 
- of optimum resource  allocation  (v.  "Optimum 
resource  allocation") 
investment  -
309- 325,  394,  447,  452,  470- 475,  481'  501'  504,  527, 
529- 531'  556,  559,  604,  655,  676,  678,  696,  709,  718 
CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS 
704,  705,  774,  786- 794 
D 
DEBT 
initial  - (v.  "Initial  constant") 
DECENTRALIZATION 
41,  115,  191,  193,  204,  215,  218,  413-416,  419,  435,  449, 
451'  461'  548,  558,  663,  666- 668,  681'  684,  685,  793,  796, 
801'  802,  1  077,  11 00,  11 02 
industrial 
449,  451 
DECISIONS 
investment  - (v.  "lnvestment(s)") 
freedom  of  -
117 
DECONGESTION OF URBAN  AREAS 
441'  449,  454 
DEFICIT 
38,  133,  170-172,  180-192,  201,208,  292,  294,300,  317-
325,  398,  481'  499,  502,  504,  508,  509,  510- 547,  574- 576, 
578,  595,  597,  603,  608,  609-657,  662,  671'  676,  751'  762, 
815,  837,  839,  840,  854,  867,  874,  883.  891'  933,  936,  1095, 
1098 
- of  infrastructure 
317 - 325,  510- 547,  609- 657 
annual-
511'  597,  608 
apportionment  of  the  - (v.  "'Imputation") 
financing  of  the  -
171,  172,  322,  324,  325,  398,  512,  513,  515,  516,  525,  527, 
534,  537,  541,  542,  546,  576,  578,  603,  609,  628,  815,  874, 
891'  1095,  1098 
imputation  of  the  - (v.  "Imputation'') overall,  total  -
511,  597 
railway  - (v.  "Railways") 
DEFISCALIZA  TION 
529,  895,  917,  1080,  1096 
DEMAND  (v.  also  "wants") 
89,  118,  121,  144,  145,  150,  152,  153,  155,  159,  161,  179, 
213,  238,  248- 267,  272,  282,  291'  292,  294,  303- 305,  318, 
320,  327 - 329,  331'  332,  334 - 336,  338,  339,  343,  346,  348, 
353,  354,  362,  368,  392,  401'  407,  477,  478,  495,  501'  503, 
504,  506,  508,  537,  551'  556,  563,  565,  570,  573,  580,  587, 
590,  592,  607,  644,  677,  688,  689,  693,  696,  698,  700,  706, 
709,  711'  715,  716,  742,  760,  767- 769,  771'  776- 778,  780, 
781'  789- 793,  795,  827,  840,  841'  850,  900,  959,  966,  967, 
969,980,997,  1003,  1041,  1060,  1070,  1071,  1100,1101, 
1103,  1104,  1130,  1137,  1152,  1164,  1165 
elasticity  of  -
265,  495,  570,  644,  688,  689,  777,  778,  791 
elasticity  of  substitution  of  -
265,  495,  570 
[price-determined]  equality  of  supply  and 
89,  118,  153,  248-267,  282,  292,  305,  392,  407 
expected  -
213 
fluctuations  of  -
145,  266,  303,  551'  587,  689,  709,  716,  966, 
insufficient  overall  -
789,  793 
pattern,  structure  of  -
570,  760,  795,  959,  969 
peak-
264-266,  742,  781 
rationing  of  -
266,  282,  303,  304,  331,  573,  776,  841 
trend  in  -
688,  706,  709,  715,  900,  1103,  1104 
DENSITY  OF TRAFFIC 
634 
DEPRECIATION (v.  "Amortization") 
marginal  -
345,  346 
176 
DEPRESSION 
25- 27,  42,  698,  750,  786 
DETERRENTS 
514,  415,  1109,  1162 
monetary -· 
414,  415 
DEVELOPMENT 
- cost  (v.  "Cost(s)") 
policy  of  economic  - growth 
436,  447,  452,  579 
regional  - policy 
18,  19,  441'  449,  451'  453,  547,  672,  673,  732,  801 
DIFFERENTIATION (v.  "Sector") 
- of  charges  for  the  use  of  infrastructure 
454,  550,  567,  571'  572,  581'  592,  632- 634,  644,  650,  806, 
827,  842,  889,  1096 
- of  prices  of  transport  services 
644,  726,  766,  771,  781,  981,  987,  1003,  1034-1044 
DISCONTINUITIES 
84- 86,  169,  505,  506,  587 
DISCOUNT 
rate  of  -
506 
DISCRIMINATION 
483,  735,  1038,  1039,  1041-1044,  1048,  1119,  1130,  1131, 
1136- 1138 
DISINVESTMENT 
140,  202,  204,  220,  472,  501'  689 
DISTORTION 
- of  the  conditions  of  competition  (v.  "Compe-
tition") 
DISTRIBUTABLE SURPLUS 
104,  105-114,  12fi,  165,  172,  207,  281 
DISTRIBUTION 
- of  income  (v.  "lncome(s)") DIVISIBILITY 
81,  83,  146,  147,  261,  262,  268,  368,  383,  665,  677,  696 
DOMINANT  POSITIONS 
14,  41'  42,  44,  193,  644,  665,  685,  687,  691' 729,  730,  747- 750, 
785,  806,  807,  820,  822- 825,  943,  944,  946,  950,  951'  954, 
959,  960,  965,  972  - 975,  977,  981'  985,  987,  989,  990,  992. 
99J,  1000,  1002,  1004,  1005,  1008-1010,  1013,  1015,  1022, 
1024,  1027,  1032-1034,  1040,  1055,  1057,  1058,  1060,  1062, 
1063,1065,1068,1069,1071-1074,1108,1111,1112,1115, 
1116,  1118,  1120,  1125,  1132,  1137,  1159,  1160,  1164-
1166 
abuse  of  -
14,  41'  42,  44,  193,  644,  685,  691'  729,  730,  747- 750,  785, 
806,  807,  820,  822,  823,  824,  825,  943,  944,  946,  950,  951' 
954,  959,  960,  965,  972- 975,  977,  981'  985,  987,  989,  990, 
992,  993,  1  000,  1  002,  1  004,  1005,  1  008 - 1  010,  1013,  1015, 
1022,  1024,  1027,  1032-1034,  1040,  1055,  1057,  1058,  1060, 
1062,  1063,  1065,  1068,  1069,  1071  -1094,  1111,  1112,  1115, 
1116,  1118,  1120,  1125,  1132,  1137,  1159,  1160,  1164-1166 
abuse  of  - by  the  railways 
687,  747- 750,  823,  960 
DUMPING 
644,  687,  728,  729,  749,  967,  987 
DURABILITY 
498,  500 - 502,  11 03 
economic  - of the  infrastructure 
500- 502 
ECONOMIC  DECLINE 
24,  799 
E 
ECONOMIC  EXPANSION 
506,  507,  587,  669,  698,  700,  705,  750,  796,  803,  964 
ECONOMIC  LIFE  (v.  "Durability") 
ECONOMY 
[- in  which  various  events  are]  uncertain 
68 
of  scale 
275,  388,  416,  422,  498,  506,  509,  665,  676,  685 
177 
decentralized  - (v.  "Decentralization") 
free  market -
115,  122,  133,  138,  140,  141,  153,  193,  199,  219,  432,  441, 
442,  684  700,  713,  1100 
EEC COUNCIL  OF MINISTERS 
1104 
EFFICIENCY 
20,  52,  70,  72,  99,  102,  107,  111,  123,193-204,222,224, 
229,256,280,282-284,277-381,411,416,428,430-434, 
436,  442,  458,  460,  497,  521'  547,  549,  585,  603,  634,  690, 
691,  801,  830,  874,  927,  929,  1159,  1168,  1169,  1173 
conditions  of -
123,  229,  927 
objective  of -
52,  377,  428,  430,  432,  434,  442,  458,  547,  801,  1168 
situation  of  maximum 
99,  111'  224,  280,  378,  380 
ELASTICITY 
- of  demand  (v.  "Demand") 
- of  substitution [of demand] (v.  "Demand") 
ELECTRICITY 
generation,  production  of -
361'  362,  615,  625 
ELECTRIFICATION 
417,  504,  543,  909 
EMPLOYMENT 
objective  of  full 
18,  22,  436,  439,  669,  705,  797 
situation  of  full  -
19,  24,  26,  27,  37,  225,  412,  440,  594,  669,  705-707,  714, 
787,  790,  803,  820,  964,  966,  982,  988,  990,  1053,  1082 
ENTERPRISES 
siting  of -
537,  591'  774,  911 
EQUALITY  OF TREATMENT 
534,  629,  643,  684,  940,  993 EQUALIZATION  OF CHARGES 
525,  533,  540,  581  - 586,  589,  592,  620,  632,  633,  635,  637, 
639,  671'  726,  750,  753,  834,  842,  853,  854,  859,  868,  869, 
875,  877,  887,  889,  893,  903- 905,  907- 910,  929,  935,  987, 
1085,  1092,  1158 
area of-
635,  639,  904,  905,  908- 910 
EQUILIBRIUM 
budgetary  -
300,  301'  322,  325,  446,  448,  452,  490,  494,  502,  511,  524, 
525,  532 - 535,  538 - 541,  545,  546,  552,  560,  562,  586,  593, 
595-662,  726,  728,  730,  751  -753,  755,  757,  761  -763,  812, 
817,  824,829,848-855,  868,874-917,918,  924,925,  928, 
929,  931,933-935,937, 938,981, 987,990, 1036,  1037,  1050, 
1080,1087,1090,1092,1093,1096-1098,1157,1158,1169, 
1173 
budgetary  - with  the possibility  of borrowing 
596,  874-900,  906,  907,  911,  912,  917,  924,  937,  938,  987, 
1097 
budgetary - without  the  possibility of borrowing 
~~m.w.~.~~~.n~~.m.~.~.~-
917,  987,  1092,  1097 
stability of -
122,  141,193-204,406 
unstable  -
99,  193,  197,  758 
EQUIPMENT 
capacity  of capital  (v.  "Good(  s)") 
capital  - (v.  "Good(s)") 
conditions  of optimum  resource  allocation  in  the 
case  of  capital  - (v.  "Optimum  resource  allo-
cation") 
divisible  -
146,  147-163, 677 
durable  - (v.  "Good(s)") 
indivisible  - (v.  "Indivisibility") 
national  - budget  (v.  "Budget") 
EQUITY 
228,  497,  512,  513,  518-525,  546,  573,  576,  627,  635,  644, 
689,  690,  721,  721,  749,  758,  815,  830,  837,  851,  901,  984, 
1037,  1087 
EQUIV  ALENCE{S) 
marginal-
230,  232,  233,  248 
178 
EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
11 
EXPENDITURE 
- on  maintenance,  operating -, investment  -
(v.  "Cost(s)") 
accountable  -
882 
actual  annual --
913 
overall  -
445,  789 
EXTERNAL EFFECT 
448,  450,  468,  486- 489,  518,  556,  611,  620,  630 
F 
FACTOR OF PRODUCTION 
78,  79,  84,  85,  90,  95,  121,  165,  185,  209,  222,  225,  235, 
238,  252,  259,  261  - 263,  268,  269,  285,  287,  288,  290,  291, 
295,  330,  420,  422,  470,  476,  478,  483,  487,  503,  573,  677, 
693,  716,  767,  799,  858,  1041,  1152 
common-
285,  287,  288,  290,  291,  295 
durable  - (v.  "Good(s)") 
FAILURE 
probability  of -
212,  213,  330,  336,  337 
FIELD OF PREFERENCE 
community's 
434 
FIXED INSTALLATIONS 
82,  307,  386,  417,  420,  543 
FREEDOM 
- of  decision  ( v.  "Decision") 
consumer's (--s')- of choice (v.  "Consumer(s)") 
FREIGHT EXCHANGES 
784,  11 01 •  11 05 FREIGHTING 
711 
FUELS 
taxes  on  - (v.  "Taxes") 
FUNCTION(S) 
cost  - (v.  "Cost(s)") 
external  - of  infrastructure  ( v.  "Infrastructure") 
preference  - (v.  "Preference(s)") 
production  - (v.  "Production") 
FUTURE 
only  the  - counts 
276- 279,  333,  371'  899 
GOOD{S) 
G 
85,  91,  92,105,110,111,118,120,121,146--179,181, 
183 - 185,  209,  213,  222,  224,  235,  238,  240,  249 - 253,  256, 
257,  259,  261  - 270,  272,  285,  287,  288,  291'  292,  294,  295, 
w.~-D.~.~.~.~~~.~-m.~-~~ 
486,  491,  498,  500,  503,  608,  677,  689,  693,  696,  716,  767, 
780,  781,  792,  841,  966,  997,  1041,  1103,  1144,  1146 
- transport 
8,  28,  441,  453,  459,  614,  644,  671,  73~ 74~ 748,  782,  81~ 
812,  978,  981'  1036,  1037,  1039,  1104,  1128 
capacity  of  capit'al  -
85,  92,  121'  184,  185,  213,  235,  250,  252,  253,  256,  257,  259, 
261'  263 - 266,  270,  272,  291'  294,  303,  304,  478,  693 
complementary  -
209 
conditions  of  optimum  resource  allocation  in  the 
case  of  durable  - (v.  "Optimum  resource  allo-
cation") 
durable,  capital  -
85,  92,  120,  121'  146-179, 181'  183- 185,  213,  235,  238,  240, 
250- 253,  256,  257,  259,  261  - 270,  272,  285,  288,  291'  294, 
295,  297,  303- 308,  330,  368,  467,  470-472,  476-478,  498, 
503,  608,  677,  689,  693,  696,  716,  767,  780,  781'  792,  966, 
997,  1041,  1103,  1144,  1146 
final  -
110,  111,  209,  224 
substitutable  - (v.  "Product") 
179 
GROWTH (ECONOMIC) 
policy  of  -
225,  441 '  447 - 454 
slowdown  in  -
440,  669,  704,  786,  787,  790,  964 
steady  (economic)  -
18,  19,  22,  24,  26,  37,  412,  440,  594,  669,  714,  787,  790, 
803,  820,  964,  966,  982,  988,  990,  1053,  1082 
H 
HARMONIZATION 
- of the conditions  of competition  (v.  "Compe-
tition") 
HYDROELECTRIC DAM(S) 
338,  362 
IMPERFECT ENVIRONMENT 
491'  495,  496 
IMPUTATION 
- of  costs  (of  the deficit) 
189,  285-305,  372,  488,  511'  518- 525,  552,  597,  609-652, 
658,  661'  693,  724,  726- 728,  730,  753,  758,  817,  855,  876, 
877,  888,  890,  907,  973,  1094,  1097,  1098,  1152- 1154,  1156, 
1158 
- of  costs  in  time  (v.  "Amortization") 
INCENTIVES 
monetary-
414,  415 
INCOME(S) 
- policy  (v.  "Policy") 
fall,  drop,  decline  in  -
689,  707,  790- 792,  796- 799 
net  maximization  of -
99,  113,  117,  123,  126,  153,  220,  297,  398,  404,  684,  756 (re)distribution  of  -
18,  20,  99,  122,  228,  229,  280- 284,  381'  432,  433,  441'  442, 
461  -46~ 518,  534,  609,  672,  686,  776-778, 801,  1142,  1147 
support' of-
464,  791 
transfers  of  -
229,  283,  322,  325,  398 
INDEX 
preference 
59,  60,  62- 64,  67,  71  - 74,  77,  90,  105,  116,  122,  216,  223, 
224,  226 - 228 
INDIVISIBILITY 
39,  81,  82,  85,  130,  132,  146,  185,  193,  218,  307,  383,  398, 
477,  478,  498,  503-509,  551,  555,  588,  664,  840,  841,  903-
905,  919,  911  - 914,  921 
INDUSTRY 
location  of - (v.  "Enterprises") 
INEQUALITY  [of  charges] 
- for  the  use  of  infrastructure 
523 - 525,  631  - 639,  726,  730,  829,  888,  889 
INFLATION 
23,  502,  653,  654,  704,  850,  851,  868,  873,  892,  893,  894, 
896,  900,  912,  917 
INFORMATION 
- of  users 
591,  741,  782-784,  1042,  1044,  1081,  1099,  1105,  1106 
[flow  of]  - to  the  authorities 
1087,  1114,  1126,  1160 
[flow  of]  - to  carriers 
706,  709,  714,  716,  717,  794,  824,  982,  1081,  1099-1104, 
1147 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
capacity  of  - (v.  "Capacity") 
co-ordination  of  investments  in  -- (v.  "lnvest-
ment(s)") 
180 
deficit  of -- (v.  "Deficit") 
definition  of -
417- 422 
economic  life  of  the  - (v.  "Durability") 
external  functions  of  -
615-626 
mtmmum  size  of  -
169,  316,  504,  505,  904,  905 
social  value  of  an - ( v.  "Value") 
underinvestment  in  -
529,  886 
INITIAL CONSTANT 
596,  597,  607,  88.2,  893,  898,  900,  924 
INSTITUTIONAL 
- arrangements 
1076,  1078,  1080,  1093,  1094,  1104,  1105,  1108 
- convexity  (v.  "Convexity") 
- framework,  setting,  context 
218,  247,  414,  415,  442,  854,  1109,  1110,  1155,  1159 
- matters,  questions 
4,  34,  38,  191,  218,  245-247,  413-415,  418,  442,  497,  521, 
528,  529,  530,  534,  538- 540,  555,  557,  561'  581'  601'  603, 
660,  663,  665,  671'  684,  685,  706,  718,  724,  731'  751'  761' 
769,  793,  795,  808,  809,  815,  816,  854,  859,  874,  885,  886, 
891,  899,  902,  910,  911,  914,  918,  942,  976,  1030,  1040, 
1076- 1138,  1155,  1159,  1162,  1163,  1165 
INTEGRATION 
european  -
441,  455-458,  63fl,  819,  1149 
vertical 
967 
INTEREST 
- charges,  burdens  (v.  "Charge(s)") 
rate(s)  of -
91'  358,  556,  626,  653,  862,  863,  901'  906,  916 
INTERMEDIARY(-IES) 
transport 
711'  1101 INVESTMENT(S) 
5,  23,  38,  39,  85,  91,  100,  103,  111,  120,  137,  138,  140, 
142,  165,  172,  174,  175,  183,  184,  191,  193,  201,  202,  204, 
207,  220,  253,  260,  262- 264,  266,  268- 275,  297,  300,  308, 
309- 325,  340,  341'  343- 346,  351  - 354,  357,  361'  369,  371' 
374,  394- 397,  400,  402- 404,  420,  447,  448,  450,  452,  467, 
470-475,  476,  481'  488,  499,  501'  502,  504,  506,  508- 511' 
515,  517,  519,  522,  526-540,  541,  542,  545,  549,  554-563, 
568,  574,  575,  577,  580,  585,  588,  591'  625,  631'  664,  676, 
689,  690,  693- 722,  724,  728,  731'  751'  753,  758,  762,  769, 
770,  774,  790,  794,  802,  806,  815,  832,  837,  850,  874,  884-
887,  892,  893,  898,  899,  902- 906,  909,  911'  912,  916,  917, 
920,  921,  930,  932,  934,  969,  982,  1053,  1054,  1078,  1079, 
1081,  1083,  1085-1092,  1094,  1095,  1100,  1103,  1104,  1112, 
1155- 1157 
- cost  (v.  "Cost(s)") 
- criteria  (v.  "Criterion(-ia)") 
- decisions 
1  03,  140,  165,  172,  193,  201'  202,  204,  220,  253,  260,  262, 
263,  266,  275,  308,  309- 325,  341'  352,  353,  395,  470- 475, 
515,  526-540,  541,  542,  545,  549,  554-561,  562,  591,  625, 
676,  689,  693,  694,  696- 722,  769,  770,  774,  790,  802,  892, 
911,920,921,930,1078,1085-1092,1103,1156,1157 
- in  capacity 
264,  588 
co-ordination  of  - in  infrastructure 
5,  39,  100,  140,  204,  397,  526,  529,  541,  549,  554-561, 631, 
664,  690,  724,  885,  886,  911,  921,  930,  1078,  1079,  1085-
1092,  1155 
errors  in 
140,  202,  689,  874,  887 
IRRIGATION 
288,  615,  625,  626 
JOINT  PRODUCTION 
286 
LAND 
626,  858,  863,  864,  866 
J 
l 
LEGAL AUTHORITIES  (LEGAL BODIES,  TRI-
BUNALS) 
1059,1132,1135,1162 
181 
LICENCE(S) 
road 
1096 
transport -
718-721,  953,  1002,  1021,  1053,  1064,  1142,  1166 
value  of  transport -
719,  720,  953,  1021,  1064,  1142,  1166 
LICENSING  SYSTEM(S) 
718,  719,  721,  824,  1008,  1053,  1082,  1113,  1166 
LONG-TERM  CONTRACTS 
688,  776 
LOSS 
- in  the  accounting  sense 
1145 
- of  capital  (v.  "Capital") 
of  social  returns  ( v.  "Return(  s  )") 
of  traffic  (v.  "Traffic") 
M 
MAINTENANCE 
costs  of  - (v.  "Cost(s)") 
MARGINAL UTILITIES 
n, 111,  122 
MARKET 
- prices  (v.  "Price(s)") 
access  to  the  -
681'  684,  694,  698,  715-722, 728,  779,  953,  982,  1021'  1045, 
1052-1054,  1082,  1112,  1166 
control of  access  to  the  -
694,  715-722,  779,  953,  1052-1054,1082 
(free)  - economy  (v.  "Economy") 
transparency  of  the  - (v.  "Transparency") 
MEANS 
- of  transport  (v.  also  "Capacity") 
129,  288,  361,  441,  503,  665,  677,  695,  708.  713,  715-717, 
719,  767,  770,  901'  980,  1060,  1087,  1100 MODE  [OF  TRANSPORT] 
competitive  - (v.  '"Sector") 
MONO PO LIST 
483 
MONOPOLY 
positions  of  - power 
246,  281'  681'  823 
public  -
690 
railway  -
42,  685,  687,  747,  748,  750,  960 
transport -
690 
MOTORWAY 
337,  362,  655 
MOVEMENT 
- of  pedestrians 
615 
NATIONALISM 
N 
national  economic  ends 
1038 
NATURAL  WEALTH 
58,  142,  317,  318 
NETWORK(S) 
local-
448,  454,  523 - 525,  531'  539,  545,  572,  579,  632,  829,  843, 
875,  877,  908,  1089,  1096,  1157 
main  road  - (v.  "Communications") 
urban  and  suburban -
454,  523,  572,  623,  625,  632,  651'  654,  829,  843,  864,  877, 
908,  1089,  1096 
NON-DIFFERENTIATION  (v.  "Sector") 
182 
NON-DISCRIMINATION 
principle  of ·-
88 
0 
OBJECTIVE(S) 
- of full  employment  (v.  "Employment") 
- of society,  of the  community (v.  "Community 
(-ies)") 
- of  transport  policy  (v.  "Policy") 
OBLIGATION 
public  service  -
459,  461'  572,  673,  733,  818,  967 
OPERATING COSTS  (v.  "Cost(s)") 
OPERATIONS 
criteria  for  current  - (v.  "Criterion(-ia)") 
current -
467,  470,  476-479, 481,  1100 
OPTIMUM RESOURCE  ALLOCATION 
4,  8,  9,  15-22,24,32,38,52-408,411,414,428-441, 
447,  450,  452,  454,  462,  466-496,  509,  510,  512,  527,  529, 
530,  535,  542,  544,  556,  567,  585,  603,  641,  642,  654,  668, 
671.  672,  676- 678,  682 - 684,  691.  692,  696,  708,  713,  719, 
767,  772,  790,  793,  795,  797,  830,  831,  836,  854,  856,  861, 
920,  939,  943,  963,  967,  968,  984,  1070,  1137,  1143,  1144, 
1152,  1153,  1156,  1173 
- in  production  space 
69-73 
achievement  of  [a  situation  of] 
115-128 
application of the theory of - to  infrastructure 
306-375 
application  of  the  theory  of - to  transport  ser-
vices 
676-678 
concept  of -
58-86 
conditions  of -
~~-~.~.~.~-~~~~m 
conditions  of -- in  the case  of  capital  equipment 
146-179,  470-475,  696 conditions  of  - in  the  case  of  durable  assets 
146 - 179,  470 - 475,  696 
conditions of  - in  the  case of durable goods 
146 - 179,  470 - 475,  696 
criteria  of  -
16- 21'  24,  87- 128,  184,  222,  241'  242,  244,  264,  268,  291' 
300,  322,  390,  411,  414,  432,  447,  450,  452,  454,  462,  466-
496,  509,  510,  527,  529,  530,  535,  544,  641,  642,  668,  671, 
672,  696,  790,  831'  836,  984,  1143,  1144,  1152,  1156 
realization  of  the  conditions  of  -
215-220 
scope  and  significance  of  the  conditions  of  -
221  - 305 
theory  of  -
4,  8,  9,' 16,  20,  21'  32,  38,  52-408, 432,  512,  556,  567,  585, 
603,  676-678,  696,  719,  767,  854,  856,  861'  920,  1070 
OPTIONS 
- in  transport  policy  (v.  "Policy") 
OVERCAPACITY 
506,  508,  698,  700,  708,  713 
OVERINVESTMENT 
687,  697,  698- 704,  706,  707,  712,  714,  718,  794,  824,  982, 
1053,  1054 
PARKING  IN  CITIES 
336 
PASSENGERS 
transport  of  -
p 
28,303,441,459, 614,781, 782,810, 811,  1105 
PATTERN 
- of  demand  (v.  "Demand") 
PEAK 
- demand  (v.  "Demand") 
- traffic  (v.  "Traffic") 
183 
PEDESTRIANS 
movement  of  - (v.  "Movement") 
PERFECT FORECASTING 
260,  294,  349,  352 
PIPELINES 
496,  683,  736,  751 
POLICY 
- of  economic  development  (v.  "Development") 
- of  growth  (v.  "Growth  (Economic)") 
agricultural  -
673 
anticyclical  -
441'  443 - 446,  529,  789 
criteria  in  transport  - (v.  "Criterion(-ia)") 
fiscal  -
439 
incomes-
674,  982,  983 
macroeconomic  -
23,  26,  27,  439,  440,  443,  444 
monopolistic  -
777 
objectives  of  transport  -
428-465 
options  in  transport  -
33,  409,  410, 413-416, 497 
regional  development  - (v.  "Development") 
social  -
18,  429,  442,  452,  691'  1159 
PORTS 
459,  851'  853,  893 
POWER 
production of hydroelectric - (  v.  "Electricity") 
PRACTICAL SYSTEM  OF ECONOMIC  CHAR-
GES  (v.  "Charge(s)") 
PREFERENCE(S) 
59,  73,  90,  1  05,  116,  122,  141' 216, 222 - 224, 226 - 228, 437 -field 
77,  1  08,  223,  227 
- function 
73,  227,  437 
- index  (v.  "Index") 
community's field  of - (v.  "Field of preference") 
PRESSURE  GROUP 
515,  532,  577,  620,  631,  635,  766,  815,  9"11,  1094,  1156, 
1158 
PRICE(S) 
alignment 
453 
limits 
'8,  773,  776,  791'  811'  949,  957,  959,  965-984, 986,  990,  993, 
996,  997,  1000,  1002,  1003,  1005,  1013,  1014,  1025,  1043, 
1063,  1068,  1070,  1072-1074,  1106,  1108,  1114,  1116, 
1119,  1128,  1129,  1131,  1136,  1152,  1164,  1165 
- schedules 
765,  768,782-785,  1043,  1105,  1114,  1130,  1131 
differentiation of - of transport services (v. "Dif-
ferentiation") 
final-
112,  113,  126,  312,  405,  676 
flexibility  of  -
266,  291'  304,  688,  689,  709,  764,  783,  10153,  1073,  1105 
market-
97,  117,  149,  152,  153,  162,  398,  476,  684,  696,  713 
maximum-
44,  729,  747,  750,  765,  773,  776,  824,  946,  956,  957,  965, 
968,  972,  974,  987- 994,  1004,  1007,  1015,  1024,  1033,  1036, 
1043,1055,1058,1063,1111,1115,1119,1125-1127,1129, 
1131'  1135,  1138 
minimum  -
44,  714,  725,  751,  759,  765,  773,  778,  779,  791,  793,  799, 
824,  946,  949,  956,  957,  965,  967,  972,  974,  977,  982,  983, 
987,  988,  990-994,  1004,  1007,  1015,  1024,  1033,  1036, 
1043,1054,1055,1058,1063,1111,1115,1119,1125-1127, 
1129,  1131,  1135,  1138 
principle  of  single 
88 
publication  of -
781-784,  1042-1044,  1105,  1106,  1114,  1131 
rigidity  of -
766,  769,  780,  781'  970,  998,  1011'  1130 
184 
scarcity 
253,  354,  479,  719,  767,  1156 
stability  of --
18,  19,  22,  258 
stabilization  of  -
494,  580,  581'  587-594,  688,  689,  773-780,  836,  841 
PRIVATE  CARS 
632,  649 
PRIVATE PROFITS 
770 
PROBABILITY 
- of failure  (v.  "Failure") 
PRODUCT 
national  -
715,  787 
substitutable --, services  goods 
198,  209,  246,  285,  288,  559,  645,  646,  1100 
PRODUCTION 
- function 
85,  216 
-space 
69,  71'  75 
common-
286 - 288,  290 
factor  of - (v.  "Factor  of production") 
linked,  joint --
181'  285-292,  295,  305,  487,  616 
multiple  -
184 
structure  of --
78-83 
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 
953,  1021,  1064 
PROGRESSION 
cost  of  - (v.  "Cost(s)") PROTECTION 
geographical 
453 
national 
457 
PUBLICATION OF PRICES  (v.  "Price(s)") 
a 
QUANTITATIVE  RESTRICTIONS 
44,  746,  751'  951'  953,  1021'  1045,  1052- 1054,  1061'  1064, 
1144 
QUOTA  [SYSTEM(S)] 
720,  779,  1012 
RAILWAYS 
R 
28,  42,  83,  129,  130,  132,  135,  136,  191,  213,  219,  267,  386, 
388,  416,  419,  455,  459,  504,  516,  526,  541-543,  554,  555, 
566,  572,  578,  603,  619,  627,  636,  644,  655,  656,  664,  665, 
681'  685,  687,  691'  695,  706,  716,  724,  726- 731'  733,  734, 
736,  747-763,  769,  806,  815,  818,  823,  824,  827,  832,  837, 
869,  874,  885,  886,  889,  804,  901'  909,  931'  960,  967,  977, 
979,  981'  987,  989,  990,  992,  1010,  1034,  1036- 1038,  1043, 
1044,  1048,  1050,  1052,  1060,  1077,  1089,  1092,  1095,  1098, 
1102,  1137,  1144 
- accounting,  accounts 
542,  543,  885 
- deficit 
516,  541  - 543,  578,  603,  627,  761'  815,  874,  1095 
abuse  of dominant  positions by  the - (v.  "Dom-
inant  positions") 
closing  of - lines  (v.  "Closing of railway  lines") 
RATES  (v.  "Tariffs") 
approval  of  - (v.  ''Approval of  tariffs") 
bracket  -
44,  765,  773,  774,  781'  947,  949,  957,  985- 1006,  1007,  1008, 
1010,  1011,  1013-1015,  1024,  1025,  1030,  1031,  1062,  1073, 
1074,  1111,  1116,  1118,  1125-1127,  1129,  1161 
control of- (v. "Control of tariffs") 
185 
fixed  - (v.  "Fixed  tariffs") 
maximum  - (v.  "Price(s)") 
minimum  - (v.  "Price(s)") 
publication  of  - (v.  "Price(s)") 
rigidity  of  - (v.  "Price(s)") 
special  -
766 
RECESSION 
25-27,  416,  440,  464,  669,  704,  705,  707,  786,  787,  789, 
790- 793,  795 - 797,  824,  964 
RECOVERY 
- value  (v.  "Value") 
REDISTRIBUTION  OF  INCOME(S)  (v.  "ln-
come(s)") 
REDUCED RATES 
459,  781 
REGIME(S) 
centralized  - (v.  "Centralization") 
competitive  - (v.  "Competitive  system") 
decentralized  - (v.  "Decentralization") 
fixed-
682,  733,  954,  1051,  1111,  1161 
REGRESSION 
cost  of  - (v.  "Cost(s)") 
RENEWAL 
cost  of - (v.  ''Cost(s)") 
RENT(S) 
84,  92,  105,  121,  155,  157,  158,  165,  170,  171,  184,  201, 
205-209,  235,  250,  251'  253,  254,  256,  257,  259,  261'  263, 
264,  266,  283,  294,  318,  322,  324,  329,  339,  344,  348,  352, 
354,  447,  450,  462,  468,  473- 475,  477-479,  480.485,  504, 
506,  508,  531'  558,  567,  604,  625,  626,  654,  671'  672,  676, 
677,  693,  713,  767,  780,  781'  790,  792,  863,  864,  966,  980, 
997 
ground-
506 marginal  -
121,  184,  251,  264,  348,  475,  477,  478,  479,  693,  767,  780 
scarcity  -
157,  158,  235,  329,  567 
transfers  of -
283,  322,  462,  672 
users'  -
208,  324,  864 
REPLACEMENT 
315,  396 
cost(s),  value  of  - (v.  "Cost(s)") 
RESERVE 
-.capacity (v.  "Capacity") 
RESOURCES 
- of  the  community  (v.  "Community(-ies)") 
RESTRICTIVE  PRACTICES 
1110. 1113 
RETURN(S) 
constant 
287,  294 
constant  average  -
135 
constant  marginal 
196,  220 
decreasing  -
77,  100,  108,  111,  113,  114,  122,  133,  135,  136,  196,  197, 
220,  287,  294,  384,  655 
increasing  -
80,94,  95,100,112-114,123,124,128,133-141,175, 
180-192,193,197-199,202,211,213,219,246,287,290, 
294,  300,  307,  320,  321'  384,  387,  398,  481'  498,  499,  655, 
683,  751,  752,  756,  758,  987,  1037 
increasing  average  -
133. 135,  180,  294,  300,  320,  321'  398,  758 
increasing  marginal  -
94,  95,  100,  123,  124,  128,  133,  136.141,  193,  197-199, 
202,  219,  384,  398,  758,  987 
loss  of  social  -
530 
186 
non-increasing 
80,  94,  123,  213,  384,  987 
RETURN  LOAD 
702,  708,  711,  712,  713,  740,  743,  746,  806,  1101 
ROAD 
28,  83,  129,  130,  131,  135,  136,  191,  267,  287,  290,  307, 
321,  386,  388,  416,  418,  419,  445,  454,  455,  487,  504,  506, 
508,  526,  529,  548,  555,  566,  568,  571'  572,  574,  581'  584, 
619,  623,  632 . 634,  636,  644,  649,  654. 656,  664,  665,  681' 
685-687,  694,  697,  703,  704,  706,  711,  719,  726,  728,  730, 
734,  736,  747. 751'  755,  758,  759,  763,  818,  823,  827,  829, 
843,  877,  889,  894,  895,  901,  917,  930,  979,  1008,  1010, 
1021,  1036,  1047,  1050,  1080,  1096,  1142,  1166 
- licences 
634 
s 
SANCTIONS  (v.  "Deterrents") 
SCARCITY 
- price(s)  (v.  "Price(s)") 
- rent  (v.  "Rent(s)") 
SCHEDULE 
price  - (v.  "Price(s)") 
SECOND  BEST 
469,  490.496, 683 
SECTOR 
competitive 
416,  676,  681,  694,  696,  699,  701,  706,  707,  714,  726,  777, 
784,  792,  806,  824,  960,  982,  984,  988.990,  1008,  1047, 
1052,  1077,  1087,  1100,  1105 
differentiated  -
79,  80,  81,  83,  91,.  98,  101,  103,  122,  123,  128,  131,  132. 
135,  136,  146,  147-163,  173,  179,  184,  218,  219,  231,  274, 
287,  383.385,  388,  392  404,  416 
non-differentiated  -
79,80-82,94,97-99,101,  103,  113,  123,  124,  126,  128, 
130,  146,  163,  164. 179,  218,  231'  274,  308,  383. 385,  387, 
'388,  392,  405 SERVICE(S) 
comparable  transport  -
960,  977- 979,  1035,  1  043,  1  048 
public  - obligation  (v.  "Obligation") 
substitutable  - ( v.  "Product") 
SHIPPING 
coastal  -
496,  683,  736 
SITING 
- of  enterprises  (v.  ''Enterprises") 
SKIMMING-OFF 
748- 751 
SOCIAL SECURITY 
733 
SOCIETY  (v.  "Community(-ies)") 
STABILITY 
- of  equilibrium  (v.  "Equilibrium") 
- of  prices  (v.  "Price(s)") 
ST  ABILIZA  TION 
- of  prices  (v.  ''Price(s)") 
STANDARD  OF LIVING 
674 
STATIC  CONDITION 
95- 97,  840 
STRUCTURAL CHANGES 
adaptation  to  -
464,  669,  689,  707,  758,  786,  795. 799,  824 
STRUCTURE 
- of demand  (v.  "Demand") 
- of  production  (v.  ''Production") 
187 
SUBSIDIZING 
internal  -
644,  687,  729,  749,  806,  824,  960,  987,  990,  1098 
SUBSIDY 
463,  528,  541,  542,  572,  596,  597,  603,  674,  761,  763,  793, 
799,  815,  818,  837,  874,  876,  882,  886,  887,  901,  967 
SUBSTITUTION  (v.  "Replacement") 
elasticity  of  - [of  demand]  (v.  "Demand") 
SUPPLY 
89,  118,  150,  153,  161,  179,  238,  248 - 267,  282,  292,  303, 
305,  392,  407,  688,  698,  700,  771,  1101,  1130 
[price-determined]  equality  of  - and  demand 
(v.  "Demand") 
SUPPORT 
- of incomes  (v.  "Income(s)") 
tariff  -
459,  460,  1  039 
SURPLUS(ES)  (v.  "Rent(s)") 
psychological  -
105,  165,  205-209,  322,  447,  450,  468,  475,  480-485,  504, 
508,  531,  558,  604,  671,  676 
users'  - (v.  "Rent(s)") 
SYSTEM(S) 
centralized  - (v.  "Centralization") 
competitive  - (v.  "Competitive  system") 
concession  - (v.  "Concession") 
decentralized  - (v.  "Decentralization") 
mode  of  transport  with  a  competitive  - (v. 
"Sector") 
permanent - [of  perfect  forecasting] 
352,  606 
social  -
G82,  954,  1051,  1111 T 
TARIFFS 
ad  valorem 
750,  981,  1036,  1037 
approval  of  --
44,  764-772, 773,  781,  969,  997,  998,  1001,  1043,  1105,  1114, 
1124 - 1129,  11 30 
control  of  -
684,  779,  886,  958,  971'  1040,  1  082,  1115- 1129,  1133,  1137 
fixed-
44,  725,  747,  764- 766,  768,  770- 773,  781'  947,  974,  985, 
997,  1005,  1008,  1010,  1015,  1062 
publication  of  - (v.  "Price(s)") 
support  - (v.  "Support") 
TAX 
463,  512,  513 
TAXES 
- on  fuels 
566,  726,  827,  889,  895,  1096 
- on  vehicles 
566,  726,  827,  889,  895,  1096 
TAXATION 
general  liability  to 
529 
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE 
58,  225,  247 
TECHNICAL PROGRESS 
79,  247,  502,  556,  587,  653,  715,  758,  760,  795,  850,  860, 
870,  891'  900,  912,  1159 
TECHNOLOGY 
122,  141 
THERMAL POWER STATIONS 
361 
TOWN  AND  COUNTRY  PLANNING 
441 
188 
TRAFFIC 
- leakage 
687,  751  - 763,  987 
peak-
570,  677,  702,  708,  710- 712,  740,  769,  781'  827 
loss  of  -
200,  201'  687,  751 
urban  and  suburban 
303,  454,  568,  623,  634,  1096 
TRANSITION 
problems  of --
5,  43,  457,  607,  871,  896-900,  907,  1015,  1022,  1062, 
1076-1149,  1162,  1164 
TRANSPARENCY 
- of the  market 
711 '  781  - 785,  11 00,  11 05,  1130 
TRANSPORT 
- capacity (v.  "Capacity" and 
"Means  of transport") 
- of  passengers  (v.  "Passengers") 
air  - (v.  "Air(craft)") 
category  of -- users 
45,  287,  290,  511,  520,  522,  524,  552,  566,  606,  608,  609, 
614,  632,  640-652,  674,  724,  726,  736,  749,  782,  :B27,  833, 
846,  855,  876,  888,  890,  907,  956,  967,  969,  981'  987,  989-
993,  1003,  1004,  1008,  1046,  1094,  1097,  1098,  1105,  1114, 
1125,  1126,  1130,  1152,  1154,  1158 
comparable -- services  (v.  "Service(s)") 
goods  - (v.  "Good(s)") 
own-account --
702,  710,  736- 746,  769,  770,  1087 
professional -- operations 
736-739,  740,  742- 746,  769,  770 
road - (v.  "Road") 
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